








This dissertation is about evidence and inference in crime investigation. The
question is: What can and should ”evidence-based” crime investigation mean? My
immediate aim is to contribute to the methodological toolbox of crime investiga-
tion, but I also aspire to contribute to the concept and standard of evidence in
real and public decision-making.
Epistemology, methodology, and the foundational issues of different knowledge
disciplines have been my basic intellectual interest since my student days. During
the obligatory curriculum for a degree in political science at the University of Oslo,
I gradually discovered that my talent, if any, was in methodology and analysis and
not in politics. I did not have the maturity or boldness of my fellow much more
politically minded students. While they rapidly formed an opinion on how things
should be on almost any social or political matter I became stuck in the premises:
How did they know that the premises of their opinions were sufficiently certain?
Is not the certainty of the premises important if your opinion is to become actual
policy, having real consequence to real people? I completed my degree in political
science with a thesis analysing central foundational problems of political science
(rationality vs. social norms; individualism vs. collectivism). Having ”discovered”
that the premises for these foundational conflicts were ideological too, the question
became: By which criteria may we evaluate the knowledge-claims of public poli-
cies? I wanted to pursue the concept and standard of evidence and justification
in practical public decision-making. During my search for like-minded students,
for funding, and for an interesting kind of problem, I read about the Norwegian
Torgersen-case in the newspapers, a Norwegian crime-case from 1958 which could
not find rest: Repeated motions for retrial were rejected, but the counsel of defence
kept insisting that something was seriously wrong with the evidence-assessment
in that case. A group of scientists joined in to add that something was seriously
wrong with Norwegian legal evidence-assessment in general!
I had found my problem: Few decision-problems are as acute, complex and
consequential than legal decisions about the case-specific value of evidence in a
given crime case. I contacted Staale Eskeland, professor at the Department of
Public and International Law, University of Oslo, who had worked (and works)
tirelessly to have the Torgersen-case reopened. He had carefully collected all the
case-documents and did not hesitate to let me use them as sources in a PhD on
legal assessment of evidence. He also offered to be one of my supervisors if the
thesis was to be worked out in Norway. I am thoroughly grateful for his support
and inspiration.
Unfortunately no research-institution in Norway wanted to host what had to
be an interdisciplinary Ph.D. Philip Dawid, professor in Statistics at the University
College in London, had no such qualms: He was the Director of a research program
specifically wanting cooperation across disciplines, Evidence, Inference and
Enquiry. Towards an Integrate Science of Evidence
(http://128.40.111.250/evidence/), and immediately invited me in. Joining this
research program meant having to stay away from my family for long periods
of time. But my wise husband (dear Arild!), knowing how much I wanted and
needed to pursue my ideas, said I would be a fool not to accept the opportunity so
generously offered by Philip Dawid. It was fortunate that I did not understand how
much I was to miss my husband and children. It is impossible to thank Mathea,
Marius, and Sandra, and my husband enough for letting me indulge in this rather
selfish pursuit — I feel very lucky to have them. I am also very lucky to have my
parents who always believe that I do the right things even when I do not (oh, you
need to go to London to write the PhD? That is probably the best. Do you need
money for that?). I thank them all I can for all the support through these years.
The work with the thesis was far from straightforward. I do like to work and do
like challenges, but I did at times feel overwhelmed. I simply did not understand
how to make sense of the knowledge-situation in bitemark-analysis: While my fel-
low students had access to reasonably clean data-sets, I had to start from scratch,
making my own data from the information offered in pieces of natural prose. This
was challenging but also very interesting — it was actually an opportunity to
make sense of the cognitive process of natural as well as formal representing and
modelling of reality. It unfortunately took a long time before I decided that the
thesis had to be just as much an epistemological as a methodological study. Philip
Dawid, my initial primary supervisor, may have wished for a more efficient student,
but he never questioned the value of my work and ideas. My second supervisor,
Dr. Christian Hennig came to be my primary supervisor when Philip Dawid left
for a professorship in Cambridge. Christian Hennig is the incarnation of thorough-
ness and precision, but fortunately also shared my curiosity about methodology.
Despite my extraordinary degree of confusion Christian always took me seriously
and carefully read and commented my presentations. I am very grateful that both
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We take for granted that the services of public institutions are based in sound
knowledge — that their decisions are based on information and evidence which
are sufficiently complete, reliable, relevant, and coherent for the case-particular
as well as for the proclaimed institutional aims and values. We take this for
granted because we trust that the public institution is ethically founded — an
instrument for doing good rather than doing harm to its subjects — and that it is
rationally founded — an instrument consciously and strategically organized so as
to systematically actually achieve the specified purposes rather than undermining
these purposes. We thus take for granted that there exist procedures — more or
less explicit and obligatory codes, rules, guidelines, or norms — to standardise
the achievement of purposes, or to make it predictable, across individual decision-
makers and across individual cases.
I thus trust a scientist at the university to produce sound basic knowledge —
because I trust him or her to want to establish true knowledge rather than false
knowledge and that he or she is rational in this pursuit, adhering to inference pro-
cedures known to support this want; I trust that my general medical practitioner
makes a sound diagnosis of my particular complaints and a sound decision about
the best treatment for me — because I trust him or her to want me to be healthy
rather than suffering and that he or she is rational in his practice, adhering to both
inference procedures and medical and public health guidelines known to support
this want; and, were I to become involved in a legal case, I will trust the judge to
produce sound legal adjudication — because I trust him or her to want to estab-
lish good law and peaceful conflict resolution based on correct facts and that he
or she is rational in this pursuit, adhering to both inference procedures and legal
procedures and guidelines known to support this want.
In this dissertation I will concentrate on crime investigative decisions: As a
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representative of the investigative office serving the legal institution, we trust the
investigator to produce sound decisions about the causal mechanism behind an
event possibly involving a legal injury — because we trust him/her to want to
establish true knowledge about this event rather than false knowledge and that he
or she is rational in this pursuit adhering to both inference procedures and legal
procedures and guidelines known to support this want.
In other words, given the serious consequences of decisions made by represen-
tatives of any public institution, we expect that such decisions are evidence-based:
Minimally based on evidence being justifiably sufficiently reliable, relevant, and
coherent.
This expectance that public decisions are evidence-based is the basic premise
of this dissertation. And a minimum standard of evidence-basis — of what I
in this dissertation minimally require of ”evidence being justifiably sufficiently
reliable, relevant, and coherent” — will apply. The following Premise 1 defines
this minimum standard of evidence-basis:
Premise 1. A minimum standard of evidence-basis
An ultimate decision made by a decision-maker of a public service is evidence-
based if all the reference-groups and -terms causally, logically, and norma-
tively necessary for the decision are explicit and unequivocal and (a) enable
person-independent assessment of the degrees of relevance decided for the
events and the concerns involved and (b) enable person-independent assess-
ment of the risk of not achieving the proclaimed aims and, thereby, not
protecting the values involved.
Explicit and unequivocal reference-groups and -terms are central to this stan-
dard: A reference-group or -term is an abstract or ideational category or collection
of individuals (any physical or ideational entity/being) perceived to be equal with
respect to a set of properties, qualities or characteristics. Such groups and terms
are basic cognitive means — necessary for humans when searching or imposing an
order on reality, make sense of it, or see or give meaning to it. Reference-groups
and terms are thus always present when we assess, evaluate, and adjudicate claims
and arguments. But they are not always conscious or explicit.
What is required for an individual to become a member of a reference-group
may be more or less easy to agree on, requiring more or less explication and spec-
ification. I will be rather easy to agree on the reference-groups for the sign ”chair
for sale” attached to a wooden object in a flee-marked, needing little specification
of what is meant by ”chair” and ”sale”; but it is far less easy to agree whether or
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not a human being is legally responsible for having violated a given legal code, re-
quiring much more explication and specification. When the groups and categories
involved become numerous and complexly intertwined and/or the consequences of
sorting an individual in this or that group are grave, the need for explication and
specification will increase; if (in such situations) reference-groups or -terms are not
made explicit or are left ambiguous, people will be more or less confused: Their
trust or confidence that a given classification is correct will be an indirect one, via
the degree to which they in general trust the authority or past decisions of the
public institution.
The citizens of modern democracies — all convinced that the principles of
equality and the right and duty to participate in government apply, and a growing
proportion having higher education — will no longer be satisfied by mere appeal to
authority and tradition. They will require justification in the terms of reason and
logic and other more contextually or locally agreed norms, principles, and terms:
Equality and the right and duty to participate requires access to the means used
by the decision-maker, the means must be explicit; and the more complex and the
graver the consequences of such decisions, the more unequivocal these means have
to be. The use of implicit or ambiguous reference-groups and -terms (consciously
or not) will in effect prevent people from exercising what they believe to be their
rights and duties, estrange and exclude them, and cause them to distrust or lose
confidence in these decisions.
Reference-groups and -terms are thus not only basic cognitive means gener-
ally necessary for people to make sense of the world and to be able to trust and
have confidence; explicit reference-groups and -terms are also useful modern in-
stitutional means — for legitimizing decisions and have people accept and abide
by them; and explicit and precise reference-groups and terms are useful modern
administrative means — useful for assessing whether a decision reached its pro-
claimed intentions and aims and whether the risk of loss of values was sufficiently
low. The claim that the modern citizen requires more than mere appeal to author-
ity to gain trust and confidence in public decisions will be substantiated further in
the next section.
Premise 1. A minimum standard of evidence-basis is thus in effect a reference-
term for this dissertation — being the comparison-basis whenever I assess claims
and pass judgement on whether such claims are evidence-based or not.
In this dissertation I will, as said, attend particularly to crime-investigative
decisions: We expect the investigator to produce sound decisions about the causal
mechanisms behind given events possibly involving a legal injury; that he/she want
to establish true knowledge about these mechanisms rather than false knowledge;
and that he/she is rational in the pursuit of this want by adhering to analyti-
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cal norms and techniques known to produce true knowledge — or, in practice,
knowledge which is justifiably complete, reliable, relevant, and coherent. These
decisions should also be evidence-based according Premise 1. But what does it
mean to have this kind of knowledge when the event is a particular event — when
the event is but a single outcome of a highly complex, unknown, and unrepeatable
causal mechanism? And what does it mean to have this kind of knowledge when
the knowledge is to be used for normative purposes within the legal-institutional
context? Which analytical norms and procedures can and should be used when
producing knowledge under these analytical and institutional conditions and aims?
This is the central questions of this dissertation.
There are of course many kinds of crime investigative decisions. In this dis-
sertation I will limit to one particular kind and to one particular subgroup within
that kind. I will only study decisions occurring in the final stage of a given crime
investigation: After the busy initial phase of crime scene investigation, primary
information-gathering, and witness-interviewing; when a given set of possible legal
indictments has been identified; and when the different means of evidence are un-
der construction and assessed for their basic — causal-logical — evidential value
relative to one or more indictments. I will further constrain to decisions about the
evidential value of means of evidence involving forensic expert-information about
physical items anticipated relevant to the event investigated. I will further con-
centrate on physical items in the form of imprints without transferred components
(imprint-means). To substantiate this relatively broad group — which includes
fingerprints, shoe-prints, tyre-prints, tool-marks etc. — I will concentrate on im-
prints in the form of human bitemarks on human skin, hereafter referred to as
bitemark-means.
The investigative decision about the basic evidential value of any means of
evidence involves the assessment of the causal and logical relationships between the
information contained in the means of evidence and the indictment — whether the
means of evidence is relevant to the indictment, whether it changes the probability
or certainty of the indictment. This decision will be used by the prosecutor assigned
to the case when he/she is to decide both whether and to which degree the means
of evidence can serve the legal negotiation and adjudication during the trial-phase
of the case.
So, immediately preceding the decision about the basic relevance of a means
of evidence, the investigator in charge has that
• a relevant indictment and its implied conditions have been identified
(An indictment is a proposition formulated in legal terms claiming that the indicted
person has committed a particular act covered by law. This proposition will be ar-
gued to be most likely true by the prosecution during the trial-phase; an indictment
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will by the court be found proven if the necessary conditions of the indictment are
proven to the required legal standard of provability );
• the means of evidence (including imprint- and bitemark-means) and
its implied conditions have been identified
(A particular means of evidence is a proposition claiming that a necessary condition
exists for the case — conditions being logically/causally necessary implications of
the terms of the formal legal indictment and otherwise being either positive or
normative; fundamental/simple or derived/complex; and legal or extra-legal or a-
legal in substance );
• the main body of information relevant to these means of evidence has
been identified, collected, and organized; and
• the main investigative tasks remaining are, for each means of evidence,
– to assess the basic evidential value or relevance with respect to
the indictment; and
– to assess the risk of deciding wrongly about this value.
• the immediate investigative aims being to
1. contribute to (a) convict the true responsible or (b) acquit the true
innocent and
2. not contribute to (a) acquit the true responsible or (b) convict the
true innocent.
The basic question of this dissertation is thus:
What can and should it mean to have evidence-based
crime investigative decisions about the evidential value of
imprint-means of evidence?
To answer this question adequately I need to identify the analytical and institu-
tional aims and conditions contextualizing the above crime investigative problem.
I also need to identify the existing decision-procedure for this problem to assess
whether it satisfies Premise 1. Finally, if amendments to the existing procedure
are needed, I must assess whether the suggested alternative procedure is compat-
ible with the institutional aims and conditions of the investigative problem. The
sub-questions studied in this dissertation given this premise are as follows:
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Sub-question 1: The institutional context of the decision-problem
What are the analytical and legal institutional aims and conditions of crime
investigative decisions about the basic evidential value of means of evidence?
Which analytical procedures exist which are compatible with both the ana-
lytical as well as institutional aims and conditions? This question is assessed
in part I of this dissertation.
Sub-question 2: The existing procedure for bitemark–means
Are the existing crime investigative decisions about the basic evidential value
of bitemark-means evidence-based according to the standard of Premise 1?
This question is assessed in part II of this dissertation.
Sub-question 3: A possible alternative procedure for bitemark-
means
A possible alternative procedure for the problem of deciding the basic value
of bitemark-means is one anchored in Bayesian theory. The procedure is
justifiably able to protect the analytical and crime-investigative aims and
values of the decision-problem. But is it justifiably able to achieve and
protect the broader legal-institutional, criminal case processual, aims and
values? This question is introduced in Part I of this dissertation, where
I discuss the use of formal analytical procedures (in general) in light of
different and conflicting legal theories on evidence and proof. The question is
reintroduced in Part III, where I discuss the suggested alternative procedure
(Bayesian Network-based) in light of its ability to achieve and protect the
criminal case processual aims and values.
These questions will be further substantiated in the last section of this chapter,
when I present the outline of this dissertation.
A final practical constraint concerns the kinds of legal systems: I will only at-
tend to the above decisions made by investigative services within European juris-
dictions formally obliged by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).1
Premise 1 and the questions of this thesis relates particularly to ECHR’s article
6.2: ”Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law”.
In addition to the main Premise 1 there will be two further premises operant
during the analyses of the questions of this dissertation: Premise 2 concerns the
1http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html
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perspective of the criminal case process — that it may be seen to be a sequential
decision-process; Premise 3 is an extension of Premise 2 and concerns the con-
flict between (a) the values associated with analyses and decisions about positive
properties (about what is, was, or will be for someone or something) and (b) the
values associated with analyses and decisions about normative properties (about
what should be, should have been, or should become for someone or something).
Premise 2. The criminal case process as a sequential decision pro-
cess
To say that a decision process is a sequential decision-process is to say that the
choices available at one interval of time of the process are dependent on or condi-
tioned by the choices made at the previous interval of time.
Time is essential dimension in the organization of the criminal case process:
The questions and issues attended to by the legal agents at the end of the trial-
phase of the case process are different from the questions and issues attended to by
the crime investigators at the end of the crime investigative phase — which in turn
are different from the questions and issues attended to by crime scene personnel
and forensic experts. The difference concerns the kind of purpose, the logical or
causal order, the degree of simplicity, and the kind of substance of the information
needed for answering the questions: Questions about what is positively true/false
for the case must be answered before one can identify and answer questions about
what is normatively right/wrong for the case; and questions about fundamental
and simple facts and standards must be identified and answered before one can ask
and answer questions about derived and composite/complex facts and standards.
In addition there will be questions about aspects being more or less legal or a-legal
in nature — questions involving terms or relationships having intensions familiar
only to legal professionals or familiar to either lay people in general or other groups
of professionals. Particularly during the latter part of the trial-phase, the questions
will in practice be complex and it will be difficult to separate them into one or
the other kind. Analytically, however, it is possible to sort the questions or claims
occurring during the different phases of the criminal case process along the three
dimensions signified above:
positive-normative: A claim may be positive or normative with respect to its
degree of dependence on contextual/situational norms and principles: A
positive claim states that a given property or characteristic, or set of such,
truly does exist for an individual (any physical or ideational entity or
being (person, thing, case, relationship, etc.)), i.e., independent (practically)
of contextual/situational norms and principles and personal preferences; A
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normative claim states that a given property, or set of such, rightly should
exist for an individual, i.e., dependent on contextual/situational norms and
principles (legal and social) (but still independent of personal preferences);
legal–a-legal: A claim may be legal or a-legal with respect to the substance of
the claim: A legal claim states that a given property of a legal specific
nature does or should exist for an individual; An a-legal claim states that a
given property of an a-legal nature — having a common social or another
disciplinary meaning — does or should exist for an individual;
foundational-derived: A claim may be foundational or derived with respect to
its degree of necessity relative to another claim: A foundational claim states
that a property necessary for a derived property does or should exist; A
derived claim states that a property which presumes the existence of another
property does or should exist.
Analytically, the crime investigator in the crime investigative phase of the crim-
inal case process can be said to attend predominantly to positive claims about
foundational and a-legal properties. Moving on to the trial-phase, the prosecutor,
defence counsel, and the judge/jury in the trial-phase will attend to both positive
and normative claims about derived and legal as well as a-legal properties (as-
suming that the required foundational properties exist): At the beginning of the
trial phase, the attention will predominantly be on positive claims, over time the
attention will gradually move on to predominantly normative claims.
According to the perspective that the criminal case process is a sequential
decision process, the questions or claims attended to by the crime investigators
will condition the choices available to the prosecutor, the defence counsel, and the
judge/jury. The crime investigator with his/her questions at the end of the crime
investigative phase is well, but not perfectly fully, informed, and has good, but
not perfectly correct, expectations about the questions which have been attended
to by the crime scene personnel or forensic experts or which will be attended to
by the prosecutor, defence counsel, judge/jury. The fuller and more correct the
information and expectations are about the choices which have been made or will
be made, the less the risk will be for deciding wrongly in the final decision. This
dependency constitutes reason to seek to control that the information needed for
answering the next set of questions is in fact established. This is the explanation
why legal procedures exist and is so important during case-management. The
Premise 2 of this dissertation is thus:
Premise 2: The criminal case process is a sequential decision-process
The choices made by the crime investigator during the investigative phase
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will condition the choices available to the prosecutor, defence-counsel, and
the judge/jury during the trial-phase.
Premise 3. The conflict between the values of positive analysis the
investigative phase and the values of the normative analysis in the
trial phase.
The ultimate aims of the criminal case process are that the parties and the public
accept and abide by the decisions made and that the public’s confidence in the
legal institution is maintained. In the legal discourse on evidence and proof, as will
be discussed further in part one of this dissertation, there is visible a foundational
conflict about the best means to achieve these aims: The ”protectionists” insist
that negotiation and conflict-reduction through consensus-building are the best
means; the ”probabilists” insist that accuracy, precision/unambiguity, and objec-
tivity are the best means. Particularly in the public discourse in the aftermath
of controversial court-decisions one may get the impression that these two sets of
means are incompatible — that one must choose among them.
The third premise of this dissertation acknowledges the conflict but holds that
both sets of means are necessary for achieving the ultimate aims of the criminal
case process. The premise is an extension of Premise 2., and concerns the conflict
between the values aspired for analysis of positive claims and the values aspired
for analysis of normative claims.
Analyses and decisions about positive claims — that a given property or charac-
teristic, or set of such, truly does exist for an individual (any physical or ideational
entity) — aspire to be true for all people at any time and place, independent of con-
textual/situational norms and principles and personal preferences. Complete truth
is impossible because the world is complex and our cognitive powers are fallible.
Instead we aspire highest possible certainty, dependent on only one fundamental
and commonly shared set of standards and norms — that of logic and causality.
Certainty is associated with the values of accuracy, precision/unambiguity, objec-
tivity and impartiality. These values appeal predominantly to people’s epistemic
needs.
Analyses and decisions about normative claims — that a given property or
characteristic, or set of such, rightly should exist for an individual (any phys-
ical or ideational entity) — aspire to be good for a specific group of people in
a given interval of time and space, dependent on several sets of context- and
situation-specific norms, principles, and personal preferences. Complete good is
also impossible, again because the world is complex, but just as much because
there will be several different sets of norms and interests which may also conflict
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with each other due to groups of people having different contextual/situational
needs. Instead right is aspired through negotiation of the weight or degree of rele-
vance which should be ascribed to each set of norms and interests, the final balance
between them agreed on among those affected. In contrast to truth and certainty,
good and right are ultimately associated with the values of emphatic considera-
tion of each and all sets of norms, consensus, and conflict-reduction. These values
appeal predominantly to people’s emotional and social needs.
It is not difficult to recognize that the values aspired when analysing and de-
ciding about positive claims are uncomfortable companions with the values aspired
when adjudicating normative claims: Positive analysis draws the attention to both
practical as well as theoretical uncertainty, while normative analysis draws the at-
tention to practical certainty ; an overt attention to accuracy and precision for
truth and certainty are not directly conducive to consensus and conflict-reduction
for contextual/situational good or right. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to
have good and right for someone with respect to contextual/situational norms and
interests if these are not fundamentally, causally/logically, relevant to the case:
The values of accuracy, unambiguity, objectivity, and impartiality are thus also
relevant, indirectly, when adjudicating the good and right in a context/situation.
Above I claimed that questions about what is positively true/false for the
case must be answered before one can identify and answer questions about what
is normatively right/wrong for the case. In the extension of this I claim that the
values aspired for positive analysis function as premises for normative adjudication:
Both epistemic and emotional/social needs must thus be satisfied for people to
have trust and confidence in legal decisions — values associated with each must
therefor somehow be emulsified. The third premise of this dissertation is thus
Premise 3: The criminal case process must emulsify truth and good.
The values aspired for positive analysis are only indirectly compatible with
the values aspired for normative analysis, but because the positive analysis
is a necessary premise for the normative analysis, the two sets of values must
somehow be emulsified during the criminal case process.
In the next section of this chapter I will justify and substantiate further the
concept of evidence-basis preliminarily specified in Premise 1. In the last section
I provide an outline of the parts and chapters of this dissertation.
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1.1 A concept of evidence-basis relevant for
crime investigative decisions.
According to Premise 2 and Premise 3, the crime investigator in the crime in-
vestigative phase of the criminal case process is to determine the basic causal
mechanism (the causal agents, human and other, and their relationships) of a
given particular event — attending predominantly to positive claims about more
foundational and a-legal properties and aspiring truth for these claims in the form
of highest possible accuracy, precision/unambiguity, objectivity, and impartial-
ity. The investigator will use three basic types of information or evidence: (1)
witnesses’ (lay and expert (including crime investigative)) sense-observations; (2)
witnesses’ interpretations (stories, hypotheses, models, theories, etc.) of the sense-
observations; and (3) lay- and expert-witnesses’ reasoning abilities (logical, cogni-
tive, emotional, etc.) for structuring the sense-observations and interpretations.
Any analysis must use these types of evidence. But the standard required with
respect to their accuracy, precision/unambiguity, objectivity, and impartiality will
vary — depending on how important it is to have the problem solved and on how
serious the consequences are: The more important it is to make a decision and the
more serious the consequences, the more accurate, precise/unambiguous, objective
and impartial we require the observations, interpretations, and the reasoning to
be.
Crime-investigative decisions about the basic causal mechanism of events pos-
sibly involving a legal injury is undeniably both important to make and will have
serious consequences. The question about what should be the appropriate stan-
dard of the instruments/means of evidence is thus a reasonable question.
So far, the concept of evidence-based crime-investigation does not exist. Nei-
ther the discipline of crime- investigation nor its main user-discipline, jurispru-
dence, has invested much in developing procedures justifiably suited to secure a
high standard of accuracy, precision/unambiguity, objectivity, and impartiality
when deciding about the truth/certainty of positive aspects or properties of a
case. The criminal case process does indeed have procedures, but these attend
predominantly to the standard of adjudication and decision about the normative
aspects or properties of cases — ensuring that the adjudication and decision is suf-
ficiently good and right in terms of emphatic consideration, negotiation, consensus-
orientation and conflict-reduction.
And the criminal case process does of course operate with standards for what is
sufficiently true, certain and probable, but this standard is not formally regulated
by procedures nor sought consistently justified in epistemological terms. Justifi-
cation is usually by ad-hoc reference to the justification existing for the standard
of good/right when adjudicating and deciding about normative aspects and prop-
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erties. The unhappy consequence is that peoples’ basic epistemic, causal/logical,
needs are less cared for. If such needs are, as stated in Premise 3 above, just as
important as situational emotional and social needs, the inattention will affect the
ability to secure the public’s overall confidence and trust in the ultimate decision
at the end of the criminal case process.
How then can one epistemologically justify a chosen standard of certainty and
probability given the analytical and institutional conditions and aims of crime
investigation?
In this dissertation I suggest that we study the medical clinical diagnosis situa-
tion: To make a clinical diagnosis is to make a decision about the most likely causal
mechanism of a given set of symptoms in a given patient — the purpose being to
serve the later identification, analysis, and balancing of medical, ethical, quality-
of-life, and economic concerns, as well as the final decision about the best course
of action for the patient. The medical clinical diagnostic decision-situation is ana-
logue to the crime investigative decision-situation: The latter is to decide about
the most likely causal mechanism of a given set of information in a given crime case
— the purpose being to serve the later identification, analysis, and balancing of
legal, ethical, social, and economic concerns, as well as the final decision about the
distribution of responsibility and kind of sanction. The two diagnostic situations
are thus analogue with respect to the immediate and mediate aims, but also with
respect to the analytical conditons: Both concern events which are singular out-
comes of unknown and unrepeatable causal processes. So, both the situations may
be seen as parts of a sequential decision-process as specified in Premise 2. above, a
process which (a) involves analyses and decisions about different kinds of aspects
or properties (positive and normative, foundational and derived, and discipline-
specific and general) and (b) must cater to both basic common epistemic needs and
situation-specific conflicting emotional and social needs; and both have to make
decisions which will have real and possibly grave consequences to real people.
I will therefore study the notion of evidence-based medicine as this is un-
derstood within the public health context. The standard is increasingly being
enforced in order to ensure that only medically, ethically, socially, and economi-
cally justifiable diagnostic procedures and medical therapies are offered by public
health institutions. The notion of evidence-based diagnosis is thus believed to
help us towards specifying what it can and should mean to have evidence-based
crime-investigation.
In order to arrive at evidence-based diagnosis we must start with evidence-
based decisions about treatment because the latter is the decision for which the
concept was originally developed and is at its most explicit. Only then may we
proceed to evidence-based diagnosis. Having this notion clear I will turn to an
important subgroup of diagnostic decisions: Decisions which must be made, but
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which have no access to justification in the form of large scale studies performed
satisfactorily according to a known inference procedure. This situation is relatively
frequent in the medical context and is usually considered to have the poorest kind
of evidence-basis. In the crime investigative context such situations are perhaps
the typical situation (but you may find evidence-based decisions here too, mainly
in forensic genetics).
1.1.1 Evidence-based decisions about the most rele-
vant therapy for a given patient
The principle of evidence-based medicine is an old one, but became familiar to
lay people during the 1990’s: You should only prescribe a particular therapy to an
individual patient with a given diagnosis if there exist sufficient evidence that it has
a net positive effect on patients similar to the patient at hand, similar both with
respect to diagnosis and other relevant characteristics; sufficient evidence being
the results of large scale studies performed satisfactorily via inference methodology
which include risk-assessment to the concerns identified for the decision.
An evidence-based decision about the most relevant treatment depends criti-
cally on the decision about the most likely diagnosis — the decision about the most
likely causal mechanism — of the patient’s symptoms. This diagnostic decision
must therefore be evidence-based as well: You should only use a diagnostic test
and/or expert-knowledge to diagnose an individual patient if there exists sufficient
evidence that the diagnostic test and/or expert-knowledge reduce the uncertainty
that patients similar to the one at hand have or do not have the condition tested
for; sufficient evidence being the results of larger scale studies performed satis-
factorily via inference methodology which include risk-assessment to the concerns
identified for the decision.
The main justification for this principle in medicine is ethical. Both the deci-
sions about the most relevant treatment and the most likely diagnosis are uncertain
decisions which, if wrong, may have serious consequences to the patient’s health
and quality of life. The uncertainty stems from the strong and unknown condi-
tioning of the case: In principle nothing is similar to this patient — it is his or
her particular kind of symptoms as these have been produced under conditions
largely unknown to the clinician and as these are informed on by the patient and
various medical heuristics. From this highly conditioned set of information the
clinician must make critical decisions, first about the most likely diagnosis of the
patient, and then about the best treatment for this patient. To avoid doing harm
to the patient, the clinician is responsible that the decisions are accurate, pre-
cise, objective, and impartial to a known high standard —- a standard specified in
decision-procedures installed to guide individual decision-makers, standardise high
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quality decision-making across individual clinicians and thus minimize overall risk
of harm. An identified and explicitly specified standard of evidence in the form of
more or less situation-specific decision-procedures is then an ethical strategy.
Another purpose of the principle is to ensure the public’s trust in the public
health service: A decision based on the best possible evidence about effect will not
only avoid doing harm but also signal that it wants to do good: Evidence-based
medicine may, it is believed, install a public confidence that the public health
institution takes its patients seriously, and, by extension, that the government
takes its subjects seriously. In this perspective, the principle is an instrument of
the state to demonstrate that it intends to keep its part of the ”contract” with its
subjects.
But it is a third purpose which made the principle explicit, more widely known,
and, some would claim, really made it consequential to the public health sector: It
is an effective budgetary instrument to a government with a tight budget; ”We can
only fund therapies and diagnostic tests documented to be effective.” The rapid
increase of medical knowledge and the increase in the availability of expensive di-
agnostic instruments and therapies, coupled with a decreasing budget, force the
need to prioritize and to find criteria for choice. Requiring that public health deci-
sions should be ”evidence-based effective for the purpose” presented itself as handy
criterion: Medically safe, ethically sound, confidence-installing, and economically
sound.
The principle of evidence-based medicine has thus become a central strategic
steering-instrument in the public health sector.
But what does this modern notion of evidence-based medicine imply? There
are several kinds of implications depending on the purpose of the medical decision,
but one feature is common: It requires an explicit ranking of the quality of the
evidence; with respect to both positive and negative outcomes; where the outcomes
include (a) strictly medical outcomes, (b) quality of life outcomes, and (c) the
economic costs of the interventions.
Several systems for grading the quality of evidence exist, each offering different
criteria for grading the quality of different kinds of evidence. In this dissertation
I will let the GRADE-system, adopted by the World Health Organization and
the Cochrane Collaboration (which systematically reviews current status of med-
ical knowledge) and recommended by the British Medical Journal to its authors,
represent the interpretation of what it means to have evidence-based medicine.2
GRADE suggests that both the recommendation of a given intervention and
the quality of the evidence of effect of the intervention should be graded according




• A strong recommendation to intervene or not to intervene with a specific diagnostic
strategy or a therapy in a given case is justified when the overall evidence is of
high quality and when the beneficial outcomes of the intervention/non-intervention
clearly outweighs the undesirable outcomes;
• A weak recommendation to intervene or not to intervene in a given case is justified
if either the overall evidence is low quality or the balance of beneficial and unwanted
outcomes is even or uncertain (Guyatt, et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).
The GRADE-system’s overall evidence contains any information relevant
both to strictly medical outcomes and to quality of life-outcomes and eco-
nomic costs to the individual patient and to the health-care system. The
quality of the overall evidence depends on both
1. the quality of the expert-knowledge based evidence offered for each of the possible
medical outcomes (positive and negative) in a given case and
2. the needs and values (positive and negative) important in the given case.
The GRADE-system suggests that the quality of the relevant expert-kind
of information should be assessed according five factors:
1. The study-designs’ ability to produce unbiased results;
2. the studies’ actual production of unbiased results;
3. the relevance of the study to the clinician’s situational problem;
4. the consistency of evidence across studies;
5. the number of studies available or the sample-sizes of the studies available for a
given outcome. (Guyatt, et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2008c)
Ideally, a clinician’s recommendation to pursue a given therapy for a given
patient should be based in knowledge from large scale randomized controlled
trials showing consistent, complete, and directly relevant large benefits and
few harmful effects with respect to not only health or medical concerns, but
also with respect to life-quality and ethical concerns and economic costs.
This highest possible evidence quality will of course not exist in practice. A
continuum of evidence-quality will exist down to the poorest quality situation
— the situation in which a poorly trained and experienced clinician simply
dictates a treatment based on his own implicit and more or less justified
opinion of positive medical effect only and without accounting for extra-
medical concerns such as value of life, ethics, or costs. The GRADE-system
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thereby signals that the individual clinicians or expert’s opinions based solely
in own clinical experience — which used to be sufficient for recommending
a given therapy to a particular patient — should be classified as very low
quality evidence:
Systems that classify ”expert opinion” as category of evidence [. . . ] create
confusion. Judgement is necessary for interpretation of all evidence, whether
that evidence is high or low quality. Expert reports of their clinical experience
should be explicitly labelled as very low quality evidence, along with case
reports and other uncontrolled clinical observations. (Guyatt, et al. 2008;
925)
The above GRADE-system for ranking quality of evidence is intended for
medical decisions about the best possible treatment or therapeutic strategy
for a given patient with his or her health-symptoms and life-situation and for
a given amount of institutional resources. Is this system relevant to crime
investigative decisions about the basic causal mechanism of a crime event?
No. If I may force the analogy for the sake of argument, it is more relevant
to the ultimate legal decision with its aim of balancing conflicting legal and
a-legal concerns. Indeed, both the clinician and the judge or jury need to
decide about uniquely conditioned cases; by case-information being equally
uniquely conditioned; and the consequences of wrong decisions are equally
serious and in the same ways. But the analogy is forced. The judge obviously
does not and will not ever have the above kind and quality of evidence to
support the ultimate legal decision. As explained in the previous section,
there are of course quality-criteria for decisions about the best balance of
legal and a-legal interests, but these are different from those relevant and
possible for medical decisions about best treatment.
The quality-criteria for decisions about treatment are thus less relevant
for crime investigative decisions about most like causal mechanism. We must
instead study the criteria specified for clinical diagnosis.
1.1.2 Evidence-based decisions about most likely diag-
nosis
Diagnosis is an originally Greek term which refers to ”discerning” or ”dis-
tinguishing”, meaning ”to know thoroughly”: ”dia-” indicating ”apart” and
”-gnosis” indicating ”to learn” (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/diagnosis). 3
3Site accessed in August 2011.
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The modern term is most often used in the medical context, but is used in
other contexts as well as it refers to the general process of learning about
causes and effects for discrimination or differentiation between the possible
causes of a given set of observations. ”Diagnosis” thus also covers the crime
investigative process of differentiating between the possible causes of ”traces”
(a ”trace” being just the legal-contextual name given to an observable effect
of some causal process).
A decision about the most likely diagnosis or causal mechanism must use
available information in the form of both lay persons’ experiences, diagnos-
tic test-results, and expert-observations. GRADE has naturally much more
to say about the grading of quality of evidence in the form of diagnostic
instruments and expert-knowledge than that of lay-person observation. A
lay-person or patient’s reported observations may, just like other kinds of
information, be more or less accurate, truthful, and relevant to the diagnosis
in question. And procedures for assessing the quality of lay-witness infor-
mation do indeed exist. But in this dissertation I will limit the attention to
information in the form of diagnostic test-results and experts-observations
and to the systems for grading quality of such information,
There are two important challenges to systems grading the quality of
evidence or information for diagnostic purposes: (1) the number of diagnostic
tests and expert-observations needed for each case is usually more than one;
and (2) the number of directly relevant high quality studies are much fewer
than at the treatment level — due to the increased contingency.
Of course a decision-maker may happen to have a case for which there
exists both sufficiently relevant and sufficiently accurate expert-knowledge in
the form of large scale studies including consequence-analyses. Then quality-
assessment criteria similar to those used for choice of best treatment can be
used. But this kind of ready-made high quality evidence is rare.
One needs criteria relevant for the normal situations in which the rele-
vance and/or the accuracy of diagnostic tests and experts is less than perfect.
As for the decision about treatment there will be two main concerns
when deciding to subject a patient to a diagnostic test or expert: (1) what
is the accuracy of the diagnostic test or the expert? What is the test’s or
expert’s ability to differentiate between individuals having and not having a
condition? What are the rates of false positives and false negatives?; (2) what
are the consequences of the test-result or expert-decision to those involved?.
Sackett and Haynes (2002) identified four relevant questions:
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1. Are test results in the true positive group different from the results in the true
negative group?
2. Are test positive/negative individuals more likely to be true positive/negative?
3. Are test results really differentiating true positives from true negatives in the kind
of situations encountered in practice?
4. Will the overall benefit in cases in which the expert-knowledge or test is used be
better than the benefits in cases not using the expert-knowledge? (Sackett and
Haynes 2002)
But this scheme cannot be a general criterion: Studies are usually either
answering only one or two of these questions and might be differently relevant
to the case at hand.
This is a challenge equally present to both a decision-maker in the med-
ical context as well as the crime investigative contexts. One might claim
that the crime-investigator is more seriously affected by this challenge: The
causal relationship sought in the crime investigative context is that between
a particular human being and the observable effect of his or her being in
a particular delineated time and space; the causal relationship sought in
the medical context is that between a physical condition and its observable
physical effect. It might be argued that the complexity of the causal path be-
tween the agent and its effect, the level of particularity needed of the causal
agent, and the possibility of having basic detailed knowledge of the causal
mechanism make the two diagnostic situations different.
I agree that the additional time and space requirements are peculiar to the
crime investigative situation. But the causal problem independent of these
is similar. Neither the need for very small subgroups with fewest possible in-
dividuals nor the possibility of having detailed knowledge of the mechanism
prohibits the establishment of diagnostic tests or expert-knowledge which
with high accuracy may differentiate between positives and negatives. That
such tests or expert-knowledge does not exist for common kinds of ”symp-
toms/traces” is a problem due to the experts not yet having studied the
mechanism for the forensic purpose. The existence of accurate tests for in-
cluding/excluding individuals with respect to their DNA-profile on a certain
set of genetic markers suggests that the both the issue of level of individuality
and the issue of basic knowledge of relevant markers may be dealt with.
The main challenge to the decision-maker at the diagnostic level is then
that general studies of the accuracy of tests and experts may be few and
variably relevant to the case at hand.
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If there exist studies of the accuracy of tests or expert-knowledge which
are judged by the decision-maker to be both sufficiently accurate and relevant
for the case at hand, then the decision to subject the patient or the case to
the diagnostic test or the expert will be conditioned by (a) the resources
available, (b) the consequences of subjecting persons to the testing, and (c)
the consequences of the test-results to the persons involved. The last is more
relevant to the clinical than to the crime investigative context: If effective
treatment is not available for a condition having a late onset and if the
baseline risk for the patient is even or smaller, a patient may choose not to
take the test (a negative result would be good for all patients, but a positive
result would be good only for those who believe they can have a good life
despite waiting for the condition to manifest). This concern is not relevant
to the crime investigative context. The second condition, about subjecting
people to testing, may be the most relevant to the crime investigative context,
where such tests may invade their legal rights.
The GRADE-system suggests the following criteria for ranking the quality
of diagnostic tests and expert-knowledge:
• The design of the accuracy-study or the performance in particular studies may
produce results with different degrees of bias: The decision-maker has access to
good quality evidence of the accuracy of tests and experts if the study involves
representative and consecutive cases in which classification status is uncertain (the
kind of cases regularly encountered in forensic situations); a comparison between
the approach under study and an alternative approach or a gold standard; existence
of appropriate blinding mechanisms; a clearly described process of case selection;
and having cases being similar to the cases in the reference standard;
• The accuracy study may be differently relevant to the case at hand: A good quality
study for the decision-maker is a study directly relevant to the case at hand by
the cases being similar and by the consequences of testing positive and negative
(correctly or falsely) are similar.
• The consistency of the accuracy measures across separate studies of the same and
relevant expert-decision may vary: A set of studies represents good quality evi-
dence to the decision-maker’s particular case if the accuracy measures are not too
divergent or if any larger divergence may be explained by relevance issues;
• The number (and their sample-sizes) of accuracy studies available to all the relevant
sub-decisions in the given case: The decision-maker has access to good quality
evidence of overall accuracy if there are several studies (all with sufficient sample
sizes) for each relevant sub-decision in the given case. (Schuneman et al. 2008)
These are then the criteria suggested by the GRADE-system to be rel-
evant for the decision-maker in the normal situations in which either the
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relevance or the accuracy of diagnostic tests and experts is less than perfect.
The criteria above does not specify that the diagnostic opinion of an individ-
ual expert constitutes the poorest quality evidence, but we may assume that
this is so for diagnostic decisions as it was for decisions about treatment.
Diagnostic guidelines for best practice
There is one more heuristic available for diagnostic decisions in the medi-
cal context — given that there are some knowledge from systematic studies
available about a given disease: A physician has access to international or
national guidelines specifying the criteria or the sub-conditions necessary for
a positive or negative decision. This is at least the case for the more common
or more serious conditions. The guidelines or ”best practice”-instructions are
developed by boards the mandates of which are to standardise the perfor-
mance of individual clinicians — to ensure as few misdiagnoses as possible.
The individual physician cannot be expected to have all the relevant knowl-
edge about all kinds of diseases integrated in his or her knowledge-basis. And
neither may one expect the physician to derive the criteria by himself each
time he or she faces a new patient. There simply is no time for that. Boards
of guideline-developers are thus given this task of (a) investigating the ex-
isting knowledge about a given condition, its sub-conditions, and its most
frequent effects in terms of symptoms, and on this basis (b) formulating the
best-practice or evidence-based diagnostic procedure for situations in which
a given condition is suspected. The bitemark-procedure I will suggest in the
last part of this dissertation is comparable to these guideline-instruments in
medical context: It is intended as a best-practice instrument to assist the
investigator facing a case with a bitemark on human skin.
1.1.3 Evidence-based decisions about most likely diag-
nosis by expert-opinion alone
The above criteria are relevant if the decision-maker actually has access to
some studies of accuracy of tests and experts. Now we must move to what the
GRADE-system has graded as the poorest evidence situation: The situation
in which the decision-maker only has access to expert-opinion about the
correct diagnosis. In this situation no standard test exists, but a certain
level of knowledge is agreed to exist with respect to the causal mechanism.
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GRADE has not formulated any system for this subclass of diagnostic
situations. Yet this is not an uncommon situation — not in the medical
contexts and is perhaps the normal situation in the crime investigative con-
text. Should the decision-criterion in such a situation always be to avoid
positive diagnosis? This is clearly not the practice. Positive decisions are
daily made on the basis of expert-opinion alone. What can and should be
the criteria for these situations? An obvious candidate is that the decision-
maker should only use the expert which reliably and truthfully represents a
body of knowledge sufficiently mature for the diagnostic purpose. But how
should the decision-maker differentiate between more or less reliable experts
and more or less mature bodies of knowledge?
We expect that an expert has a certain amount and variety of phenomenal
and methodological knowledge. Due to this we expect that an expert will be
more accurate than a non-expert with respect to exclude or include particular
instances in their correct category — and better at it than a randomizing
mechanism, like tossing a coin. The more serious the consequence of a wrong
decision, the more accurate will we require the expert to be.
But having ”expertise” is not like having a certain amount of hormone
in the blood: Instead a range of more or less subtle criteria goes into the as-
sessment whether some professional person is an expert or not. For someone
not knowing the expert discipline it is not easy to separate the more accurate
from the less accurate expert. O’Hagan et al. (2006), although primarily in-
terested in the premises for best elicitation of experts’ probability judgements
and resting on cognitive theories and experiments about both non-experts’
and experts’ judgements under uncertainty, suggest the following criteria:
An expert has access to his/her own sufficiently large pool of relevant particular instances
which are sorted into already developed classification-systems. This pool forms a
stable basis for estimating the probability of new instance belonging to this or that
sub-group (a basis not being affected by factors known not to affect it — such as
media attention or own interest);
he or she has access to a sufficiently large pool of markers or characteristics by which to
sort a new instance into a given sub-group (a sorting which appropriately accounts
for conjunctions, basis and base-rates, sample-sizes, and imperfect correlation);
he or she has reached a certain stage of causal understanding of the relationship between
the basic components of a relevant mechanism, knowing the basic facts about the
components, but equally or more occupied with understanding the relationships
between these components under different conditions;
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his or her normative/methodological knowledge is just as developed as his or her sub-
stantive knowledge;
he or she is able to assess a problem analytically when that is needed: Consciously and
strategically adhering to rules of logic and probability in situations where accuracy
is explicitly required
he or she is able to assess a problem intuitively or creatively when that is needed —
not attending strictly to rules of logic/probability, and possibly violating these in
situations where strict accuracy is less an aim;
he or she is aware of how specification of a hypothesis affects the assessment of both
initial and conditioned probability assessments;
he or she is able to express adequately modest recommendations in problem-situations
needing accuracy, but where the components of the problem itself are inherently
indeterminate: Accurate expert-performance is easier to achieve if the agents are
inanimate entities than if the entities are human beings. O’Hagan et al (2006; 27,
52-55),
The ideal expert is thus a professional with the above characteristics: He
or she faithfully represents the substantive knowledge of his or her subject
discipline and the variety of strategies differently suited to different problems.
The ideal expert is thus like any material diagnostic test — independent of
aspects irrelevant to a given diagnostic problem. Any given ideal expert
would give the same conclusion to a given problem as any other ideal expert.
But experts are not ideals and the criteria above are not directly assess-
able of any given individual expert (accuracy in specified problems may be
assessed). Instead we assess the expert by his or her general and purpose-
specific professional training and experience; by his or her performance in
similar cases and in academic work.
In diagnostic situations in which the decision maker only has access to
justification in the form of expert-knowledge, a common practical solution
is to assess the kind of justification generally possible by the expert-domain
before consulting an individual expert: Is the general level of the expert-
domain mature, but just not yet had the opportunity to study the particular
aspect relevant to the case at hand? Or is it generally immature, primarily
busy with the basic sorting of the elements of a phenomenon and not yet
ready for study of relationships? But to be able to differentiate between
mature and immature knowledge you need to know the criteria by which to
differentiate sufficiently and not sufficiently justified knowledge claims.
In the medical context, the decision-maker is trained within the same
basic scientific academic context as the expert of the expert-domain: The
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decision maker and the expert will, by having the same basic training in
substantial medical knowledge and methodological norms, agree on the cri-
teria differentiating mature from immature knowledge; and they will have the
same expectance with respect to what it means to have a sufficiently sound
justification for a knowledge claim. This agreement on (a) norms for good
knowledge-production and (b) criteria for good diagnosis is itself contributing
to a predictable standard of evidence with respect to diagnosis-decisions.
This agreement on the basic norms for separating ”good” from ”bad”
knowledge is the motivation for the argument in this dissertation, that also
a decision having no access to large scale studies can be evidence-based:
It is evidence-based if the decisions-maker adheres to the epistemological
and inferential norms underlying the procedures and techniques required
for good large scale studies — norms that induces conscious and explicit
choice of reference groups and terms; explicit justification of probability of
the symptoms/information under each possible diagnosis/hypothesis; and
explicit assessments and statements about the risks of being wrong and doing
harm. This agreement on the basic norms of knowledge production is thus
also the motivation for the formulation of Premise 1. in this dissertation.
But in the crime investigative context, one may not assume that the dif-
ferent decision-makers agree on the basic norms of knowledge-production. A
crime-investigator is usually trained at a police-academy primarily educating
first-line police-officers. Officers wanting to become crime-investigators re-
ceive further training, but the curriculum for analysis and inference has just
recently started to aspire that of academic institutions. A crime-investigator
may thus not be expected to share the same norms as the scientific experts as-
sisting investigation. In addition, the crime-investigator is to serve another
kind of expert-knowledge, namely the jurist. The latter has yet different
norms and criteria for knowledge-production. Jurisprudence of course knows
how to differentiate between good and bad legal adjudication and has a firm
expectation of what it means to have a sound legal justification. But the cri-
teria for differentiating between god and bad legal adjudication are not the
same as those for differentiating between good and bad knowledge-decisions.
But despite being under this kind of cross-pressure of needs and interests
I will in this dissertation hold that also crime-investigative decisions both
can and should be evidence-based to the minimum standard specified in
Premise 1. The preliminary standard of evidence-basis particular to the
crime-investigative decision about the causal mechanism of a crime event
may thus be formulated as follows:
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Premise 1a.A basic standard of evidence-basis for
crime-investigative decisions
A decision about the basic causal mechanism of a crime event is
evidence-based if all the reference-groups and -terms causally and
logically necessary for the decision are explicit and unequivocal
and (a) enable person-independent assessment of the probabilities
of the events involved and (b) enable person-independent assess-
ment of the risk of deciding wrongly about the causal mechanism
— thereby contributing to (i) the conviction of a true innocent
person or the acquittal of a true responsible person; (ii) the reduc-
tion of resources available to other cases; (iii) the public loosing
trust and confidence in the crime investigative services and the
legal institution.
This is then the minimum standard for evidence-based crime-investigation
and is the standard referred to when I in this dissertation study and evaluate
existing and alternative inference-procedures for crime investigative decisions
about the basic causal mechanism of crime events.
1.2 Overview of the dissertation
In Part I of this dissertation I will study the epistemological and legal insti-
tutional conditions and aims relevant when assessing existing methodologies
or inference-procedures for crime investigative decisions or when constructing
new ones. The question in this part is:
1. What are the epistemological and institutional con-
ditions, aims, and values differentiating inference in the
legal context from inference in the scientific context?
This kind of question must be addressed in any study aiming to construct
an inference-procedure for a given practical decision-problem. I argued above
that in the medical context it is the agreement about the basic norms and
criteria for good diagnosis which ensures the minimum standard of evidence
in situations lacking justification in the form of relevant large scale studies
via statistical techniques. The construction of evidence-basing diagnostic
procedures for such situations in the medical context will usually not be
met with opposition — the users are already familiar with the concepts and
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technical heuristics of methodological instruments. This is unfortunately not
the case in the legal context: In particular, any inference-procedure exploiting
formal heuristics will most likely be met with scepticism or even be seen as
a threat to the ultimate aims and values of legal adjudication.
The first part of this dissertation tries to explain this resistance by study-
ing the foundational issues connected to concept of evidence and proof within
jurisprudence. There are three chapters in part I: Chapter 2 introduces the
concept of evidence and inference/proof, first in the terms of epistemology
and methodology and then in the terms of jurisprudence. The history of the
legal notions of evidence and proof is presented and a central dimension of
conflict or a jurisprudential foundational problem is identified. Chapter 3
presents what I believe to be the catalyst of the modern expression of the
foundational problem in legal theories of evidence — namely the arrival of
the notion of subjective or personalistic probability. In Chapter 4 I present
the positions held with respect to aspects of the foundational problem: The
resistance existing in jurisprudence to formal approaches for assessing evi-
dence is explained; and the position of this dissertation is argued —i.e. that
formal approaches are conducive to the needs, aims, and values of the crim-
inal case process if these are constrained to the crime-investigative phase of
that process.
In Part II of this dissertation I proceed to study the subgroup of crime
investigative decisions focussed on in this dissertation: Decisions about the
evidential value of means of evidence involving (a) imprints without trans-
ferred components and (b) expert-knowledge for diagnosing the causal object
and the time of occurrence of imprints. To illustrate the inference-structure
of this group of inference problem I will use human bitemarks on human skin.
The question in this part of the dissertation is:
2. Are European crime investigative decisions about
the evidential value of bitemark-means evidence-based to
the standard of Premise 1a of this dissertation?
This main question will be assessed in light of the conclusions about two
related questions. First:
2a. Were the series of decisions about the evidential
value of the bitemark-means in the Norwegian Torgersen-
case evidence-based to the standard of Premise 1a. of
this dissertation?
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Chapter 5 introduces the Norwegian Torgersen-case and discusses the
relevance of the sources available with respect to answering question 2a. The
sources are insufficient with respect to information about the reasoning of the
crime-investigators. They are far better with respect to the written expert-
reports justifying the diagnoses of the bitemark, but still insufficient with
respect to information on the expert-statements during their oral testimonies.
The bias introduced by letting the information in the written expert-reports
represent that of the crime investigators at the time of decisions is discussed
and decided to not represent a treat to the purpose of the analysis. A brief
introduction to the Norwegian legal system is provided in Appendix 1.
Chapter 6 analyses the first bitemark-expert’s (in 1957/1958) justifi-
cation for his diagnosis of the bitemark. The information provided in the
written report was not sufficient for assessing the expert’s conclusion because
(1) no information at all was provided for the diagnosis-criterion of time of
occurrence of the bitemark and (2) incomplete information was provided for
the diagnosis-criterion about the source-object of the bitemark (implicit and
ambiguous information on the reference-groups used). The information pro-
vided indicates adherence to an inference-procedure labelled ”incomplete and
open induction”. This procedure does not satisfy the standard of Premise
1. The expert’s diagnosis of the bitemark may have been correct or it may
have been wrong, but the information needed for assessing this, is, as said,
either absent or ambiguous. An addendum to the chapter presents the de-
fence counsel’s argument that the case qualifies for review. In Chapter 7 I
study the modern bitemark-experts’ (in the period between 1997 and 2006,
court-appointed as well as party-appointed) justification for their diagnoses.
Again and for the same reasons the information provided in the written re-
ports is not sufficient for the diagnoses to qualify as evidence-based according
to standard of Premise 1. An addendum to the chapter presents the Norwe-
gian Criminal Cases Review Commission’s position on evidence-theoretical
issues.
The second question under the main question is:
2.b. Are bitemark-experts’ decisions about hypothe-
ses investigated for more general knowledge-purposes (a)
relevant for practical forensic diagnoses and (b) evidence-
based to the standard specified in Premise 1?
In Chapter 8 I assess this question in light of studies published in sci-
entific journals between January 1976 and December 2008. The procedure
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used to identify items is described and assessed (the final collection of pa-
pers constituting the basis for the assessment of question 2.b is included in
Appendix 3). In the second section of chapter eight I present the inference-
procedure recommended by The American Board of Forensic Odontology
(ABFO), which is the main authority for forensic bitemark-analysis. This
procedure, if followed, is found to provide evidence-based decisions to the
standard of Premise 1 and indicates that Premise 1 is neither too strict nor
irrelevant to forensic bitemark-diagnoses.
In the third section I present the existing studies of the accuracy and reli-
ability of bitemark-diagnoses. None of the five studies identified was directly
relevant to practical diagnostic situations (the AUC’s (ROC) were between
0.69 and 0.86). In section four I present the results of the literature-review
with respect to question 2b: 7.6 % of the papers identified was found to
be both relevant to practical bitemark-diagnosis and evidence-based to the
standard of Premise 1. The papers categorized as materially relevant to prac-
tical bitemark-diagnosis, were found not to be evidence-based according to
the standard of Premise 1 due to absence or ambiguous information — most
likely due to adherence to the inference-standard of ”incomplete and open
induction”.
But the 7.6 % evidence-based studies provides poor knowledge-support
for practical bitemark-diagnostic purposes: Only partial knowledge exists of
the relationship (a) between teeth/mouth-markers and bitemark-markers, (b)
between pairs of markers, or (c) between pairs of markers and the background
conditions most likely intervening during bitemark-production; and only one
study is indirectly relevant to the time-criterion of bitemark-diagnosis. In
light of (a) the analytical norms adhered to by bitemark-analysts who have
published research relevant for practical diagnosis and (b) the general state
of knowledge indicated by this research, the crime-investigator should not ex-
pect a bitemark-analyst to be evidence-based to the standard recommended
by ABFO (nor to the standard of Premise 1 of this dissertation).
The conclusion to question 2, given the conclusions to questions 2a and
2b, must be that it is more likely than not that European crime investigative
decisions about the evidential value of bitemark-means will not be evidence-
based to the standard of Premise 1 of this dissertation.
In Part III of this dissertation I try to be reconstructive. The question
in this part of the dissertation is:
A Bayesian theoretical approach to crime investiga-
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tive and forensic bitemark-problems provides decisions
which are evidence-based to the standard of Premise 1
of this dissertation: The decision may thus serve the par-
ties’ and the public’s basic and shared epistemic needs
and values. But what about the parties’ and the public’s
contextual/situational and conflicting social and sym-
bolic emotional needs? Does the Bayesian theoretical
approach’s, by its use of formal logical heuristics, affect
the ability to serve these needs — as these become in-
creasingly more prominent during the trial phase of the
criminal case process?
In Chapter 9 I suggest that a subjectivist or personalistic Bayesian
Network approach (BNs) is a possible alternative to the existing crime-
investigative procedure for determining the basic causal-logical mechanism of
a bitemark. The epistemological concepts and technical heuristics of BNs is
introduced, explained, and specified, and argued to be adequately accounting
for the epistemological conditions and aims of the crime investigative deci-
sion. This chapter may seem superfluous to those naturally inclined to the
logic-structural and the reasoning-qualitative aspects of knowledge produc-
tion. It contains nothing new. However, as I argue in the second part of this
dissertation, the relevance of epistemology, logic, and methodology seems to
remain at best unclear to a large proportion of legal scholars, crime inves-
tigators, and forensic experts. The risk of being met with unconstructive
en-block resistance coupled with the poorly developed discourse on episte-
mological norms and procedures within jurisprudence, crime investigation,
and forensic odontology is the reason why I insist on including this chapter:
I believe, perhaps naively, that an explicit justification of the connections
between the epistemological and the methodological concepts and heuristics
will facilitate the necessary transfer to evidence-based crime-investigation.
My suggested decision-procedure for bitemark-means may be wrong or ill-
suited, but the fact that it is explicitly justified — in contrast to the existing
decision-procedure — makes it at least a reference from which to develop
better concepts and better procedures.
In Chapter 10 I proceed to specify the kind of bitemark-problem to
be modelled in the terms of Bayesian Decision Theory. The first part spec-
ifies the context, the relevant events, the relevant consequences, and the
decision-options of the problem. This provides the basis for the expression
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of the bitemark-problem as a utility-function. Secondly, the likelihood-ratio
is suggested used by the crime investigator as an indicator of the value of
the expert-information with respect to the diagnostic criteria involved in the
problem. Thirdly, a general likelihood-ratio for the bitemark-problem is sug-
gested and justified, and a general utility-function for the bitemark-problem
is specified.
In Chapter 11 I perform a BNs-analysis of a crime-investigative bitemark-
problem approximating that of the Torgersen-case. Borrowing the reality of
the case, it will be assumed (a) that four markers were used for the expert-
diagnosis of the most likely causal biting-mechanism of the bitemark and that
these have certain distributions; (b) that a joint set of both case-particular
and expert-knowledge markers was used for the diagnosis of simultaneity
between the legal injury and the bitemark and that this has a certain dis-
tribution; and (c) that the experts have a certain diagnostic accuracy when
using these markers for the two diagnostic purposes. The likelihood-ratio for
the problem is calculated and interpreted and I demonstrate how different
reference-classes affect the posterior probabilities.
Chapter 12 concludes this dissertation. The suggested BNs-solution
to the crime-investigative bitemark-problem is related to the worries held
by opponents to formal approaches to evidence-assessment in the legal con-
text. These worries are concluded to be far less relevant when the BNs-
approach is restricted to the decisions at the investigative level. If Premise
2 and Premise 3 are reasonable then the investigative decisions should not
under-communicate uncertainty — quite the contrary: Crime-investigative
knowledge is then expert-knowledge just like any other expert-knowledge and
not only can but also should adopt a methodology which routinely induces
assessments of the risks of propagating false beliefs.
The chapter ends by suggesting a basic guideline to crime investigators
with a bitemark-problem similar to the one specified in Chapter 11. This
guideline specifies the minimum set of questions the crime investigator needs
to assess and answer for such problems in order for the decision about basic
relevance or evidential value to be evidence-based. The guideline includes
the questions needed answered by the bitemark-experts and the medical ex-
aminers as well.
With the current state of knowledge of bitemark-production, one should
not be surprised that future bitemark-means will tend to be rejected: The
markers most often observed are ill defined, their role during bitemark-
production is poorly understood, and their discriminatory powers under dif-
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ferent conditions have poor independent support in systematic studies or
expert-consensus. Given this state of knowledge, the risk of unconstructive
expert-battles during the trial-phase will continue to be high. An improve-
ment may take more than a couple of years: The studies for better markers
will in itself take time, but this can only happen when the bitemark-experts
start to cooperate towards a common set of concepts and, not the least, a




institutional conditions of legal
evidence and proof
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In order to assess current and alternative epistemological norms and
methodological procedures for crime investigative problems one must account
for the epistemological as well as institutional conditions, aims, and values of
the criminal case process. This is the aim of this first part of this dissertation.
The question is:
What are the epistemological and institutional con-
ditions, aims, and values differentiating inference in the
legal context from inference in the scientific context?
In Chapter 2 I introduce the concept of evidence and inference/proof,
first in the terms of epistemology and methodology and then in the terms
of jurisprudence. The history of the legal notions of evidence and proof is
presented and a central dimension of conflict or a jurisprudential foundational
problem is identified.
In Chapter 3 I present what I believe to be the catalyst of the modern
expression of the foundational problem in legal theories of evidence — namely
the arrival of the notion of subjective or personalistic probability.
In Chapter 4 I present the positions held with respect to aspects of the
foundational problem and the resistance existing in jurisprudence to formal
approaches for assessing evidence is explained.
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Chapter 2
The discourse on inference,
proof, and evidence
In this chapter I will present the conceptual apparatus needed for an inter-
disciplinary discourse on inference, proof, and evidence. Various disciplines
will develop their own terms and it is necessary to identify the common phe-
nomena referred to by these terms. In the first section I will present the basic
epistemological position of the dissertation — that of moderate foundation-
alism coupled with realism. In the second section I will present the concepts
needed for this dissertation in epistemological terms. In the third section
I present the analogue concepts in the historical terms of legal theories on
evidence and proof.
2.1 Inference and justification — in the terms
of epistemology
This dissertation holds the view that all inquiry has a basically similar rea-
soning structure: The complex methods of science are but amplifications,
tailor-made over time to suit the needs arising in a multitude of differently
conditioned problem situations. A central claim is that the purpose of scien-
tific methods is equal to that of institutional procedures and organizational
instructions: To standardise performance across decision-makers and partic-
ular cases to achieve as many correct decisions as possible (decisions which
achieve the aims intended and protect the values aspired) and as few wrong
decisions as possible (decisions which fail to achieve the aims intended and
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thus harm the values aspired). The more important the aim is and the more
complex the problem, the more complex these methods, procedures, or in-
structions will be. Complexity may be regretted but it is unavoidable — the
world is complex.
The dissertation thus folds in with the more moderate theories of knowl-
edge and evidence. It is inspired by the writings of Charles S. Peirce, Ian
Hacking, David A. Schum, and Susan Haack. Haack’s ”Critical Common-
Sensism” is representative of the position of this dissertation:
”Critical Common-Sensism” acknowledges [. . . ] that there are objective
standards of better and worse evidence and of better and worse conducted
inquiry, [. . . ] and acknowledges too that observation and theory are inter-
dependent, that scientific vocabulary shifts and changes meaning, and that
science is a deeply social enterprise [. . . ].
The core standards of good evidence and well-conducted inquiry are not
internal to sciences, but common to empirical inquiry of every kind. In judg-
ing where science has succeeded and where it has failed, in what areas and
at what times it has done better and in what worse, we are appealing to the
standards by which we judge the solidity of empirical beliefs, or the rigor and
thoroughness of empirical inquiry, generally. Often, to be sure, only a spe-
cialist can judge the weight of evidence or the thoroughness of precautions
against error, etc; for such judgements require a broad and detailed knowl-
edge of background theory, and a familiarity with technical vocabulary, not
easily available to the lay person. Nevertheless, respect for evidence, care in
weighing it, and persistence in seeking it out, so far from being exclusively
scientific desiderata, are the standards by which we judge all inquirers, detec-
tives, historians, investigative journalists, etc, as well as scientists. In short,
the sciences are not epistemologically privileged. (Haack 2003:23)
Moderate theories of knowledge seek to account for the nature of the
inferential processes in which one belief is formed on the basis of other beliefs
and for the ways in which these processes extends justification and knowledge.
At the heart of these theories lies a shared perception of the architecture
of knowledge: Truth and meaning are the purposes of knowledge; beliefs
are the necessary bricks of knowledge; justification being relevant, reliable,
and coherent, is the necessary cement between the bricks; and our faculties
of sensing, reasoning, and emotion are the necessary tools for knowledge.
(Haack 2003, p. 23)
But the theories will differ with respect to the weight ascribed to the parts
of the architecture: Some scholars, foundationalists, hold that the basic
sources of knowledge is critical: To have knowledge or justified belief at all,
you must presuppose that some beliefs are basic by being directly connected
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in a reliable and causal way to its sources through sense-perception, memory,
introspection, and reason. Other scholars, coherentists, insist that the
cement of justification is critical: To have knowledge and justified belief
at all you need beliefs to connect with each other in a certain manner and
according to certain standards required by the more or less contingent context
— otherwise the meaning of the knowledge is lost to us. A coherentist would
of course accept that we need an epistemic chain (anchored in basic beliefs
or not) in which beliefs are built upon each other, transmitting justification
this way, but this transmission cannot happen without a psychological and
cognitive sense of coherence between the beliefs, a coherence which is partly
dependent on the situation we are in (the content and our previous knowledge
of that content).
The position on these issues in this dissertation is moderate foun-
dationalism coupled with realism as it is described by Robert Audi
(2003:212-213):
• Knowledge and justified belief about more or less mind-dependent objects, events,
phenomena, and processes are possible;
• some beliefs are directly anchored in, and thus traceable to its sources such as
sense-perception and reason;
• any belief can at any time and by any person be more or less indirect depending
on the context;
• a belief may gain or loose justification;
• a belief may have any content;
• some foundational beliefs may be false, unjustified, or both — experiential sources
and reason are less than perfectly reliable.
It cannot and will not be presumed that this position is without problems
or that it is better than any other position possible. I shall have to assume
that it works at least as well as any other position given the particular purpose
of this dissertation.
So, when I claim in this dissertation that crime investigation both can and
should be evidence-based by adhering to one identified set of epistemological
norms and methodological rules, then I assume the possibility and relevance
of moderate foundationalism coupled with realism.
The concept of evidence has always been studied in philosophical disci-
pline of epistemology, aided by psychological theories of cognition, linguistic
theories on meaning, and theories of social norms of what knowledge is and
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should be. But the issues of interest to philosophers have not always been
found equally interesting or relevant to working scientists. The urgency of the
academic philosopher is quite different from that of the practicing physician
or judge — the philosopher’s constant nagging about order and standards has
been as welcome to the practicing scientist as an accountant in a flourishing
oil-company. But the increase in knowledge and communication technolo-
gies and the tighter budgets have made the resources of epistemology into
input-capital in its own right: The result has been the growth of a new
evidence-scholarship with a more practically oriented epistemology.
2.1.1 Sensing and believing — a practical example
A medical examiner which approaches a body recently brought in for forensic
examination will let his eyes run over the whole body to get an initial su-
perficial oversight: Torn clothes, dirt, contusions, bruising, lacerations, and
blood may be visible. When attending more thoroughly to one thing at a
time, the examiner will perhaps arrive at something on the breast which had
been briefly registered: The first impression may have been registered as ”ir-
regularity here. Dirt?”. Upon the closer inspection it may be reconsidered:
”The irregularity is not dirt but bruising and incisions”. The first belief was
perceptual — caused by the seeing of an irregularity in the form of a de-
limited area with an unexpected colour and surface differentiated from the
surrounding skin. The second belief, that this was bruising and incisions,
stems not from seeing this directly but indirectly, based on both the direct
belief that here is an irregularity (the seeing) and by another indirect be-
lief that this irregularity has properties which looks more like those usually
classified as bruising and incisions. The examiner sees this irregularity, rec-
ognizing its qualities, comes to believe that it looks like those things called
bruising and incisions, and concludes that here is bruising and incision.1
The examiner has just performed an inference— a kind of reasoning.
An inference is an argument from one set of propositions or claims — the
premises to another set of propositions or claims — the conclusion. The in-
ference in the example was an inference from the general to the particular for
one individual (the thing/phenomenon observed): From irregularity to irreg-
ularity in the form of bruising and incision. But in between there occurred
1This example is originally from Audi (2003: Chapters 1 and 6), but I have taken the
liberty to alter it to make it more directly relevant to the dissertation.
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another kind of inference as well, that from the particular to the general:
The examiner initially labelled this irregularity as dirt — a general class of
irregularities with its own qualities — and held this belief a brief moment
until returning for closer inspection. But then the examiner reconsiders: If
it is dirt, then the specific ”dirt”-qualities must exist in this particular irreg-
ularity. He or she finds that they do not and concludes that this irregularity
is not dirt. By this the examiner moves the irregularity back to the broader
class-level — the class of ”dirt” was considered premature. That is inference
from the particular to the general. A brief digression about generals and
particulars is necessary.
We usually think about ”particulars”, ”generals”, and ”generalization” as
being about the number of individuals having one property: From ”these 20
students are very nervous about the exam?” to ”all students are very nervous
about the exam”. But generalization may just as well be about the number of
properties held by one individual: From ”this irregularity has depth, width,
breadth, colour, external cause, etc.” to ”this irregularity is a bitemark”; or
from ”this real event has the properties a,b,c, ., and n” to ”this real event is
subsumable in the class of events covered by section 192 in the Penal Code”.
The latter kind is typical to the legal context and is often used to explain why
formal approaches to evidence-assessments are not useful for this context.
But it matter less whether the generalization is over individuals or proper-
ties: Individuals cannot exist without properties and vice versa. Whether
one attends to one property for many individuals or many properties for one
individual is a practical consequence of the analytical conditions/possibilities
and the purpose of the analysis. Some statistical techniques are indeed re-
stricted to analytical conditions which allow attention to one/few properties
for many individuals, but the formal epistemological norms underlying those
techniques are not restricted to such conditions. The question of the norms
of analysis, their content as well as how situation-dependent they should be,
is instead governed by the purpose of the analysis — highly standardized
norms being more compatible with positive analysis than normative analy-
sis. As long as the purpose is positive analysis, the condition of having to
attend to many properties for one individual is well compatible with highly
standardized norms (see further justification for this claim in the section on
Premise 3 in Chapter 1). In this dissertation, when concentrating on positive
analysis, ”generalization” or ”subsumption” includes both inference from few
to many individuals with respect to one property and inference from few to
many properties for one individual.
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To conclude this subsection: The examiner thus uses direct beliefs based
in perception, memory, and reason, indirect beliefs derived from these, and
inference to make a reasoned conclusion about this particular irregularity —
a conclusion which can be justified and which can thus constitute justified
belief and even knowledge.
2.1.2 What is an inferential belief?
The moving from the sense-perception to the belief is an inference (or argu-
ment) between generals and particulars. The concluding and the believing
are mental entities. These are properties of a person’s mind or mental facul-
ties. The contents of concluding and believing are objects. These objects are
not the property of the person’s mind, but can be thought of as propositions,
statements, claims, or hypotheses. A critical property of these objects is that
they can be true or false. (Audi 2006:156-158). Two kinds of entities are thus
integrally involved in an inference: (1) The mental process of concluding on
the basis of believing; and (2) the propositions of the believing and the con-
cluding. The propositions identify what is inferred from what. A person,
say, the examiner in the above example, might not necessarily express the
inferential process and its content in a language — he or she might not even
be conscious of it. It is just done, naturally. But he or she can express it in
the terms of a language, orally or by writing, if required.
The medical examiner thus uses his or her senses, his or her mental fac-
ulties or powers, and his or her language when trying to make meaningful,
understand, explain, or learn about that which triggered the inference. The
process from sensing an irregularity to categorizing it as dirt or bruising is
one of giving meaning to or explaining the irregularity. The inference has
created new knowledge.
Inference is thus a source of justification and knowledge. But it is not
a basic source like sense-perception, reason, and emotion. It is a dependent
source, necessary but not in itself sufficient — it is a device or instrument
for transmitting and extending justification from one belief to another (Audi
2003:162-165). Only if the examiner is justified in the belief(s) constituting
the premises of the argument may the inference justify the belief constituting
the conclusion. And, by the kind of moderate foundationalism of this dis-
sertation, the former is justified only if grounded directly or indirectly in a
basic source. The knowledge about the irregularity on the skin of the body —
that it is a bruising — is new knowledge, but it may also be used to solidify
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other beliefs by buttressing these: Perhaps the examiner suspects (abduces,
tentatively believes), due to other circumstances, that the victim’s death was
caused during a sexual assault — then he or she may use the bruising and it
being on the breast as further and strengthening reasons for that suspicion.
And both new and buttressed beliefs may be yet further justified by other
and independent sets of premises: Just having formed the belief that this
might possibly be bruising, further justification may be had if a colleague
comments that ”there is a bruising there”. The colleague might be wrong
just like the examiner might be wrong, but when two independent sources
arrive independently at the same belief it takes a bit more to undermine it.
2.1.3 How may inference contribute to justification?
If inference is not a basic source of justification, but a dependent one —
aiding the transmission of justification — what must exist for it to work as a
transmitter? Audi (2003: 164-165) sees two kinds of conditions: First there
are the source conditions — the beliefs in the premises of a conclusion must
be justified in the first place; Secondly, there are the transmission conditions
— the nature of the relation between the premises and the conclusion must
be sufficiently sound and strong in some sense.
The examiner in our example may be justified in believing that the ir-
regularity on the breast is bruising. Say that he or she also believes it looks
like a human bitemark — a further subclass under the class of bruising and
incision. The examiner knows well that he or she cannot just jump to this
conclusion — because the transmission is not yet done in ”the right way”.
The bruising and incisions might well be a human bitemark, but he/she
might be wrong. And to claim that something is a bitemark when it is not
may have serious consequences in the context of the medical examiner. The
medical examiner therefore asks if the inference is sound enough: ”Are the
characteristics which made me think of a human bitemark relevant and suf-
ficiently so?”; ”Is this bruising/incisions a true member of the subclass of
bruising/incisions we call ”human bitemarks”? He/she might recall the case
where the skinmark first was diagnosed as a human bitemark, but had to be
re-categorized as a mark from a bottle-cap. The question the examiner asks
here is if the transmission of justification can occur and how strong it is.
Audi (2003) suggests that the transmission conditions can be more ef-
fectively understood via two basic models of inference: Deduction and in-
duction. These are descriptive models of frequently occurring ways in which
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inference is actually performed by human beings. And they can be normative
models — ideals for how inferences should be.
I have already said that an inference is an argument from the premise-set
of propositions to the conclusion-set of propositions. I also said that the
content of the beliefs are propositions of a language. Propositions have the
characteristic that they are either true or false. Propositions are claims about
how the world is or should be. That is then the object of the proposition (and
of the belief). A proposition must minimally contain one subject, a predi-
cate, a copula (a verb-like word linking the subject and the predicate), and a
verb. An inference is thus both an argument and its content. The argument
and the content are necessarily connected in practice, but we may analyti-
cally abstract the logical structure of the argument from its content. The
two models of deduction and induction are models of frequently occurring
logical structures. They are the best known and a certain consensus exists
about their nature. There are of course other models or types of inference
too — abduction (inference to the best explanation) being perhaps the more
salient type. In this dissertation abduction will be reserved for the inferences
typically occurring in the initial or the discovery phase of given problems:
In this phase the aim is to identify possible explanations and not the test-
ing of carefully formulated hypotheses by carefully designed procedures and
standards; the inferences for the detection/discovery-purpose are not subject
to strict rules of logic or calculus to allow space for creativity. Abduction is
as important to practical problem solving as induction and deduction, but
its role during the latter phase of an investigation, where one tests specific
hypotheses according to predetermined procedures and standards, is seen to
be small.
Transmission in a deductive argument
The transmission of justification in a deductive argument is necessary and
absolute: If the premises are true, then the conclusion is necessarily true too.
We may either describe, positively, a given argument as deductive, or we may
judge or require it, normatively, to be so.
We may require deductive structure if we need certainty of a particularly
safe kind — if we require the argument to be logically valid as well as its con-
tent being true. Logical validity is only possible if the conclusion is implicit
in the premises, already contained in them. In practical reasoning one would
rarely require the complete reasoning to have this absolute kind of certainty
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(if you do logic or math you might). But deductive kinds of reasoning reg-
ularly occur inside chains of practical reasoning. And sometimes we might
construct an argument as deductive as a heuristic strategy — to disclose or
map out the logical consequences of a complex claim. But we would not
insist on deductive validity as the final standard for the argument.
Transmission in an inductive argument
The transmission of justification in an inductive argument is a-necessary and
partial. The premises may be certain to some extent and the conclusion will
only be certain to some extent as well. A given argument may be described
as inductive or we may judge or require it to be inductive. Arguments with
premises being more or less certain may be assessed as good or bad by their
soundness. The most important dimension separating deductive from induc-
tive arguments is thus the certainty dimension.
Now, what are the conditions for transmitting justification through infer-
ence? The condition for transmitting justification in a deductive argument
is validity: Only if all the premises are necessarily true can the truth be
transmitted to the conclusion. That is a very strict but also a very clear
condition.
The condition for transmitting justification in an inductive argument is
soundness: Only if all the premises are true to some degree of certainty can
the conclusion be true to some degree of certainty. This is not clear at all
and admits defeasibility not available in deductive reasoning.
Perhaps soundness means that the premises should be relevant to the
conclusion? That if the premises were true they would render the conclusion
more certain than if the premises were false? That would allow the situa-
tion in which only a slight change of certainty of the conclusion should be
considered sound — which would imply that the the negation of the conclu-
sion would be only slightly less certain. The condition of relevance seems
necessary, but is at best too weak. It could even be seriously misleading: A
physician might via one set of information arrive at the conclusion that the
patient has a 40% chance to survive the next year, but via a further set of
relevant information the physician might have arrived at a much higher (or
lower) chance.
Perhaps we should better require that sound induction means taking into
account all the relevant information? This condition is too strong. All rele-
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vant information might not be practically available and we do not even seem
to want or need all relevant information: We do not need the fourteenth
witness informing the same as the previous thirteen.
Perhaps sound induction should mean the sufficient set of relevant infor-
mation? This might do for an argument having only one step, with one set
of premises and one conclusion. But this kind is rare in practical reasoning:
Here you have reasoning in several steps, in chains, where one conclusion ar-
rived at becomes a premise in the next, repeatedly. And you might well have
sufficient justification at the start of such a chain, but further up justification
might potentially decrease to insufficiency. So in a sound argument justifica-
tion is transmitted if you have relevant information, not too little of it, but
not too much either — just sufficient for the purpose. This is unfortunately
only a bit clearer.
Relevant information is that which is able to change the certainty of the
conclusion and a body of information is sufficient when it reaches the thresh-
old of certainty required in a given situation — when it has reached the
standard of proof. But relevance and sufficiency are not matters of logical
structure alone — the content or materiality of the issue under determina-
tion, the purposes of the decision, and the seriousness of the consequences
determine just as much.
And even if we were able to say something general about what should be
sufficiently relevant given these contextual conditions, the situation-specific
conditions cannot be accounted for: An argument may be perfectly sound
according to logical structure, institutional purpose, and seriousness of the
consequences, but still be found unsound due to what we may call symbolic
factors — factors whose weight in given situations can be more or less un-
predictable: Gender and social status are typical such factors.
So, this is as far as we get: An inference can transmit justification
• in deductive arguments, only if the argument is valid — the standard
of validity being very precise: If all the premises are true, then the
conclusion will be true —
• in induction only if the argument is sound — the standard of soundness
being less precise: If all the premises are (a) true to a sufficient degree of
certainty, (b) logically relevant to the conclusion, and (c) contextually
and situationally relevant to the purpose of the conclusion, then the
conclusion will true to a sufficient degree of certainty.
52
In the next section the attention is turned to the concept of inference,
evidence, and proof in jurisprudence and legal adjudication.
2.2 Inference and justification — in the terms
of jurisprudence and legal adjudication
In the former section I identified the concepts generally relevant to inference
and justification in the terms of epistemology — the discipline which tradi-
tionally have studied the foundational issues relevant to truth, knowledge,
beliefs, certainty, and justification. Theories of inference and justification
developed for the needs and purposes of jurisprudence and practical legal
adjudication will mostly agree with the concepts specified in the former sec-
tion, but use different labels for them. The table below translates the more
central ones:
Epistemological term Term in jurisprudence and practical
legal adjudication
Inference Argument, proof, reasoning
Single chain of argument Means of evidence
Premise Premise, Ground
Information Evidence, reason, information, witness or
expert observation, a forensic object itself
Justification Evidence, relevance, evidential value
Relevance When a piece of evidence makes a proposition
more probable than the proposition would have
been if without the evidence
Reliability When a piece of evidence is what it is believed to
be; when an object is authentic; when a witness has
normal senses, so that he observation is accurate;
When a witness is truthful, wanting to tell the truth
A sound argument A condition being proved to the standard
required by law
Proposition Proposition, claim, statement
Table 2.1: Corresponding terms in epistemology and jurisprudence
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Such theories would also agree on some version of the moderate founda-
tionalism/realism specified at the beginning of the first section of this chapter.
Twining (1985) and Anderson, Schum, and Twining (2003) summarizes this
basic agreement under the name of ”The Rationalist Tradition”:
1. Knowledge about particular events is possible
2. Establishing the truth about particular events in issue in a case is a necessary
condition for achieving justice in adjudication; incorrect results are one form of
injustice.
3. The notions of evidence and proof in adjudication are concerned with rational meth-
ods of determining questions of fact; in this context operative distinctions have to
be maintained between questions of fact and questions of law, and questions of fact
and questions of opinion.
4. The establishment of the truth of alleged facts in adjudication is typically a matter
of probabilities falling short of absolute certainty.
5. (a) Judgements about the probabilities of allegations about particular events can
and should be reached by reasoning from relevant evidence presented to the decision
maker; (b) The characteristic mode of reasoning appropriate to reasoning about
probabilities is induction
6. Judgements about probabilities have, generally speaking, to be based on the avail-
able stock of knowledge about the common course of events; This is largely a matter
of common sense supplemented by specialist scientific or expert knowledge when it
is available.
7. The pursuit of truth (i.e. seeking to maximize accuracy in fact-determination) is
to be given high, but not necessarily an overriding, priority in relation to other
values such as the security of the state, the protection of family relationships, or
the curbing of coercive methods of interrogation.
8. One crucial basis for evaluating ”fact-finding” institutions, rules and procedures,
and techniques is how far they are estimated to maximize accuracy in fact determi-
nation - but other criteria such as speed, cheapness, procedural fairness, humanness,
public confidence, and the avoidance of vexation for participants are also taken into
account
9. The primary role of applied forensic psychology and forensic science is to provide
guidance about the reliability of different kinds of evidence and to develop methods
and devices for increasing such reliability.
2.2.1 A brief history of legal theories of evidence
The agreement about the basic principles of the The Rationalist Tradition
evolved over time since the eighteenth century. In his Theories of Evidence.
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Bentham and Wigmore, (1985), William Twining sees an ”old evidence schol-
arship” in the period between 1750-1800 and 1900:
This first wave of the evidence scholarship in jurisprudence emerged with
Lord Chief Baron Gilbert’s Law of Evidence (1754) and Jeremy Bentham’s
Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827). They reacted in different ways to
the potpourri of precedent ruling in previous cases — rulings governed in
an ad hoc fashion by the principle of the best evidence rule. Gilbert, a
disciple of Locke and his empiricism, tried to impose some order among the
precedents to firm up the best evidence-principle, but the situation was still
rather disordered when Bentham entered the scene in the first decade of
the nineteenth century. A strong opponent of rules of evidence, Bentham
advocated a return to the ”natural” system of free proof as governed by
everyday experience and common sense reasoning. He saw the finding of the
truth of the facts in issue as necessary for achieving rectitude of decision and
his central aim was to develop a design-like procedure which could maximize
the overall reliability of adjudicative decisions. Bentham’s ideas were too
radical for his contemporaries and it seemed easier to support the ideas of
Sir James Stephen in his A digest of the Law of Evidence (1879): Accepting
the wisdom of having at least some rules of evidence, Stephen was the first to
suggest one common principle of the rules of evidence — that of relevance —
based in the logic of J.S. Mill. But it was only the Scottish lawyer William
Glassford’s An Essay on the principles of Evidence and Their Application
to Subjects of Judicial Inquiry (1820) which voiced any opposition to the
empiricism of Gilbert and Stephen. Nevertheless, Glassford’s text signifies
a foundational conflict to become much more prominent later: That of a
holistic versus an atomistic approach to evidence and inference with respect
to ultimate legal adjudication. The central question in this conflict is: Is the
joint collection of evidence more or something else than the mere ”sum” of
its individual means of evidence?
During the nineteenth century Twining sees the centre of gravity shifting
to the United States, where James B. Thayer, by his A preliminary Treatise
on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), is an most important figure in
this old evidence scholarship. Thayer partly rejected Bentham’s views by
accepting rules of evidence, yet agreed that case-law is without principled
reasoning, and he launched materiality (not relevance) as the main guiding
principle for the rules of evidence. By this it is possible to see Thayer’s text
as the first to voice another dimension of conflict still alive in the modern
evidence discourse in jurisprudence: What are the primary principles for
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determining whether a legal proof is sound or not? Should it be the principles
of logic — or should it be the principles of materiality of the facts in issue?
Thayer of course accepted logic, but could not see any guiding potential for
it in a general sense. That role was attributed then to the particular content
or materiality of the case and its effect on what could become the facts in
issue in a case.
John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943), a student of Thayer, shared the ba-
sic acceptance of rules of law, saw materiality as a central guiding principle
for determining the soundness of legal proof, but came to focus equally on
logical rules as guiding the determination of soundness. Where Thayer pro-
vided a rationale for the law of evidence, Wigmore saw this as only part
of what he saw to be a broader science of evidence and proof. Wigmore’s
The Principles of Judicial Proof (1937) are foundationally important for
the later evidence-scholarship in jurisprudence, and his methodology may be
seen as a prototype of the more formal methodologies argued relevant for
legal adjudication. His Chart-method reflects the recognition that human
rational capacities worked well for certain situations and for certain amounts
of information, but less well when the amount of information increased and
diversified over time. The purpose of the Chart-method was to be an analyt-
ical instrument aiding the rational determination of the total effect of a mass
of mixed evidence. The Chart-method relies on epistemologically familiar
notions: Any narrative of a real life event must be expressed in propositions
about a few common types more or less indirect evidence (objects or testi-
mony), propositions which must cohere plausibly via a few common types of
reasoning processes such as assertion, explanation, denial, rival, corrobora-
tion. And uses methodologically familiar instruments: Types of propositions
and types of relationships in any given case may be signified symbolically
which may juxtapose a complex mass of ideas in a compressed graphical
form.
Wigmore’s thinking about evidence is important to the modern evidence
scholars, not so much by the chart-method per se and certainly despite Wig-
more’s lack of any explicit epistemological justification or caution about cen-
tral evidential concepts, such as relevance, reliability, and probability. It is
important mainly, I hold, because Wigmore insisted on the existence of a
practically useful logic. This logic is of course normative, but not in the
artificial sense as in the stereotypical old school formal logic for simple infer-
ences.
Wigmore’s methodology derived from the observation of actual reasoning
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processes and is thus much more suited to the complex multistage inferences
we find in real legal trials. This makes Wigmore’s notion of relevance, despite
(or perhaps because?) it not being anchored in any established epistemologi-
cal theories: It may be seen to be richer than that the relevance-notion used of
the more formally inclined analysts, particularly those adhering to Bayesian
theory and methodology. ”Bayesians” agree that a notion of probability is
necessary for the notion of relevance; that relevance is always conditioned in
more or less particularized ways, including the complexly conditioned kind
occurring in practical legal adjudication; and that the coherence-component
of relevance is and must be coloured by the content of the propositions in-
volved — a content carrying potential for multiple symbolic meanings to
different people. But ”Bayesians” have not always been able to convinc-
ingly explain to legal scholars why and how this is so in their own terms.
Wigmore’s terms for analysing practical legal inferences thus complements
the terms of the Bayesians. This, I believe, is why modern scholars such as
Schum, Tillers, Twining, and Anderson see Wigmore’s Principles as such an
important source to their own works.
2.2.2 Conclusion old scholarship
Twining (1985) sees the first half of the twentieth century as a fallow period
for both English and American Evidence theorizing, with Wigmore remaining
the more visible scholar. Foundational issues of jurisprudence are signified
by the disagreement about which principles can and should govern evidence-
assessments - holism vs. atomism and situational coherence vs. ”pure” logic.
But all in all Twining sees more homogeneity than heterogeneity in the first
major wave of the evidence scholarship: A basic agreement about the nature
and ends of adjudication, about the possibilities of having knowledge about
particular events, and about what is involved in reasoning about disputed
questions of fact in forensic contexts.
Twining (1985) notes that this homogeneity (in 1985) was particular to
jurisprudence — other disciplines showed much more heterogeneity. Jurispru-
dence’ interest in and theorizing about evidence and proof was constrained to
issues relevant to the discourse on the law of evidence and the presumptions
were those of an almost nave optimistic rationalism — ”remarkably unscepti-
cal” (Twining 1985, p.177). It insisted on a simplistic model of adjudication
and litigation where the final adjudicative stage of a trial with a jury repre-
sents a rather diversified set of processes — such as the fact-finding/selection
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stage during crime investigation, the negotiation-stage before the adjudica-
tion, and the sentencing process after the adjudication. The connection to the
broader discourse on evidence, inference, and reasoning in other disciplines,
such as epistemology or psychology, remained loose and unsystematic. This
feature, Twining suggests, may be the reason for the extraordinary isolation
of the study of evidence from intellectual developments in other fields during
the twentieth century.
So far I have presented the basic concepts and relations relevant to this
dissertation’s theme of evidence-based crime investigation. But I am not
quite ready: I must identify the modern conditions for what can be the most
appropriate methodologies. This will be the topic of the next two chapters.
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Chapter 3
The catalyst of the modern
discourse on evidence and proof
In this and the next chapter I will review a foundational conflict which has
been and still is important to legal theories and practical procedures con-
cerning evidence and proof. The conflict is one between the protectionists,
who see the institutional and societal values of legal institution as unique de-
terminants of legal adjudication — a position implying the rejection of any
approaches to problem-solving developed outside the legal context — and the
eclectics, who do not see the values of the legal institution as essentially dif-
ferent from the values of other institutions — a position recognizing the values
attached to truth and certainty (accuracy, precision/unambiguity, objectiv-
ity, and impartiality) and accepting the potential suitability of approaches
developed for scientific purposes. This conflict rearranged the positions held
on the two conflicts mentioned in the previous chapter. A protectionist will
resist any formal approach to legal adjudication, but an eclectic may hold
either (a) that logical principles (including the content of propositions) alone
can and should guide the assessment of the soundness of legal arguments
or (b) that logical principles and other principles compatible with these can
and should guide such assessments. These other principles are various formal
principles for accounting for the uncertainty-aspect of inductive arguments
— those of probability and utility. An eclectic of kind (b) will be referred to
as a probabilist.
I will concentrate on the conflict between the protectionists and the prob-
abilists as this best exhibits issues which are irresolvable, yet which must be
kept foremost in our minds when studying existing and alternative practical
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methodologies for analysing evidence in the legal context: The issues remind
us of the values which are at stake in legal adjudication. I will expose the
arguments of the conflict as represented in a series of seminal papers from
the late 1960’s and early 1970’s and argue that the conflict was revitalized at
the turn of our century due to an increased attention to the appropriateness
of the current epistemological norms and methodological rules of forensic
science.
But in order to assess the strength and weaknesses of the arguments of
these papers, it is necessary to have the conceptual apparatus of the proba-
bilists clear in mind. In this chapter I will therefore present this in the terms
of Leonard J. Savage, in his The Foundations of Statistics from 1954. The
arguments directly relevant to the legal foundational conflict are treated in
the next chapter.
3.1 The catalyst of the modern discourse on
legal evidence and proof
It may be argued that the catalyst of the modern discourse on legal proof and
evidence was the development of an alternative interpretation of the notion
of probability: That probability is a measure of the confidence or the degree
of belief a person has in the truth of a given proposition in light of a given
set of knowledge.
The ruling interpretation in Savage’s time was that probability is a mea-
sure of a property of the world, independent of human perception — of
phenomena’s tendency to occur together according to laws of nature. This
physical/objectivist interpretation did not make much sense to legal adjudi-
cation. The objectivist interpretation presupposes symmetries of processes
and outcomes over repeated independent trials under similar conditions —
while the processes relevant to legal adjudication is highly conditioned and
unrepeatable. The development of the epistemic/subjectivist interpretation
may be said to be a response to the needs of analysts being in a different
place in the investigative loop.
In the previous chapter I said that a practical inference will involve gen-
eralization (from few to many individuals with respect to one property or
from few to many properties with respect to one individual) and standards
or norms for this generalization (deduction and induction). A scientist will
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typically ask: ”What is the probability of this sample if (a) the population or
causal mechanism can be represented by this probability-model and (b) the
individuals of the sample are randomly selected?” Here the analyst has had
the time to study the phenomenon; specify the conditions and choose/fit an
appropriate model; select the sample-individuals through a mechanism en-
suring independence between them; perform the experiment under controlled
conditions; and assess whether the results of the experiment are probable or
not, conditional on the truth/falsity of the model assumed. The assumptions
about the population and the deliberate design of the conditioning of the in-
dividuals allow more arguments of the deductive kind than the inductive
kind.
An analyst like the medical examiner in the previous chapter will ask a
different question: ”What is the probability of this suggested causal mecha-
nism if I observe these properties/characteristics of individuals that are not
randomly selected?” Here the analyst is not in a position to control the
conditions of the observations, repeat the process, or strategically ensure in-
dependence between the observations. The large number of possible causal
mechanisms of these observations allows for fewer arguments of the deductive
kind than the inductive kind.
The typical scientist can start at the ”top”, with the population, the
causal mechanism, or the general, and deduce the effects or observations; the
medical examiner must start at the ”bottom”, with the effects or the obser-
vations, first abduce (suggest/suspect) a set of possible causal mechanisms,
and then induce (select via sound argument) the one most likely.
The physical/objectivist interpretation of probability is more suited to
the kind of questions asked of the typical scientist. The development of
the epistemic/subjectivist interpretation was a response to the analysts who
needed to account for uncertainty, but were prevented from using the ana-
lytical properties achieved by random sampling and assumed or known con-
ditioning. The legitimization of canons of inductive reasoning coupled with
an epistemic/subjective interpretation of probability led to analytical tech-
niques enabling the assessment of inverse probability — in turn enabling the
estimation of the probability that an identified mechanism is the source of
a given set of observations. This appeared much more meaningful to legal
scholars with issues of accuracy in practical legal contexts.
Several scholars of probability and statistics were involved in developing
this interpretation of probability: D. Wrinch and H. Jeffreys (1919, 1921,
1923), H. Jeffreys (1931, 1939), J. M. Keynes (1921), F. P. Ramsey (1926),
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A given causal mechanism by its model 
Random sampling 
Observations of one characteristic  
of several indpendent individuals 
equally conditioned 
Q: What is the probability of this  
sample if model is false? Are we 
justified in not rejecting the model  
A possible causal mechanism by its model 
Unknown sampling 
Observations of several characteristic  
of one individual uniquely  
conditioned 
Q: What is the probability of this  
model in light of these observations? 
Are the observations more evidence of  
the model than of its negation? 









Figure 3.1: Being in different places in the investigative loop. A given causal mechanism
or model is here separate from a possible causal mechanism or model by being better
justified in terms of having ”survived” more selection rounds from the original and wider
space of possible causal mechanism/models
B. de Finetti, (1931), R. Carnap (1950), and L. J. Savage (1954) are some
of the early contributors. Each had their own interpretation of the logic-
probability relationship, but I will let Leonard J. Savage’s proposal in his
The Foundations of Statistics from 1954 (Dover edition 1972) represent the
interpretation relevant to the foundational conflicts discussed in this section
— the strand focusing on the probability aspects.
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3.2 Probability: A suitable means towards
sound practical arguments?
Savage (1954/1972) was primarily occupied with the interpretation of prob-
ability in statistics but his main question was important to legal scholars as
well:
Reasoning is commonly associated with logic, but it is obvious, as many
have pointed out, that the implications of what is ordinarily called logic are
meager indeed when uncertainty is to be faced. It has therefore often been
asked whether logic cannot be extended, by principles as acceptable as those
of logic itself, to bear more fully on uncertainty. (Savage (1954/1972:6-7)
Savage suggested that these principles could be those of probability. It is
important to stress here at the beginning that Savage’s theory is a normative
theory: It suggests logic-analogous standards for reasoning when having to
make decisions in situations where there is uncertainty and where the con-
sequences of these decisions are serious. Humans must of course be able to
actually adhere to the criteria, but they may, like other ideals, not always
correspond to actual reasoning practices. The rationale of Savage’s theory
was, as for any set of norms or procedures, to aid in achieving aims and
protecting values or help avoiding undermining these. The presumption is
thus that human beings have aims and values which are sought achieved and
maintained through decisions and actions. It is therefore important to ensure
that decisions or actions are not such that they prevent us from achieving
these aims and values. Like Wigmore, Savage recognized that normal human
beings are imperfectly able to account for all relevant factors and concerns
in given decision-situations. His theory presumes further that human beings
are able to reason according to principles. Principles are either known and
explicable, such as those of logic, probability, and preference, or unknown
and implicit, such as those from psychological, religious, and social needs.
Each kind of reasoning is equally important and both will be simultaneously
present. Savage’s theory is normative, but not concerning what should in
general be the correct mix of these kinds: He asks instead what can and
should be the meaning and content of those principles we can explicate when
it is agreed that such principles are necessary to avoid undermining given
aims and values. Savage, I believe, did not imply that implicit principles
are invalid or unsound. These are both operating and useful but analytically
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suspended for the purpose of analysing principles we do have agreed concepts
for.
3.2.1 Three important premises
A first premise of Savages theory is that it is an effort to answer the needs
of the person or decision-maker who
• is concerned about a specific phenomenon and its properties because
he/she wants to achieve specific aims;
• knows that only one state can be true for the phenomenon but has only
partial information about it;
• is uncertain whether this or that state of the world is the correct one;
• knows that this uncertainty can affect the possibility of achieving the
aims — that an incorrect decision will, over time, disable the achieve-
ment of aims or have unwanted consequences; and
• has to make a decision.
A second basic premise of Savage’s theory is that descriptions of reality
and its possibilities should be structured according to an algebra in which
each event has the same logical status. The justification is that this enables
the use of standard logical rules for construction and deconstruction of com-
plex events. Savage’s theory presumes Boolean algebra and defines events,






A, B, C, . . . generic symbols for events
s, s′, s′′ generic symbols for states
S the universal event
0 the vacuous event
(Relations)
s ∈ A. s is an element of A, i.e., a state in A.
A ⊂ B (or B ⊃ A). A is contained in B, i.e., every element
of A is an element of B.
A = B A equals B , i.e., A is the same set as B,
i.e., A and B have exactly the same
elements.
(Constructs)
the complement of A with those elements of S that are not in A.
respect to S
¬A the complement of A with respect to S.
the union of the Ai’s those elements of S that are elements
of at least one of the sets A1, A2, etc.⋃
iAi the union of the Ai’s.
A ∪B the union of A and B, i.e., those ele-
ments of S that are elements of A or
B (possibly both).
the intersection of the Ai’s those elements of S that are elements
of each the sets A1, A2, etc.⋂
iAi the intersection of the Ai’s
A ∩B the intersection of A and B, i.e., those
elements of S that are elements of
both A and B
This set of rules constitute a logical heuristic, a central or basic instru-
ment for protecting certain epistemic norms or values with respect to what it
means to have valid and sound reasoning. This logical heuristic is a premise
for all formal or statistical inference. That it is the logical heuristic which
conditions statistical inference and not statistical heuristics which condition
logical inference seems to be a point which has been under-communicated to
some of the opponents of formal approaches to legal adjudication.
A third premise of Savages theory is the perception of a human act and its
consequences: An act is a decision to choose to do something — intending
to make a change, to bring about certain consequences; A consequence is
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anything happening to a person as the result of an act. A consequence may
be more or less good and may be in terms of money, things, status, wellbeing,
health, truth, justice — whatever a person or a group of persons wants and
dislikes losing. First Savage’s denotation:
F denotes a set of acts;
f, g, h, . . . denotes individual acts;
F denote a set of consequences;
f , g, h, . . . denotes individual consequences;
f(s) denotes the act as a function attaching the consequence f to the state
s. (Savage 1954/1972: 13-15)
Savage (1954/1972) suggests that if you have to make a decision and have
specific intentions with that decision, but are uncertain about the true state
of the world, you should not only account for the possible states, but for
the consequences implied when choosing one of these states. How should the
decision-maker who has to decide, but is uncertain, proceed? How can he/she
more often than not achieve the aims intended by the decisions? Are there
principles available which could be followed? Savage (1954/1972) suggests
two sets of such principles.
3.2.2 Qualitative principles
a. Simple ordering of preferences among acts:
A first set of constraints concerns the relationship between the preferences
among a set of acts and their consequences. If the aims are important and
affected by the decision, the decision-maker should rank or order the acts
according to his/her (own or instructed) preferences among the possible con-
sequences of each possible act — and this ordering should be simple in order
to preserve the coherency of the decision:
Let the relation ≤ be a simple ordering among acts and let F be a finite
set of acts (so that the structure of algebra is imposed):
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(a) If there exist f, h, and g in F then the relation f ≤ g ≤ h should apply to all g in F.
This basic coherence principle is usually referred to as the transitivity principle: If
you find that among acts f, g, and h you do not prefer f to g and do not prefer g
to h, then it is not rational, i.e., coherent, to simultaneously not prefer h to f.
(b) If Bi is a partition of B, and f ≤ g given Bi for each i, then f ≤ g given B. If in
addition f < g given Bj for at least one j, f < g given B.
This second basic principle is usually referred to as the consistency principle: If
your preference has an order which you know is unaffected by an uncertain event,
your order should not change when you come to know the actual state of that event:
(c) If Bi is a partition of B; and if (for all i and s) fi ≤ gi, f(s) = fi, and g(s) = gi when
s ∈ Bi; then f≤ g given B. If, in addition, fj < gj for some j for which Bj is not
null, then f < ggiven B.
This third basic principle concerns the consequences of the actions and is derived
from the two above. It states that if several people agree in their preferences among
consequences, then they must also agree on in their preferences among certain acts.
b. Simple ordering of the degrees of beliefs about uncertain events
A second set of constraints or criteria concerns the relationship between the
uncertainties of a person’s beliefs about the occurrence of relevant events.
An action will be considered as a possible decision if the action is believed to
bring about a specified aim. But if the events relevant to the decision have
occurred or will occur only to some degree of certainty, the actual realization
of those aims will depend on the occurrence/non-occurrence of the event.
Savage (1954/1972) holds that a person’s degree of belief that a relevant
event has/will occur can be expressed in terms of probability: A degree of
belief in an event is informed, basically, in an epistemic and cognitive process
in which the person evaluates different ”models” of the situation for which he
or she needs the probability. Arguing by a betting-analogy (see addendum
to this chapter) Savage (1954/1972) holds that the person chooses the degree
which best fits the conditioned situation and suggests the following:
A relation ≤ · between events is a qualitative probability;
if and only if, for all events B, C, D,
1. ≤ · is a simple ordering,
2. B ≤ ·C, if and only if B ∪ D ≤ ·C ∪ D, provided B ∩ D =
B ∩D = 0,
3. 0 ≤ ·B, 0 < ·S.
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[. . .]
THEOREM [. . . ] The relation ≤ as applied to events is a
qualitative probability.
(Savage 1954/1972, p. 31)
3.2.3 Quantification of degrees of belief and conse-
quences
a. From qualitative to quantitative probability
Qualitative probability can be connected to quantitative probability or a
probability measure. Savage first defined a probability measure:
A probability measure on a set S is a function P (B) attaching a real
number to each B ⊂ S such that;
1. P (B) ≥ 0 for every B;
2. If B ∩ C = 0, P (B ∪ C) = P (B) + P (C);
3. P (S) = 1.
(Savage 1954/1972:33)
Then Savage identified the condition for connecting the qualitative prob-
ability, ≤ ·, with the probability measure P :
If S carries a probability measure P and a qualitative probability ≤ · such
that, for every B, C, P (B) ≤ P (C), if and only if B ≤ ·C; then P (strictly)
agrees with ≤ ·. If B ≤ ·C implies P (B) ≤ P (C), then P almost agrees
with ≤ ·. [. . .] [I]f P strictly agrees with ≤ · then knowledge of P implies
knowledge of ≤ ·. (Savage 1954/1972:34)
Given that certain properties hold for S, Savage suggested the following
criteria concerning the uncertainty relations among a person’s beliefs about
the occurrence of relevant events:
Postulate 6’ If B < C, there exist a partition of S the union of each element of which
B is less probable than C.
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Postulate 6 If g < h and f is any consequence; then there exists a partition of S such
that, if g and h is so modified on any one element of the partition as to take
the value f at every s there, other values being undisturbed; then the modified g
remains less than h, or g remains less than the modified h, as the case may require.
(Savage 1954/1972:38-39)
Savage argued that the qualitative relation ≤ · also applies to conditional
events:
Theorem [5]1 If ≤ · is a qualitative probability, then so is ≤ · given
D. [. . . ] for any D that is not null there exists [. . . ] one and only one
probability measure P (B | D)the (conditional) probability of B given
D that almost agrees with ≤ ·.
P (B | D) = P (B ∩D)/P (D).
(Savage 1954/1972:43-44)
This can be interpreted as the probability a person attaches to the event
B after having observed or assumed D — and can be further interpreted as
gaining knowledge about B when experiencing D.
Savage’s theory was a suggested solution for decision-situations in which
the decision-maker had to choose the most probable among alternative mech-
anisms conditional on a set of uniquely conditioned information. The decision-
maker here needs a ”reverse” rule for conditional probability. If C and B are
not null and relevant to each other and Bj, which in turn is a partition of S,




P (C | Bj)P (Bj).
From this we may derive the instrument for ”inverse” probability, the
so-called Bayes’ rule or theorem:
P (Bi | C) = P (C | Bi)P (Bi)
P (C)
=
P (C | Bi)P (Bi)∑
j P (C | Bj)P (Bj)
The fact that
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P (B | C)
P (B)
=
P (C | B)
P (C)
=
P (B ∩ C)
P (B)P (C)
can be given the following interpretation: Knowledge of C modifies the
probability of B by the same factor by which knowledge of B modifies the
probability of C. If the need of the inquiry is to establish the effect of
available information on the probability of a hypothesis you should
establish the probability of the information conditional on the hypothesis,
account for the probability of the hypothesis before this information and
the probability of the information. This will establish the probability of the
hypothesis conditional on the information and provide the effect of
observing this information.
The concepts of a random variable, a probability space, and the
expected valuewill be presented here as they are needed later. In the
terms of Savage(1954/1972:45-46):
A random variable is a function x attaching a value x(s) in some set X to every s in
S on which a probability measure P is defined (if x is measurable);
A probability space is such an S together with the measure P .
The expected value of a finitely additive real random variable x with a probability dis-
tribution P (x) is a function, E(x), attaching a real number to x:
∑
x xP (x). It may
also be expressed as the integral of x over S:
∫
x(s)dP (s). (Savage 1954/1972:43-
44)
b. From qualitative to quantitative consequences
What remains of Savage theory is his argument (a) that the qualitative pref-
erence among acts in terms of the consequences also may be connected to
a quantitative preference, or a measure of the value or utility of the acts in
light of the consequences and (b) that the expected utility of the acts in a
decision problem should guide the decision-maker with respect to what is the
best act to choose.
Constraining Savage’s argument to acts for which there exists partitions
Bi of S such that P (Bi) = ρi and f(s) = fi for s ∈ Bi: For these acts (a)
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the fi’s are a finite sequence of consequences (not necessarily distinct), (b)
the ρi’s are a corresponding sequence of non-negative real numbers such that∑
i ρi = 1, (c) there is always at least one element, and (d) all elements of a
given decision-problem are equivalent:
If the events Bi of a partition have the probabilities ρi and if the act f is
such that the consequences fi will befall the person in case Bi occurs, then
the value of f is independent of how the partition Bi is chosen. (Savage
1954/1972:71)
Savage defines utility for this class of acts:
A utility is a function U associating real numbers with consequences in
such a way that, if [f ] =
∑
ρifi and [g] =
∑





σiU(gi). Writing U [[f]] for
∑
ρiU(fi), the condition takes
the form U [[f]] ≤ U [[f]]. [. . .] it is convenient to understand that, for an act
f,
U [f] = E(U(f)).
(Savage 1954/1972:73)
So, the preferences among the acts in terms of their consequences should
thus first be ensured ordered according to simple orderings, ≤. This set of
constraints couples then with the constraints given by the representing of the
values of the consequences by a utility function, U .
Savage summarizes his theory of preference for (bounded) acts as follows:
[A]n act [f] will be understood to be a real-valued random variable. [. . .]:
R f ≤ g given B, if and only if P (B) = 0, or E(f− g | B) ≤ 0.
If a person is free to decide among a set of F of acts, he will presumably
chose one the expectation of which is vF, where
v(F) = supf∈FE(f)
provided that such a one exists. [”sup” (”supremum”) refers to the least
upper bound value] (Savage 1954/1972:80-82)
This ends the specification of the two main sets of criteria Savage (1954/
1972) argues should be respected or imposed on decision-makers needing
to be coherent when deciding between alternative acts involving uncertain
events and consequences to specified aims and values.
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3.3 Conclusion
The theory of Savage (1954/1972) was intended for persons, decision-makers,
who have to make a decision, who have to achieve certain specified aims
and avoid certain others, but who were uncertain whether the events in
issue had occurred (or would occur): There exist principles of action this
person can follow to ensure that choices more often bring about the intended
consequences than not. These principles are anchored in generally accepted
principles of logic: A real — and imperfect — decision-maker should ensure
1. that the preferences among the acts in terms of their consequences are
ordered according to simple orderings, ≤ — the values of which can
and should be represented by a utility function, U , and
2. that the degrees of belief about uncertain events are ordered according to
simple orderings, ≤,as well — the degrees of which can and should be
represented by a probability function, P ,
in order to coherently arrive at the act with the greatest expected utility
with respect to identified consequences and events. By these criteria, Sav-
age argued, the decision-maker has a justified procedure by which to avoid
undermining aims and values identified to be important.
It is the need to structure the events of a decision-problem’s according to
an algebra which is to become the central problem to practical legal adjudi-
cation. This structuring forces about equal attention to both the suspected
and the alternative hypotheses — an attention which, particularly in cases
where the evidence balances on the standard of proof, threatens an aim
which is not relevant to the typical scientist: At the end of the trial-phase,
a legal decision about responsibility and degree of sanction needs to under-
communicate uncertainty to achieve the parties and the public’s accept and
abidance by that decision. In the next chapter I will substantiate how this
problem materializes in the modern legal discourse on evidence and proof.
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ADDENDUM
Personal probability: simple ordering of degrees of beliefs in events
Savage (1954/1972) holds that a person’s degree of belief that a relevant
event has/will occur can be expressed in terms of probability: A degree of
belief in an event is informed, basically, in an epistemic and cognitive process
in which the person evaluates different ”models” of the situation for which
he or she needs the probability. Savage (1954/1972) holds that the person
chooses the degree which best fits the conditioned situation and postulates
the following:
To offer a prize in case A obtains means to make available to the person
an act fA such that
fA(s) = f for s ∈ A
fA(s) = f
′ for s ∈ ¬A,
where f ′ < f . The assumption that on which of two events the person
will choose to stake a prize does not depend on the prize itself is expressed
by the following postulate:
P4 If f , f ′, g, g′, A, B, fA, fB , gA, gB are such that
1. f ′ < f , g′ < g;
2a. fA(s) = f , gA(s) = g for s ∈ A,
fA(s) = f
′, gA(s) = g′ for s ∈ ¬A,
2b. fB(s) = f , gB(s) = g for s ∈ B,
2a fB(s) = f
′, gB(s) = g′ for s ∈ ¬B,
3. fA ≤ fB ;
then gA ≤ gB .
In the light of P4 it will be said that A is not more probable than B,
abbreviated A ≤ B; if and only if when f ′ < f and fA, fB are such that
fA(s) = f for s ∈ A, fA(s) = f ′ for s ∈ ¬A,
fB(s) = f for s ∈ B, fB(s) = f ′ for s ∈ ¬B;
then fA ≤ fB .
[. . .]
I therefore propose the following postulate:
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P5 There is at least one pair of consequences f , f ′ such that f < f .
[. . .]
A relation ≤ · between events is a qualitative probability; if and only
if, for all events B, C, D,
1. ≤ · is a simple ordering,
2. B ≤ ·C, if and only if B ∪D ≤ ·C ∪D, provided B ∩D = B ∩D = 0,
3. 0 ≤ ·B, 0 < ·S.
[. . .]
THEOREM [. . . ] The relation ≤ as applied to events is a qualitative
probability.






Theories such as that of Savage (1954/1972) offered principles of reasoning
to legal scholars who worried about the values associated with truth- and
certainty-aspects of legal assessment of evidence. But other legal scholars,
those viewing the legal institution as having a unique role in society, saw the
formal basis of those theories as a threat to the filling of that role. In this
chapter the attention will be on the development of the modern jurispruden-
tial discourse — expressed in the discourse among the probabilists and the
protectionists. This foundational conflict is a persistent one and therefore
relevant to this dissertation (the concept of evidence is intrinsically connected
to foundational issues in any discipline): any constructive effort to develop
a notion of evidence-based decisions within the legal sector must therefore
acknowledge the concerns which will be provoked.
The first legal scholars to advocate more formal approaches to practi-
cal legal assessments of evidence and proof were John Kaplan (1965, 1968),
Alan D. Cullison (1969), and Finkelstein and Fairly (1970). In this disser-
tation Alan D. Cullison’s Probability analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding. A
preliminary outline of the subjective approach from 1969 will represent the
probabilists. It is chosen because it (a) is the only text which identifies
the epistemological connection between its suggested methodology and the
foundational issues of legal adjudication and (b) illustrates a critical aspect
of the foundational conflict, namely the different interpretations of the pur-
75
poses of the legal standard of proof. The protectionists will be represented
by Laurence H. Tribe’s seminal paper Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process (1971). This is chosen because it is the only
text which directly and in a constructive way counters the probabilists’s ar-
guments. I hold that Tribe (1971) still is, in 2011, among the better texts
for understanding the foundational conflict concerning legal assessment of
evidence.
The first section explicates the probabilists’ position in the terms of
Cullison (1969); the second section explicates the protectionists’ arguments
in the terms of Tribe (1971); and, lastly, I will present perspectives for par-
titioning the different kinds of decision-situations involved in the processing
of a legal case. The argument of this chapter is (a) that the resistance to for-
mal approaches during the trial-phase assessments of evidence is well founded
and may not be expected to diminish, but (b) that the resistance to such ap-
proaches during the investigative phase is not well founded and may even
harm the ultimate aims and values of the criminal case process.
4.1 Cullison (1969): A probability model of
the trial process
Legal scholars of proof and evidence have of course noted the peculiar rea-
soning problems associated with the need to decide on the basis of strongly
conditioned information. In the late 60’s Wigmore (1937) was still the main
text offering an analytical procedure for such situations (Twining 1986), but
his chart method seemed anachronistic and did not account in any princi-
pled manner for the uncertainty aspects. The theories of epistemic/subjective
probability and the instrument of inverse probability, coupled with the theory
of expected utility, thus filled a need felt by a part of the legal community.
Noting that the fact-finding of lawsuits is oriented towards human action
tinged with values and that the ”facts” of legal assessments are inevitably
uncertain, Cullison (1969) could not but see that probability-theory had
much to offer and that the subjective theory of probability was an appropriate
approach. He thus wanted to outline a probabilistic model for describing the
fact-finding process.
The basic decision-problem in legal adjudication, Cullison (1969) argues,
is that of choosing the correct of two possible alternatives —guilt and not
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guilt in criminal cases (and liable or not liable in civil cases) — in light of
the presented evidence and the requirement that the decision of guilt cannot
be taken unless proven beyond a specified standard. The intention of the
latter is to achieve specified aims and values and to avoid specified costs or
losses: The aims in legal decisions are to decide guilty when truly guilty
and to decide not guilty when truly not guilty; and the costs or losses to be
avoided are those of deciding guilty when truly not guilty and deciding not
guilty when truly guilty. In each individual legal decision there are thus four
possible outcomes (Cullison, 1969, p. 569):
1. Decide guilty when truly guilty — denoted by (c | g)
2. Decide not guilty when truly not guilty — denoted by (¬c | ¬g)
3. Decide guilty when truly not guilty — denoted by (c | ¬g)
4. Decide not guilty when truly guilty — denoted by (¬c | g)
These aims and costs connect with institutional values — that a legal
adjudication should avoid ending up convicting an innocent or acquitting a
guilty — which in turn connect to social values of justice — that an accused
is to be presumed innocent until guilt is proven beyond a certain standard. If
concentrating on crime cases, the following order of preference is suggested:
(c | ¬g) < (¬c | g) < (¬c | ¬g) ≤ (c | g).
Letting P (g) and P (¬g) denote the probability of guilt and not guilt
respectively, Cullison (1969) suggests that the desirability, denoted by D, of
deciding ”guilt” or ”acquittal” in the terms of decision-theory should be:
D(c) = P (g)D(c | g) + P (¬g)D(c | ¬g)
and
D(¬c) = P (g)D(¬c g) + P (¬g)D(¬c | ¬g)
respectively.
The usual legal standard of proof in crime cases is that guilt must be
proven ”beyond reasonable doubt”: When the fact-finders’ belief in guilt,
P (g), is not beyond reasonable doubt, the utility of acquitting the defendant
is greater than the utility of convicting; when beyond the standard the reverse
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is the case; and when only barely convinced that the standard is met, the two
alternative decisions should have equal utility. So, the minimum probability
of guilt needed for conviction occurs when the utility of deciding ”guilty”
equals the utility of deciding ”acquit”:
D(c) = D(¬c)
= P (g)D(c | g) + P (¬g)D(c | ¬g)
= P (g)D(¬c g) + P (¬g)D(¬c | ¬g) P (g)P (¬g)
=
D(¬c | ¬g)−D(c | ¬g)
D(c | g)−D(¬c | g) .
(Cullison, 1969, p. 569)
The ratio P (g)
P (¬g) equals the ratio of two differences: That between the util-
ity of acquitting an innocent and the utility of convicting an innocent, and
that between the utility of convicting a guilty and the utility of acquitting a
guilty. The denominator is the amount by which the utility of convicting a
guilty exceeds that of acquitting him and the numerator the amount by which
the utility of acquitting an innocent exceeds that of convicting him. Accord-
ing to the preference-order both differences should be positive and as large
as possible (the principle of maximizing expected utility). The principle may
be restated as the principle of minimizing the costs of deciding incorrectly
by taking the negatives of the differences — denoting the cost of incorrectly
convicting an innocent by D(I) and the cost of incorrectly acquitting the
guilty as (DII):
D(I) = −[D(¬c | ¬g)−D(c | ¬g)] = D(c | ¬g)−D(¬c | ¬g);
D(II) = −[D(c | g)−D(¬c | g)] = D(¬c | g)−D(c | g).
(Cullison, 1969, p. 569)












The minimum probability needed for conviction should be large if a mis-
taken acquittal is more desirable (less costly) than a mistaken conviction;
and small if a mistaken conviction is less serious than a mistaken acquittal.
If the aim is to minimize, over time, both kinds of error (as is normally the
aim in civil cases) the probability standard of proof should be set to 0.5.
But if the aim is to minimize the risk of wrongly convicting an innocent (the
norm in criminal cases) then the probability of guilt should be increased to
above 0.5.
Cullison (1969) believes this approach to be sound epistemologically, but
also legally: It admits the flexibility needed in legal adjudication of real cases
where the specifications D(c | g) and D(c | ¬g) are likely to be more or less
uniquely conditioned; civil cases are different from crime cases, serious crime
is different from less serious crime, and at case level the parties may be more
or less equal concerning their material or political resources and concerning
their need to have their legal rights protected.
Decision theory may thus assist arriving at a legal judgment being accu-
rate concerning the evidence, accounting for the risk of loss of important val-
ues. Cullison (1969) aspires to be descriptive as well as normative and seems
not to differentiate between the different needs of the various phases of a case-
process: The basic decision of the trial phase represent any decision during
a case’s process. Then it is assumed that the legal indictment is naturally
one among mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. Cullison (1969)
insists that the decision-theoretical approach is the only appropriate because
it assists what he interprets to be the purpose of legal proof-standards: Its
purpose is primarily to ensure sufficient relevant evidence for an accurate
decision and is not to ensure peaceful conflict resolution through a collec-
tive of lay people’s careful and commonsensical consideration of the evidence
and arrival at the truth of the issues in a case. The latter interpretation is,
Cullison (1969) claims, a misunderstanding:
There is much disagreement among authorities on whether a fact-finder
applying the ”preponderance of the evidence” standard is supposed to de-
velop a distinct ”belief” in the truth of the facts it finds or whether it needs
only to decide what evidence preponderates. If, as some authorities indicate,
a jury must be able to say ”we believe f occurred” (rather than simply ”our
belief that f occurred is greater than our belief to the contrary”) before they
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can find f , then the threshold probability would be significantly greater than
1/2. This view of course implies that the cost of [erroneously holding a de-
fendant liable] is notably greater than the cost of [erroneously leaving the
plaintiff with recourse]. Many authorities argue, on the other hand, that the
threshold probability for ordinary civil cases should be 1/2. (Cullison, 1969,
p. 569)
In a footnote he fills in:
The most acceptable meaning to be given to the expression, proof beyond
a preponderance, seems to be proof which leads the jury to find that the exis-
tence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence. Thus the
preponderance of evidence becomes the triers’s belief in the preponderance
of probability. Some courts have boldly accepted this view.
Other courts have been shocked at the suggestion that a verdict, a truth-
finding, should be based in nothing stronger than an estimate of probabilities.
They require that the trier must have an ”actual belief” in or be ”convinced
of” the truth of the fact by this ”preponderance of evidence”. (Cullison,
1969, p. 569 (footnote 44))
Cullison (1969) stresses that it is not wrong to instruct the jury that
they must come to believe in whatever facts they find. But he believes that
the ”belief in the truth”-interpretation of the standards of proof will make
people create a wide margin in the middle of the probability range where
the decision goes to one party simply because the other carries the burden
of proof:
If I am asked if I believe f , I understand that a ”no” answer would leave
open the question of whether I therefore believe ¬f ; I understand (especially
if I ponder the matter) that there is a vast middle ground where doubts might
keep me from really believing the truth of either f or ¬f . By contrast, if I
am asked whether my belief in f is greater than my belief in ¬f , I understand
that to say ”no” is almost surely to imply that I believe ¬f more than f ;
here, the only way to hedge is to claim that my degree of belief is precisely
the same for both propositions. (Cullison, 1969, p. 571)
Cullison (1969) insists that the idea of ”belief” being a necessary and
sufficient test for ”truth” is a symptom of a whole syndrome — a set of
misperceptions caused by holding the primacy of the value of the legal process
as being peaceful resolution of conflict, in which the ”truth” is a necessary
but subordinate aim.
This can also explain the resistance to using probability-concepts as an
overt part of the legal process, because probability not only explicates cer-
tainty but uncertainty as well: Say that a poor farmer sued the government
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for recovery after he lost his mule in its frightened escape from roaring jet-
planes flying too low. A court would not admit recover by the evidence that
80 % of the jets in the air that day was Air Force (and not civilian), but the
same court would admit recovery by the evidence that the farmer testifies
to seeing the pilot wearing Air Force gear. The former kind of evidence is
neither better nor worse than the testimony-evidence with respect to accu-
racy, but is worse with respect to peaceful conflict-resolution since it does
not account for the asymmetry of the resources between the poor farmer
and the government: It would be worse to erroneously deny recovery to this
poor farmer than to erroneously judge a resourceful government liable — so
the testimony is given more weight than the frequency-evidence because the
overall aim dictates so.
Those holding the ”belief is truth”- interpretation and resisting overt
explication of doubt is therefore provoked by suggesting probability analysis
and decision theory as a tool for the adjudication process. But, Cullison
(1969) argues, the overall aim of peaceful conflict resolution does not itself
dictate any specific interpretation of the standards of proof.
Cullison (1969) is good for explicating the arguments against the necessity
of the ”belief in the truth”-interpretation of the standards of proof. But he is
less precise on the foundational arguments which should convince us why the
”preponderance of probability”-interpretation serves the aims of he court.
Sure, he appeals to the standard reasons:
[. . . ] the very process of deciding what really happened in a case is at
heart a matter of probabilities; [. . . ] the great bulk of our trial procedures
are ultimately justified by their long run effects [. . . ]; [. . . ] law courts are
increasingly confronted with scientific evidence which they are ill-equipped to
evaluate and utilize efficiently; [. . . ] a comprehensive probabilistic analysis of
fact-finding [can] give us better clues as to what factors influence fact-finding
decisions, [and] to help us evaluate specific kinds of evidence, [and] to help
us evaluate our rules of evidence and procedures. (Cullison, 1969:538-539).
Cullison (1969) unfortunately finds no space for justification: ”[T]o out-
line [the probabilistic model] is a large enough project that, even without
including an inquiry into the justifications and practical potentials, a great
deal of basic ground must be left untouched.” (Cullison, 1969:539). Then we
are left wondering why one in a legal adjudication should prefer the question
”Is your belief that f occurred greater than your belief that ¬f occurred?”
(a closed space of possibilities) over the question ”Do you believe that f oc-
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curred?” (an open space of possibilities). The other scholars attempting the
same kind of approach as Cullison (1969) (Kaplan 1965, 1968 and Finkelstein
and Fairly 1970) are equally thorough when it comes to demonstrating their
approach, but do not at all touch upon foundational issues.
4.2 Tribe (1971) The case against formal ap-
proaches
A host of legal scholars viewed and still view formal approaches to evidence
and proof in the legal context with apprehension. I will let Tribe (1971) rep-
resent these by reviewing the arguments in his seminal Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process. For Tribe it is the axiomatic basis
of formal approaches and the need for precision —or the reduction required
for such precision — which is worrisome. Precision is at best difficult to
attain in the legal context:
[. . .] although the mathematical [. . .] devices which a society embraces
to rationalize its systems for adjudication may be quite comprehensible to a
student of that society’s customs and culture, those devices may nonetheless
operate to distort — and, in some instances, destroy — important values
which that society means to express or to pursue through the conduct of
legal trials. (Tribe 1971; 84; 6: p.1330)
It is important to note what Tribe states are not problems — because
this, I believe, is what makes his paper more enlightening than other critiques
of formal approaches:
• The problem is not the mathematical subject per se;
• legal cases frequently have issues in which probabilistic inference is directly involved;
• all factual evidence, including legal proof, is ultimately ”probabilistic”, in the epis-
temological sense that conclusions from observations are inductive;
• mathematical methods in the trial process are fine as long as it is appropriately
conducted —- mathematics is not more esoteric than other expert-knowledge;
• probabilistic inference is essentially about generalization;
• probability may represent a measure of a person’s confidence in the truth of a
proposition about an event: Tribe knew Savage (1954) and saw the latter’s problem-
situation as similar to trial-problems;
• mathematically derived assessment may supplement conventional evidence.
82
Tribe (1971) also acknowledges the worry about accuracy in a legal pro-
cess, and understands the motive for wanting to develop various formal in-
struments to amend the legal actors’ ability to deal with uncertainty. But
he takes equally serious the dangers by uncritically endorsing formal ap-
proaches, recalling the abuse of calculus in the Dreyfus affair in France and
in the American Collins-case in 1968:
[. . . ] I suspect the lure of objectivity and precision may be increasingly
hard to resist by for lawyers concerned with the reliability or simply suc-
cessful, adjudication; partly because a critique of mathematical efforts to
enhance the reliability and impartiality of legal trials may yield helpful in-
sights into what such trials are and ought to be; and partly because such
a critique may ultimately contribute to an appreciation of how rigour and
quantification, once their real costs and limits are better understood, might
actually prove useful in processes of decision-making. Most fundamentally,
though, I write in reaction to a growing and bewildering literature of praise
for mathematical precision in the trial process, a literature that has tended
to catalog or to assume the virtues of mathematical approaches quite as
uncritically as earlier writers tended to deny their relevance.
But Tribe (1971) is mainly concerned for the effect on the aims and values
pursued by the legal system:
The difficulty [lies] in the discovery of an acceptable integration of mathe-
matics into the trial process. (Tribe 1971: 1350)
I will below explicate Tribe (1971)’s worries. Note that the paper is a
reaction to Finkelstein and Fairly (1970), Cullison (1969), and Kaplan (1968).
All use the Bayesian rule for inverse probability and is why Tribe sometimes
refers to the formal approach as the ”Bayesian approach” or those using it
as ”Bayesians”. Tribe’s arguments concern three levels: The case-level; at
the trial-institutional level; and at the procedural level.
4.2.1 The case level: Formal approaches may cause
loss of accuracy
Tribe’s arguments at this level proceeds via the hypothetical case of Finkel-
stein and Fairly (1971):
A woman is found in a ditch in an urban area. There is evidence that
the deceased had quarrelled with her boyfriend the night before and that
this boyfriend had been violent to her on several occasions. A knife, known
to be the murder weapon, contains a partial palm-print the characteristics
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of which are indistinguishable from the boyfriend’s partial palm-print. But,
because the print is partial, the expert can only say that 1 in 1000 of the
general population would have such characteristics. This means that in a
general population of 100 000 persons 100 of these would have such a print.
In turn this would mean that the boyfriend is among these and that there
are 99 other possible suspects — the palm-print is thus far from uniquely
determining the individual who made the print on the knife. Tribe lets X
represent the proposition that ”The boyfriend, now the defendant, used the
knife to kill his girlfriend”, ¬X its negation, and E the proposition that
”A palm-print resembling the defendant’s was found on the knife that killed
her”.
(1a.) The meaning of ”random probability”
Having two print-samples assessed to be similar is relevant, but the signifi-
cance of it is unclear: The presentation of its random relative frequency may
be more misleading than enlightening; if given this figure at all, how should
one delimit and justify the choice of suspect population? How should one
account for the fact that other individuals than the defendant could equally
well be the source, yet risking the fact-finders seeing the figure to signify the
innocence of the defendant? (Tribe 1971:1355)
(1b.) Heuristics and moral responsibility
The Bayesian approach needs an initial or prior probability of X. How easy
is it for a lay fact-finder to simply ascribe a specific number which should
both authentically and correctly represent his real prior assessment? And
is P (X) better set at 0.33 or 0.43? It is the gravity of the situation, not
the technicalities which is the problem: Would not most lay people being
assigned the very serious jury duty hesitate just picking any figure as in a
parlour game? Even if told that the choice of the prior does not matter much
because it is the coherency which is wanted, would not a lay fact-finder worry
that his choice will affect the outcome? And what if a person chose the prior
to be 0.5? Does that signify equal weight to each alternative hypothesis due
to inability to prefer among them or does it signify the weight to one of
the hypotheses irrespective of the alternative? A Bayesian says we should
consider relatively, but can we assume that people actually do it? This is
far from obvious. The proponents of formal approaches like the Bayesian
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seems to assume (a) that lay people, like the proponents, perceive formal
modelling as instrumental, like a hammer or a knitting machine — having
no consequence on the value-system of the situation in which it is applied
and (b) that lay people actually do choose according to the set of norms for
comparison which the proponents of a formal approach believes should be
used. But lay people may not as easy as the proponents separate between
the real world and the model, and even if we accept that we should separate, it
does not mean that we practice it. Would not that produce rather nonsensical
outcomes? These two complications must be accounted for when assessing
the costs and benefits of formal approaches in practical decision situations.
(Tribe 1971:1356)
(1c.) The event as a member of a class: Initial categorization or
prior probability?
In most cases a statistic is usually presented for the purpose of classifying the
present case: ”70 % of all the injuries caused in this way is due to negligence,
so this is claimed to be true in this case as well”. Such a statement can shed
light both on the kind of case had and on the choice of a prior probability. But
how useful is it for the latter purpose in particular cases? The initial figure
might overwhelm the jury — disabling them from seeing the complexities
occurring in the wide space between that general statement and the case at
hand. This is a problem for the partial palm-print too: A general statement
about the random probability of the partial print may overwhelm the jury
— disabling them from accounting appropriately for the individual case’s
softer kind of evidence. In addition the palm-print is detected (sampled)
under quite other conditions than the event of the general statement. This
is a general problem to the trial situation. A possible solution would be
to instruct the jury about the necessity to differentiate between the general
statement and the particular case, but Tribe worries that assuming a lay
jury’s ability to differentiate appropriately just introduces new uncertainties.
(Tribe 1971: 1361)
(1d.) The inputs and outputs of the Bayesian computer:
How will the expert communicate the assumptions required for most mod-
elling and can we trust that the modeller has constructed the best model
for the case in question? Can we rely on the jury to detect possible flaws?
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The number of conditioned variables in any given case will be large, there
will be both objective frequencies and subjective probabilities, all processed
through the Bayesian computer to yield a posterior probability: How may
we expect the lay person to interpret this while performing the serious obli-
gation of a jury service? Tribe cannot but be worried that this approach,
intended to enhance uncertainty, instead introduces new sources of error.
(Tribe 1971:1361)
(1e.) The risk of bias towards easily quantifiable events
A formal approach lends itself easily to quantifiable matters and to events
whose nature is easily agreed. But can it deal with matters involving the
mental state of the suspect? An expert-probability using forensic information
is one thing, but a legal claim will require information about mental states
as well. The Bayesians’ regularly denotes the ultimate proposition by G for
guilt. Even if their ”guilt” is not legal, we may not assume that the jury
accounts for this ambiguity. The inherent tendency in formal approaches to
attend more to matters easily quantified and/or agreed may induce a shift
of focus not benefiting the aim of the trial. (Tribe 1971: 1361-1366).
(1f.) The risk of double and creative accounting
Tribe worries that the Bayesian approach lends itself to double or wrongful
accounting. Double accounting may occur if assessing the prior hypothesis
in light of suspected evidence and then use that evidence to find the poste-
rior probability: Being categorized as a suspect in the investigative phase is
already a selection on the basis of evidence; would not being further assessed
for the category of guilt on the same evidence constitute double accounting?
The accurate application of Bayes’ Theorem necessarily assumes that the ev-
idence is independent of the prior suspicion, but in most trials these two will
be hopelessly enmeshed. Wrongful accounting may occur due to the sym-
metry of the formal approach: the order in which the evidence is presented
does not matter to the posterior probability. But interdependency between
evidence might be hidden, intentionally or unintentionally, behind this prop-
erty: A robbery is suspected to have been committed in the 30 minutes period
between 3.00am and 3.30am. The robbery is known to have lasted exactly
15 minutes. A witness says he saw the suspect sitting in a car half a mile
(800m) from the crime scene at 3.10am (evidence E1). Another witness says
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that he saw the suspect sitting in a car half a mile (800m) from the crime
scene at 3.20 (evidence E2). If both E1 and E2 are true then the suspect
cannot possibly be the robber. But if E1 is treated first then one might be
misled to think that E2, when considered subsequently, corroborates with E1
to increase the probability of the hypothesis instead of invalidating it. Can
we expect the jury to detect this? (Tribe 1971: 1366-1368)
4.2.2 The trial level: Formal approaches may cause
loss of social values
Tribe (1971) is also concerned whether formal methods, if used in given trials,
may be too costly with respect to the societal values pursued in actual legal
trials. He has three arguments here:
2a. Conflicting systems of values:
The first argument concerns the values expressed by the presumption of
innocence. The presumption of innocence is not just a rule of evidence, but
a normative principle committing the adjudicators morally to the proposition
that an accused is no less than his accuser or any other member of society
entitled to freedom and respect. The intention is to (i) protect the accused
from onerous restraints which are not needed to effectuate the interest in
completing the trial; (ii) encourage an independent assessment of the guilt of
the accused; (iii) preserve an atmosphere in which an acquittal in trial may
be taken seriously by the community; (iv) sustain the attitude of refusing
to acknowledge prosecutorial omniscience as long as the accused insists his
innocence; and (v) sustain the obligation to listen to the accused before
judging about his guilt. These values rest on the fragile ability of the fact-
finder to suspend (i) the suspicion that most suspects are guilty and (ii) the
fact that the suspect would not have been accused at all if there was not
already a certain level of probability that he is guilty. Would not the ability
to suppress these suspicions be weakened if repeatedly having to explicate
prior probability of guilt? Here is thus an obvious conflict between the values
of rationality, coherency, and transparency versus the values of protection of
an individual’s basic rights to freedom and integrity. (Tribe 1971: 1368-1372)
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2b. The standard of proof: Towards overall predictability or to-
wards situational moral commitment?
What is the purpose of standards of proof? Is it a measure of the degree
of error tolerable by the institution? Or is it the case-by-case swearing or
ritual reminding of the fact-finders commitment to the obligation to strive to
be as certain as humanly possible under the circumstances while attending
primarily to the rights of the accused? Tribe holds that it is both: The
system needs the first, the accused needs the second. Tribe worries that a
systemic use of the Bayesian approach will tend to stress the first over the
second.
2c. The need to mediate between abstract law and lay justice:
The third argument concerns the legal institution’s need to have modes of
ascertaining truths and modes of conflict resolution which are grounded in
its subjects’ basic beliefs and norms. The institution needs its subjects to
respect and abide by its decisions. This depends on the degree to which
the subjects trust that its fact-finding apparatus is basically comprehensible.
This is why lay fact-finders are involved at all: They are to mediate between
the law in the abstract and the public’s basic sense of justice. The law in the
abstract is complex and alienating and an introduction of formal modes of
proof would not make it less so. A typical lawsuit is not simply the objective
search for truth, it is also a ritual: A complex pattern of gestures comprising
”the society’s last line of defence in the indispensable effort to secure peaceful
settlement of social conflicts”. Tribe worries thus that formal modes of proof
might induce loss to the legal institution’s fundamental need for legitimacy.
(Tribe 1971: 1375-1377)
4.2.3 The procedural level: Formal approaches may
cause loss to values sought via the procedural
rules and norms of the legal institution
This third level set of arguments concerns the use of formal approaches when
formulating the rules of legal procedure: What are the consequences of in-
corporating formal thinking into the normative basis of legal adjudication?
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3a. Can decision models effectively represent the particular mix of
values in given cases?
Cullison (1969) noted the gravity of the injury and the resource-distribution
among the parties as central variables affecting the choice of a threshold prob-
ability for guilt or liability. But are other dimensions thereby ignored? What
about the losses caused by mistaken identity, mistaken intention, miscalcu-
lated statute of limitations? The particular mix of correct and incorrect
decisions in a given case must of course condition the actual threshold of
probability, but can the decision-theoretical model incorporate the values at-
tached to the consequences in kinds of cases, of which any particular case is
but an example? Tribe worries that the equations in given cases will be too
complex. (Tribe 1971:1381)
3b. Will emotional needs affect a person’s probability-assessment?
The decision-theoretic approach ignores the possibility that the legal context
may, more than other contexts, be affected by the general phenomenon of
preference-dependent probability-structures. There is the possible need for
dissonance-reduction: Wishing that the accused is also the guilty may affect
the assessment of the probability of the evidence, thereby affecting the stan-
dard of proof selected. Are such and similar needs more prominent in a legal
trial situation? How? (Tribe 1971:1383-1384)
3c. The standard of proof: Kind-based or case-based?
Cullison (1969) suggests that decision-theoretical models can be guides to
fact-finders in given cases. But, Tribe worries: The above problems are
problems under any approach to the standard of proof. Could it be that
fact-finders in given cases should rather abstain from expressing personal
probabilities and preferences? That an appropriate selection of the standard
depends on being separate from particular cases? (Tribe 1971: 1384)
4.2.4 Concluding remarks on Tribe (1971)
Tribe’s worries are still valid expressions of a position on a still existing cen-
tral and foundational dimension of conflict within jurisprudence with respect
to assessments of evidence for practical legal purposes. I believe that this
conflict is essentially irresolvable.
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This implies that I also believe that formal approaches cannot be the one
unifying methodology for legal assessment of evidence. Some of Tribes wor-
ries may now be less justified, but I cannot but agree that formal approaches
are not on their own able to serve the symbolic or ritualistic purposes of
the legal trial. This, I believe, has neither never been the intention of those
advocating formal approaches to legal assessment of evidence. Just as Tribe
fears the effect of formal approaches’ commitment to rationality, accuracy,
impartiality, and transparency, the increased attention to more formal ap-
proaches may have been provoked by the institution being already too biased
to values serving the legal ritual aspects. A majority of legal scholars are nei-
ther pure protectionists nor probabilists. These would likely agree that one
cannot achieve peaceful conflict-resolution through the symbolic/ritualistic
aspect of negotiating legal rights and obligations in the latter stages of a trial
if not having already secured a basis of justified knowledge about the facts
in issue. The question is thus not whether or not the legal institution can
integrate methodologies that protect the values of accuracy and impartiality
but how it can be done without harming the basic aims/values of peaceful
conflict-resolution.
4.3 A modern discourse on evidence and
proof
During the 1980’s and 1990’s the evidence-discourse in jurisprudence gained
momentum. Three trends are visible: (1) The development of a diversified set
of perspectives and models, normative and positive, of the legal adjudication
of a case; (2) the development of the view that the legal processing of a given
case poses a differentiated set of problem-situations with their own specific
purposes — that different methodologies could and should be sought for these
conditional purposes; (3) and the increased attention to forensic science and
their methodologies for assessing forensic and scientific kinds of information.
One important development during the 1980’s and the 1990’s is the emer-
gence of a host of alternative approaches to both descriptive and norma-
tive theories of evidence-assessment in legal situations: Cullison (1969)’s ap-
proach may be sorted into what became known as the Pascal/Bayes School
of Probability and Uncertainty. But there are also the Bacon/Mill/Cohen
School of Inductive Probability; the Shafer/Dempster School of Non-additive
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Beliefs; and the Zadeh School of Fuzzy Probability and Inference — all being
more or less formal approaches. Then there is the more informal and ”fact-
sceptic” or a-rational and social-norms-based approaches within Legal Real-
ism — inspired by the works of Jerome Frank (1889-1957), Karl Llewellyn
(1893-1962), and by sociological and anthropological theories on dispute-
resolution. Finally one will find literature-inspired approaches dwelling on
legal reasoning as narratives and rhetoric. Each of these approaches provides
valuable insights to legal reasoning. Unfortunately there will be no space for
studying these in this dissertation.
A second trend is the acceptance that the legal processing of a case is
multi-staged: Each stage having its own set of problems and aims, each nec-
essary but neither alone sufficient for ultimate multipurpose decision about
the degree of legal responsibility. This means that it is not very fruitful to
let the ultimate decision-situation at the end of the trial-phase represent all
kinds of problems at any stage of the process. Schum (1986) proposed to
see the processing of a case as a stage play, with a complex and changing
plot evolving over three main acts having separate scenes in which different
actors ”play” different inferential roles:
Act I. Discovery Starts with the occurrence of a relevant event — a bribery, a murder,
etc: Scene 1 involves the investigators, followed by the advocates, who attend to
the discovery of possible hypotheses and information in a creative and informal
manner; Scene 2 involves the same actors, but these attend now to the elimination
of hypotheses in light of an increasing amount of information; and Scene 3 involves
the same actors, but now attending to the argument construction for the means of
evidence.
Act II. Proof Consists of the courtroom scenes involving the advocates and the fact-
finders. Advocates attend to convincing the fact-finders of the strength of their
arguments, exploiting both analytical and rhetoric skills.
Act III. Deliberation and Choice : Consists of the fact-finders only who attends to
weighing of the evidence and the aims and finally decides on the overall weight of
the evidence .
.
Peter Tillers suggested a slightly different model in his Mapping Infer-
ential Domains (1986), but stressed the same: A case goes through several
procedural phases having different needs and values, thus requiring different
inferential ”logics”. And Cohen (1980), though concerned with medical diag-
nosis (arguably analogous to legal adjudication), suggested that Bayesianism
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and Baconianism are not competitive normative systems, but complement
each other as each seeks to optimize different sets of values at different phases
of the processing of a case.
These scholars are signs of moving away from the meta-theoretical founda-
tional debate and onto the practical work of developing, not one overarching
methodology, but a ’toolbox’ of different methodologies suited for different
decision-purposes.
The third trend is the increased attention to the analytical norms and
procedures of the forensic sciences. In 2005 Saks and Koehler published
a paper in Science voicing suspicions that most of the sub-disciplines with
the forensic sciences adhered to epistemological and methodological norms
which were not suited to the aims and values of the legal institutions. Saks
and Koehler referred to data provided by the Innocence Project, Cardozo
Law School (New York): In 86 cases where DNA-profiling contributed to
conclusion of wrongful conviction, 63 % involved forensic scientific testing-
error and 27 % involved false or misleading testimony by forensic scientist.
They claimed the error-rates were due to the analytical norms practiced
by the traditional forensic sciences — norms which could develop due to
the majority of the forensic scientists having either none at all or too little
training under regular scientific norms. (Saks and Koehler 2005:892). Despite
U.S. Supreme Court rulings in 1993 and 1999 that expert testimony had
to answer to the Daubert-standard, studies of error-rates of many of the
traditional forensic sciences in the U.S. continued to be poorer than that of
diagnostic instruments and expert-conclusions used for medical diagnostic
purposes (Faigman et al. 2002, Koehler 1996, Collaborative Testing Services
Inc. 1993-2004).
Saks and Koehler (2005) attend to American forensic sciences, but the
European forensic sciences have been equally isolated from the scientific cul-
ture. It should not come as a surprise if the error-rates of the European
forensic services should be demonstrated to be similarly poor as well. In
chapter five and six of this dissertation I present information indicating that
the error-rates of the discipline of forensic bitemark-analysis are as poor as
Saks and Koehler suggest and I document my claim that the analytical norms
of this discipline are a main part of the explanation why it has not progressed
beyond the level it has.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this first part of the dissertation I have studied the more central analytical
and institutional conditions, aims, and values of the criminal case process.
The main analytical condition is that the questions typically concern (a)
highly conditioned, natural, and unrepeatable events and (b) positive aspects
as well as normative aspects. The main institutional condition is that the
aims and values are complex and highly important to the parties involved in
given cases, the public in general, and the legal institution: At the end of
the first decade of the 21’ century there is no disagreement that the ultimate
aim of the criminal case process is to secure the parties’ and the public’s
confidence and trust that the final court-decision is the best in terms of both
truth and good. But a latent disagreement exists about the best means to
achieve that ultimate aim — some insist on certainty in terms of accuracy,
precision, objectivity and impartiality, while others insist on legal, social, and
situational right in terms of negotiation, consensus-building, and conflict-
reduction. This disagreement will still emerge in the aftermath of difficult
cases and the arguments have not changed much since the 1960-1970’s. This
will be seen in the next part of this dissertation, when I analyze the Norwegian
Torgersen-case.
The disagreement about the best means to secure confidence and trust is
partly a constructed one — resting on the presumption that the problems of
the latter part of the trial phase of the criminal case process can represent
all the problems of all the phases of that process.
In the following parts of this dissertation I break that presumption, pre-
suming instead that the criminal case process is a sequential decision problem
according to Premise 2 and Premise 3 from the introductory chapter: In this
perspective the problems of the criminal case process are differentiated over
time and by substance and purpose — the problems chosen and decided on
in one interval of time will condition the condition the choices available for
analysis and decision in the next interval of time. This perspective allows for
a differentiated approach to the means of problem-solving as well: The ques-
tion is no longer whether or not one may use formal statistical procedures
when assessing evidence or inference in the criminal case process, but which
formal logical procedures are the best for assessing given kinds of evidence
for given kinds of purposes in given phases of the criminal case process.
Under this alternative perspective, I will attend only to decision-problems
typical at the end of the crime investigative phase and concentrate on means
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of evidence based on imprint-traces and involving expert-analysis, exempli-
fied by bitemarks on human skin without transferred components. The ques-
tion will be:
which is the best methodological procedure for assessing the
basic, causal-logical, evidential value or relevance of bitemark-
means of evidence with respect to (a) a given formal legal in-
dictment and (b) a standard of evidence being minimally that of
Premise 1a in this dissertation —
Premise 1a.A basic standard of evidence-basis for crime
investigative decisions: A decision about the basic causal
mechanism of a crime event is evidence-based if all the reference-
groups and -terms causally and logically necessary for the deci-
sion are explicit and unequivocal and (a) enable person indepen-
dent assessment of the probabilities of the events involved and
(b) enable person-independent assessment of the risk of deciding
wrongly about the causal mechanism — thereby contributing to
(i) the conviction of a true innocent person or the acquittal of a
true responsible person; (ii) the reduction of resources available
to other cases; (iii) the public loosing trust and confidence in the
crime investigative services and the legal institution ?
To answer this question I must first examine the procedures which are
used, historically and currently, by crime investigators and experts for solving
this problem. This is the topic of the next and second part of this dissertation.
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Part II





In this part of this dissertation I proceed to study the current epistemo-
logical norms and methodological procedures for a subgroup of crime inves-
tigative decisions: Decisions about the basic causal-logical evidential value
of means of evidence involving (a) imprints without transferred components
and (b) expert-knowledge for diagnosing the imprints’ causal object and time
of occurrence. To illustrate I will use human bitemarks on human skin. The
question in this part of the dissertation is:
Question 2. Are European crime investigative decisions about
the evidential value of bitemark-means evidence-based to the
standard of Premise 1a of this dissertation?
This main question will be assessed in light of the conclusions about two
related questions.
Question 2a. Were the successive decisions about the evi-
dential value of the bitemark-means in the Norwegian Torgersen-
case evidence-based to the standard of Premise 1a. of this disser-
tation?
Chapter 5 introduces the Norwegian Torgersen-case and discusses the
relevance of the sources available with respect to answering question 2a. A
brief introduction to the Norwegian legal system is provided in Appendix 1.
Chapter 6 analyzes the first bitemark-expert’s (in 1957/1958) justifica-
tion for his diagnosis of the bitemark. An addendum to the chapter presents
the defence counsel’s argument that the case qualifies for review.
In Chapter 7 I study the modern bitemark-experts’ (in the period be-
tween 1997 and 2006, court-appointed as well as party-appointed) justifica-
tion for their diagnoses. An addendum to the chapter presents the Norwegian
Criminal Cases Review Commission’s position on evidence-theoretical issues.
The second question under the main question is:
Question 2b. Are bitemark-experts’ decisions about hy-
potheses investigated for more general knowledge-purposes (a)
substantially relevant for practical forensic diagnoses and (b) evidence-
based to the standard specified in Premise 1?
In Chapter 8 I assess this question in light of studies published in sci-






In this chapter I will first introduce the Norwegian Torgersen-case and its
court-history. In the last section I assess the relevance of the sources with
respect to the question I want to assess — i.e. Question 2a: whether the the
successive decisions about the evidential value of the bitemark-means in the
Norwegian Torgersen-case were evidence-based to the standard of Premise
1a. of this dissertation.
5.1 The Norwegian Torgersen case
1
At 1.27 am, early Saturday morning the 7. December 1957, the fire
department in Oslo was alerted to a fire in the basement of a block of flats in
Skippergata 6b, in the poorer harbour area of Oslo. It was the tenants on the
ground floor apartment who had called. The fire brigade arrived at 1.30 am
and discovered the body of a dead woman covered with smouldering scraps of
wood and cardboard. The police was alerted and arrived immediately — the
crime police and the medical examiner arrived later, at 2.30 am. The medical
examiner’s report (Eskeland, 2000: Vol. I;242-249) states that the woman
1Four sets of documents are the main sources of this section: Eskeland (2000), Eskeland,
(2005), Prosecution (2005), and Commission (2006)
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was found half naked, with her clothes torn off. She had bled significantly
from an injury to her head and from her mouth and ears. Only mild signs
of rigor mortis were observed on the crime scene. The report concluded that
that the most likely cause of death was asphyxiation by manual strangulation
and/or head-injury by blunt force. Time of death was not commented on in
the report. The woman’s face also had several areas of bruising, there were
signs of rape or attempted rape, and on her left breast, around the nipple, was
observed a patterned mark stated to look like a bite-mark. The crime scene
investigation gave reasons to believe that the actual murder had occurred in
the entrance-area towards the steps leading to the back yard of the building.
A pool of blood and faeces was observed here as well as a piece of RJ’s
underpants and some coins.
The dead woman was identified as Rigmor Johnsen (RJ) — a 16 years
old girl who lived with her family in the same building as the fire. The
last reliable observation of RJ was at 11.00pm on the ground floor in that
building, in the entrance area, by a neighbour — OE. RJ was observed being
with a man not known by this neighbour.
RJ’s movements until 11.00pm are not disputed: Earlier that evening
RJ had been together with her boyfriend (SEJ). They had been out for
Christmas-beer, and had parted as SEJ took the tram home at 22.30-22.40.
She then walked towards her house a few hundred meters away and stopped
to buy apples. The shopkeeper told the police that RJ had complained that
a man was annoying her and that she (the shopkeeper) had told the man to
leave RJ alone. Nevertheless, RJ and the man went away together. They
were seen by several witnesses as they approached RJ’s Skippergata 6b and,
last, inside this building by the neighbour woman, OE.
OE had been on her way to clean a store across the street. She came
back at 11.50pm together with her husband. He went straight up to their
flat, while OE went out into the backyard to empty some garbage. She
had noted a pool of ”blood and sick” in the corner by the door out into
the backyard. She had told her husband about it, commenting it to be yet
another sign of the bad neighbourhood they lived in.
At 0.58 am, the same morning, 500m from the crime scene, a police-patrol
stopped a man — Fredrik Fasting Torgersen — for not having lights on his
bicycle. They also suspected the bike was stolen. Torgersen was uncoop-
erative and they decided to take him in for further questioning. On their
way to the police-station Torgersen tried to escape, but failed. At the police
station the information about the incident in Skippergata 6b had arrived.
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The newspapers that day, Saturday, wrote that a young man was suspected
and arrested. The following Tuesday, 10.December, the newspapers showed
a photo of Torgersen.
5.1.1 The crime investigation
The gruesome nature of the murder caused an intense search for information
to answer the natural questions: Why, how, who had murdered RJ, and
was Torgersen involved? Forensic samples were identified, collected, and
analyzed, and complemented by information from witnesses to events directly
connected in time and place to the murder and to Torgersen, who soon came
to figure as the main suspect. A couple of other suspects were considered
too, but it is difficult to establish from Eskeland (2000) how the investigators
imagined the suspect population, how they arrived at those who did briefly
figure as potential suspects, how important any of these were at any stage of
the investigation, or how much information was gathered for the elimination
of each of these. Torgersen was known by the police from other incidents:
He had a previous sentence for violence against the police, and at the time of
the arrest he was on parole from prison due to a conviction for rape. Finally,
Torgersen was perceived to have had the opportunity as he was in the area in
the time period of the murder. In early spring 1958, Torgersen had become
the single suspect.
d. The investigator’s theory
In May/June 1958 the investigators recommended the following theory to the
prosecution: Torgersen was the person who was together with RJ between
RJ’s stop at the fruit-stall and 11.00pm in the entrance area of her block.
Some time between 11.00 and 11.30, in the entrance area towards the door
out to the backyard Torgersen tried to rape RJ and then hit and strangled
her. He then carried her out into the backyard, opened the trapdoors, went
down and lay the body on the immediate inside. He then went up to collect
the coat, hat, scarf, and bag of apples which he placed on the inside of the
body. There was no light in the basement. He built the fire in the dark.
He then discovered not having matches. Torgersen decided to go home for
matches — he walked to a cab-station 700m away, was driven to his home
(2,6km), arriving at ca. 12.00pm. He changed clothes while playing music
and left again at ca. 00.30am, and arrived by bike at Skippergata 9. He
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then walked across and in to nr. 6b, through to the backyard, opened the
trap-doors, and used 11 matches to light the material covering RJ. He walked
out the same route, fetches his bike at Skippergata 9 and cycled homeward.
After ca. 450 m., at 00.58am, he was stopped by the police.
e. Torgersen’s explanation and the defence counsel’s theory
Torgersen’s defence counsel had access to the same information as the in-
vestigation and must be presumed to have gatherer additional information
as well. Torgersen and his defence counsel argued the following explanation:
Friday 6.December, at ca. 11.00pm, outside a cinema in Oslo Torgersen met
a woman called Gerd (not identified at the time of the first trial) whom he
knew superficially. They went home to his house, where Torgersen lived with
his mother and two brothers. They arrived here at ca. 11.30pm. They stayed
in his room for an hour, playing music. He changed clothes. At 00.30am he
takes Gerd home by a bike borrowed from his young nephew. They separated
at Akersgaten and Torgersen walked and cycled alone the 750m to the place
he met the police patrol at 00.58am.
5.2 The court-history of the Torgersen-case
5.2.1 The public prosecutor’s indictment
The case against Torgersen was accepted by The Director of The public
prosecutions the 12. May 1958. The indictments delivered to Eidsivating
Court of Appeal were as follows:
I. The [Norwegian] General Penal Code Section 192 [Chapter
19. Sexual offences]
Section 192. Any person who
a) engages in sexual activity by means of violence or threats, or
b) engages in sexual activity with any person who is unconscious or incapable
for any other reason of resisting the act, or
c) by means of violence or threats compels any person to engage in sexual
activity with another person, or to carry out similar acts with himself or
herself
shall be guilty of rape and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
10 years. In deciding whether the offender made use of violence or threats or
whether the aggrieved person was incapable of resisting the act, importance
shall be attached to the whether the aggrieved person was under 14 years
of age.
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A penalty of imprisonment for not less than two years shall be imposed
if
a) the said activity was sexual intercourse, or
b) the offender has rendered a person in such a state as is specified in the
first paragraph (b) in order to engage in sexual activity.
Imprisonment for a term not exceeding 21 years may be imposed if
a) the rape has been committed by two or more persons jointly
b) the rape has been committed in a particularly painful or offensive man-
ner,
c) the offender has previously been convicted and sentenced pursuant to this
provision or section 195, or
d) as a result of the act the aggrieved person dies or sustains considerable
injury to body or health. Sexually transmitted diseases and generally infec-
tious diseases, cf. section 1-3, No. 3, cf. No.1, of the Act relating to control
of communicable diseases, shall always be deemed to be serious injury to
body or health pursuant to this section.
Any person who through gross negligence is guilty of rape pursuant to
the first paragraph is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years. If such circumstances as are specified in the third paragraph subsist,
the penalty shall be imprisonment for a term not exceeding eight years.
parts 1 and 3, relate to part 2, all relate to part 4,for having committed an act
which intention was to initiate a not completed crime, namely by violence or
by installing fear for life or health having forced someone to commit indecent
intercourse, as the indicted has a previous conviction by the same statute,
by having, Friday 6.December 1957 between 11.00pm and 11.30pm, in the
entrance-area of Skippergata 6b, Oslo, tried to force about intercourse with
16 years old RJ by strangulating her and/or hit her head violently on the
edge of the lower step of the stairs and tear apart her underwear.
II. The General Penal Code Section 233 [Chapter 22. Felonies
against another person’s life, body and health],
Section 233. Any person who causes another person’s death, or who
aids and abets thereto, is guilty of homicide and shall be liable to imprison-
ment for a term not less than 6 years.
If the offender has acted with premeditation or has committed the homi-
cide in order to facilitate or conceal another felony or to evade the penalty
for such felony, imprisonment for a term not exceeding 21 years may be im-
posed. The same applies in cases of repeated offenses and also when there
are especially aggravating circumstances.
parts 1 and 2, for having caused another one’s death as the murder is com-
mitted in order to diminish or hide another crime or to evade punishment
for such a crime, and or under particularly aggravating circumstances, by
having, at the same time and place as under I, caused the 16 years old RJ’s
death by strangulating her with hands and/or hit her head violently against
the edge of the step of the lower stairs as he committed the murder for
diminishing, hide, or evade the punishment for the indictment I.
III The General Penal Code Section 148 [Chapter 14. Felonies
against public safety],
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Section 148. Any person who causes any fire, collapse, explosion, flood,
maritime damage, railway accident or aircraft accident which may easily re-
sult in loss of human life or extensive destruction of another person’s prop-
erty, or who abets thereto, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of not
less than two years and not exceeding 21 years, but not less than five years
if as a result of the felony any person dies or or is seriously injured in body
or health. An attempt may be subject to the same penalty as a completed
felony.
for having caused fire by which loss of life easily could have been caused,
by having, the night before Saturday 7.December 1957, caused fire in the
basement of Skippergata 6b, Oslo, by collecting a heap of rubbish, paper
bags, cardboard, a dry Christmas tree and old wood material and lighting
with matches whereby loss of human life easily could have been caused, if
the fire had not been detected in time. (The Norwegian General Penal Code
1902/2005, Review Commission 2006:14-15)
5.2.2 The trial and the court’s decision in June 1958
The trial was by jury directly.2 During its two weeks in June 1958 the jury heard 71
witnesses and 19 experts in relation to several types of physical traces. The jury decided
the prosecution’s evidence was convincing to the instructed degree of probability. On the
16 June 1958 Eidsivating Court of Appeal delivered judgement, accepting that all the facts
in issue in all the allegations of the prosecution against Torgersen had been proven to the
required standard:
[Torgersen] is convicted for crimes against the General Civil Penal Code
Section 192, first and third part, relate to second part, related to Section
49 [Attempt], and relate to fourth part, related to Section 61 [Suspended
sentence and grounds for reducing or increasing the penalty] Section 233,
first and second part, and Section 148, first part, all related to Section 62,
and is sentenced to imprisonment for life.
In case of release he is to be submitted to rules of preventive deten-
tion/supervision in accordance with General penal Code 39 nr.1 a-f as long
as seen necessary, although not beyond 10 - ten - years without the court’s
approval. (Review Commission 2006:15)
Torgersen appealed to the Supreme Court, concerning procedural aspects,
the sentencing, and the preventive supervision. This appeal was rejected by
the Supreme Court’s Appeal Committee in a ruling 1.November 1958. At the
same time Torgersen addressed a motion for retrial of his case to Eidsivating
Court of Appeal in November 1958, but withdrew it in July 1959.
2See Appendix: Brief overview of the Norwegian legal system.
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5.2.3 A miscarriage of justice?
A second motion for retrial was addressed to Eidsivating Court of Appeal
22. March 1973. This was rejected 27. June 1975. It was appealed, but
sustained by a High Court Ruling 31. May 1976. A third motion for retrial
was addressed to Borgarting Court of Appeal in September 1997. The motion
was rejected August 2000, appealed, but sustained by High Court Ruling of
28. November 2001.
In the aftermath of both these rounds in the Norwegian Courts caused
heated public debates with rather hostile fronts emerging. Torgersen’s de-
fence counsel argued that he had been wrongfully convicted: The overall ev-
idence, including the forensic evidence, had been biased against him and the
three necessary means of evidence involving forensic items — the bitemark
on RJ’s breast, excrement from the main crime scene and from the sus-
pect’s clothing/shoe, and spruce-needles from main crime scene and from
the suspect’s clothing — had been based on analyzes which were unreliable,
incomplete, and ”unscientific”.
But Torgersen and his counsel were not able to convince the judges of the
Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court. It sustained the Court of Appeals
decision to reject the motion by High Court Ruling of 28. November 2001.
5.2.4 The last effort: The Norwegian Criminal Cases
Review Commission
A last motion for retrial was decided in 2004, when the The Norwegian
Criminal Cases Review Commission (Commission) was established as
an independent legal body.
The Commission is not an ordinary legal body — it may not itself produce
legally enforceable decisions in given cases, but, if reopening is decided, the
commission will refer the case back for retrial at the same court-level it was
last decided. Only if new circumstances, new evidence, or other conditions
have come into existence since the last court decision may the Commission
decide to reopen the case by sending it back to court for retrial. (The Nor-
wegian Criminal Procedure Act 1981/2006: Sections 390-393).
In Eskeland (2005) (the document containing the motion to have the case
reviewed by Commission) Torgersen’s counsel argued that the Torgersen-case
is a rare case of exception where the courts have delivered the wrong decisions
in total five times. The counsel argued that both sections 391, 1 and 3 and
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section 392 of The Criminal Procedure Act were fulfilled. The means of
evidence relevant to this dissertation, the bitemark-means, figured in both
arguments:
One forensic odontological expert witness intentionally lied when testify-
ing about the bite-mark during the trial (Eskeland 2005;80)
The bitemark excludes that Torgersen can be the perpetrator. This is new.
(Eskeland 2005;83)
All the experts to today, including the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine,
with the exception of professor [odontology] Tore Solheim [footnote 70: ”Sol-
heim’s view cannot be taken seriously. See section 9.2 above and chapter 8,
section 7”] agree that the bitemark on Rigmor Johnsen’s breast is not iden-
tical to Torgersen’s teeth. All the experts today, including The [Norwegian]
Board of Forensic Medicine, with the exception of professor Tore Solheim
[footnote 71: ”See previous note”], agree that there is no disciplinary basis
on which to conclude that there is a probability that the bitemark connects
Torgersen to the murder. This includes the British experts [MacDonald
and Whittaker, the court-appointed experts, see chapter ], who openly ac-
knowledges that they have no disciplinary basis for their conclusion ”very
likely”. The same applies for the Supreme Court’s Appeals Committee in
2001 (Supreme Court Decision 2001). In 1958 the bitemark was presented
as identical to Torgersens teeth and the evidence was perceived as an almost
certain evidence that Torgersen was guilty. (Eskeland 2005:76-79)
But the Commission was not convinced: On 8. December 2006 it con-
cluded that the conditions required by the sections 391 and/or 392 in the
Criminal Procedures Act were not met (Commission 2000). Nothing new was
seen added to the motion which had not been considered several times by
previous courts and latest by the Supreme Court in 2001 (The Commission’s
arguments concerning the bitemark-means and concerning legal evidence and
proof is presented in an addendum to chapter 7).
The repeated assessments and decisions about the bitemark in this case
will be seen to represent a series of individual decisions about the bitemark-
means. In the next two chapters I will analyze the reasoning towards the re-
peated decisions that the bitemark-means was basically (causally/logically)
positively relevant to the indictment General Penal Code Section 192 and/or
Section 233. The aim is to identify the epistemological norms and method-
ological procedures of that reasoning and to assess whether these norms
and procedures are able to evidence-base these decisions to the standard
of Premise 1 in this dissertation.
104
But before proceeding to this assessment I must assess whether the sources
of information is sufficiently relevant.
5.3 The relevance of the sources
Are the sources available about the Torgersen-case relevant for identifying
and assessing the epistemological norms and methodological procedures be-
hind the investigative decisions about the case-specific value of the bitemark-
means?
5.3.1 Excerpts to the High Court’s Appeal’s Com-
mittee, Criminal Case Nr. 2000/1148, Fredrik
Fasting Torgersen v. The Public Prosecution
2000; Volumes I-IV.
The first and main source is Stle Eskeland’s Utdrag til Hyesteretts Kjremlsut-
valg Straffesak Nr. 2000/1148 Fredrik Fasting Torgersen mot Den Offentlige
Ptalemyndighet 2000; Volumes I-IV (Excerpts to the High Court’s Appeal’s
Committee, Criminal Case Nr. 2000/1148, Fredrik Fasting Torgersen v. The
Public Prosecution 2000; Volumes I-IV). This source will be referred to as
”Eskeland (2000)”.
Eskeland (2000) contains the primary material: Copies or transcripts of
initial and later police and crime scene personnel reports; fire brigade reports;
initial and later witness- and suspect-interviews; correspondence between the
parties (court, prosecution, and defence counsel); and the reports provided
by the forensic or scientific experts requested to assist on the assessment of
physical traces as well as the correspondence between these, their parties,
and the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine.
I have no reason to question the reliability of Eskeland (2000) — neither
the accuracy nor its authenticity. It is not perfect, but is within the limits
of what can be expected of this kind of information given the purpose of
Eskeland (2000) as well as the purpose of this dissertation.
The mere volume of the collection suggests that it contains ”everything”.
But of course it does not. Eskeland (2000) is first of all the information
collected given the needs of Eskeland who had taken on to defend Torgersen
from the time he decided to motion for retrial for the second (or, strictly,
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the third) time in 1993. The kind of information relevant for this purpose
is clearly less than perfectly relevant for my question about the reasoning of
the crime-investigators.
Eskeland (2000) is what it is due to the original purpose and due to the
traditional role of the Norwegian defence counsel: The latter led to seeking
information relevant for decreasing the certainty of the court’s conclusion
about the indictment. The former relevance issue is more serious for my
purposes: Eskeland (2000) has very little information directly relevant to the
crime investigator’s reasoning. It includes information about the reasoning
of the forensic experts. But only about this reasoning as it is presented in
their written reports.
The main explanation is that only the court’s adjudication of evidence
during the trial phase can constitute reasons for retrial. Whether a wrongful
adjudication is caused by incorrect weighing during the trial phase or during
the investigative phase does not matter much: It is the court which has to
ensure that the information used in the means of evidence in the case is
the best possible for the legal purpose. The information about the crime
investigator’s reasoning was therefore less relevant for the purpose of the
counsel.
A second explanation is that the original holder of all the potentially rel-
evant information — the police and the prosecutor — either did not find it
relevant or could not release it because it does not exist. To take the latter
first, a person subject to a Norwegian police investigation has in principle a
right to access the same information as the police investigator, but in prac-
tice this principle might come into conflict with other legal or investigative
needs. A grey zone of judgement will necessarily exist here. However, it is
unlikely that this factor has been important in this case as the case was old.
More important, then, is the reason that the police simply could not release
such information because it does not exist in the written format. I am not
able to document whether Norwegian investigators in 1958 were obliged to
log the investigation. Neither am I able to document whether investigators
in 1958 could influence the mandate and the performance of medical and
odontological experts.
The Prosecuting Authority in Norway was contacted for access to infor-
mation about the investigation of the case. But the cost of gaining such
access was decided too high, both in light of what I expected to find and in
light of the purpose of the information. The access to governmental bodies’
documents are in Norway in principle open to the public by law, but will
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in practice be conditioned by legal issues of privacy. Documents relating to
crime investigations are by nature sensitive to privacy issues and access is
authorized by application to several public bodies — a procedure which is
time and labour consuming. An authorization also involved the risk of being
imposed publication clauses. And the risk was still that not even this ad-
ditional information would be relevant for my purpose. All in all, I decided
thus not to pursue access to this information.
The court-proceedings from 1958 are available but do not contain the
detailed content of the examination of the experts and the investigator. The
minutes only inform about who was examined when by whom.
A fourth possible reason why Eskeland (2000) does not contain informa-
tion about the reasoning of the investigators concerning the bitemark-means
is that the police investigators simply was not much involved in neither the
communication/mandating of the expert-analyzes nor the construction of the
means of evidence. It is possible that the mandate was formulated rather
generally by the court when initially and formally appointing the expert as
a court expert, and it is possible that specification beyond the mandate was
done by the expert himself and/or in communication with the prosecutor of
the case. The modern investigator may be more involved in the mandating
of experts, but I am not able to document anything about this relationship,
not in the Torgersen-case and not more generally.
5.3.2 Eskeland (2005): The evidence in the Torgersen-
case
A second source of information is Stle Eskeland’s Bevisene i Torgersensaken
(”The evidence in the Torgersen case”) from 2005. This source will be re-
ferred to as ”Eskeland (2005)”.
Eskeland (2005) contains the argument of the motion for retrial addressed
to the Norwegian Criminal Case Review Commission in 2004. This document
is not very relevant with respect to the reasoning of the investigator on the
case, but it illuminates that the role of a legal defence counsel is different from
the role of a scientist or an investigator. Concerning the bitemark-evidence
Eskeland (2005) argues that
All the experts today, including the Board of Forensic Medicine, with the
exception of professor Tore Solheim [footnote 71: ”Solheim’s view cannot
be taken seriously by anyone. See section 9.2 above and chapter 8 section
7.”] agree that the bitemark on Rigmor Johnsen’s breast is not identical to
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Torgersen’s teeth.
All the experts today, including the Board of Forensic Medicine, with the ex-
ception of professor Tore Solheim [footnote 72: ”See previous note”.] agree
that there is no scientific [forensic odontology] basis for concluding that it is
probable that the bitemark connects Torgersen to the murder. This applies
also to the British experts [the court-appointed experts in 1997-2006], who
openly acknowledges that they do not have any scientific [forensic odontol-
ogy] basis for their conclusion ”very likely”. Eskeland (2005:77-78)
On first reading of this and knowing that the case had been repeatedly
rejected (and possibly requiring my gullibility) I did indeed worry that some-
thing was seriously wrong in the Norwegian legal institution. But having had
the time to study all the material I see that the statement above can only
be true if the term ”identical” and ”probable” are interpreted in the most
formal sense. Such precision is not available in practical forensic diagnoses.
The purpose of this kind of information is not primarily to enlighten the
reader about the nuanced positions of the experts. The purpose is to influ-
ence the readers’ basic sentiment towards the case — in order to ultimately
protect the defendant’s rights. As said, substantiating the argument in this
way is perhaps appropriate for the counsel in trial phase modus, but is almost
”dangerous” as a source of information about the reasoning of the succes-
sive investigators on this case. Eskeland (2005) is therefore used only for
information about the sub-claims possible in this case.
5.3.3 The Public Prosecution (2005): Statement to
Fredrik Fasting Torgersen’s Motion of 25. Febru-
ary 2004 for retrial of criminal case adjudicated
by Eidsivating Court of Appeals 16. June 1958.
A third source of information is the report produced by the Norwegian
Higher Prosecution Authority on request of the Norwegian Criminal Case
Review Commission: Oslo Statsadvokatembeter (2005) Ptalemyndighetens
uttalelse til Fredrik Ludvig Fasting Torgersens begjring av 25. februar 2004
om Gjenopptakelse av straffesak pdmt av Eidsivating lagmannsrett 16. juni
1958 (The Public Prosecution (2005): Statement to Fredrik Fasting Torg-
ersen’s Motion of 25. February 2004 for retrial of criminal case adjudicated
by Eidsivating Court of Appeals 16. June 1958). This source will be referred
to as ”Prosecution (2005)”.
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Prosecution (2005) corrects for some of the relevance-issue posed by Eske-
land (2000), but has the same basic relevance issues as Eskeland (2005). The
Public Prosecution (2005) may be expected to be less biased than Eskeland
(2005) in one sense: Unlike the defence counsel, the prosecution is formally
obliged to attend to all the aspects of all the necessary evidence of the case.
However, other communication-techniques are available for one not wanting
to divulge too much. Anyway, the arguments of Prosecution (2005) are re-
lated to the legal formal conditions for retrial, they are in the terms of the
prosecutor-role, and contain thus less information about the investigators’
reasoning.
5.3.4 The Norwegian Criminal Case Review Commis-
sion (2006): Decision in case nr. 2004-00071,
Fredrik Ludvig Fasting Torgersen v. The Pub-
lic Prosecution Authority
A fourth source of information is the final report of the Norwegian Crimi-
nal Case Review Commission from 2006: Beslutning i sak nr. 2004-00071,
Fredrik Ludvig Fasting Torgersen mot Den offentlige ptalemyndighet (The
Norwegian Criminal Case Review Commission (2006): Decision in case nr.
2004-00071, Fredrik Ludvig Fasting Torgersen v. The Public Prosecution
Authority). This Source will be referred to as ”Commission (2006)”.
Commission (2006) is more relevant to my question about the crime in-
vestigative reasoning and may be said to complement Eskeland (2000). Com-
mission (2006) contains assessments of the arguments of the parties as well as
assessments of the expert-reports generated over the years. It also contains
a lengthy justification for the Commission’s decision in the Torgersen-case.
But not even the information of Commission (2006) is optimal for my
purpose in this dissertation — again because the Commissions’ mandate was
to assess the defendant’s motion with respect to the requirements of the
Criminal Procedure Act’s Section 391 and 392. This mandate is not very
different from my question in this dissertation. We are both investigating
the evidence-basis of the necessary means of evidence in the Torgersen-case,
but Commission (2006) seems to hold that the decision-problems of the trial-
phase are representative for all decision-problems occurring in the different
phases of the criminal case process — it does not differentiate the problems
as I do by Premise 2 and Premise 3 from Chapter 1.
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5.3.5 Are the sources sufficiently relevant?
In this dissertation I want to identify and assess the epistemological norms
and methodological procedures adhered to by the crime investigators. But
are the sources relevant for this question if they do not contain much infor-
mation about how these investigators reasoned?
Eskeland (2000), Eskeland (2005), Public Prosecution (2005), or Review
Commission (2006) cannot be said to be optimal sources of information: All
have their own purposes which are more or less different from mine. And
any more directly relevant information may not even exist.
But the sources do contain information which is indirectly relevant to my
question: All the expert-reports requested for the investigative assessment of
the bitemark-means are available. I believe I may use these to represent the
reasoning of the crime investigators:
(1) It is known that all the courts as well as the Review Commission (2006)
decided that all the three indictments of the prosecution were proven
to the required degree of provability by the prosecution’s means of
evidence; and
(2) It may be assumed that the bitemark-means was a necessary necessary
means of evidence for at least one of the indictments — that one or two
of the indictments could not have been found proven to the standard
required without the bitemark-means:
a. nobody voiced the argument that the bitemark-means is superfluous
to the indictment(s),
b. the bitemark-means was repeatedly reinvestigated, and
c. the costs involved by these reinvestigations (in terms of money, time,
and public confidence) were accepted.
If this is true we also know that the following consequences must have
been found sufficiently proven as well:
• The skinmark observed on the victim’s left breast is a human bitemark;
• Torgersen’s biting-mechanism by April 1958 is the causal source-object
of the bitemark;
• The bitemark occurred simultaneously with the lethal and rape injuries;
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• There was only one human agent other than the victim present during
the time-interval specified for the lethal injuries.
All these consequences or bitemark-means criteria must each be suffi-
ciently relevant to the bitemark-means for the bitemark-means to be posi-
tively relevant for the indictment(s): If the latter was found so, then by logical
implication, each of these consequences must have been found relevant to a
degree which made the bitemark-means more probable than not.
The three first consequences or criteria rest directly on the conclusions
of the bitemark-experts’ analyzes of the bitemark and Torgersen and other’s
biting-mechanisms. We know that all the court-appointed bitemark-experts
recommended holding Torgersen as the most likely biter. The experts’ justi-
fication for these conclusions were presented in both oral testimonies during
the trial and other court-hearings and written reports. As said above, Eske-
land (2000) does not contain information on the oral testimonies, but contain
all the relevant expert-reports. Eskeland (2005), Public Prosecution (2005),
and Review Commission (2006) contains information about the oral testi-
monies during the court-hearings as well.
The consequences of accepting the bitemark-means as relevant and nec-
essary for the indictment(s), I hold, is good enough reason for letting the
experts’ reasoning towards the three first criteria represent the crime inves-
tigators reasoning about them. The last criteria — that there was only one
human agent other than the victim present during the time-interval specified
for the crime-event — cannot be assessed by any one particular scientific or
forensic expert-domain. It must be assessed by the crime investigator via
case-particular information in the form of both lay and expert observations.
I was not able to find such information in relation to the bitemark-means.
The criterion of one or more offenders is necessary for other means of ev-
idence as well but I could not find such information for these either. As
said above, not having written information does not mean that the question
was not assessed. To avoid letting the absence of information about the
assessments of this criterion undermine my later analyzes I will impose the
following assumption:
The criterion that there was only one offender in the Torgersen-
case is fulfilled to the required degree of certainty. The Torgersen-
case is thus an example of a one-offender case.
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One possibility remains: Perhaps the crime investigators actually did
find the experts reasoning unjustified but were overruled by the legal agents?
This would imply that the crime investigators could maintain a standard
of justification which was different than both the bitemark-experts and the
prosecutor. This is of course possible but not very likely, particularly in light
of Commission (2006): The standard held by the investigators more likely
than not agreed with the standards of the prosecutor and the bitemark-
experts in this case.
Under the assumption that there was only one offender in the Torgersen-
case, I find it safe to let the justifications of the bitemark-experts repre-
sent the justifications of the crime-investigators with respect to the decisions
about the bitemark-means.
5.3.6 Independent decisions about the bitemark-
means?
The repeated assessments and decisions about the bitemark-means in the
Torgersen-case will be seen as a series of separate decisions about a particular
kind of bitemarks under a particular kind of case-conditions — as a sample of
decisions from the European population of such decisions. This is clearly not
a sample in the statistical sense of that notion as the decisions are dependent
on each other in too many respects, being independent only by having been
made by different investigators and experts. Ideally I should have collected
a much higher number of cases with the same kind of bitemarks occurring
under same kind of crime events and being investigated for the same kind of
purposes from different European jurisdictions. That would have been better
with respect to the first question of this dissertation. But bitemarks are
relatively few compared to other kinds of forensic traces. And, if a sufficient
number of such cases do exist, the accessing and processing of case details
required for establishing such an ideal information-basis would extend far
beyond the limits of a PhD-dissertation. To amend for the biasing effects of
dependence I will also study the epistemological norms and methodological
procedures of bitemark-experts when these produce general knowledge of
phenomena and mechanisms relevant for forensic diagnoses of bitemarks on
human skin. This study is presented in chapter eight of this dissertation.
In the next chapter I will assess and decide about the evidence-basis of
the first decision about the bitemark-means in the Torgersen case — in the
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The counsel’s arguments for retrial of the Torgersen-case
Torgersen’s defence counsel could not but see that the court’s assessments of
means of evidence as basically flawed and that this was evident to anyone not
directly involved on the sides of the police-investigation, prosecution, or the
judges of the court. Eskeland (2005) argued therefore that the Torgersen-
case was an example that certain social-psychological mechanisms had been
at work within the legal community: The authority of an institution and its
internal loyalty may incapacitate later courts from seeing and correcting the
serious inadequacies or errors committed by a previous court if the belittling,
rationalization, or even cover-ups had gone too far. The risk of miscarriage
of justice by these mechanisms, Eskeland argued, was well known to the
Norwegian legal community by Krarup’s (1996) study of such mechanisms in
British cases of miscarriages of justice:
During the assessment of the motion for retrial in 1973-1976 it was clear to
anyone having the ability and will to study the case in an unprejudiced way
that the adjudication of the evidence in 1958 suffered from serious weak-
nesses. All these weaknesses were interpreted away. In 2001, after professor
Senn [the expert-witness on the bitemark of the defense] and three other
prominent forensic odontologists from USA had broken down the myth that
the bitemark connected Torgersen to the murder, this was obvious. But not
even the Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court was able to rid itself
from this mental force. (Eskeland 2005:88)
In addition Eskeland (2005) saw to six other possible sources of miscar-
riages of justice relevant to the Torgersen-case:
1. A court may give undue weight to witness statements: A witness, despite being
truthful, may still be unreliable because of misperception due to sense-inaccuracy
or interpretation (citing four studies of witness-behaviour and incorrect court deci-
sions)
2. A court may be recommended unsound forensic evidence by experts not really being
experts due to lack of experience or competence but having a high status
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3. A court who is mislead to believe the certainty of actually uncertain forensic evi-
dence may underestimate the true evidential value of witness-statements countering
the forensic evidence;
4. A court may uncritically trust that the police and the prosecutor present all the
evidence in the case as obliged by law — both the evidence for and the evidence
against the accused (citing The Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act 1981/2006,
sections 166, 168, 226 and actual cases where evidence had been either conveniently
left out, wilfully left out, or forged)
5. A court may uncritically trust that the police and the prosecution, during the
investigative phase, have actually eliminated other possible suspects (citing actual
cases where this had not been the case);
6. A court may be led by a judge who has little ability or will to admit that a wrong
has been committed. (Eskeland 2005:91-95)
In the Norwegian legal system a jury is set to decide the issue of guilt
in cases like the Torgersen-case. Before 2010, the jury was not required to
justify its decision and the Supreme Court had in 1999 decided that the fact
that the issue of guilt was decided by a jury should not constitute a reason
for reopening of a case. Torgersen’s defence counsel agreed that the jury
not being obliged to justify its decision while at the same time being the
only agent with the direct access to the best evidence — by being the first
hand witnesses of the actual presentation of both the witness-statements and
the forensic evidence — makes it difficult to assess whether it actually had
weighed the evidence correctly. Nevertheless, they argued, it is possible to
assess the premises of the evidence presented to the jury: The assessment of
these premises in the Torgersen-case would demonstrate that the means of
evidence could not provide sufficient reasons for the jury’s conclusion (Eske-
land 2005:98). And finally, the counsel agreed that the principle of direct and
immediate proof — that oral testimonies of both lay witnesses and experts’
evidence are heard and observed directly by the jury is better than if the
evidence is represented by someone or by text — did sometimes enhance the
appropriate assessment of the evidence. But they argued that this was not
relevant to the critical issues in the Torgersen-case: The forensic items in
question still existed in good condition; the witness-statements in question
exist in written form in the police transcripts as do the expert-reports; and,
not the least, there exist methods today which were not available in 1958
which counter the loss of information caused by the time passed (Eskeland
2005:99-101).
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The counsel’s claim that the successive courts’ mode of assessing the
evidence had been built on insufficient premises and thus exemplified a flawed
kind of reasoning drew support from the scientific community. The following
article (published in a newspaper read by the cultural elite in Oslo) by a well
known and respected professor of social science captured an important part
of the defence counsel’s argument:
The approach used by the [court-experts] deviates from what is recom-
mended by methodology. When analysts are mandated to classify a material,
and particularly when this involves elements of judgment, the analysts should
not know the hypothesis preferred by those mandating. Knowledge of this
preference may bias the analysts. Put on edge, the approach used in this
case reminds of a situation in which a witness is presented with the suspect
and asked if they agree with the police that this is the guilty one. [. . . ] The
[court-experts’] conclusion that it is very likely that Torgersen is the true
biter can only be supported by knowledge about how many people were in
that area of Oslo at the time of the event and who had teeth which could
have made similar marks. If we as an example assume that it was 10 such
persons, including Torgersen, the probability that Torgersen is the biter is
one in ten — 10 per cent. If the number of possible biters is 100 the prob-
ability is reduced to one per cent — if the information included is only that
of dental properties. If other information is included, say, about alibi, the
number of possible candidates becomes smaller. If having reduced the num-
ber of possible candidates to three, the probability of any of the candidates
of not being the biter is still larger than the probability of being the biter.
To conclude on the basis of odontological data that it is very probable,
i.e. more than 50 per cent chance, that Torgersen is the true biter is the
same as to conclude that there was probably no other person with teeth
like Torgersen who could have made such a bitemark. This is a conclusion
which may not be drawn without reliable information about the dental state
of men in the Oslo-area in 1958. When such information do not exist, as
is admitted by the [court-experts], one can from elementary principles of
scientific inferences conclude that the [court-experts’] conclusion is not sound.
(Hellevik, O. Scientifically doubtful conclusions Dagbladet 2000, 28.June, in
Eskeland 2000; Vol. IV:179)
The article comments on the basis for the bitemark-evidence, but the
same kind of unsound reasoning was claimed for the other forensic evidence
as well.
Torgersen’s counsel claimed that if each of the forensic means of evidence
is insufficient they cannot together form a sufficient premise for the conclu-
sion:
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In a criminal case the whole body of evidence must be assessed. That
means that one must interpret all the evidence in connection and decide
whether they are compatible with the defendant being the offender and to
which probability. More precisely it must be correct to proceed in the fol-
lowing way:
(1) If there exists one or several pieces evidence which each
separately excludes the possibility that the defendant is the of-
fender and if the other evidence do not with certainty (beyond
reasonable doubt) demonstrate that the defendant is the of-
fender, there exists sufficient reason to conclude that the de-
fendant is not the offender.
(2) If there does not exist evidence excluding the defendant as
the offender and the evidence in total makes it more probable
than not that the defendant is not the offender, there exists suf-
ficient reason to conclude that he is not the offender.
(3) If the evidence in total suggests that it is more probable that
the defendant is the offender, but if there nevertheless exists rea-
sonable doubt that this is true then there exists sufficient reason
to conclude that the defendant is not the offender. This follows
from the rule of burden of evidence in criminal cases, which is to
ensure that reasonable doubt goes in the favour of the defendant
in the form of acquittal. This rule must in general also apply
when assessing a case for reopening.
(4) Only if all the evidence in total suggests that it is approxi-
mately certain (beyond reasonable doubt) that the defendant is
the offender does reason exist to conclude that the defendant is
the offender.
Which conclusion the total evidence should lead to with respect
to the probability that the defendant is the offender may often
create doubt because doubt may exist with respect to any one
of the pieces of evidence. But some types of evidence are of-
ten considered more secure than other. These will, then, in the
assessment of the overall evidence be given more weight than
(”overrun”) other evidence. (Eskeland 2005:113-115)
But Torgersen and his counsel were not able to convince the judges of
the Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court — who sustained the Court of
Appeals decision to reject the motion by High Court Ruling of 28. November
2001.
Eskeland (2005), the motion for review addressed to the Review Com-
mission argued that the Torgersen-case is a rare case of exception where the
courts have delivered the wrong decisions in total five times:
However, it is important to underscore that The Review Commission is
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to assess a totally different picture of evidence than the courts had avail-
able both during 1973-1976 and during 1997-2001. It is sufficient to refer
to the fact that nothing is left of the technical [forensic] evidence. The Re-
view Commission is therefore not to adjudicate the earlier interpretations of
the evidential material in the form as it then existed. The Review Commis-
sion’s task is to draw the necessary consequence of what we today know with
certainty: The three [sets of] technical [forensic] evidence does not connect
Torgersen to the murder. Substantially the task is therefore simple. The law
cannot of course authorize denying retrial when the main evidence in the
case are no longer valid. Psychologically, however, it must be acknowledged
that the task may be difficult. (Eskeland 2005:85-86)
The defence counsel argued that both sections 391, 1 and 3 and section
392 of The Criminal Procedure Act (chapter 27. Reopening a case) were
fulfilled. Section 391, 1, was allegedly fulfilled by the following claims:
• One forensic odontological expert witness intentionally lied when testifying about
the bite-mark during the trial;
• one witnesses intentionally lied during the trial;
• the prosecutor intentionally withheld crucial information from two witnesses; and
• the amount and kind of faeces used to connect Torgersen to the crime scene was
manipulated by the expert scientist. (Eskeland 2005;80-81);
And it argued that both Section 391, 3 and Section 392, second part, was
fulfilled. The following set of claims is only a selection of the themes actually
claimed — the set most thoroughly treated by the Review Commission (2006)
and containing claims relevant to this dissertation.
Firstly, there exist, in 2005, several pieces of exclusionary evidence. By
exclusionary evidence we understand evidence which by its nature is not
compatible with Torgersen being the perpetrator and that it is a high degree
of certainty that the evidence is correctly interpreted. Both conditions must
be satisfied and is satisfied according to the following evidence:
1. The bitemark excludes that Torgersen can be the perpetrator. This is
new.
2. The time of death — which was after 23.30, most likely ca. 01.00 —
excludes that Torgersen can be the perpetrator. This is new.
3. The fire was initiated after Torgersen had been arrested by the police.
This excludes that Torgersen can have been the perpetrator. This is
new
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4. Absence of traces on Torgersen compared to traces on the crime scene
(blood, soil and dirt, faeces (clothing nr.1), textile fibre, hair, finger-
prints, building material) excludes that Torgersen can have been the
perpetrator. This is new.
5. Torgersen has an alibi. Torgersen’s mother and sister witnessed truly
about the time on which Torgersen was at home and that he was
together with a woman. Her name was Gerd Kristiansen. The alibi
excludes that Torgersen can have been the perpetrator. This is new.
Secondly, there exist, a series of conditions which do not connect Torgersen
to the murder:
6. It is most likely that Torgersen could not have had time to meet Rigmor
Johnson when she was on her way home just before 23.00 o’clock. This
is new.
7. The faeces-evidence does not connect Torgersen to the murder. This is
new.
8. The spruce needle-evidence does not connect Torgersen to the murder.
This is new.
[. . . ] There no longer exists any evidence which connects Torgersen to
the murder. This is how it necessarily must be when Torgersen is innocent.
Most of the interpretations of the evidence are certain to such an extent that
another reasonable interpretation cannot be claimed. To illustrate this, we
will briefly demonstrate how the three pieces of forensic evidence was assessed
in 1958 and their status in 2005 [I will limit to the bitemark evidence. The
same kind of argument applies to the two other pieces of evidence]:
The bitemark evidence: All the experts to today, including the Norwe-
gian Board of Forensic Medicine, with the exception of professor [odontology]
Tore Solheim [footnote 70: ”Solheim’s view cannot be taken seriously. See
section 9.2 above and chapter 8, section 7”] agree that the bitemark on Rig-
mor Johnsen’s breast is not identical to Torgersen’s teeth. All the experts
today, including The [Norwegian] Board of Forensic Medicine, with the ex-
ception of professor Tore Solheim [footnote 71: ”See previous note”], agree
that there is no disciplinary basis on which to conclude that there is a prob-
ability that the bitemark connects Torgersen to the murder. This includes
the British experts [MacDonald and Whittaker, the court-appointed experts,
see chapter 5], who openly acknowledges that they have no disciplinary basis
for their conclusion ”very likely”. The same applies for the Supreme Court’s
Appeals Committee in 2001 (Supreme Court Decision 2001). In 1958 the
bitemark was presented as identical to Torgersens teeth and the evidence
was perceived as an almost certain evidence that Torgersen was guilty. (Es-
keland 2005:76-78)
But the Review Commission was not convinced: 8 December 2006 it
rejected review of the case by concluding that the conditions required by the
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sections 391 and/or 392 in the Criminal Procedures Act were not met by the
case (Review Commission 2000). Nothing new was seen added to the motion
which had not been considered several times by previous courts and latest
by the Supreme Court in 2001.
The Review Commission’s arguments concerning the bitemark-means and
legal evidence and proof in the Norwegian legal context are presented in an
addendum to chapter 7.
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Chapter 6
The first decision about the
bitemark-means in the
Torgersen-case
The Torgersen-case presents a series of crime investigative decisions about
the basic, causal-logical, value of a bitemark-means: A suspected human
bitemark observed on the victim was repeatedly assessed and decided, by
successive investigators and forensic bitemark-experts, to be positively rele-
vant to one or more of the legal indictments. The final degree of relevance
— having also accounted for information about situational, motivational,
victim-profile, etc. characteristics — was found to be strong enough to war-
rant a separate bitemark-means of evidence.
In this and the next chapter I will analyse the justifications provided for
the first decision about the bitemark-means in the Torgersen-case. I will
restrict to the basic decision — that the bitemark-means was/is basically
(causal-logically) positively relevant to one of the indictments (I will thus not
analyse the further decision, about the strength of this positive relevance).
The question of these two chapters is:
Were the series of crime investigative decisions about the rel-
evance of the bitemark-means in the Norwegian Torgersen-case




Premise 1a.A basic standard of evidence-basis for crime-investigative
decisions
A decision about the basic causal mechanism of a crime event is evidence-
based if all the reference-groups and -terms causally and logically neces-
sary for the decision are explicit and unequivocal and (a) enable person-
independent assessment of the probabilities and likelihoods of the events
involved and (b) enable person-independent assessment of the risk of decid-
ing wrongly about the causal mechanism — thereby contributing to (i) the
conviction of a true innocent person or the acquittal of a true responsible
person; (ii) the reduction of resources available to other cases; (iii) the public
loosing trust and confidence in the crime investigative services and the legal
institution.
In this chapter I concentrate on the first decision — the decision made in
1958. In the first section I deduce the logical consequences of the bitemark-
means in the case the indictment(s) in the case is(are) true. This logical
structure will be the frame of reference when I in the next sections identify
information relevant for assessing the above question.
6.1 The logical structure of the
bitemark-means
As we saw in the previous chapter, the legal agents on the Torgersen-case de-
cided that the bitemark-means was a necessary means of evidence for proving
the indictments to the legal standard required. Then they also accepted that
the causal-logical condition of the bitemark-means was sufficiently certain.
A bitemark-means of evidence, like any means of evidence, need to prove
a series of different kinds of conditions. In the first chapter of this disserta-
tion I argued that legal arguments and involves analyses about positive and
normative aspects or properties; foundational/simple and derived/complex
properties; as well as legal and a-legal properties. The causal-logical con-
dition exists for a means of evidence if the positive properties of the foun-
dational kind implied by the means of evidence are certain — in terms of
accuracy, precision/unambiguity, objectivity and impartiality — to the stan-
dard required in light of the consequences. This condition caters mainly to
epistemic needs. Other conditions will cater to contextual, situational, so-
cial, and emotional needs. Both kinds of needs are, as claimed by Premise
3 (Chapter 1) for this dissertation, necessary for people when forming confi-
dence and trust in claims and decisions.
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A causal-logical condition exist for a bitemark-means of evidence if
a. the causal agent (the person) identified in both the indictment and the
bitemark-means existed,
b. the causal object necessary for the act identified in the bitemark-means
exists,
c. the effect-objects necessary for both the acts of the indictment and the
means of evidence exist; and
d. the existences of a., b., and c. occurred in the intervals of time and
space specified in the indictment(s).
The causal-logical condition of a bitemark-means of evidence (as for any
means of evidence) is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
indictment in question.
In this and the next chapter the causal-logical condition of the bitemark-
means in the Torgersen-case is implied by the individuals (human or other,
physical or mental) and their relationships specified in the claims or proposi-
tions representing the indictment(s) and the bitemark-means. In the Torgersen-
case there were several indictments, but only two are directly relevant to the
bitemark-means. I collapse the two as they have the same causal-logical con-
dition. The indictment-proposition of the Torgersen-case will be specified
and denoted as follows:
PC: ”The suspect is the causal agent of the victim’s lethal/rape injuries
which occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b, Oslo.”
By this proposition the crime investigators claimed that the suspect was
the true causal agent of the mechanism which caused the effects observed —
the legally relevant such effects being the lethal/rape injuries of the victim.
In the remaining analyses I will hold the following assumptions:
• The victim was correctly identified;
• the time-interval specified in the indictment-proposition was correct;
• the space specified in the indictment-proposition was correct;
• the lethal/rape-injuries were correctly diagnosed and were the true cause of death;
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• the decision that there was only one human causal agent other than the victim
present at the time and place specified by the indictment-proposition was correct;
• the suspect was correctly identified; and
• the decision-agents (the bitemark-experts, the forensic examiner, and the crime-
investigator) were informed about the purpose of the diagnoses and the investigative
decisions; were sufficiently trained/experienced; had accurate senses and normal
and predictable reasoning-faculties (logical, cognitive, and emotional), and were
truthful.
The crime investigators in the Torgersen-case accepted the expert’s rec-
ommendation that the skinmark on the left breast on the victim was a
human adult bitemark. They also accepted the expert’s recommendation
that the suspect’s biting-mechanism was the most likely causal object of the
bitemark and that the biting had occurred during the same time interval
specified for the lethal/rape injuries. The investigators thus believed that
the bitemark connected the suspect to the victim and to the time-interval of
the lethal/rape-injuries — that it could be used as a means of evidence when
arguing for the truth of the indictment(s). The causal-logical condition of
the bitemark-means will be referred to as the bitemark-proposition and
specified and denoted as follows:
BM : ”The suspect is the causal agent of the bitemark observed on the left
breast of the victim which occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skip-
pergata 6b, Oslo.”
In the following I will first deduce the main logical implications of PC and
BM . I will, secondly, suggest an inductive structure for practical situation
in which the conditions are uncertain.
6.1.1 The logical consequences of PC and BM
The strictest logical standard possible is that for deductive arguments,
namely validity. This standard may be exploited analytically in practical
problems: Assuming that both the claims of PC and BM are true, then the
lethal/rape injuries and bitemark both occurred by necessary consequence
and explains, deterministically, why they are observable by us. But what
are the simpler propositions involved if BM are assumed to be true? These
propositions may be called diagnostic criteria or, in the legal context, con-
ditions which must be true for BM to be true. I have already assumed the
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truth of some of these conditions — those of time and place, the identity
of the victim, etc. There are four basic and logically necessary conditions
involved:
1. The skinmark on the victim must be a bitemark and not something
else;
2. the suspect’s biting-mechanism and not someone else’s biting- mecha-
nism must be the causal object of the bitemark;
3. the bitemark must have occurred simultaneously with the lethal/rape-
injuries and not during an event irrelevant to these injuries; and
4. the analytical norms and heuristics used by the decision-makers on the
case must be agreed to be conducive and not harmful to the penultimate
(crime-investigative) and the ultimate (legal) purposes of the decision.
Each of these conditions rests on further conditions. The second ba-
sic condition above, for example, requires that the biting-mechanism and
the bitemark are similar in a sense specific enough to exclude all biting-
mechanisms but the suspect’s, a kind of similarity requiring expert-knowledge
of a particular kind, etc. The basic conditions (and their sub-conditions) of
a true bitemark-proposition will be specified and denoted as follows:
BM1: ”The suspect’s biting-mechanism is the causal object of the
bitemark”;
BM1.1: ”The suspect’s biting mechanism’s joint state on bitemark-
index1 is compatible with the bitemark’s joint state on bitemark-
index2”;
”Bitemark-index2” refers to the set of characteristics observed of
the bitemark and decided by the expert to be relevant for diagnosing
the causal object of the bitemark; ”bitemark-index1” refers to the
set of corresponding or correlated characteristics of the suspect’s
biting-mechanism
BM1.11: ”The suspect’s biting-mechanism state on bitemark-index1
is bmi1”;
bmi1 denotes the biting-mechanism’s joint state or profile on
bitemark-index1
BM1.12: ”The bitemark’s state on bitemark-index2 is bmi2”;
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bmi2 denotes the bitemark’s joint state or profile on bitemark-
index2
BM2: ”The bitemark occurred simultaneously with the lethal and the rape
injuries”;
BM2.1: ”The bitemark’s state on the time-index is equal to the
lethal/rape injuries’ state on the time-index”;
”Time-index” refers to the set of characteristics observed of skin-
injuries and decided by the expert to be relevant for diagnosing the
time of occurrence of the bitemark
BM2.11: ”The lethal/rape-injuries’ state on the time index is t1”;
t1 denotes the lethal/rape-injuries’ joint state or profile on the time-
index
BM2.12: ”The bitemark’s state on the time-index is t2”;
t2 denotes the bitemark’s joint state or profile on the time-index
BM3: ”The analytical norms and heuristics are used in this case are agreed
to be conducive to the penultimate (crime investigative) and the ulti-
mate (legal) purposes of the decision”;
BM3.1: ”The norms of inference (epistemological and methodological)
are agreed to be conducive to those purposes”;
BM3.2: ”The profiling instruments (set of forensic markers) are agreed
to be conducive to those purposes”;
BM3.3: ”The technical instruments (observational techniques and
aids) are agreed to be conducive to those purposes”;
BM4: ” The skinmark is a bitemark caused by a human adult biting-mechanism”;
BM4.1: ”The causal object of the skinmark is a human adult biting-
mechanism”;
BM4.11 ”The skinmark has an external cause”
BM4.12 ”The skinmark is a delimited area of abnormal epidermal
structure”
BM4.2: ”The causal mechanism is biting — teeth onto skin (not skin
onto teeth)”;
Figure 6.1 might assist the perception of these logical consequences of
PC and BM were they to be true.
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OC   
T is the causal agent of the victim’s lethal/rape injuries which  
occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b, Oslo. 
BM 
T is the causal agent of the bitemark observed on the left  
breast of the victim which occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b, Oslo. 
BM1 
T’s biting-mechanism  
is the causal object of the bitemark 
BM2 
The bitemark occurred simultaneously  
with the lethal injuries 
BM1.1  
T’s biting-mechanism’s  state on  
bitemark-index1  
is compatible with  
the bitemark’s state on  
bitemark-index2 
BM1.11  




The bitemark’s state  
on bitemark-index2 I 
is bmi2  
BM2.1  
The bitemark’s state on  
the time-index is equal to  
the lethal/rape injuries’ state  
on the time-index   
BM2.11  
The lethal/rape injuries’  
state on the time index  
is t1 
BM2.12  
The bitemark’s state  
on the time-index is t2   
BM3 
The analytical norms and heuristics  
are agreed to be conducive to  
the aims and values of the 
criminal case process  
 
Expert-witnesses 
bitemark Lethal/rape injuries Torgersens biting-mechanism 
BM4 
The skinmark is a 
bitemark caused by a human  
adult’s biting-mechanism  
through biting  
BM3.1   BM3.2   BM3.3  BM4.1    BM4.2    
BM4.1    BM4.1    
Figure 6.1: A deductive structure of the physical conditions of the bitemark-means. An
arrow signifies that the two propositions involved are logically (or causally) related; and
the direction of the arrow signifies the direction of the transference of the justification.
Two propositions connected via an arrow will have the following interpretation: ”If the
proposition at the beginning of the arrow is true then the proposition at the arrowhead
will be true as well.”
We may turn the argument on its head and see BM1 through BM4
as premises for the conclusion, BM : all must be true for BM to be true.
If the biting-mechanism is by absolute necessity connected to the bitemark
then this by absolute necessity connects the suspect to the bitemark (via
the assumption that he is the only agent which motioned his own biting-
mechanism). This is necessary for BM . But this condition alone is not
sufficient, because the suspect could have made the bitemark during another
event irrelevant to the event involving the lethal injuries, because the human
bitemark could be a misclassification of the skinmark (it could be an animal
bitemark, caused by a tooth-like object, etc.), or because the analytical norms
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or technical heuristics are not agreed to be conducive to the purposes of the
decision. We could do the same exercise for the sub-conditions. All the
conditions are needed, no-one is alone sufficient. We thus have two chains
of implications continuing down to the forensic items observed and to the
persons making the observations.
6.1.2 An inductive structure of the physical aspects of
the bitemark-means
The standard of validity connected to deductive arguments is only a heuris-
tic in our situation of assessing an empirical means of evidence. For such
arguments we instead require soundness. As we saw in chapter two of this
dissertation, the standard of soundness is not precise: Any premise in a
complex inductive argument should be relevant for the conclusion, relevance
existing if the premise changes the certainty of the conclusion. But one may
not say anything general about the degree of change required. This depends
on the other premises and their degree of relevance, as well as on the content
of the argument and the context in which the argument is presented.
In the Torgersen-case, the bitemark-proposition could thus only be a
means of evidence if it was relevant to the indictment-proposition in the
restricted sense of it being able to reduce the uncertainty of the indictment-
proposition. In this dissertation I will only assess the decision that the
bitemark-proposition was relevant to the indictment-proposition. I will not
assess whether that relevance was of a sufficient degree. That would have
required similar assessments of all the other means of evidence in the case as
well — legal, forensic, and lay-evidence. This was decided to be beyond the
scope of this Ph.D.
To obtain an inductive structure of physical conditions of the bitemark-
means we need to change the direction of the arrows and rephrase the
propositions so that they need not be true or certain, but only likely. Fig-
ure 6.2 shows the inductive structure of the bitemark- and the indictment-
propositions.
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OC   
T is the causal agent of the victim’s lethal/rape injuries which  
occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b, Oslo? 
BM 
T is the causal agent of the bitemark observed on the left  
breast of the victim which occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b, Oslo? 
BM1 
T’s biting-mechanism  
is the causal object of the bitemark? 
BM2 
The bitemark occurred simultaneously  
with the lethal injuries? 
BM1.1  
T’s biting-mechanism’s  state on  
bitemark-index1  
is compatible with  
the bitemark’s state on  
bitemark-index2? 
BM1.11  




The bitemark’s state  
on bitemark-index2  
is bmi2?  
BM2.1  
The bitemark’s state on  
the time-index is equal to  
the lethal/rape injuries’ state  
on the time-index?   
BM2.11  
The lethal/rape injuries’  
state on the time index  
is t1? 
BM2.12  
The bitemark’s state  
on the time-index is t2?   
BM3 
The analytical norms and heuristics  
are agreed to be conducive to  
the aims and values of the 
criminal case process?  
 
Expert-witnesses? 
bitemark Lethal/rape injuries Torgersens biting-mechanism 
BM4 
The skinmark is a 
bitemark caused by a human  
adult’s biting-mechanism  
through biting?  
BM3.1?   BM3.2?   BM3.3?  BM4.1?    BM4.2?    
BM4.1?    BM4.1?    
Figure 6.2: An inductive structure of the physical conditions of the bitemark-means. An
arrow signifies that the two propositions involved are logically (or causally) related; and
the direction of the arrow signifies the direction of the transference of the justification.
Two propositions connected via an arrow will have the following interpretation: ”If the
proposition at the beginning of the arrow is sufficiently certain then the proposition at the
arrowhead has uncertainty changed (reduced or increased, depending on the nature of the
relationship between the two propositions).
The above is just the logical structure of the relationship between the
bitemark-proposition and the indictment-proposition when the former is as-
sumed to be relevant for the latter. Now we must attend to the substantial
or material content of that structure. The logical structure is a necessary
element of the argument — analogue to the basic engineering structure of a
bridge or a building which ensures that the bridge does not collapse when
subjected to the intended use. But the engineering part is not sufficient —
one also needs architecture, or the tailoring of the content of the structure
to the needs of the situation. So: What was the content of the first expert’s
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arguments, in 1957/1958? How did the expert justify the claim of relevance?
6.2 Justifying the claim that BM was rele-
vant to PC
The police’s medical examiner, who arrived at the crime scene at most 3,5
hours after the death of the victim, had both in the crime scene report and
in the post-mortem report recorded observing a set of smaller marks and
punctured skin around the nipple of the victim’s left breast. He believed it
to be a bitemark and called dentist Ferdinand Stroem.
Stroem was a practicing dentist but held a post teaching forensic dentistry
at the School of odontology and was a regularly appointed forensic expert in
cases of identification of dead bodies. He had no practical experience with
diagnosing bite-marks. Stroem initiated his examination of the skinmark at
most 10,5 hours after time of death. Stroem and the medical examiner agreed
that the skinmark was a human bitemark and the examiner requested the
court to appoint Stroem as the odontology-expert on this skinmark (Stroem
1958:1).
It should be noted that a Norwegian court-appointed forensic expert is
expected to be independent of the parties, serving them both, and is (was?)
obliged by law to submit a written report to the Norwegian Commission
for Forensic Medicine for accreditation.12 If accredited the report will get
status as legal evidence in the case. Stroem’s report has been translated and
is included in Appendix 2 in its entirety as it is rather brief and gives an
historical and practical example of forensic expert reasoning.
I was unable to find any document in Eskeland (2000) specifying the
mandate of the bitemark-analysis. Nor was I able to find any informa-
tion about the communication between Stroem and the crime investigator
or prosecutor in charge of the case. The transcripts from the trial did refer
to Stroem’s testimony in court, but contained only court-administrative de-
tails. The testimony would have complemented the written report, but I am
left with Stroem’s written report Bitemark examination of the murdered Rig-
mor Johnsen (Stroem 1958, in Eskeland 2000; Vol. I: 1-7) as the only source
of Stroem’s reasoning. Stroem (1958) has no detailed information about the
1I am not certain whether experts needed to have their reports accredited in 1958.
2See Appendix 1 for a brief overview of the Norwegian legal system
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mandate of the forensic examination either. However, Stroem (1958) contain
the exclusion of two other persons’ biting-mechanisms so we may infer that
he had been instructed to examine at least three biting-mechanisms.
6.2.1 BM1 and BM4: ”The suspect’s biting- mecha-
nism is the causal object of the bitemark?”
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 shows the bitemark and the suspect’s biting-mechanism:
Figure 6.3: The skinmarks on RJ’s left breast (photograph by Stroem (?) at the time of
the medical examination). Includes Stroem’s enumeration of the marks. Image is omitted
due to not being able to secure permission from the copyright holder.
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Figure 6.4: The suspect’s anterior teeth (photograph by Stroem (?) at the time of
the odontological examination four months after the crime event). The numbers are
in terms of FDI World Dental Organization’s enumeration-system for permanent teeth
(http://www.fdiworldental.org/content/two-digit-notation, ISO 3950.)Image is omitted
due to not being able to secure permission from the copyright holder.
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Before proceeding it should be noted that ”bitemark-index1” and
”bitemark-index2” are my terms, not Stroem (1958)’s. The indexes are just
shorthand names for the sets of characteristics by which Stroem concluded
about the sufficient probability of BM1 and its consequences. ”Bitemark-
index2” refers to the set of characteristics by which Stroem performed his
differential diagnosis concerning the causal biting-mechanism of the bitemark
(given that the skinmark is a human bitemark — another set of characteristic
will be required for that level of classification). The characteristics used may
be color, shape, size, depth, proportion of some enzyme, etc. — any more
or less refined heuristic for sorting an object into its appropriate class or
subgroup. Some characteristics may be relevant for the class-determination
of the causal object while others are more relevant for the differentiation
within the class once this class is determined. Any characteristic used for
diagnoses must be relevant — i.e. it is itself a means of evidence needing
to be able to reduce the uncertainty of the diagnosis. Like any means of
evidence, a characteristic will be more or less efficient — have more or less
differentiating or discriminatory power.
What is here said about ”bitemark-index2” is also relevant for ”bitemark-
index1”. The latter is then referring to the set of characteristics used for
differentiating between increasingly smaller subgroups of biting-mechanisms.
The characteristics of ”bitemark-index1” are assumed to correlate or co-vary
with those of ”bitemark-index2”, but cannot do so perfectly. The mesiodistal
length of the cutting edge of a tooth or a rotational pattern of a given set of
teeth cannot be expected to record itself perfectly in the skin bitten because
certain mechanisms will intervene during the biting-process: The mobility
of the teeth and the jaw, the force and direction of the biting, and the
visco-elastic properties of the skin will intervene to determine the symptoms
observable of the bitemark. The profile of a biting-mechanism is thus not
transferred to the bitemark on the skin: The profile of a bitemark on human
skin after the biting has ceased can thus only be an indirect sign of the profile
of the causal biting-mechanism.
Now we may return to Strom (1958)’s justification for recommending
that BM1 was sufficiently justified in the Torgersen-case. I will proceed by
the order in which Stroem (1958) presents the information (which does not
necessarily follow the logical structure of my figures 6.1 and 6.2). First he
offers a partial classification of the bitemark (BM1.12 in figure 6.2), then
the classification of the suspect’s biting-mechanism (BM1.11 in figure 6.2),
thirdly he re-examines the bitemark and compares the two items (completing
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BM1.12 and BM1.1), and, finally, Stroem (1958) concludes on the certainty
of the claim of BM1.
1. The bitemark has state bmi2 on the Stroem (1958)’s bitemark-
index2? (BM4andBM1.12)
Stroem (1958) claimed to see a human bitemark on the left breast of the
victim and that it had certain states on a select set of characteristics. How
does Strom (1958) justify that the skinmark is a human bitemark?
The term ”bitemark” has a clear intension and extension in the Norwegian
language. It refers to marks made by animal or human teeth through biting.
Marks resulting from the process in which the object impacted onto teeth
would not be called a bitemark but teethmarks. At the beginning of the
report Stroem states that
At 09.00 am 7-12.1957 [the medical examiner] informed that [. . . ] [a]
bitemark appeared visible on one of the victim’s breasts [. . . ].
I could immediately conclude the explicit presence of marks from biting
in the left breast, 3 of the marks were from the upper jaw and 3 to 4 from
the lower jaw. It must be assumed that it was the front and right side teeth
that had been operant during the biting. (Stroem 1958:1)
Stroem (1958) then numbers the individual marks (see figure 3 above)
and describes the change to the epidermal surface-structure:
Bitemark nr.1: Biting through the skin, upper jaw
Bitemark nr.2: Biting through the skin, upper jaw
Bitemark nr.3: Biting through the skin, upper jaw
Bitemark nr.4: Biting through the skin, lower jaw
Bitemark nr.5: Biting through the skin lower jaw
Bitemark nr.6: Impression, no blood assembled under the mark, lower jaw
Bitemark nr.7: Possible impression, no blood assembled under the mark,
lower jaw
Bleeding from the bite-wounds could not be seen,
neither blood-assembling under the marks. (Stroem 1958;2)
This is the justification offered for the claim that the skinmark is a hu-
man bitemark (condition BM4 in the above figures 6.1 and 6.2). Stroem
appeals to some characteristics which could be relevant for the sub-condition
BM4.111 but generally the differential diagnosis from skinmark to human
bitemark is by declaration and by pointing at the skinmark and at another
witness declaring the same.
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Nobody in the Torgersen-case ever questioned that the bitemark was a
human bitemark. But the later experts came to disagree on the existence
of two submarks: Stroem (1958), with primary objects but poorer aids for
observation, suggested a possible mark 7. None of the later experts claimed
the existence of this mark. But the modern court-appointed experts were to
claim a possible mark 4a, in the position between Stroem’s mark nr. 4 and
5. Stroem did not comment on the reason for the space which was agreed
to exist here; the modern court-appointed experts argued a weak almost
invisible imprint compatible with having been made by the suspect’s lower
right side front tooth; and the expert-witnesses for the defence counsel argued
no imprint, which, they argued, could only be compatible with having been
made by a biting-mechanism having no lower right side front tooth — thus
excluding the suspect’s biting-mechanism.
Stroem (1958) thus implicitly decided that the causal object of the skin-
mark was not by animal teeth or tooth-like objects, and not by skin impacting
onto teeth. None of these possibilities became issues in the Torgersen-case,
but misdiagnosis at this diagnostic level is not unheard of in bitemark-cases.
Bruising initially diagnosed as bitemarks has later been rediagnosed after
discovering that the more likely cause was animal teeth, defibrillator-pads,
bottle-tops, vacuum-pipes, or other round sharp objects (Grey 1989, Kerry
et al. 1990, and James and Cirillo 2004). Hunt (2007) stressed that using
the shape of the bruise as a single marker for diagnosing causal object and
mechanism is risky and pointed particularly to such risk in bitemark-cases.
The direction of the causal process of the mark-production is also generally
relevant to the crime investigator, even if it may have seemed less relevant
in the Torgersen-case. The differentiation between the mechanism behind
bitemarks and that of teethmarks will require justification by motivational
as well as odontological markers. In this dissertation I do not consider such
conditions — only the physical ones as these are used by forensic odontol-
ogists. Yet Stroem nevertheless diagnosed the bitemark as of a particular
motivational subgroup:
The bite performed is not done in order to bite off a piece, but is a so called
pleasure bite, combined with sucking on the nipple of the breast. (Stroem
1958:4)
Stroem did not justify how he came to that diagnosis either. Nobody
questioned Stroem’s opinion about the motive for the biting.
Having decided that the skinmark was a bitemark caused by human teeth
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through biting (condition denoted by BM4 in my figures 6.1 and 6.2) Stroem
(1958) proceeds to the claims that the individual marks were symptoms of
different kinds of human teeth: Bitemarks nr. 1 through 3 were from the
upper jaw and marks nr. 4 through 7 were from the lower jaw (Stroem
1958:2). He could differentiate between middle incisors, side incisors, and
canine incisors as well:
It must be assumed that it was the front and right side teeth that had been
operant in the biting. [. . . ]
We see thus explicit marks from two upper jaw middle front teeth and im-
pressions of two lower jaw front teeth. (Stroem 1958:1, 4 in Eskeland 2000;
Vol. I:1, 4)
Stroem (1958) does not justify how he is able to make this differentiation
either — perhaps it was the size, shapes, and the ordering of these character-
istics of individual marks which made him conclude — but it is impossible
to say.
The only characteristic Stroem observed with respect to the classification
of the bitemark on the bitemark-index2 which may also with reasonable
certainty be said to have been observed independently of any suspect biting-
mechanism, is identified in terms of its corresponding teeth-characteristic —
that of wear and its degree:
During my analysis the 7-12-57 I expressed to Police Constable Haukenaes
that the one who performed this biting must have severely worn teeth in the
lower jaw. (Stroem 1958:1)
Stroem (1958) does not specify this observation in dermatological terms.
Stroem (1958) observes further characteristics of the bitemark, but these
are identified only after having observed Torgersen’s biting-mechanism. Then
he also provides justification for why he does not report on the bitemark’s
state on standard characteristics. I will discuss these and their justification
when explicating the justification for the claim of BM1.1 below.
Stroem (1958) thus does not provide much substance or content of the
justification for the decisions about conditions BM4 and BM1.12. The main
means of justification are declaration; pointing at the breast with the irregu-
larity or at the representations of this forensic item (the photographs, models,
etc.); and authority by scientific training, experience, and attestation.
The decisions about the sufficient certainty of these conditions were not
challenged in 1958 — despite of the other court appointed expert on the
bitemark, Waerhaug (1958), diagnosing some of the sub-marks as being from
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different kinds of individual teeth (Waerhaugh 1958:2). Only two of the
decisions came to be challenged later: The decision about the number of
sub-marks and the decisions about which kind of tooth was the cause of
which individual sub-mark.
2. The suspect’s biting-mechanism’s has state bmi1 on
bitemark-index1? (BM1.11)
Stroem (1958) reports that four months passed before the suspect allowed
him to examine his biting-mechanism. The purpose of the examination was
to classify the suspect’s biting-mechanism according to the set of charac-
teristics (bitemark-index1) which Stroem decided in this case would be the
most relevant for the decision whether he could be the cause of the bitemark.
Stroem (1958) reports the biting-mechanism’s states on the following char-
acteristics:
Characteristics of the ”super-unit” (the teeth/biting-mechanism):
• Occlusion (States: Edge to edge)
• Positioning of teeth (States : Good and regular)
Characteristics of the ”medium-unit” (the mechanism’s upper and lower jaw):
• (none mentioned)
Characteristics of the ”individual-unit” (the mechanism’s 12 anterior teeth):
• Tooth-general (States: Not characteristic)
• Cuttingedge-adjacency (States: Spaced)
• Cuttingedge-furrowing (States: Characteristic, Especially
explicit, present, explicitly cobshaped)
• Corner-general (States: Less characteristic)
• Corner-damage (States: Splintered)
• Corner-wear (States: Worn)
• Leftcorner-damage (States: Defect)
• Rightcorner-damage (States: Defect, Broken off )
Not all the 12 anterior teeth were classified on all characteristics. Table
6.1 shows how the teeth and the characteristics distribute.
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Upper left Upper left Upper left Upper right Upper right Upper right
side canine side front middle front middle front side front side canine
















Lower left Lower left Lower left Lower right Lower right Lower right
side canine side front middle front middle front side front side canine
















Table 6.1: The suspect’s 12 anterior teeth in terms of the characteristics observed by
Stroem (1958). Numbers in parenthesis refers to FDI World Dental Federation notation
for particular teeth.
3. The suspect’s biting-mechanism is compatible with the bitemark
(BM1.1)
Having decided that the claim of BM1.11 was sufficiently certain, Stroem
proceeded to the next diagnostic level: Do the two samples ”match” or not
in light of the observed characteristics? This is the question implied by the
condition denoted by BM1.1 in figure 6.2. Stroem (1958) decides:
[. . . ] I assess the bitemark in the breast of the murdered to be identical
[Strom’s underlining] to the teeth of the suspect. (Stroem 1958:5)
How does Stroem (1958) justify that conclusion? He states that
The teeth of suspect have a series of particular characteristics that with-
out exception is to be found represented in the bite-traces of the murdered.
(Stroem 1958:4)
— which is substantiated as follows:
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The suspect’s teeth have, as mentioned, a series of characteristics in the
cutting edges of both the upper and lower jaws’ middle front teeth. These
characteristics are to be found also in the bitemarks.
Bitemark nr.1 represents the furrow in the cutting edge of upper jaw’s left
middle front tooth.
Bitemark nr.2 represents 2/3’rd of the cutting edge of upper jaw’s right
middle front tooth (the part towards the midline), and shows clearly
the jagged front cutting edge. The part away from the midline is not
bitten into the skin because it is broken off.
Bitemark nr.3 must be from the right side front tooth, but has, as the
tooth itself, no characteristics and is only partly recognised.
Bitemark nr.4 must be from the lower jaw’s right canine tooth but is
without characteristics, as the tooth itself.
Bitemark nr.5 is from right middle front tooth and is re-presented with
all characteristics. Especially explicit is the cob shaped extension in
the furrow.
Bitemark nr.6 is from the left middle front tooth and re-presents all the
tooth’s characteristics, especially prominent is the straight furrow.
The space between the two middle front teeth’s cutting edges in the lower
jaw of (earlier mentioned), is clearly present in the bitemark. (Stroem
1958:4-5)
The above claims and their justifications are then the justification pro-
vided by Stroem (1958) when he concluded that it was sufficiently certain
that the suspect’s biting-mechanism is the most likely cause of the bitemark:
The teeth of suspect have a series of particular characteristics that with-
out exception is to be found re-presented in the bite-traces of the murdered.
From a scientific point of view it is my opinion that it is predominantly prob-
able that the bitemark in the breast is from the suspect. (Stroem 1958:5)
Stroem had also been asked to assess and opine on the possibilities that
two other individuals could be the cause of the bitemark. Stroem (1958) only
states the conclusions of these analyses. Eskeland (2000) does not contain
any separate reports for these analyses or signs of the existence of such.
Stroem did not find these other individuals to be likely sources:
My conclusion from this examination is:
After a very thorough analysis of this material compared to with the
material of the bitemarks in the murdered [victim]’s left breast, I find the
deviations to be so extensive that I with certainty can exclude [L] as the one
who performed this bite. (Stroem 1958:2-3)
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P.S. I have also taken imprint in plastelin of [J]’s teeth Fig.19 which was
without the characteristics expressed by the bitemark. (Stroem 1958:5)
Unfortunately Stroem (1958) describes the symptoms of the bitemark in
terms less clear than those of the biting-mechanism — Stroem did not exploit
existing dermatological terms or natural language terms which could have
made the claimed connection between a given tooth and its corresponding
imprint assessable by others. The characteristics used for profiling of the
suspect’s teeth are reasonably clearly specified, but when the characteristics
used for the profiling of the bitemark are not at all clearly specified, it is
impossible for anyone to assess Stroem’s reasoning with respect to similarity
between the two forensic items.
I will return to the question about the conduciveness of Stroem (1958)’s
bitemark-index1 and bitemark-index2 when discussing the condition concern-
ing the analytical norms and heuristics (denoted by BM3 in figures 6.1 and
6.2).
6.2.2 ”The bitemark on the victim occurred simulta-
neous with the lethal/rape injuries?” (BM2)
The third condition required for the bitemark-proposition to be relevant to
the indictment-proposition is that the bitemark must be proven to have oc-
curred simultaneously with the legally relevant injuries (this condition is de-
noted by BM2 in figure 6.2). It does not matter much to have proven BM1
if it cannot also be proven that the bitemark was made during the time
specified — because the suspect could have made the bitemark earlier that
evening during an event unrelated to the crime event. When the investigator
in 1958 decided that the bitemark-proposition was positively relevant to the
indictment-proposition, then this implies that the bitemark was, most likely,
made during the same interval of time as that specified for the lethal/rape-
injuries — i.e., between 11.00pm and 11.30pm on the night of the murder of
the victim.
The question about the time-aspect of the bitemark was never an issue in
the Torgersen-case, and only very few and indirect comments on it are found
in Eskeland (2000): Either the legal agents agreed by some obvious signs that
the bitemark did occur within the specified time interval (an agreement not
found important enough for recording) — or they forgot to ask the question.
It is impossible to say.
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Stroem (1958), we saw above, reports about the bleeding/bruising of the
sub-marks of the bitemark. These characteristics may be relevant to the
question of the time of the occurrence of the bitemark: Absence of bruis-
ing/blood coupled with open incisions suggests for example that the biting
occurred during or immediately after death. But Stroem (1958) does not
explicitly relate these observations to the timing of the bitemark — he does
not comment on the question of simultaneity at all. Stroem’s unfamiliarity
with dermatology may be the reason why he did not address this question.
Another reason may be that he saw it to be the domain of the forensic ex-
aminer (I did not find any information about the timing of the bitemark in
the examiner’s reports either).
6.2.3 Are the analytical norms and heuristics used in
this case agreed to be conducive to the penulti-
mate and ultimate purposes of the decision about
the bitemark-proposition? (BM3)
The last condition required proven for the bitemark-proposition to become
relevant to the indictment-proposition is that the analytical norms and tech-
nical heuristics are agreed among the bitemark-experts, crime investiga-
tors, and legal decision-makers to be conducive to the penultimate (crime-
investigative) and ultimate (legal) purposes. The penultimate purpose is to
establish the accurate and impartial truth of the bitemark-proposition. This
purpose is to serve the ultimate purpose, which is to reach a solution which
can be acceptable to the parties having conflicting interests and which can
be respected by the public.
This condition has three sub-conditions targeting the different kinds of
analytical tools used during the analyses required for the other conditions:
Norms of inference (epistemological and methodological norms and rules),
profiling-instruments (sets of characteristics used for diagnostic purposes),
and technical instruments (technical instruments aiding observation of char-
acteristics). I will start with Stroem (1958)’s choice of profiling-instruments,
then consider his choice of observational aids, and end with his choice of
norms of inference.
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1. Was Stroem’s choice of characteristics conducive to the penul-
timate and the ultimate purposes of the bitemark-proposition?
BM3.3
The bitemark-indexes There are two questions concerning the
conduciveness of the bitemark-indexes used for diagnosing the most likely
causal biting-mechanism of the bitemark: the main question relates to the
aggregated discriminatory power of the characteristics constituting in the
bitemark-indexes; a second question relates to and accentuates the first ques-
tion and concerns the strength of the relationship between bitemark-index1
(for classifying or profiling the suspect’s biting-mechanism) and bitemark-
index2 (for profiling the bitemark).
The main question concerns discriminatory power: How effective are the
indexes with respect to differentiating between individuals having a given pro-
file and individuals having another profile? Stroem (1958) provides relevant
information only for two of the characteristics involved in bitemark-index1 —
occlusion-conditioned kind and degree of wear and ordering of the anterior
teeth in a given jaw relative to a smoothed teeth-arch:
From the models Fig.11 [present in Eskeland (2000), but omitted in
Stroem (1958)] it is visible that the suspect has a so-called edge to edge
bite, i.e. that the front teeth, when occluded, meet at the cutting edges.
This is a deviation from the ordinary norm of upper jaw front teeth more or
less covering the lower jaw front teeth. (Stroem 1958:3)
The suspect has good regularly positioned teeth [. . . ]. (Stroem 1958:3)
In the following I will refer to these two characteristics as wear (”wear”
when observed of a bitemark) and rotation/position (”rotation/position”
when observed of a bitemark).
The purpose of observing specific characteristics or symptoms of individ-
ual items in the forensic or legal context is the same as that for the clinician
in the health-context: To identify and narrow the set of possible mechanisms
causing such manifestations — aiming ideally to be left with only one possi-
ble mechanism. In practice it is difficult to reach the ideal — because a given
set of observable symptoms are but a particular and thus are but indirect and
more or less distorted sign of its unobservable cause. In addition, the abil-
ity to correctly differentiate between individuals (the set of symptoms of a
bitemark or a patient) having different causes depends on the diagnostician’s
ability to recognize ever finer cause-effect relationships. This ability depends
on the diagnostician’s training and experience, but also on the accumulated
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knowledge via systematic studies of relevant cause-effect relationships. If a
given symptom and its cause is well known (by an individual or a collective of
experts and via subjective or intersubjective experience or via systematic ex-
periments or studies of prevalence of co-variation in nature) this provides an
accurate diagnosis, with few false diagnoses. If the cause-effect relationship
in addition to being well known is relatively rare, then the discriminatory
power achieved via this particular cause-effect relationship will be good —
i.e. the certainty that the diagnosis will be correct will be high.
What would be the discriminatory power of the two kinds of symptoms or
characteristics of ”wear” and ”rotation/position” observed by Stroem (1958)?
If we may assume (1) perfect co-variation between symptom and cause for
both ”wear”/wear and ”rotation/position”/rotation/position, (2) wear is as
”deviate from the ordinary norm” as the occlusion-type is, and (3) ”good
and regular” refers to ”within the ordinary norm” in the population in ques-
tion, then the discriminatory power of ”wear” will be better than ”rota-
tion/position” — because the number of possible causal biting-mechanisms
having the particular kind and degree of wear observed in the case is smaller
than those having the particular kind and degree of rotation/position (— if
one agrees that ”deviate from the normal norm” signify less than, say, 20%
of the reference-population and ”within the normal norm” signify more than,
say 40% of that population).
But Stroem (1958) does not perform these assumptions. The only piece
of information provided on the reference-population is that the suspect’s kind
and degree of wear is ”deviate from the norm”. Stroem did not say anything
about the prevalence of the other characteristics or about the relationship be-
tween given cause-characteristic and its effect. Would Stroem have been able
to differentiate symptoms of occlusion-caused wear from symptoms caused by
other kinds and degrees of wear? These issues are not discussed by Stroem
(1958). This brings us over to the related second question induced when
asking about the conduciveness of Stroem (1958)’s bitemark-indexes.
This question concerns the strength of the relationship between bitemark-
index1 and bitemark-index2. I have already claimed that one may not take
for granted that the profile of the biting-mechanism is perfectly represented
in the bitemark — due to mechanisms activated during the biting. Possible
such mechanisms are
• the force applied;
• the force’s direction during the biting;
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• the mobility of the teeth when subject to this forced motion (a mobility
which is conditioned by the bio-mechanical properties of the tissue-basis
of the biting teeth);
• the mobility of the skin when subject to this load of dynamic impact (a
mobility which is conditioned by the bio-mechanical properties of the
human skin-area bitten);
• the shape of the skin-area bitten;
• the position and direction of movement of the head and body of the
biter during biting;
• the position and direction of movement of the body and limbs of the
person bitten during biting;
These factors will variably condition a bitemark’s state on bitemark-
index2. Only if the analyst accounts for these intervening mechanisms may
we have confidence that bitmark-index2 is relevant to bitemark-index1 and
for the forensic purposes.
Stroem (1958) touches on this issue, citing it as reason why he avoids
standard measuring devices:
Due to the ball-shaped form and the plasticity of the skin of the breast
a bitemark here will appear differently than that made of an apple. We do
not know the position of the part of the breast that was bitten relative to
the teeth-rows during the biting.
Another thing is that it does not make much sense to measure the lengths
of the bitemarks in human skin as the fibers of the skin will contract the
marks when biting stops and as the vaulted form of the breast makes it
difficult to produce a measurement that is comparable to the suspect’s teeth.
(Stroem 1958:4 in Eskeland 2000; Vol.I:p.3)
But Stroem (1958) does not report on how these same mechanisms con-
ditions the characteristics he did observe. And the report is inarticulate
concerning the characteristics observed of the bitemark.
Knowledge about the mechanical properties of different types of human
skin and about skin-wounds did exist for both dermatological,
health-diagnostic, and forensic-diagnostic purposes and it had progressed be-
yond the mere descriptive and classificatory level: Particularly the study of
so-called Langer’s lines (refers to the natural orientation of fibers in the der-
mis and the epidermis) and their behaviour under impact (first described
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by K. Langer in 1861 for surgical purposes) was found relevant for foren-
sic pathological purposes as well (Spillsbury (1939), Cox (1941), Edwards et
al. (1951) Camps (1952), and Hamdy et al. (1955)). This knowledge was
indirectly relevant to the study of bitemarks on human skin, but any connec-
tion between dermatology and forensic bitemark-analysis is not detectable
in the published literature by 1958. The existence of relevant dermatologi-
cal knowledge may, I believe, not be used against Stroem in 1958: Forensic
bitemark-analysis was a new domain and there was no time for an appropri-
ate updating for the diagnostic purposes in the Torgersen-case.
A second issue related to intervening mechanisms is the change caused
by time: The forensic objects may change during the time passing between
the biting and the time of forensic examination: Are the observations of
the characteristics of the bitemark and the biting-mechanism representative
of the observations which would have been made closer in time to the ac-
tual biting? The bitemark was observed approximately 10,5 hours after the
death of the victim. How does this affect the states of the characteristics
of bitemark-index2? Stroem (1958) does not relate to this question and no
justification is therefore given. The same question is relevant to the suspect’s
biting-mechanism. This was not examined until four months after the death
of the victim. What kinds of change may have occurred naturally or inten-
tionally during those four months — and how would that change the states
of the characteristics of bitemark-index1? Stroem (1958) does not relate to
this question either and no justification is therefore given.
Neither the question about discriminatory power of the bitemark-indexes
nor the relationship between them had been studied in published papers in
1958. The number of studies on bitemarks on human skin or other surfaces
was limited in most respects: The conceptual and theoretical development
had in 1958 barely been initialized.
If excluding pure case-reports there were 9 published papers discussing
issues connected to theory and methodological standards.3
The most directly relevant paper from this period is Berg and Schaidt
(1954) who aimed to find criteria for making positive identification of biter’s
teeth-profile from bite-marks in foodstuff: Comparing 100 persons’ diapos-
3The review was performed mainly through UCL’s library’s metalib-engine (searching-
terms being ”bitemark”, ”bite-mark”, ”bite mark”, ) and complemented by hand-searching
(a) forensic, odontological, and dermatological journals, (b) the reference-lists of published
papers, and the collections compiled by European and American organizations for forensic
scientists and for forensic odontologists.
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itively photographed teeth-imprints to a given bitemark known to be from
one of the 100 persons, they noted that several superimposed exactly on
one or two teeth, but only one superimposed on all teeth in a given arch
of teeth. They suggested therefore that no positive identification should
be made unless at least four or five adjacent marks could be observed in
the bitemark. I will relate this standard to that of Stroem (1958) below.
Five papers study potentially relevant teeth/biting characteristics, but were
not related to bitemarks per se: Two papers study the prevalence of teeth-
characteristics (teeth-positioning (Seipel 1946) and the mesiodistal crown-
diameters (Moorees, 1957)); and three papers study the force of biting (How-
ell and Manly 1948), (Howell and Brudevold 1950), (Kydd 1956). The re-
maining papers are descriptions of technical heuristics (procedures of photog-
raphy, instruments of observation, and materials for sample representation)
and are only indirectly relevant to bitemark analysis, the aims being to en-
hance reliability and validity of representations of primary samples.
The available knowledge about bitemark-analysis in 1958 was thus rather
poor. It provided no guidance to Stroem in his particular problem-situation;
and leaves it difficult to assess whether the bitemark-indexes were conducive
in terms of discriminatory power.
The poor understanding of the causal mechanism of bitemark-production
and the underdeveloped set of terms for describing the dermatological effects
of the characteristics of bitemark-index1 came later to create confusion with
respect to the evidential value of the bitemark in relation to BM1. I will
in the next two chapters return to these problems of justification. They will
figure centrally in this dissertation’s assessment of the question about the
evidence-basis of crime investigative decisions about bitemark-means.
The time-index Given the lack of written information about the question
of simultaneity between the bitemark and the legally relevant injuries in the
Torgersen-case, it will be impossible to assess whether any time-index was
conducive to the purposes of the decision about the bitemark-proposition.
Both the condition about simultaneity and its sub-condition about the suf-
ficient relevance or discriminatory powers of the characteristics — the time-
index — used to assess the question about simultaneity are but implied by
the acceptance of the relevance of the bitemark-proposition.
A time-index would contain characteristics indicating the stage of the
repair-process of skin-injuries. Knowledge about the repair-process of skin-
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wounds existed in 1958 and had progressed beyond the mere descriptive
and organizational: Lowell et al. (1953) had studied the effects of cortisone
and adrenocorticotrophic hormone in bruises over time. Udenfriend et al.
(1955) had studied the role of serotonin and Robertson (1957) had studied
the difference between antemortem and postmortem bruises. The existence
of relevant knowledge about the timing of skin-wounds may, I believe, not be
used against Stroem in 1958: Forensic bitemark-analysis was a new domain,
there was no time for an appropriate updating for the diagnostic purposes
in the Torgersen-case, and it is possible that the forensic examiner in the
Torgersen-case would be the correct address for assessing the justification of
the decision about simultaneity (I did not find any such information in the
examiners reports).
2. Was Stroem’s choice of observational aids conducive to the
penultimate and the ultimate purposes of the bitemark- proposi-
tion? (BM3.2)
The accuracy of an expert’s assessments and decisions will, in addition to
the individual’s own senses and reasoning capacities, depend on the accu-
racy of the instruments and materials used during the analyses of the given
samples. In our case, Stroem (1958) does not divulge many details about
the instruments and materials used: The only instruments indicated to have
been used are stereography and photography. There are no specifications
of the methods applied while using these instruments, but the methods of
photography involved different angling, different lighting, different scaling,
and with and without a one-dimensional ruler. Stroem did not discuss the
reliability of these instruments or the validity of the information resulting
from the use of these instruments.
Stroem stated to have used plaster and plastelin for the imprinting and
the modeling of both the skinmark and suspects’ teeth. He also stated to
have used a certain preserving liquid for the preservation of the excised breast
tissue, but does not state the kind nor the specific properties of any of these
materials. We know that he did not use any stabilizing mechanism when
excising the breast tissue. But we do not know the excising method or
who performed that procedure. What is also lacking from Stroem (1958) is
information on the labeling of the primary and the secondary samples.
The only comment on reliability or validity issues connected to the inter-
vention procedures is about the imprint obtained from the suspect’s teeth:
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14-4-58 I made an imprint of his teeth and let him bite into plastelin. He was
helpful, and I got the best imprints. (Stroem 1958: 3, in Eskeland 2000;Vol.
I:4)
No legal agent questioned the reliability of the information derived from
using these instruments and this material — not in 1958 and not later. How-
ever, the incomplete identity-labeling of the secondary samples was to become
an issue when the case was assessed for retrial in 1973-76 and 1997-2001 —
when the experts disagreed on what ought to constitute the ”best evidence”.
3. Was Stroem’s choice of norms of inference conducive to the
penultimate and the ultimate purposes of the bitemark- proposi-
tion? (BM3.1)
The last sub-condition required of the condition about analytical norms and
heuristics concerns the norms of inference chosen by Stroem (1958). Stroem
(1958) provides some information directly relevant to this question:
An odontological examination of a bitemark-trace compared with the
suspect’s teeth will, if there do not exist accordance [/agreement/similarity],
imply absolute acquittal for the suspect. Differently if existence of accor-
dance [/agreement/similarity]. In this case there will always be judgements
and there should be exhibited care, if there are no details that are judged to
be particularly characteristic.
The teeth of suspect have a series of particular characteristics that with-
out exception is to be found re-presented in the bite-traces of the murdered.
From a scientific point of view it is my opinion that it is predominantly
probable that the bitemark in [the victim’s] breast is from the suspect.
Based on my personal experience, well informed about my responsibility,
I assess [/conclude] the bitemark in the breast of the murdered to be identical
[Strom’s underlining] to the teeth of the suspect. (Stroem 1958:5)
Stroem (1958) thus has a decision-criterion tailored to the forensic situa-
tion, a criterion different from Berg and Schaidt (1954). They suggested that
no positive identification should be made unless at least four or five adjacent
marks could be observed in the bitemark. Stroem (1958) recommends a pos-
itive identification based on 6 sub-marks profiled on given characteristics.
That Stroem did not use Berg and Schaidt’s recommendation may not nec-
essarily be used to criticize Stroem’s choice: Berg and Schaidt (1954) used a
different comparison-technique than Stroem did, the study was experimen-
tal, under non-natural conditions, and it concerned bitemarks in foodstuffs,
not human skin.
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But Stroem (1958) has no further comment on the more general stan-
dard of inference required for this situation — i.e. for decisions in situations
characterized by high and uncertain conditioning and serious consequences.
He acknowledges that judgment is involved and that care should be exhib-
ited, but does not appeal to any more specific standard of inference for the
situation. And he does not appeal to the standard usually required within
the scientific context. This standard assumes that all observations of real
phenomena and inferences from such observations are inherently uncertain.
Therefore any conclusion of consequence should be according to a given basic
norm of inference to make the risk of error as small as possible: The decision-
maker should always assess the probability of the observations/inferences
under the possibility that the negation of the suspected hypothesis is true;
and only if this probability is sufficiently small may he/she conclude that the
observations are significant and relevant in some further sense. This norm,
conserving the attention on the possibility that the suspected hypothesis
could indeed be false, forces about and makes routine an explicit delibera-
tion about the most appropriate reference-populations — an element crucial
to this dissertation’s notion of evidence-basis.
Stroem (1958) does not deliberate on the relevant reference population.
Instead he seems to apply the standard practiced in everyday decisions —
that of incomplete or open induction: One has a problem, searches
for possible explanations and hypotheses, suspects one explanation as more
likely than the others, avoids a structured deliberation, selection, specifica-
tion, and closure of the space of possibilities, and attends primarily to the
likelihood of the anticipated or suspected hypothesis. This strategy is fine
for everyday problems when time is limited and the consequences are not
too serious. But it is less appropriate if one needs to be certain that the
decisions do not bring about unwanted consequences. This need is funda-
mental to scientific knowledge-production, and it is the reason why scientists
are obliged to adhere to the basic norm of inference described above — that
of complete and closed induction: One has a problem, searches for
possible explanations and hypotheses, suspects one as more likely than the
others, seeks consciously — contrary to the everyday strategy of incomplete
and open induction — a structured deliberation, selection, specification, and
closure of the space of possibilities, and attends primarily to the likelihood
of the negation of the suspected hypothesis. This fundamental need to be
certain that decisions do not bring about unwanted consequences, and the
norm and procedures caring for this need, was well known and agreed about
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in 1958, also in the Norwegian academic institutions.
Stroem was an odontologist and had been exposed to the scientific stan-
dard of inference through the obligatory courses in general as well as practical
metodology. But he was a practicing odontologist and may, like many prac-
ticing professionals, have found the principles and examples of methodology-
courses ill-fitting to real decision-problems that are conditioned in nonstan-
dard ways.
Was Stroem (1958)’s choice of decision-strategy an anomaly? And how
did Stroem’s analysis compare to the state of the knowledge and knowledge-
production on forensic bitemarks in 1958?
Professor Dr. Waerhaug was appointed as a second court-appointed ex-
pert in May 1958 and provided a written report in May 1958 (Waerhaugh
1958, in Eskeland 2000, Vol.1:8-9). Waerhaugh (1958) applies the same ap-
proach as Stroem (1958), both concerning the kind of characteristics observed
and the inference-strategy. But unlike Stroem, he had no qualms about using
standard measurements. He also diagnosed one mark differently than Stroem
and did not perform the analysis completely independently of Stroem’s anal-
ysis. But all in all it is possible to say that Waerhaug (1958) corroborated
Stroem’s solution to the problem as well as his conclusions: Waerhaug (1958)
also chose to use incomplete and open induction.
The number of published studies on bitemarks on human skin or other
surfaces was, as said above, limited in most respects. The conceptual and the-
oretical development had in 1958 barely been initialized: Two papers study
the prevalence of characteristics of biting-mechanisms (not of bitemarks in
skin) (Seipel (1946) studies teeth-positioning and Moorees (1957) studies
the mesiodistal crown-diameters and three papers study the force of biting
(Howell and Manly (1948), Howell and Brudevold (1950), and Kydd (1956).
Five papers study potentially relevant characteristics, but were not related to
bitemarks per se. And no regional forensic organization existed which could
have guided Stroem concerning neither the choice of observation/analytical
heuristics nor the choice of diagnostic strategy. His most important refer-
ence was most likely the standard he knew was accepted by the legal agents
concerning the forensic work he had experience from, namely identification
of dead bodies from teeth and dental records.
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6.3 Was the decision about BM evidence-
based to the standard of Premise 1a?
The crime investigator decided that the bitemark-proposition was positively
relevant to the indictment-proposition. This decision was based on Stroem
recommending that ”[. . . ] it is predominantly probable that the bitemark in
[the victim’s] breast is from the suspect” (Stroem 1958:5) — which in turn
was based on Stroem finding that ”[t]he teeth of suspect have a series of
particular characteristics that without exception is to be found represented
in the bite-traces of the murdered” and ”[. . . ] the bitemark in the breast
of the murdered [is considered] to be identical [Strom’s underlining] to the
teeth of the suspect.” (Stroem 1958:4, 5).
Was this decision evidence-based according to the standard specified in
Premise 1a of this dissertation? Premise 1a in terms of the bitemark-problem
is as follows:
Premise 1a.A basic standard of evidence-basis for
decisions about the basic evidential value of bitemark-
means
A decision about the evidential value of a bitemark-means is
evidence-based if all the reference-groups and -terms causally and
logically necessary for the decision are explicit and unequivocal
and (a) enable person-independent assessment of the probabil-
ities of the events involved and (b) enable person-independent
assessment of the risk of deciding wrongly about the evidential
value — thereby contributing to (i) the conviction of a true in-
nocent person or the acquittal of a true responsible person; (ii)
the reduction of resources available to other cases; (iii) the public
loosing trust and confidence in the crime investigative services
and the legal institution.
We can assume that both the crime investigator and the expert both knew
about and intended to contribute to the aims of the investigation and the
ultimate aims of the legal processing of the case — that they had no intention
to undermine these. But the information provided in the written sources is
both too incomplete and too ambiguous for assessing the (a) probabilities
of the events involved and (b) the risk of having decided wrongly about the
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evidential value of the bitemark-means: No information at all is provided for
the diagnostic criterion concerning the time of occurrence of the bitemark;
the information provided for ”bitemark-index1” and ”bitemark-index2” (the
profiling-instruments) are to a large extent implicit and those explicit are
ambiguously specified; and the information provided for the reference-groups
used for the decisions about the source-object, the biter, and the offender of
the legally relevant acts is equally implicit or ambiguous. Even if we assume
that the combined profile of the suspect’s biting-mechanism was in fact rare
in the population and highly correlated to the profile of the bitemark, there
is no sign in Eskeland (2000) concerning the reference-population of possible
offenders of the legally relevant act. Surely, more than one person could have
been the offender and surely the investigator reflected on the nature and size
of this suspect-population, but no record exists of this.
The information provided in the written sources is thus of a kind not
expected if the expert’s and the investigator’s decisions were evidence-based
to the standard of Premise 1.
But perhaps the expert and the investigator completed and specified the
information orally — during the investigative phase or in their testimonies
in court? That is possible. The written sources do not divulge much about
this. In 2006, the experts and the investigators are required to provide the
complete and unambiguous reference-groups and -terms in the written report
— because these have to be accredited by The Norwegian Board of Forensic
Medicine but just as much because the modern notion of legitimacy is dif-
ferent than in 1958: The 1958-public may have seen authority in itself as a
sufficient source of legitimacy.
In light of the kinds of information provided in the written sources, the
conclusion is that (a) it is more likely than not that the crime investigative de-
cision (that the bitemark-proposition is positively relevant to the indictment-
proposition) in 1958 was not evidence-based to the standard of Premise 1 of
this dissertation, but that (b) Premise 1 might not be relevant for the forming
of legitimacy, confidence, and trust in 1958.
It should be noted that not being evidence-based does not imply that
the investigative decision about the relevance of the bitemark-proposition is
incorrect: It might be correct or incorrect. Not being evidence-based means
only that there are no person-independent means, in the form of information
about the reference-groups and -terms, by which we can assess the justifica-
tion and the reasonableness of the decision. Not providing such information
in 2006 may affect the public’s trust or confidence in the decision, the inves-
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tigative services and/or in the legal institution. And the provision of such
information will become more critical when the means of evidence are weak
and when the consequences of wrong decisions are serious.
In the next chapter I move to study the information provided for the
two last decisions about the relevance of the bitemark-proposition the in the
Torgersen-case — to assess whether these are evidence-based to the standard
of Premise 1 of this dissertation.
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Chapter 7
The modern decisions about
the bitemark-means in the
Torgersen-case
In this chapter I will study the modern crime investigative decisions about
the bitemark-means of the Torgersen-case. Torgersen motioned several times
to have the case re-investigated and retried: One of the main arguments
was that the technical forensic evidence, including the bitemark-means, was
incorrect due to being logically biased (attending only to the suspected hy-
pothesis) and that the agents of the legal community could not see this
because they were contextually partial (loyal to the previous decision-makers
as well as preferring the suspected hypothesis). The aim of the study is the
same as in the previous chapter: Were the modern decisions about the ba-
sic evidential value of the bitemark-means evidence-based to the standard of
Premise 1 in the first chapter of this dissertation?
In the first section I present the decision agents involved — the forensic
experts and investigators. In the second section I explicate the reasoning of
the modern investigators and the bitemark-experts — relative to the logi-
cal structure of bitemark-means suggested in the first section of the previ-
ous chapter. A third section assesses and concludes about the question of
evidence-basis. In an addendum to this chapter I present the Norwegian
Criminal Cases Review Commission’s position on the norms and standard of
reasoning with respect to forensic evidence.
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7.1 The decision-agents involved between
1997 and 2006
In chapter five we saw that Torgersen motioned for retrial three times: First
in 1973, then in 1997, and finally in 2004/2005. One of the main argu-
ments for the motions was that the forensic means of evidence, including the
bitemark-means, were incorrect due to the analytical procedure (or lack of
such) used for assessing evidential value. Each time both the court and the
appeal-instance decided to reject the case. None of the in total four courts
saw any flaws in the analytical procedure and concluded that the bitemark-
means was positively relevant to the indictments. Neither the Norwegian
Criminal Cases Review Commission (hereafter Commission) saw any ana-
lytical flaws or any other condition required for review.
Space only permits in-depth analysis of the reasoning in the period be-
tween 1997 and 2001 — the period ending with the decision by the Appeals
Committee of the Norwegian Supreme Court (hereafter Appeals Com-
mittee) in 2001. I will attend predominantly to the court-appointed
bitemark-experts’ reasoning towards the diagnostic decisions: The infor-
mation on the investigators’ reasoning is better for 2001-decision than for
the 1958-decision, but the expert-reports are still much better than the in-
vestigative reports; and the information on the expert-witnesses’ reasoning,
while good, is incomplete with respect to the bitemark-proposition: Legally
obliged only to react to the court-appointed expert’s reasoning, their reports
address only selected issues of the bitemark-propositions, leaving others un-
commented.
The exclusion of the analysis of the reasoning behind the two decisions
made in 1973-1976 and that of the Commission in 2006 is not too serious:
The norms of inference of the court-appointed expert-reports are the same
as in 2001; and while the experts used partly different markers due to newer
technical heuristics, the discriminatory power of these markers was not better
justified than the other markers used in the case. Neither diagnostic proce-
dure nor the knowledge-basis of forensic bitemark-analysis had changed very
much conceptually, theoretically, or empirically during the period between
1973 and 1997. The conclusions about the evidence-basis of the (1973-1976)-
decisions and the 2006-decision were similar to that of the 1997-2001-decision,
and for the same kinds of reasons. In an addendum to this chapter I present
the Commission’s position on the norms of inference for assessing forensic
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evidence.
7.1.1 The court-appointed experts
Eskeland (2000), Eskeland (2005), Public Prosecution (2005) and Commis-
sion (2006) give reason to believe that there were in total 10 bitemark-experts
involved between 1999 and 2006: 2 court-appointed experts (obliged to serve
both parties and to provide written reports accredited by the Norwegian
Board of Forensic Medicine) and 8 expert-witnesses (legally only obliged to
serve the appointing part but professionally obliged to be impartial).
In August 1998 The Borgarting Court of Appeals appointed two bite-
mark experts: D. G. MacDonald, professor of odontology (pathology) at
Glasgow Dental Hospital and School, Glasgow University, Scotland; and Dr.
David K. Wittaker, university teacher in odontology (biology) and forensic
odontology at the Dental Schoool, University of Wales College of Medicine.
Hereafter, MD/W, will refer to these two experts.
Their mandate was to assist the court in assessing questions raised con-
cerning the opinions of the 1958- and 1976-experts and to re-investigate the
forensic material and provide opinion in the case (Eskeland 2000; Vol. I:
98-99) (I return to the mandate in the next section). They submitted a joint
report 28.July and 3.August 1999. This report exists in Eskeland (2000: Vol.
I; 123-170), but will hereafter be referred to as MD/W (1999). They submit-
ted two more reports to answer further issues: One in May 2000 as the result
of the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine (hereafter Board) requesting
fuller analysis of certain aspects and response to critical questions raised by
the defence counsel; and one in July 2001 as the result of questions raised a
Court-hearing about the bitemark evidence. These two reports will hereafter
be referred to as MD/W (2000) and MD/W (2001).1
MD/W were experienced bitemark-analysts, both concerning practical
forensic analysis and academic work. I am not able to say how many cases
they had each assisted on. Each had contributed to the bitemark-discourse
through published papers: MD/W had, alone or with other scholars, au-
thored 3 and 10 papers respectively. MD/W stayed on as appointed ex-
perts until the final decision in 2006. Throughout the period between 1999
and 2006 they submitted further statements in connection to several court-
1MD/W (2000) and MD/W (2001) are represented in Eskeland 2000 Vol. III 336-375
and Vol. IV 213-273, respectively
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meetings and hearings. These statements do not exist in one collection, but
are scattered on several institutions with variably strict access regulations.
MD/W (1999, 2000, 2001) contain their main analysis. Statements provided
during court-hearings will be referred to by their occurrence in Commission
(2005).
7.1.2 The expert-witnesses for the defence
In 1998 Torgersen and his defence counsel appointed dentist Johannesen
(general practitioner), professor (human anatomy) Per Holck, and senior re-
searcher Dr. Med. (human anatomy) Per R. Flood. None of these had
any experience with forensic diagnostics, but were appointed due to expert
knowledge in clinical dentistry, human skin, and instruments for observing
geometric characteristics. It was the later appointed Professor David Senn
(D.D.S., Diplomat of the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO))
from The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, Dental
School who came to represent as the main expert-witness. Senn submitted
a report to the defence counsel in the 28. Jul y and 3. august 1999. This
report exists in Eskeland (2000, Vol.I pp), but will hereafter be referred to
as Senn (1999). Senn, similar to the court-appointed experts, submitted
further statements throughout the period between 1999 and 2006 in connec-
tion with the court-meetings and the hearings. I will refer to these later
statements as ”Senn, in Eskeland (2000)”, ”Senn, in Prosecution (2005)” or
”Senn, in Commission (2006)”.
Senn had approximately 10 years of practice from forensic odontology, is
an ABFO-diplomat, a Fellow of the American College of Dentists, a Fellow
of the International College of Dentists, and a member of the American Den-
tal Association, the Texas Dental Association, and the San Antonio District
Dental Society. Since 1976 Senn had co-authored on one publication rele-
vant to forensic bitemark analysis in international dental or forensic science
journals (Senn et al. 2005). Senn was later assisted by three colleagues, also
diplomats of the ABFO: Professor (DDS) Michael Bowers (Ventura Califor-
nia); professor (DDS) Marden E. Alder (San Antonio, Texas); and professor
(DDS) Paul. G. Stimson (Houston Texas). Particularly Bowers was a strong
voice in the bitemark-discourse in the period after 1976. He had authored
or co-authored 17 books and papers in international journals the content of
which signifies a broad interest and experience in theoretical, experimental,
methodological, and forensic diagnostic aspects bitemark-analysis. Bowers,
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Alder, and Stimson did only provide indirect support to Senn — they did
not offer their own reports nor did they formally attest to Senn’s analyses of
the bitemark in the Torgersen-case.
7.1.3 The expert-witnesses appointed by the prosecu-
tion
The prosecution had appointed Professor (odontology) Tore Solheim (Faculty
of Dentistry, University of Oslo, Norway) as their expert-witness. As far as
2002, Solheim had published four papers on identification from teeth and
dental records (Solheim et al. 1995, Solheim et al. 1995, and Solheim et al.
1992, and Solheim et al. 2002), but any experience or substantial knowledge
of identification of biter from bitemarks was not signified until 2006 (Bernitz
et al. 2006).
Of all the involved experts on the bitemark theme of this case it was
MD/W who were originally appointed by the court and thereby had the sta-
tus as court-appointed experts. They were thus by law obliged to serve both
parties and to submit their written reports for accreditation by the Norwe-
gian Board of Forensic Medicine (Board). I am unable to say whether any
of the other experts received this legal status. Torgersen’s counsel motioned
to have Senn appointed, but I am unable to document whether the status
was actually given. The status came to matter less: All the experts involved
were given access to the forensic items, allowed have written reports assessed
by the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine, and to voice their opinions
during several court-hearings concerning the bitemark-theme.
7.1.4 The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine
(Board)
The Board also came to play an important role during the courts’ assess-
ment of the Torgersen-case during this period. It was requested on several
occasions to deliver written statements about the experts’ analyses of the
bitemark. The Board is appointed by the Ministry of Justice and its main
mandate is to supervise, control and accredit the analyses performed by court
appointed experts in criminal cases. The Board is also a hearing body in cer-
tain cases, as it came to be in the Torgersen case. The Board’s legal authority
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is anchored in section 146 of the Norwegian Criminal Procedures Act. 2. The
information about the Board’s assessments and decisions is sourced by Board
(1999), Board (2000), Board (2001), and Commission (2006).
7.1.5 The investigators in the period between 1999 and
2006
In the period between 1997 and 2006 we get more information about the
reasoning of the investigators. Particularly Commission (2006) is valuable in
this respect. Five persons signed the Commission (2006): three jurists, one
psychologist, and one psychiatrist. I do not know how many investigators
were involved on the bitemark-means. It is also rather difficult to separate
between the investigative reasoning and the legal reasoning: Some of the
investigative decision-makers are the same individuals as the legal decision-
makers, and the Commission (2006) does not separate between reasoning for
diagnostic and penultimate factual purposes and reasoning for ultimate legal
purposes.
7.2 The court-appointed experts’
justification of BM1 through BM4
It is known that both the Appeals Committee and the Commission found
that the bitemark-means of the Torgersen-case was positively relevant to
and necessary for the indictment(s) of the case. Figure 7.1 reminds of the




OC   
T is the causal agent of the victim’s lethal/rape injuries which  
occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b, Oslo. 
BM 
T is the causal agent of the bitemark observed on the left  
breast of the victim which occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b, Oslo. 
BM1 
T’s biting-mechanism  
is the causal object of the bitemark 
BM2 
The bitemark occurred simultaneously  
with the lethal injuries 
BM1.1  
T’s biting-mechanism’s  state on  
bitemark-index1  
is compatible with  
the bitemark’s state on  
bitemark-index2 
BM1.11  




The bitemark’s state  
on bitemark-index2 I 
is bmi2  
BM2.1  
The bitemark’s state on  
the time-index is equal to  
the lethal/rape injuries’ state  
on the time-index   
BM2.11  
The lethal/rape injuries’  
state on the time index  
is t1 
BM2.12  
The bitemark’s state  
on the time-index is t2   
BM3 
The analytical norms and heuristics  
are agreed to be conducive to  
the aims and values of the 
criminal case process  
 
Expert-witnesses 
bitemark Lethal/rape injuries Torgersens biting-mechanism 
BM4 
The skinmark is a 
bitemark caused by a human  
adult’s biting-mechanism  
through biting  
BM3.1   BM3.2   BM3.3  BM4.1    BM4.2    
BM4.1    BM4.1    
Figure 7.1: The basic logical structure if both the physical conditions, BM and PC, of
the bitemark-means and the indictment(s) respectively are true. Arrows signifies trans-
ference of justification.
21. August 1998 MD/W received a letter from Borgarting Court of Ap-
peal formally appointing them as experts on the bitemark in the Torgersen-
case. Their mandate, included in the same letter, was as follows:
Your task will first and foremost be to assist in evaluating questions raised
against the opinion of earlier appointed experts, in particular the statement
that the perpetrator must have had one or more teeth missing and the that
position of [suspect]’s teeth can rule him out as the person who left the
toothmarks. [. . . ]
It is assumed that you will give a written report to the Court of Appeals,
containing your opinion in the case. You can otherwise undertake the in-
vestigations/tests you find necessary. Any questions or requests you might
have to the prosecuting authority or [suspect], should be put forward to the
court. (Eskeland 2000; Vol. I: 98-99)
Before I start the analysis of this question it is important to know that
the forensic items available to the experts were less than ideal than that of
the first expert Stroem:
• The excised breast with the skinmark;
• Photographs of the breast with the skinmark (before being excised) at the crime
scene and on the autopsy-table during external examination of the deceased;
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• Photographs of the breast after excision
• Imprints (plaster) of the skinmark (made by Stroem in 1957) and photographs of
these imprints
• Imprints (unidentified material) of the skinmark (made by Stroem in 1957?) and
photographs of these imprints
• Imprints (unidentified material) of suspect’s teeth (made by Stroem in April 1958)
and photographs of these
• Imprints (plastelin) of suspect’s teeth (made by Stroem in April 1958) and pho-
tographs of these
• Models (unidentified material) of suspect’s teeth based on the plastelin-imprints
(made by Stroem in April 1958) (MD/W 1999:Appendix 1)
From now on, unless otherwise specified, ”skinmark” and ”bitemark”
will both refer to any tangible object in the list above that represents the
original skinmark on the breast as observed at post-mortem prior to excision.
Likewise, ”the suspect’s biting-mechanism” will, unless otherwise specified,
refer to any tangible object in the list above that represents the suspect’s
natural biting-mechanism as observed by Stroem in April 1958.
The following analysis starts with the justification provided for the claim
of BM4 and BM1, continues with that for the claim of BM2, and ends with
that of the claim of BM3.
7.2.1 ”Is the suspect’s biting-mechanism the most
likely cause of the bitemark?” (BM4 and BM1)
1. ”Is the skinmark a human bitemark? ” (BM4)
MD/W (1999) simply decides without further justification that the skinmark
is a human bitemark — a mark made by human teeth through by the process
of biting. MD/W(1999) does not discuss the other possibilities and thereby
excludes that the skinmark stemmed from causes internal to the victim, from
tooth-like objects, or from animal teeth:
All [individual marks] show a mark which consists of several elements
which are completely in accordance with a bitemark made by a human set
of teeth. (MD/W 1999: 6).
2 The bite in [the victim]’s breast shows marks from three front teeth of
the upper jaw and at least three front teeth of the lower jaw. These teeth
[marks] show explicit characteristic features with respect to shape, size, and
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position. In particular there exist non-normal characteristics in terms of
teeth’s wear. (MD/W 1999:15)
2. ”Is the bitemark’s state on bitemark-index2 bmi2?” (BM1.12)
Unfortunately, MD/W (1999) is just as inarticulate and imprecise about the
characteristics observed of the skinmark as Stroem (1958): Existing derma-
tological terms for describing the skinmark are not exploited. Instead a rich
variety of natural language adjectives referring to teeth is preferred. The
following quotation illustrates: (MD/W (1999) adopt Stroem (1958)’s num-
bering of the individual marks of the skinmark).
The cutting edge on the lower jaw’s left middle front tooth (mark 6)
shows a narrow furrow which runs in the breadth of the cutting edge. In
the bitemark this furrow appears as parallel light and dark linear areas. The
light part towards the tongue is the side of the furrow which is towards the
tongue. The part of the cutting edge which is towards the tongue has not
made an explicit mark. The dark area towards the lip-side of the tooth is
the other side of the furrow.
This is in connection with a clear delineation of the lip-side of the cutting
edge. The irregularity in the cutting edge is probably caused by wear of the
edge by contacting the opposite teeth in the upper jaw which has caused
a loss of the hard tooth enamel and an exposition of the underlying tooth
bone which is softer and which is easier lost. The cutting edge of the lower
jaw’s right middle front tooth show a similar wear pattern but is less marked.
The furrows in the middle teeth lay in a flat angle in relation to each other
and are more or less on a line. The part of the lower jaw’s right front tooth
which faces towards the tongue has made a more explicit mark than the part
facing towards the lip. The marks from the two middle front teeth seem to
be separated by a small space which may possibly signify an actual space
between the teeth or a small defect of a part of the cutting edges. (MD/W
1999:7-8)
It is impossible to say why MD/W (1999) use the natural language kind
of adjectives instead of existing dermatological and odontological terms. Per-
haps they believed this to be better when addressing a lay audience. But
no reasons are given for this choice of terms. The result is imprecision and
disintegration into detail.
To make the information more manageable I had to impose broader cat-
egories and use anatomical and odontological terms wherever I felt this to
be safe. I am variably happy with my choices. An example: MD/W (1999)
observe that (a) ”Mark 4 is a small oval mark [. . . ]” (1999:6) and that (b)
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”Mark 4 [. . . ] is shown as a moderately pointed rounded mark” (1999:8). I
translated this into claims about the sub-mark’s shape (being rounded) and
size (being moderately pointed). I believe this to be reasonable, but I may
be wrong. If I doubted the efficiency of the translation I chose to use the
adjectives originally chosen by MD/W (1999).
MD/W (1999) report (in my terms) to have observed the following char-
acteristics of the secondary skinmark.
• Characteristics observed of the ”macro-unit” of the skinmark
Characteristics (not specified) (States: Completely in accordance with charac-
teristics expected when causal process is biting with a human set of teeth);
characteristics (not specified) (States: Similar to characteristics expected when
causal object is individual teeth;
Indentation-explicitness (States: Explicit);
• Characteristics observed of intermediate units of the Secondary skin-
mark:
Shape (States: curved; almost linear; angle; similar to the shape expected when
causal objects are the lower jaw’s front teeth);
Mark-positioning on curve (States: Almost regular; irregular);
Length (States: 9.5mm; similar to length expected when causal objects are upper
jaw’s anterior teeth; similar to that expected when causal objects are a human
being’s lower jaw anterior teeth; similar to that expected when causal objects
are a human being’s lower jaw’s right and left middle front teeth);
Breadth (States: Similar to breadth expected when causal objects are upper
jaw’s anterior teeth);
Cutting edge sizes (States: Not completely similar to cutting edge sizes ex-
pected when the causal objects are the upper jaw’s anterior teeth);
Characteristics (not specified) (States: Somewhat similar to characteristics ex-
pected when the causal objects are the upper jaw’s anterior teeth; similar to
characteristics expected when the causal object is either one upper jaw single
large middle front tooth or two upper jaw adjacent anterior teeth; similar to
those expected when causal objects are a human being’s lower jaw anterior
teeth; similar to those expected when causal objects are a human being’s
lower jaw’s right and left middle front teeth anterior teeth);
Injury base consistency (States: Different from the injury base consistency of
marks 5 and 6; more similar to the consistency expected when causal object
is tissue fluids (caused by vital reaction to injury) than to the consistency
expected when the causal object is teeth);
• Characteristics observed of units being individual marks of skinmark:
163
Size (States: Small; moderately pointed; similar to that expected when the causal
object is a pointed tooth);
Shape (States: Circular; lightly prolonged oval; oval; somewhat circular; moder-
ately pointed; similar to that expected when the causal object is a pointed
tooth);
Breadth (States: Narrow);
Indentation1 (States: Present, Possibly present, Not present);
Indentation2 (States: Similar to indentation expected when the causal object
is a human tooth’s cutting edge; Similar to indentation expected when the
causal object is the lower jaw’s right side front tooth); MD/W (1999:16-20)
These characteristics and their states are then the elements of MD/W
(1999)’s bitemark-index2 and are the foundation for the bitemark’s profile
on this index.
MD/W (1999) do not report all the units’ states on all the characteristics
observed: Some but not all marks are observed with respect to furrowing —
both present and not present are used if observed. How should one interpret
this? It is difficult to say whether this is a conscious choice. Maybe they
believed that only the positive observations should be reported or maybe
they believed that only the positively relevant markers given the truth of
the claim of BM1 should be reported. Or maybe they did not consciously
choose any of these strategies, but just happened to do so — proceeding by
the same kind of reasoning as Stroem (1958). I will study this further in
section three of this chapter.
Nobody challenged MD/W (1999)’s decisions about the conditions de-
noted by BM4 and its sub-conditions: All agreed that the skinmark was
a human bitemark and that the marks nr. 1, 2, and 3 were from the up-
per jaw and that the marks number 4, 5, and 6, were from the lower jaw.
But conflict arose on the number of individual marks observed and on which
kind of tooth (middle or side incisor or canine tooth) was the cause of given
individual marks.
MD/W (1999) state to be confident, through all their reports, that all the
sub-marks nr. 4, 4a, 5, and 6 existed and that these were most likely caused
by the lower jaw’s right canine, the lower jaw’s right side incisor, the lower
jaw’s right middle incisor, and the lower jaw’s left middle incisor, respectively.
They state to be less confident about the kinds of teeth being the causes of
the marks 1, 2 and 3, and they suggest two possible alternatives: Either
these marks had been caused by the upper right middle incisor, the upper
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right side incisor and the upper right canine, respectively; or they had been
caused by the upper left central incisor, the upper right central incisor, and
the upper right canine tooth, respectively. They recommend that the former
alternative was the more likely alternative (MD/W 1999:6). Their argument
for this will be explicated below as they used the suspect’s biting-mechanism
to justify their choice.
I will just remind that the latter alternative was recommended by Stroem
(1958:5). Waerhaug (1958) (the second expert in 1958) chose the alternative
of MD/W (1999), but during the trial Waerhaug changed to the alternative
recommended in Stroem (1958). The court-appointed expert between 1973
and 1976 also recommended Stroem’s alternative (Bang 1974:5).
Thus, all the court-appointed experts on the case from 1973 to 2006
agreed among themselves about the kinds of teeth which was the most likely
causes of the sub-marks 4, 4a, 5, and 6, but disagreed among themselves
about the most likely causes of the sub-marks of 1, 2, and 3.
I have not been to able document the alternatives and the distribution
of these among the expert-witnesses concerning the sub-marks 1, 2, and 3
(all the expert-witnesses denied that the suspect’s teeth could have made
these marks). All these denied the existence of mark 4a: This possible mark
had not been observed by Stroem who had a much better sample but poorer
instruments of observation. The absence of this mark, the expert-witnesses
argued, indicated a biter without a lower right side incisor — which would
exclude Torgersen who had this incisor present. Even if admitting the ex-
istence of a very weak such a mark it would not include Torgersen because
his lower right side incisor was not damaged or smaller than its two adjacent
teeth. We will come back to this when discussing the experts’ arguing about
BM1.11 below.
Finally, it should be mentioned that none of the court-appointed experts
or the experts-witnesses argued the presence of a mark 7 suggested (hesitat-
ingly) by Stroem (1958).
3. ”Is the suspect’s biting-mechanism’s state on the bitemark-
index1 bmi1?” (BM1.11)
MD/W (1999) found that the bitemark was ”very likely” caused by Torg-
ersen’s biting-mechanism. Then they also presumed that the set of charac-
teristics observed of this biting-mechanism was sufficiently relevant for the
comparison to the set of characteristics used for the classification of the
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Tooth 23: Upper jaw’s left canine Tooth 33: Lower jaw’s left canine
Tooth 22: Upper jaw’s left side front tooth Tooth 32: Lower jaw’s left side front tooth
Tooth 21: Upper jaw’s left middle front tooth Tooth 31: Lower jaw’s left middle front tooth
Tooth 11: Upper jaw’s right side front tooth Tooth 41: Lower jaw’s right middle front tooth
Tooth 12: Upper jaw’s right middle front tooth Tooth 42: Lower jaw’s right side front tooth
Tooth 13: Upper jaw’s right canine Tooth 43: Lower jaw’s right canine
Table 7.1: The relevant teeth represented by the notation of the FDI’s World
Dental Federation System
bitemark. Which characteristics were observed and how were they justified
as relevant for the decision about BM1.1 and BM1?
Before proceeding I will introduce a more efficient notation for referring
to the different teeth than that used by MD/W (1999). I have chosen the
FDI World Dental Federation’s Two-Digit Notation System. In table 7.1 the
right refers to the patient’s right:3
MD/W (1999) state to concentrate on the anterior and canine teeth of
the upper and lower jaw and observed the following characteristics of the
suspect’s biting-mechanism:
Characteristics observed of groups of teeth
Curve (States: Weak, relatively broad);
Teeth positioning on curve (States: Slightly irregular, relatively regular).
Characteristics observed of individual teeth
Shape (States: Pointed, normal, approximately normal);
Size (States: Normal, approximately normal);
Position on teeth-arch (States: Normal, approximately normal, slightly out-
side/labial);
Continuity mesial adjacent(States: Small space;
Maximum coronal-apical height position (States: Labial, distal-labial, mesial-
labial);
Maximum coronal-apical height proportion (States: 2/3 of tooth);
Minimum coronal-apical height position (States: Mesial-palatal, distal-palatal);
Maximum coronal-apical height relative (States: Greater than both adjacent
teeth);
Coronal-apical height relative (States: Less than mesial adjacent and equal
to distal adjacent, more than mesial adjacent);
3Also known as the ISO-3950 notation: http://www.fdiworldental.org/content/two-
digit-notation.
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Cutting edge breadth (States: Narrowing distally);
Cutting edge wear (States: Very slightly, some, moderate, significant, explicit
and strong);
Cutting edge wear position (States: Lingual, mesial-palatal, palatal);
Cutting edge wear distribution (States: Irregular);
Cutting edge surface (States: Flat, even, generally smooth);
Cutting edge indent (States: Yes);
Cutting edge mesial corner shape (States: Rounded);
Cutting edge furrow presence (States: Yes, explicit, very weak);
Cutting edge furrow length (States: As long as cutting edge, almost as long
as the cutting edge, less than cutting edge);
Cutting edge furrow position (States: Labial, centre, distal);
Cutting edge furrow shape (States: Flat);
Cutting edge continuity mesial adjacent (States: Small space);
Cutting edge continuity distal adjacent (States: Explicit space);
Cutting edge rim presence (States: Yes);
Cutting edge rim explicitness (States: Yes);
Cutting edge rim breadth (States: Narrow);
Cutting edge rim position (States: Lingual);
Cutting edge damage (States: Yes, slight);
Cutting edge damage position (States: Mesial-labial, labial).
4. ”Is the bitemark-indexes relevant to the claim of BM1.1?”
I will treat this question here although it is a part of sub-condition denoted
BM3.2 in figure 7.1.
MD/W (1999), like the first expert Stroem, do not explicate any standard
or best set of characteristics given the kind of bitemark in the Torgersen-
case. The considerable experience of these two bitemark-experts makes it
difficult to believe that they did not have any such reference. A few remarks
indicate their opinion about the discriminatory power of some of their chosen
characteristics:
The bite in [the victim]’s breast shows marks from three front teeth of the
upper jaw and at least three front teeth of the lower jaw. These teeth [marks]
show explicit characteristic features with respect to shape, size, and position.
In particular there exist non-normal characteristics in terms of teeth’s wear.
(MD/W 1999:15)
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And MD/W (1999) comment indirectly on the reliability of the obser-
vations by commenting on the conditions under which they were observed.
They recognized that
(a) body and limbs-position during biting being different from position during forensic
examination could affect the reliability of the observations:
We examined the photographs of the deceased on the crime scene
and on the examination table. These show that the left arm and the
breast were in the approximate same position on the two pictures and
the probability that any positional distortion of any significance is there-
fore low. (MD/W 1999:5)
They did not comment on the possible difference between position at first exami-
nation and position during the biting.
(b) the method and material of photography could affect the reliability of the observa-
tions:
Figure 2a bitemark shows detail better than figure 2b bitemark
(MD/W 1999:6)
An interpretation of these irregularities is complicated because the
marks one can observe in figure 2a [secondary skinmark] includes a
mixture which is caused by colouring caused by subcutaneous bruising
and the vital reaction and by indentations caused by cutting edges [of
the causal objects]. (MD/W 1999:7);
(c) the method and material of light for visual observation or for photographic represen-
tation could affect the reliability of the observations:
The interpretation of the pictures in figures 3a and 3b is complicated
because the light used is angled in order to underscore the 3-dimensional
characteristics of the pictures. Considerable care is required when the
characteristic features are to be assessed. (MD/W 1999:7);
(d) and that the method and material of imprinting and modeling as well as the method
and material of repeated imprinting and modeling could affect the reliability of the
observations:
Many of the details visible in these figures [pictures of model] were
visible on the model we examined, but the latter’s details were less
explicit due to material wear and the probability that this model was
not the first model made of the skinmark.4(MDW 1999:7)
4Stroem, in 1957 and 1958, may have made ”second generation” models: Models from
imprints from models from imprints of the skinmark. An expert involved in 1973-76 as
well as a prison-dentist also made models of models. I have not been able to trace the
exact number of models existing and their origin (made by whom, when, and from which
imprint). This need not imply that the legal agents could not trace them
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MD/W (1999) did not explicate how they were confident about the suf-
ficient certainty of condition BM4 and its sub-conditions.
As for the skinmark, MD/W (1999) do not report all the units’ state
on all the characteristics observed, do not justify this selective approach,
and do not justify that the set of characteristics observed are sufficiently
discriminatory for the diagnostic purpose. They merely claim that:
The suspect’s set of teeth has a series of characteristics. (MD/W 1999:
9)
And, like Stroem (1958), MD/W (1999) do not discuss the relationship
between their bitemark-index1 and bitemark-index2: Beyond the mecha-
nisms introduced by the methods for creating secondary forensic items, none
of the mechanisms operant during the biting are discussed. Maybe they saw
such issues as irrelevant as they were prohibited from assessing them anyway,
given the forensic material available to them, but they do not discuss their
possible relevance either (it came to be mentioned in the later reports, but
just as a matter of course).
The only legal agent requesting further justification for the discrimina-
tory power of the markers observed by any of the experts involved was the
Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine (Board) — and they only asked for
justification for one of the markers — the one used to classify Torgersen’s
biting-mechanism with respect to wear. In the Board’s assessment of MD/W
(1999) it states that:
The Board would, however, have found it purposeful that the experts
had expressed their opinion about/scientific basis for how this characteristic
[wear] is for the one who have bitten, i.e. the degree of dental wear required to
make such marks, and the proportion of the population (’non-biters’) having
this degree of wear. [the Board’s stressing/parenthesing] (Board 1999:2)
The Board did not ask about the other characteristics observed and
MD/W(1999) do not appeal to any published studies or organizational guide-
lines to support their choice of characteristics and their classifications of the
forensic items on these.
5. ”Is the suspect’s biting-mechanism compatible with the
bitemark?” (BM1.1)
In the order of MD/W (1999), their next assessment concerns whether a
bitemark like the one in this case could have been made by a biting-mechanism
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like that of the suspect. We know that their conclusions were accepted by
the legal agents involved:
4 [The suspect] has natural teeth with explicitly characteristic features and
his system of teeth can explain all the characteristics which one finds
in the bitemark on [victim]’s breast.
5 In our opinion it is not possible to exclude [the suspect] as the biter.
6 In our opinion it is very likely that the bitemark in [the victim]’s breast
was made by [the suspect’s]’s teeth. (MD/W 1999:15)
How did they justify this level of confidence about the certainty of con-
dition BM1.1?
MD/W (1999) were confident that the suspect’s teeth 43, 41, and 31
could be seen to be the causal sources of the skinmark’s sub-marks 4, 5, and
6 respectively: ”The characteristics of the bitemark and the teeth described
show close correspondence” (MD/W 1999:11):
1. The bitemark’s 4, 5, and 6 and the suspect’s 43, 41, and 31 have corresponding shape
being flat arch;
2. the skinmarks 5 and 6 and the suspect’s 41 and 31 have corresponding
a. cutting edge furrow-angle being approximately flat;
b. cutting edge furrow position being missing (the suspect’s 31 is reported to be in
the state centre on this characteristic, but mark 5, mark 6, and the suspect’s
41 had not been ascribed any state in MD/W (1999));
c. cutting edge explicitness position relation being labial/lingual; and
3. the sub-marks 4, 5, and 6 and the suspect’s 43, 41, and 31, observed through trans-





MD/W (1999) struggle more with the sources of the sub-marks of 1,
2, and 3 and suggest two alternative combinations: Either that these were
caused by teeth 11, 12, and 13, respectively, or that they were caused by
21, 11, and 12, respectively. The latter alternative was suggested by Stroem
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(1958) and Bang (1974). Waerhaug (1958) also changed to this alternative
later after having first suggested the former alternative. MD/W (1999) argue
that the former alternative is the more likely one:
Mark 3 was made by 13 because
• it signifies a pointed tooth.
Mark 1 and 2 was made by 11 and 12 because
• 12 is too small to be responsible for both the marks 1 and 2;
• 12 is responsible for part of the joint marks 1 and 2;
• 12’s max. height and its cutting edge’s shape explains mark 2 breadth broad-
ening towards towards mark 3;
• the distance between the most distal point of the cutting edge of tooth 12 and
the most mesial point of the cutting edge of tooth 13 corresponds to distance
between mark 2 and 3;
• 12’s cutting edge is worn, but shows no furrows, and this corresponds with
the characteristic features of mark 2.
• 11 lays in an almost continuous arch with 12, particularly the labial side of
the cutting edges.
• 11 cutting edge’s distal level and 12 cutting edge’s mesial level is different
and this can explain the space observed in the bitemark.
• 11 cutting edge furrow corresponds to the furrow observed in the cutting edge.
• 11 cutting edge’s uneven wear — with the more prominent side towards the
lip corresponds to the same feature in the bitemark.
• a transparent overlay of the suspect’s upper front teeth’ cutting edge shape,
size, and positioning corresponds closely to the cutting edge shape size and
positioning of the bitemark (on a photo same magnification as the teeth).
• in a state of rest the suspect’s biting-mechanism’s lower jaw mesial line is
slightly displaced to the left with respect to the mesial line of the upper
jaw. In a state of motion the suspect’s biting-mechanism’ lower jaw has good
capacity to produce a bite in which the lower jaw’s mesial line appears slightly
displaced to the right with respect to the mesial line of the upper jaw. This
signifies that the whole lower jaw has been slightly displaced to the right with
respect to the upper jaw during the biting. This capacity was corroborated
by the state of the corresponding wear-facets between the upper and the lower
jaw. (MD/W 1999:10-11))
MD/W (1999) argue the other alternative to be less likely,
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Even if a series of possible characteristic features exists of these teeth
which could correspond to the respective marks, we opine that these do not
provide a good and complete explanation of the way the bite was made for
several reasons.(MD/W 1999:13)
Mark 2 and 3 do not correspond to the suspects’ 11 and 12 because
• the distance between mark 2 and 3 does not correspond to the distance be-
tween the suspects 11 and 12;
• mark 3’s form and position do not correspond to the shape and position of
the suspect’s 12 — even if mark 3 appears to be oval in figure 3a and appears
to be rounded in figure 2a and even if these possible shapes could have been
produced by the highest part of the cutting edge of 12 ”It is difficult to accept
[this] as a satisfying explanation” ;
• mark 1 and 2 being on a line is at odds with the suspect’s 21 being slightly
displaced labially — which could be explained by the bitemark reflecting the
part of 21 cutting edge’s palatal side and the part of 11 cutting edge’s labial
side, but the 21 an 11 cutting edge wear’s slanting patterns signifies that this
possibility has a low probability;
• mark 2 cannot be explained by the furrowing of 11 — because the furrowing
in mark 2 observed by Stroem (1958) and Bang (1974) cannot be observed of
the skinmark by MD/ W (1999). If mark 2 does have a furrow it can equally
well be explained by 12 and its furrowing;5
• Bang (1974)’s photogrammetric analysis is compatible with both alternative
explanations of marks 1, 2, and 3.
This was thus MD/W (1999) reasoning when concluding that ”[. . . ] it is
not possible to exclude [the suspect] as the biter”.
7.2.2 BM2: The bitemark was made simultaneously
with the lethal/rape injuries?
MD/W (1999) does not address the condition of simultaneity (denoted BM2
in figure 7.1) and could neither have done so given the time passed.
5A possible confusion exists: MD/W(1999:13) states: ”The furrow in the cutting edge
of mark 2, described by Dr. Stroem and explained by being attributed to upper left middle
front tooth, may just as well correspond to the furrow described in our assessment of the
upper right middle front tooth. Dr. Stroem does not mention any furrow in mark 2, while
Dr. Bang has noted a thin furrow. We have not been able to observe any furrow in mark
2 in the material which was at our disposal.” I chose the interpretation above, but they
may have meant Stroem’s mark 1 when they refer here to mark 2 (which is theirs) because
the marks are difficult to separate
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The condition of simultaneity was not an issue during the assessments for
review either.
7.2.3 ”Were the analytical norms and heuristics agreed
conducive to the purpose?” (BM3)
In 1999, the Torgersen-case was rejected review by the Court of Appeal: the
Court accepted MD/W (1999)’s recommendation that all the conditions nec-
essary for the bitemark-proposition existed to the required degree of certainty.
The defence counsel insisted that the bitemark-means as well as the other
forensic means of evidence were not able to bring the case above the required
threshold of probability — their argument partly resting on the ”unscientific
methods” applied by the court-appointed forensic experts. The decision was
immediately appealed to the Appeals Committee of the Norwegian Supreme
Court (Appeals Committee).
By 2000 the suspect and his solicitors had listed five issues they asked
the Appeals Committee to address in a separate hearing about the bitemark-
means:
1. What is the ”best evidence” for assessing the bitemark and the suspects’
teeth today? The set of photographs taken by Stroem in 1957 (of the skinmark
in situ, on excised breast, on first imprint, etc.) and 1958 (the suspect’s natural
and and modelled biting-mechanism) — which were preferred by [MD/W] — or
the excised and stored breast, an imprint of the bitemark on this breast made
from this stored breast in 2001 by professor Senn, and an imprint of the bitemark
whit unknown origin or other specification — which were preferred by the defence
counsel’s expert-witness, professor Senn?
2. Which bitemark-procedure is the best approach? The feature-based ap-
proach in which directly (or not-mediated via instruments with unknown reliability)
observable markers dominate and where the less conceptualized markers observed
via transparent overlay complements the former — which were preferred by [MD/W]
— or the overlay approach in which markers observed via computer-generated over-
lays dominate — which were preferred by Senn?
3. All experts involved today (except professor Solheim) agree that the bitemark’s
sub-marks nr. 1, 2, 3, must stem from teeth 11, 12, and 13, but they disagree if
these are the suspect’s teeth 11, 12, and 13:
Does mark 2 correspond to the suspect’s 12 (as [MD/W] argue) or not
(as Senn argue)?
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4. All experts involved agree that the bitemark’s submarks nr. 4, 5, 6, must stem from
teeth 43, 41, and 31, but they disagree if these are the suspect’s teeth 43, 41, and
31:
(a) Does the lack of or the very weak imprint from a tooth 42 exclude the
suspect as the biter given that the suspect has a tooth 42 present
and 42 is not abnormal (as Senn argued) or not (as [MD/W] ar-
gued)?
(b) The relationship between mark 5 and 6 is ”lingual”/”labial” while
the relationship between the suspect’s 41 and 31 is opposite — does
that exclude the suspect as the biter (as Senn argued) or not (as
[MD/W] argued)?
(c) Does mark 5 correspond to the suspect’s tooth 41 (as [MD/W] ar-
gued)? Or not (as Dr. Flood argued)?
5. The relationship between the midlines in the bitemark is opposite that of
the suspect’s when occluded naturally — does that exclude the suspect
(as Senn argued) or not (as [MD/W] argued) or not (as Dr. Flood
argued)?; and
6. Is dental wear sufficiently discriminatory (as [MD/W] argued) or not (as
the suspect’s counsel argued)?
In section 2 above I listed the forensic items available to the bitemark-
experts: MD/W (1999) opine that the preserved breast, the imprints, and
the models (of both the skinmark and Torgersen’s biting-mechanism) have
been exposed to change and that this render these items less good evidence.
They decide that the photographs taken by Stroem of the primary and the
secondary items in 1957 and 1958 should be considered the best items.
Senn, on the other hand, opined differently: He claimed that the preserved
breast, an imprint he made from this breast in 2001, and an imprint of
unknown origin should be considered as the best items for observation. The
only justification I could find for this decision was Senn’s claim that the
photographs are not the best means because they are not scaled (Commission
2006:98).
But the Appeals Committee was convinced by the argument of MD/W
(1999, 2000) (Supreme Court Ruling 28. November 2001, cited in Commis-
sion 2006:100).
This decision made Senn’s arguments against MD/W(1999, 2000) very
difficult. But questions 4(a) and 4(b) were independent of the kind of sec-
ondary material used: How should one explain what was agreed among all
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the experts to be an unexpectedly large space between the sub-marks of 4
and 5?
All agreed that it must have been primarily caused by characteristics
of the causal biting-mechanism (any contribution by skin-characteristics is
only mentioned in the passing by MD/W): Senn claimed that the suspect
had tooth 42 present and not abnormal, and argued that this was reason
for excluding the suspect as the biter. Senn had performed a controlled
experiment in which Torgersen’s tooth 42 consistently produced an indent
equally explicit as the indents made by the adjacent teeth. MD/W saw it
differently. A bitemark made under conditions such as in this case, they
argued, is extremely difficult to recreate experimentally. Both the suspect’s
43 being longer than his 42, possible variation in tissue texture, and the
strength and direction of the forces applied — all these elements may explain
the space. A tooth which may be expected to make a mark will thus not
always make a mark in a natural context.
Much of the same kind of reasoning was used to explain the apparent
disparities in questions 4(b) and 5 — that the relationship between mark 5
and 6 is lingual-labial while the relationship between the suspect’s 41 and 31
is opposite; and that the relationship between the midlines in the bitemark
is opposite that of the suspect’s when occluded naturally: Variation in tis-
sue texture and the strength and direction of the forces applied was again
appealed to for explaining the difference in the skinmarks.
The Appeals Committee was again convinced by MD/W’s explanations
for these discrepancies (Supreme Court Ruling 28. November 2001, in Com-
mission 2006:102-105).
Question 6 was also independent of the secondary forensic items: How
common was the suspect’s kind of wear in 1958 among the population in
Oslo in the 50’s? The counsel argued it to have been very common. But
the Appeals Committee argued that even if such a wear was common this
does not thereby provide reason to believe that many other people would
have the same combination of the other joint characteristics documented of
the suspect’s teeth by the court appointed experts. They saw support for
this decision in Board (2001) (I will return to this particular issue in the last
section).
The Appeals Committee was all in all more convinced by the reports
and testimonies of the court-appointed experts than those of the expert-
witnesses. Some of this difference in confidence must be explained by the
Board’s assessments of the expert-reports.
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Board (2001) found that professor Senn had appropriate training and
experience in forensic bitemark-analyses, that he obviously had performed a
most thorough analysis, and that his findings were generally well described
and documented. But,
[. . . ] his conclusions depend to a large degree on the confidence one
can have to the opinions the expert have about which features the teeth
which made the bitemark must have had. These expected features are —
at least partly — presented by the expert as non-documented statements
or as expert judgements. These statements and judgements — and thereby
the strong conclusion that it is excluded that the suspect could have caused
such a bitemark — are therefore not available for evaluation by the Board.
(Board 2001:4)
Professor Senn had been supported by three other American bitemark
analysts, but only professor M. Bowers provided a written analysis for the
case. The Board of Forensic Medicine recognised that Bowers argued that the
evidence created sufficient doubt that the suspect had made the bitemark,
and that such evidence would not allow any positive identification, men could
not see that Bowers had provided sufficient reasons for the claim that the
suspect should be excluded.
Board (2001) found no reasons not to accredit the two other expert-
witnesses, Holck (1999 and 2000) and Flood (2001): It had no objections
to Flood (2001), the suspect’s assisting expert on geometric analyses (via
stereoscopy) of the bitemark, and found that Flood stressed his uncertainty
with respect to his findings appropriately.
Professor Holck had provided two analyses, one in 1999 and one in 2000.
His main argument concerned the characteristics by which court-appointed
experts founded their conclusions. He argued that both the reliability of the
classifications in this case and the general relevance of these characteristics
with respect to bitemark-diagnoses were questionable. The characteristics
observed of the suspect’s teeth, Holck argued, could impossibly have the dis-
criminatory power claimed by Stroem (1958), Bang (1974), or MD/W (1999):
He appealed to the part of the literature supporting his concerns about low
reliability; and stressed that Whittaker himself in 1975 had published the
results of a controlled bitemark experiment (on pigskin) which showed that
the ability to identify the correct biter fell from 60% at zero hours to 9% at
24 hours (Holck 1999:1-10, in Eskeland 2000; Vol III:198-207). Holck (1999)
concluded by stating that there was nothing evidencing a correspondence be-
tween Torgersen biting-mechanism and the bitemark (Holck 1999:10). Holck
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(2000) concerned an experiment to demonstrate the distortions of the dimen-
sions of an ink-mark on a female left breast given various positions of the left
arm, where the aim was to show reliability issues attached to bitemarks in
human skin.
These two reports had been assessed in Board (2000). It generally ac-
knowledged Holck’s expert-knowledge about human anatomy and his expe-
rience with forensic assessments in physical anthropology, but:
The Board has no significant complaints to the expert’s examinations.
However, the Board is in doubt with respect to the degree to which the
expert has a reasonably sufficient scientific competence to assess the signif-
icance of his findings in relation to the given case. The Board, in any way,
cannot find that he has presented a sufficient basis for his relatively bom-
bastic conclusions. This is valid for both [Holck 1999 and Holck 2000]. [The
slanting is the Board’s] (Board 2000:3)
The Appeals Committee thus saw the Board (2000 and 2001) as generally
supporting their preference of MD/W’s analyses and recommendations over
those of Torgersen’s experts:
As mentioned above, the Board has not found it appropriate to provide
its own detailed views. After having assessed all the experts’ reports and
comments in this case, the Board finds it however correct to communicate
its general assessment to the Court:
The ”bitemark-evidence” in the Torgersen case has now been assessed by
a series of specialists in forensic odontology and related disciplines and among
these several experts with a solid international scientific reputation. They
have collectively expressed a wide spectrum of different expert judgements
in relation to the main question in this connection: What is the probability
that [the suspect’s] teeth could have made a bitemark such as that on [the
victim] compared to the probability that the bitemark could have been made
by the set of teeth of another? It is demonstrated that that the experts have
different opinions of the degree to which and how particular features of a set
of teeth will cause particular features in a bitemark. This leads to different
opinions with respect to criteria for ”match” between a bitemark and a set
of teeth. There is no agreed knowledge, nor a shared opinion, concerning the
weight which should be attached to ”matching” features and there are no
well defined criteria for ”not-matching” features. If a feature of a bitemark
deviates from what was expected given a set of teeth, it seems that this may
be explained away by natural reasons by some experts while other experts
would use it as grounds for exclusion. All in all it has been demonstrated that
the contemporary ”state of the art” in this sub-discipline of forensic science
is such that it does not provide a basis for any strong conclusion that the
given bitemark was caused by Torgersen and neither any strong conclusion
that it was not.
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The Board of Forensic Medicine therefore maintains and strengthens the
assessment it gave to the Borgarting Appeals Court the 7. August 2000:
Caution should be shown and the Court should not attach too much eviden-
tial burden to the bitemark. (Board 2001:5)
The Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court finally recognized this
and downgraded the weight attached to the bitemark by the 1958-experts
Stroem and Waerhaug. Under considerable doubt the Appeals Committee
also found that also MD/W’s conclusion was too strong. They concluded
that the weight should be reduced from that given in 1958, but:
The Appeals Committee finds that the bitemark-evidence still pulls in the
direction that Torgersen is the biter, but that this is not essentially more
likely than that he has not caused the bitemark. (Supreme Court Ruling 28.
November 2001, in Commission 2006:108).
Concluding about the justifications for BM3.2 and BM3.3 It is diffi-
cult from the available sources to see how the crime investigators in 2001 jus-
tified that MD/W’s analyses were better than those of the expert-witnesses:
They obviously trusted the former more than the latter, but what this trust
consisted in remained unarticulated: Neither the investigators nor the legal
agents explicitly expressed their own expectations or standards of expert-
analyses, did not perform any literature-review to form an opinion about the
state of knowledge of forensic bitemark-analysis or the state of guidelines in
bitemark-analysis.
The expert-witnesses did not offer anything different than the court-
appointed experts: Indeed they offered alternative characteristics, alternative
observational heuristics, and an alternative set of forensic items, but could
merely claim that the discriminatory powers of these were better than those
of the court-appointed experts. The expert-witnesses’ analyses were thus no
more ”scientific” than those provided by the court-appointed experts.
1. Were the norms of inference agreed conducive to the purpose?
(BM3.1)
The last issue to be considered in this chapter concerns MD/W (1999, 2000,
and 2001)’s decision that the claim of BM3.1 was sufficiently certain.
Very little information is offered by MD/W concerning their preferred
standard of inference — they comment only indirectly, when they explain
why they do not use statistical techniques:
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The interpretation of bitemarks and possible suspect teeth is known as a
very difficult sub-discipline within forensic odontology which requires signif-
icant amount of experience and knowledge. Assessments of the probability
that a given system of teeth has been the cause of an individual bitemark
are subjective. It is not possible to determine the probability scientifically
in the same way as for other means of identification. (MD/W 1999: 4)
In an appendix MD/W (1999) comment (as mandated) on the method-
ological remarks made about Stroem (1958) by the expert-witnesses from
1973-1976 — Dr. Neumann and Hagen:
A forensic expert’s opinion about the probability that a particular given
mouth has caused a given bitemark attends to finding an explanation to all
those characteristics which one finds in the bitemark and which are found in
the suspect’s row of teeth. The final interpretation does not say that only
the mouth of the suspect could have made the bitemark. It is never possible
to say this. It is obvious that an expert cannot completely exclude the possi-
bility that another mouth with the same or alternative teeth-characteristics
could have made the bitemark.
[. . . ]
We disagree with Hagen’s perception about what it should mean to com-
pare scientifically [. . . ]. A meaningful comparison does not require that the
”participating objects should be characterized independently of each other”.
The comparison process starts in that way, but continues with what may be
described as an ”interactive comparison” which moves between the objects
of the comparison. This may disclose areas of compatibility or lack of such
not noted previously. This is not to change the data, as suggested by Hagen.
The facts stay unchanged. What is changed is the observer’s ability to see
and interpret the actual evidential material.
[. . . ]
We agree with Hagen that in a scientific comparison ”everything must
fit”. This is only possible by the kind of interactive comparison we have
described.
[. . . ]
Hagen discusses the inferences drawn from the investigation of the
bitemarks. This, again, underscores his lack of practical experience and
understanding of bitemarks. Much of his discussions are based on very com-
plicated statistical arguments which we hold to be completely irrelevant to
the practical treatment necessary of a case under conditions such as those of
a murder-investigation. His main arguments are based on whether Stroem
could have observed the kind of detail in the bitemarks which he describes.
It is clear that given our own examinations of the existing material in 1998
that even after all these years many of the the details described by Stroem
is still visible and we find that this is a very strong argument supporting the
observations made by Stroem and Waerhaug [the second bitemark-expert in
1958] [MD/W’s quotation-marks]. (MD/W 1999; Appendix 3: 5)
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Board (1999) generally accredits MD/W (1999), but the latter’s grade of
uncertainty expressed in the conclusion, ”very likely”, was met with some
hesitation. Board (1999) states that it would have preferred an expression of
the prevalence of the kind of wear observed of the suspect’s biting-mechanism
in the relevant population:
The Board finds that the experts’ assessments in this context must be seen
to have been lege artis. The results are however, that the Board does not get
any basis for assessing the validity of their conclusion that ”In our opinion
it is very likely that the marks in [the victim]’s breast were made by [the
suspect]’s teeth”. The Board will add that it would have been in line with
the tradition within forensic odontological dental identification (from teeth
and dental records) to use the expression ”likely” (as in ”identity likely”)
in a situation where several details are demonstrated, but where there are
still a presumed possibility that another suspect with the necessary dental
characteristics may exist. [. . . ] One should be aware that when [the experts]
base their final conclusion very likely on comparisons between the bitemark
and [the suspect]’s set of teeth, then they compare with a partly different
set of teeth than that of expert Stroem and Bang [in 1974] when these two
compare and conclude that the bitemark with all probability stems from [the
suspect]. The fact that two different sets of [the suspect]’s upper anterior
teeth are found to be compatible with the upper part of the bitemark could
indicate that this part of the bitemark is not very characteristic with respect
to the one who made the bite. (Board 1999:3).
In 2000 MD/W delivered a supplementary report answering questions
asked by the defence counsel. Four comments are relevant with respect to
the methodological norms of MD/W: One question concerned the issue of
diagnostic criteria:
There is no consensus about any given number of in modern forensic
odontology. In principle, 12 teethmarks in one row without any abnormal
characteristics may be less useful than for example 6 or 7 marks with more
available information. See R-v-MUDD, Whinchester Crown Court, 1998.
Only three teeth were involved in this case about a bite in a breast. Mudd
was found guilty. (MD/W 2000:21)
A second question concerned MD/W (1999)’s perception of degrees of
certainty:
Concerning the use of the word ”certainty”. To us this means 100% cer-
tainty. We make it clear in our introduction that bitemark-analysis is not like
DNA-analysis where precise probabilities can be determined mathematically.
[. . . ] We use the words ”very likely” because we are in full awareness that we
may not provide mathematical certainty in a case about a bitemark. There
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is no method for applying statistics, like in a DNA-case. We have made an
assessment based on a series of factors which all works together in this one
bitemark. These contain wear and pattern of erosion of the teeth, the teeth-
arcs’ form, the positions of the teeth, distance between the teeth, the size of
the teeth, and a series of details in the photographs and the imprints. We
have not assessed small deviations in size and position because, as we say in
our introduction, the aspiration of such a precision in bitemark-analysis has
no purpose.
[. . . ]
We have acknowledged that analysis of bitemarks is difficult and requires
much experience. This is why we have not said that it is 100% certain that
the [suspect] is the cause of this bite, but that his set of teeth can explain the
marks and that it is very likely that he has caused it. We can not exclude
that he did it. I Norway, as in The Great Britain, it is for the court to decide
about the question of guilt. The claim that bitemarks normally should only
be used to prove innocence has often been appealed to in court since 1954.
The courts in Great Britain nevertheless still accept bitemarks as evidence
for the prosecution.
[. . . ]
Finally — we have emphasized not claiming that the material of evidence
is fully objective and providing statistical results. This is never the case of
bitemarks. This is why ABFO (The american Board of Forensic Odontol-
ogists) recommends using words like ”probably” or most likely. (MD/W
2000:26-27)
A third question concerned the issue of the prevalence of the kind of wear
observed of the suspect’s biting-mechanism in the relevant population:
A larger study about dental wear in a population in Great Britain was
performed by Smith and Robb (1996). In the age group 15-26 years the
dental wear of the anterior teeth in the lower jaw was ascribed an average
reference-number of 1.25. In the age group 56-65 years the average was 2.25.
If using Smith and Robbs method of reference, the degree of loss of dental
tissue in Torgersen’s anterior teeth in the lower jaw would have been given the
highest but one, or the most serious category (3) described by them. This
degree of wear in the cutting edges of a young person is very uncommon.
(MacDonald/Whittaker (2000: 15a)6
And fourthly, concerning the issue about the meaning of their grade of
”very likely” they state to adhere to the guidelines offered by Manual of
Forensic Odontology (Bowers (ed.), 1995 (3.edition) where the grading ”very
6This quote is from a correction to the original 2000-report. In the latter they state
that Smith and Robb (1996) shows that in the age-group 15-26 years, 5.3% was classified
as having dental wear of the anterior teeth in the lower jaw being ”unacceptable”.
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likely” corresponds to a probability between 0.5 and 0.95 (MD/W 2000: 23-
24).
The Board (2001) was somewhat surprised that MD/W insisted on the
formulation of very likely when they at the same time state that grade to
represent between 0.5 and 0.95 on an analogous scale. The Board appealed to
the practice in forensic genetics, in paternity-cases, where very likely is agreed
to be reserved for likelihoods above 0.95: It is agreed among the Scandinavian
forensic genetics that only ratios exceeding 19 should be allowed to enable
speaking with weight that a given man is the father of the child (The Board
2001:2). Board (2001) does not explicitly ask about the risk of false positives
or about the nature and degree of the relationship between markers observed
of the forensic items. Board (2001:5) accredits MD/W (1999, 2000), but
cautions the legal decision-makers about the value of the bitemark-means
with respect to the indictment(s).
As noted above the Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court noted this
and downgraded the weight which had been attached to the bitemark by
all the court appointed experts. However, it still saw that ”the evidence
still pulls in the direction that Torgersen is the biter, but that this is not
essentially more likely than that he has not caused the bitemark.” (Supreme
Court Ruling 28. November 2001, in Commission 2006:108).
Conclusion about the claim of BM3.4 The Board (2001) seems not to
entirely agree that the strategy of inference used by MD/W was the best
possible. The Board wanted information of a kind it knew was possible for
the investigative conditions: It wanted an estimate about the discriminatory
potential of the expert-knowledge — in order to form an opinion about not
only the probability of the suspected hypothesis conditional on the bitemark-
evidence, but also the probability of the alternative hypothesis conditional
on the same evidence — all ultimately to form an opinion about the risk
of having made the wrong conclusion and thereby harming the aims of the
decision. The board did not thereby require that this estimate should be
based on a certain kind of data analyzed by a certain kind of statistical
technique. It would, I believe, have accepted an estimate derived from the
inter-subjective experience of bitemark-experts — even subjective experience
would have been accepted. The Board wanted MD/W’s reference-groups
for the different decisions. But MD/W could not respond adequately to
this request as they confused norms of inference with methods/techniques of
182
inference.
Just like Stroem (1958), MD/W (1999, 2000, 2001) seem to be guided
by the norm practiced in everyday decisions which I in the previous chapter
called ”incomplete or open induction”. This norm does not induce explicit
deliberation on the relevant reference population and has no standardized
means for assessing the risk of making the wrong decision.
How, then, did MD/W (1999, 2000, 2001)’s norms of inference compare
with that of the other bitemark-experts on the case? The latter most likely
adhered to the same norms: None of the expert-witnesses challenged these
norms. The defence counsel had partly based their arguments in the claim
that the court-experts’ analyses were ”unscientific”, but did not proceed to
specify what a ”scientific” analysis would include. Nor was their own experts
of any help here as their analyses were just as ”unscientific” as the court-
appointed experts.
The question of how MD/W (1999, 2000, 2001)’s analytical norms and
heuristics compare to those used for producing more general knowledge about
phenomena and mechanisms relevant to forensic bitemark-analysis will be
studied in the next chapter. Here it suffices to say that MD/W’s norms and
heuristics were representative of those of the larger pool of bitemark-experts:
7.3 Was the 2001-decision about BM
evidence-based?
Again the investigators decided that the bitemark-proposition was positively
relevant to the indictment-proposition. And again we must assume that
both the crime investigators and the experts knew about and intended to
contribute to the aims of the investigation and the ultimate aims of the legal
processing of the case — that they had no intention to undermine these.
And we must presume that they did find the risk of having recommended
a wrong conclusion as sufficiently small. But again there is only one weak
sign of the need to assess this risk in the sources referred to in this chapter
— in Board (1999, 2000), when it asked for the reference-population for the
suspect’s state on the characteristic of wear.
The most critical information still not provided in the written sources
accumulated in 2006 is that about the reference-groups and -terms used by
the experts as well as the investigators. No information was provided on (a)
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the general discriminatory power of the markers observed; (b) the negation of
BM1 (that ”another biting-mechanism than the suspect’s is the true causal
object of the bitemark”); or (c) the negation of BM (that ”another than the
suspect made the bitemark during the time specified or the suspect or another
made the bitemark at a time different from the time specified). Not explicat-
ing the reference-groups and -terms is not only contrary to the basic and well
known norms of scientific inference, but also contrary to the inference-norm
recommended by the main organization of forensic odontology, the American
Board of Forensic Odontology. And it makes the investigative decision that
the bitemark-proposition (BM) is basically (causal-logically) positively rele-
vant to the indictment-proposition (PC) not evidence-based to the standard
of Premise 1 of this dissertation.
And, again, I will underscore that not being evidence-based does not im-
ply that the investigative decision is incorrect. It may be correct or incorrect
— we do not know: As long as the reference-groups are not explicit there are
no means by which to assess that question.
For the decision in 1958, I recognized that the public not necessarily
needed access to the details of the reference-basis of public decisions to be
able to form trust and confidence in them — an appeal to the authority of
the decision-maker or institution was a possible means of legitimacy. Then
Premise 1 of this dissertation would be less relevant. But, as argued in
Chapter 1, in 1997 and 2001 an appeal to authority alone is no longer suffi-
cient: The modern public is highly educated, is convinced about democratic
ideals such as equality, citizen’s participation in government, and rational
decision-making, and is therefore much more critical — demanding access to
the means of public decision-making. Implicit reference-bases coupled with
appeals to authority alone, unconsciously or not, prohibit participation and
foster doubt about the intentions of public decision-makers.
There is still possible that information about reference-groups and -terms
was provided orally. But it is not easy to imagine how this could have hap-
pened without leaving more traces in the written sources. Only Board (1999,
2000, 2001) contains information indicating some interest in the reference-
groups used by the experts.
The conclusion about the evidence-basis of the 1997-2001-decisions about
the bitemark-means must be the same as for the 1958-decision: In light of
the kinds of information provided in the written sources, the conclusion is
that it is more likely than not that the crime investigative decisions (that
184
the bitemark-proposition is positively relevant to the indictment-proposition)
between 1997 and 2001 were not evidence-based to the standard of Premise
1 of this dissertation. And we may remove the condition on the conclusion
about the 1958-decision: Premise 1 is relevant for modern public decisions
— the modern citizen needs access to the means of public decisions to be
able to form confidence and trust in in these.
In an addendum to this chapter I present the Norwegian Criminal Cases
Review Commission’s position on the norms and standard of reasoning with
respect to forensic evidence. In the next chapter I will review the current an-
alytical norms and general state of knowledge within the discipline of foren-
sic bitemark-analysis. The question remains the same: Are the scientific
decisions about phenomena and mechanisms relevant to forensic bitemark-
analysis evidence-based according to Premise 1 of this dissertation?
185
Addendum
The Review Commission’s view on legal evidence and
proof
Neither the court-appointed experts nor the expert-witnesses called on
to assist on the bitemark-means in the Torgersen-case provided the kind of
information needed for person-independent evaluation of (a) the decision that
the bitemark-proposition positively relevant to the indictment-proposition
and (b) the decision that the risk of being wrong was sufficiently low. The
only agent asking for such kind of information was the Norwegian Board of
Forensic Medicine.
In this addendum I will study the arguments of the Commission (2006)
when they accepted that the previous courts’ analyses and decisions about
the relevance of the forensic means of evidence as both appropriate and cor-
rect — thus deciding that the conditions for retrial, according to Sections 391
and 392 of the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act, did not exist for these
means in the Torgersen-case.
7.4 Review Commission on legal assessments
of evidence
With respect to the conditions of Sections 391 and 392 of the Norwegian
Criminal Procedure Act, Review Commission (2006) holds that the standard
of proof should be ”reasonable overweight of probability” given the precedent
High Court Rulings (2000:1285 and 2004:449) (Review Commission 2006:70-
71). The fourth condition of 391, 1) ”cannot be excluded” was also held
to be less strict than that required for general case-procedural error and
requires that there exists a certain possibility that the fault affected the
decision. Section 391, 3), states two alternative conditions which can reopen
a case. The Commission interpreted that ”seems likely to lead to” requires
that a circumstance or new evidence must minimally produce ”a reasonable
possibility” for acquittal, etc. It also interpreted ”new” circumstance or
evidence to mean that it had not been presented to the judging court, and
thereby had not had the power to affect the content of that court’s decision.
Review Commission (2006) further stated that, normally, new assess-
ments of evidence cannot be viewed as new circumstance. But a new expert-
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assessment could be viewed as new evidence even if it was not based on
new forensic material and in any case if the assessment was based on new
knowledge having common support in the discipline in question (supported
the High Court Ruling in the case in 2001). Given these conditions, new
expert assessment of old expert statements could constitute new evidence.
The theme of assessment would be the import of the new circumstances or
evidence if it had been known to the court trying and deciding the case,
and as related to the other evidence and circumstances present at that time
(Review Commission 2006: 89-90).
Section 392, second part, has two conditions. Review Commission (2006)
stated the question to be whether the case all in all now is such that it should
be reopened to insure that no injustice has been caused. It reminded that a
change of the Section occurred in 1993 — where ”very doubtful” had been
changed to ”doubtful” — and that the latter only applies to case-decisions
effective from 1. January 1980. The Commission further stated that there
are no limitations concerning the meaning of ”special circumstances”: New
assessments of the validity or soundness of the evidence presented to the
deciding court may constitute such ”special circumstances”. Both before
and after Section 392 was changed in 1993 its second part is seen as a last
safety measure in cases in which a decision appears ”(very) doubtful” (Review
Comission 2006: 90-91).
Review Commission (2006)’s position on legal evidence, proof, and stan-
dards of proof criminal cases is a familiar one:
It is a fundamental principle of rule of law that a suspect shall be seen as
innocent until proven guilty. The burden of proof belongs to the prosecutorial
authority, and it is this part which has to prove, in a sufficient manner, that
the suspect is guilty as charged. When a suspect’s guilt is to be adjudicated,
both reasonable doubt and sensible doubt shall come in his or her favour.
This implies that, in order for deciding the suspect guilty, the court must be
certain and convinced that all the conditions for punishment are fulfilled. It
is not sufficient that there exist an overweight of probability of guilt. The
court must perform an overall assessment of the jointly existing evidential
material and decide not guilty if there exists a reasonable and sensible doubt.
Norwegian law is subject to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its section 6 (Right to a fair
trial), part 2, refers to the presumption of innocence:
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law. (Review Commission 2006: 49)
The Review Commission appealed to the principle of free admittance of
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evidence, combined with strict requirements concerning the weight of evi-
dence, and the presumption of innocence as the best means against arbitrary
assessments and wrongful convictions. The Norwegian legal adjudication is
based on what they called a non-arbitrary assessment of legal evidence:
The essence of this notion was, the Commission argued, adequately ex-
pressed in Strandbakken (2003) and Andenaes (2000) (generally accepted
authorities in Norwegian jurisprudence):
Assessment of evidence may never be reduced to a mathematical com-
putation of probabilities, but must be seen in light of it being psychological
cognitive/epistemic process. Subjective prejudice and frames of reference
can never be the fundament of a legal judgement. Assessment of evidence
must neither be based on pure intuition nor non-reflective overall interpreta-
tions. [. . . ] The best basis for providing a correct judgement is to build on
a rational assessment having as its starting point that each case is unique.
(Strandbakken 2003:244 in Review Commission 2006:49)
The judge cannot restrict himself to a non-reflective intuition. The evi-
dence must be processed by though. The presented evidence must be related
to common/ordinary statements of experience when deciding its value, and
on this basis the judge must adjudicate whether a sufficient degree of prob-
ability exists for him to build on. [. . . ] Direct evidence is, for instance,
a suspect’s confession, witness-statements from persons who have seen the
suspect committing the act, a libeling letter produced in court. This kind of
evidence is evidence which directly says something about the criminal rela-
tion. Examples of indirect evidence are witness-statements about seeing the
suspect nearby the crime scene at the time of the crime, blood on the sus-
pect’s clothes, [. . . ]. That which is the direct object of proof is circumstances
which in itself are not of legal importance. It is not punishable by law to
be close to a crime scene, nor have blood on ones clothes, [etc.]. But the
circumstances can, individually or jointly give a basis more or less certain
inferences about the guilt of the suspect.
The separation between direct and indirect evidence is not something by
law, and it is, in my opinion, of little value. Direct evidence too, in reality,
can only provide a basis for more or less certain inferences about the guilt
of the suspect. If a witness explains it saw the suspect committing the mur-
der, then it is impossible to use this without premising that (1) the witness
saw correctly, (2) that it remembers correctly, and (3) that it represents cor-
rectly. In all three premises an error may occur. In addition one has the
possibility that a witness may intentionally explain incorrectly, for instance,
in order to revenge on the suspect. The technical evidence (fingerprint anal-
yses and legal chemical and legal medical analyses of different kinds) is as a
rule only indirect evidence, but these may often create a certainty which is
far stronger than that had by so-called direct evidence ( Andenaes 2000 in
Review Commission 2006: 49)
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The Review Commission noted that, usually, there will be a variety of
different kinds of evidence in any criminal case. In some cases one may have
that one particular evidence alone convinces the court that the suspect is
guilty, in others it will be the sum of several evidence which lead to the
convincing. ”When assessing the strength of the evidence, both individually
and jointly, one may not simply build on statistically computed probability.
This is so partly because one may lack information to perform such a precise
computation and partly because statistics may only be a part of that which
provides a conclusion in a given particular case.” (Commission 2006: 49)
The Comission drew further support for holding this notion by referring
to Slettan and ie (2001) and Supreme Court Rulings (2001 and 2005):
But absolute certainty occurs rarely or never in the real world. When
the burdening decision about guilt or innocence is to be taken, it will often
be a margin of doubt. A sole theoretical doubt – the doubt consisting in
that anyone may always be wrong – is not sufficient for acquittal. Some-
thing in the case must create doubt: Did the prime witness lie? Is it possible
that he observed incorrectly or mistaken one person for another? [. . . ] The
expression ”reasonable doubt” means therefore that the doubt must be rea-
sonable and justified [. . . ] If it, in practice, can not be doubt about the guilt
of the suspect, he may be convicted. (Slettan and Oie (2001;Vol 1: 25) in
Commission 2006: 49)
By the decisions concerning claims for reopening with reference to Crim-
inal Procedural Act, Section 391, nr. 3 and Section 392, second part, it is
considerably important that when the deciding court has found that there
exists no reasonable doubt about the suspect’s guilt this was so on the basis
of immediate proof. The kind of proof in reopened cases will in contrast
be mediate — possibly supplied by investigation and oral negotiations of a
limited character in relation to the negotiations in the judging court. Imme-
diate proof — that the adjudicating court itself will hear the defendant and
the witnesses — is a central carrying principle in the criminal process. By
the explanations given, and the added information, change, and clarification
occurring through examination in court, and by the impression communi-
cated by the personal behaviour in the courtroom, the adjudicating court
will normally have a better basis on which to assess the credibility and the
validity of the explanations than that which may be had by reading docu-
ments representing the explanations.
The concerns which normally caution the court re-trying a previous court’s
decisions (which was based on immediate proof) will be strengthened by
time. New explanations will strongly tend to be characterised by weakened
and changed memory over time, or explanations may not be reproduced.
Technical evidence may have had their value reduced or be lost.
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It is also of importance whether the decision sought re-adjudicated is
justified or not. In cases by a Court of Appeal, where the decision and
its reasoning is not required explicitly and openly justified, it is normally
difficult to say anything certain about how the individual evidence was ac-
tually assessed by the court. It must be premised that the appellate court
based its adjudication on the joint assessment of the evidence presented. It
may normally be assumed that individual evidence may have played a more
prominent role than other evidence. But beyond that the court judging about
reopening must exhibit restrain concerning statements about how the appel-
late court weighed individual evidence against each other. (Rt 2001:1521 in
Commission 2006: 49)
The principle that any reasonable doubt shall be to the benefit of the
accused is s carrying principle in the criminal procedure. The requirement
applies to the result of the evidence as such. Legal proof rests often on an as-
sessment of several aspects which individually may have different evidential
force. It is not required that each individual aspect is proven beyond reason-
able doubt if a joint evaluation of all the aspects gives no reasonable doubt
about the conclusion. (Supreme Court Ruling 2005: 1353 in Commission
2006: 49)
Review Commission (2006) states to subscribe to the general views about
legal proof as expressed in these sources and concluded that even if doubt may
be recognized for one or several of the means of evidence in the Torgersen-
case, this may not necessarily imply that the case will be reopened. It repeats
that the mandate of the Commission is to assess if the conditions given in
Criminal Procedural Act, Section 391, nr. 1and 3 and Section 392, second
part are fulfilled.
The Review Commission (2006) thus argues that, generally, legal proof
concerns the practical and immediate weighing of a complex whole of ev-
idence against a multitude of conditions of a varied nature and that this
weighing can neither be based in arbitrary intuition nor in a mathematical
computation of probabilities. This might be so when all kinds of evidence
are weighed together at the end of the trial.
7.5 Review Commission on evidence involv-
ing expert knowledge.
But what about means of evidence involving expert knowledge? What is the
Review Commission (2006)’s position with respect to standards of expert-
knowledge?
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In Norway both the police during the investigative phase and the judge
during any phase of the processing of a case, can use any kind of expert-
knowledge — traditional forensic expertise such that offered by internal per-
sonnel (fingerprint-experts, weapon-experts, photo-experts, etc) or support-
personnel (forensic pathologists, geneticians, odontologists, psychiatrists) as
well as other expertise not regularly assisting investigation for legal purposes.
Rules exist to ensure that objectivity and quality of the expert’s work: Chap-
ter 11 and 12 in the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act (1981/2006) states
how this appointment can be done (by whom, and who can be appointed,
etc.). Recall that in the Norwegian system there are court-appointed experts,
who are required legal formally (a) to be impartial and (b) to have their writ-
ten reports accredited by the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine; and
expert-witnesses, appointed by and answering to the needs of a party in the
case, who are not legal formally required to be impartial, but are scientific
normatively required to be so. The latter need not, but can upon request
(as happened in the Torgersen-case), have their written report assessed by
the Board of Forensic Medicine. The court-appointed experts are funded
by the state, but the cost of the expert-witnesses must be paid by the par-
ties themselves. The rules, norms and expectations regulating the use and
performance of experts are basically the same as those in 1958.
Torgersen’s legal counsel had specifically asked the Commission to com-
ment on the relevance of the problems discussed in a much cited paper by
Saks and Koehler published in Science 2005. This paper addresses the foun-
dational problems of identification science:
Little more than a decade ago, forensic individualization scientists com-
pared pairs of marks (handwriting, fingerprints, tool marks, bite-marks, hair,
tire-marks, etc.) intuited whether the marks matched, and testified in court
that whoever or whatever made one made the other. Courts almost never
excluded the testimony. Cross examination rarely questions the foundations
of the asserted expertise or the basis of the analyst’s certainty.
Today, that once-complacent corner of the law and science has begun
to unravel — or at least to regroup. The news carries reports of erroneous
forensic identifications of hair, bullets, handwriting, footprints, bite-marks,
and even venerated fingerprints. Scientists have begun to question the core
assumptions of numerous forensic sciences. (Saks and Koehler 2005)
Saks and Koehler studied 86 cases in which DNA-profiling identified an-
other offender than the one convicted. They were not surprised that wrongful
convictions do occur or that witness observations in these cases were often in-
correct, but they were surprised that in 63% of these cases the original foren-
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sic experts concluded differently than the forensic DNA-experts and, worse,
that in 27% of the cases, the forensic experts had provided false or mislead-
ing explanations. Saks and Koehler observed too that 96% of the positions
held in forensic science had only at most a bachelor’s degree (2-3 years), 3%
had a master’s degree (5 years), and only 1% had a PhD (8-9 years). They
argued that this indicates that a bachelor’s degree is not sufficient for an
appropriate socialization into the norms and ethics of scientific investigation
— it is not sufficient for an appropriate cultivation of the norms concerning
methodological rigor, openness, and cautious interpretations of data. Not
being firmly and continuously in contact with academic science forensic sci-
ence may develop its own set of investigative norms — norms which are not
necessarily conducive to the ultimate purpose of forensic science.
Commission (2006) agrees that this article and its findings are generally
relevant to the Norwegian forensic scientific community, but that it does not
necessarily affect the experts involved in Torgersen case: The three main
technical evidence in this case involved the use of experts all having substan-
tial academic scientific training; the error rates of this particular group was
not studied in the Saks/Koehler paper; and their arguments suggests that
academic scientific training actually counters errors due to underdeveloped
scientific methodological norms.
Yet the Commission readily admits that Norwegian courts, as other coun-
tries’ courts, have been criticized for not ensuring quality requirements con-
cerning expert knowledge. Several serious criminal cases have been reopened
due to such critique. Over the years several government-mandated inves-
tigative committees delivered reports on the use of expert knowledge within
the justice sector, the most relevant here being Official Norwegian Reports
(NOU) 1996:15 and 2001:12.
The use of forensic scientific experts is to provide the court and the par-
ties the necessary knowledge about the questions connected to the forensic
scientific expert’s subject field. Thereby the court is provided the opportu-
nity to perform the safest possible assessment of the issues raised by the case.
The use of forensic scientific occurs thus as a part of the court’s assessments
of the evidence.
Several requirements must be fulfilled for the court to make appropriate
use of an expert’s statement. [. . . ] (1) The Court must be reasonable ensured
that the expert is fully independent, both in relation to other experts and, not
the least, in relation to the parties. (2) The expert must have the expertise
necessary in order to assist appropriately in the given case. (3) The number
of experts must be adapted to the character of the question sought answered.
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Several experts are seen appropriate when the conclusions are partly based
on opinion and also if it exists doubt or disagreement within the expert-
discipline. (4) A written statement signed by the expert should exist at the
beginning of a trial. This written statement should have been performed
according to a given mandate or as answers to questions posed by the court
itself as suggested by its parties. (5) The expert’s statement must in terms
and content be such that the court may perceive and understand it, and a
possibility for further questioning must exist. (NOU 1996:15, p125)
Court-appointed medical experts need to present their report, and any
later change to it, to The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine:
”[The Norwegian Commission for Forensic Medicine] control is to ensure
that the expert-opinion has, at any time, the best possible scientific founda-
tion, and that like cases treated at the same time shall be assessed equally
across the jurisdiction [. . . ]. An appropriate control of an expert-statement
implies in practice, the following:
an assessment of the expert’s expertise (relevant and sufficient education and
experience
an assessment of the quantity and the quality of the experts analyses relative
to generally accepted scientific standards
an assessment of whether the premises of the conclusion seems appropriately
scientifically founded
an assessment whether there is a connection between the stated premises and
the conclusion. (NOU 2001;12: 105)
And, finally, Commission (2006) cites the 2001-ruling (concerning the
Torgersen-case) of the Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court:
The Appeals Committee refers to the Criminal Procedure Act of 1887
which does not state the today’s rules governing the requirements of expert-
statements but within the limits of the purpose of the expert-analyses it must
be premised that the statements must of course be scientifically appropriate
according to the requirements set for the given subject field. The Appeals
Committee underscores that written expert statements in criminal cases are
not — neither in 1958 nor today — supposed to fulfill requirements as if
they were scientific reports. A [written] expert statement, which assumedly
is to be further supplied and understood through the expert’s explanation
and through the examination by the parties and the court, need not contain
detailed explication of the methodology, method, or assessments. A natural
development has indeed occurred, today one see other criteria for the elab-
oration of a written expert-statement than those used in 1958, but that is
another matter. (Supreme Court Ruling (Rt) 2001:1521)
The Commission (2006) stresses that only the criteria for what should
be documented in writing have changed since 1958 — the criteria for the
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expert-analysis have not changed. So even if the expert-reports in 1958 do
not explicate the methodologies, methods, and techniques used one may not
infer that the report is without value. It must be premised that both parties
and the court could have examined the expert about these, if this was needed.
To sum up the Commission’s views about legal proof and forensic and
scientific evidence: Commission (2006) does comment on the relationship
between epistemological and methodological norms and the actual and im-
mediate ability of the court to achieve the intentions and aims of immediate
particular decisions in given cases, and the actual but more long term abil-
ity of the legal institution to stay close to the legal ideals and principles as
these are agreed should govern the Norwegian legal system (principles such
as those expressed in the European Convention on Human Rights, partic-
ularly its Article 6.2). But Review-commission (2006) comments only on
this relationship as it is conditioned by the full spectrum of aims during the
trial-phase: The possibility that the assessments and decisions about positive
aspect of a claims are necessary premises for the assessment and decisions
about the normative aspects of that claim — the former caring for a set of
few basic and mostly non-conflicting epistemic (causal-logical) needs and the
latter caring for a set of many and much more conflicting contextual, case-
specific, social, and emotional needs — was not commented: It appeals to
the existence of the Board of Forensic Medicine and its functions, and seem
to delegate entirely to this Board the assessments and the decision whether
given experts adequately serve the needs of the court.
The Commission cites the standards regularly required by this Board,
but these are too general to shed any light on whether the Board routinely
requires information of the kind I have specified to be necessary for evidence-
based expert-statements. The Board, as we saw in the previous chapter, did
ask for such information, at least with respect to the relative likelihood of the
hypothesis that Torgersen’s biting-mechanism is the source of the bitemark
in the case, but it did not ask for the same kind of information with respect
to the other diagnosis required: The relative likelihood that the bitemark was
produced simultaneously with the lethal/rape-injuries. The court took for
granted that both these relative likelihoods were larger than their comparison
likelihoods. Maybe they were justified in granting this, but any justification




I cannot but conclude that also the last decision about the bitemark-proposition
in the Torgersen-case was not evidence-based to the standard specified in this
dissertation. The information about the relative likelihoods of the alterna-
tive hypotheses of the two necessary diagnostic decisions of the bitemark-
means was still not available in 2006. Then the court’s decision that the
bitemark-means (including information about motive, etc.) was relevant to
the standard required by law was not evidence-based either. The decisions
may be correct and no harm may have been done. But not having access
to the information about the reference-bases for the positive aspects of the
bitemark-means of evidence means that we have no independent instruments
by which to evaluate that claim. In the modern Norwegian society — where
the values of equality under the law, citizen-participation in government,
and public decision-makers duty to answer to the public are highly esteemed
and where the population is well educated — the failure to provide neces-
sary information undermines people’s ability to have and maintain confidence
and trust in the crime investigative services and the legal institution: Many
of us still wonders whether (a) Torgersen’s rights, (b) the victim’s rights,
and (c) the resources left available to other cases were protected; we find
ourselves asking what were the ”real” intentions of the legal agents in this
case, whether the case-management was an accident or systemic, and will
we in the next case will be offered the information we need? The absence of
person-independent means of evaluation, in the form of information about
the reference-groups and -terms used by the investigators and the experts,
are, I hold, the main reason why the Torgersen-case cannot come to rest.
However, it is not difficult to see why the Commission had to reject the
case: The Commission does not have the mandate or authority to decide
about basic norms and procedures — neither those regulating the investiga-
tion of positive aspects nor those for regulating the legal normative aspects.
That mandate lies only with the Parliament. Indeed, the Commission has
a mandate to sanction violation of existing procedural acts: The Norwegian
Criminal Procedure Act, Section 226, states for instance that 7
The purpose of the investigation is to obtain the necessary
information
a) for deciding whether an indictment should be preferred,
7http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19810522-025-eng.pdf page 75
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b) to serve as preparation for the court’s trial of the issue of guilt
and any issue concerning the determination of a sanction, [. . . ]
If a specific person is under suspicion, the investigation shall
seek to clarify both the evidence against him and the evidence
in his favour. [. . . ] (Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act, Section
226, p.75)
But how should one interpret ”necessary information” and ”shall seek to
clarify both the evidence against him and the evidence in his favour”? This
level of specification does not discriminate between the two sets of induction
norms I identified in the previous two chapters —”incomplete/open induc-
tion” and ”complete/closed induction”. Even if the commission-members
did see this ambiguity, they could not have acted on it: That would have
required a broader consensus in the legal community that the ambiguity was
a problem. So far, there is no such consensus.
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Chapter 8
The evidence-basis of forensic
bitemark-analysis
The investigative decisions about the positive aspects of the bitemark-means
in the Torgersen-case were found, more likely than not, not to be evidence-
based according to Premise 1 in this dissertation: The investigators and the
experts did not provide the means necessary for independent assessments
of (a) the decision that the bitemark-proposition was positively relevant to
the indictment-proposition (b) the decision that the risk of having decid-
ing wrongly about the relevance was sufficiently low, and thereby (c) the
claim that the aims and values of the criminal-case process was achieved
and protected. The information which was provided was of a kind which is
more probable when adhering to the inference norms of ”incomplete/open
induction” than when adhering to the inference norms of ”complete/closed
induction”. In the modern Norwegian democracy, the former set of inference
norms — by not inducing explicit choice and justification of reference-groups
— is too weak when it comes to securing legitimacy, trust, and confidence in
decisions about legal responsibility.
Was the choice of reference-norms just an effect of the particular condi-
tions of the Norwegian Torgersen-case or was it reflecting the norms gener-
ally preferred by investigators of forensic bitemark-means of evidence? This
is the main question in this chapter. A second question is: What was the
state of knowledge about phenomena and mechanisms relevant for forensic
bitemark-analysis in the period 1997-2006?
To assess these questions I will use the information provided in publicly
available written material in the period between 1974 and 2006. The collec-
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tion of papers includes the studies published in scientific journals as well as
research-reports, conference-papers, organizational guidelines and newslet-
ters, books, and information-leaflets.
In section one I explain the procedures used to detect and construct
the collection of papers being the source of this chapter. This collection,
each item briefly graded on relevance and evidence-basis, exist in Appendix
3. In section two I identify the inference-procedure recommended by the
main authority on forensic bitemark-analysis, the American Board of Forensic
Odontology (ABFO). This procedure is found compatible to the standard of
evidence-basis of Premise 1 of this dissertation. In section three I study
the accuracy of bitemark-diagnoses. In section four I justify the relevance
of my classification of papers and proceed to attend to the papers found to
be relevant to bitemark-diagnosis and evidence-based and asks for the state
of knowledge currently existing about the variables involved in bitemark-
production on human skin.
8.1 The sources of this chapter
The body of material collected for assessing the questions of this chapter was
constructed by several procedures: The main procedure was the use Metalib
provided by the Library Services of the University College of London (UCL).
Items responding to the possible spelling-combinations of bitemark? and
teethmark? were secured. The only other condition specified was year of
publication: 1970 through 2006. The search was not conditioned by discipline
as bitemark-analysis by nature extends into several disciplines.
This collection was further narrowed by removing items not belonging to
the following classes: Forensic analysis and diagnosis of bitemarks by human
teeth on human skin. Membership was not always clear: Some items only
briefly mention bitemarks in relation to a topic not relevant to this disserta-
tion; some were too uncritical or unspecific — being ad-hoc descriptive, brief
introductions or information about bitemark-analysis, or festive praising or
not so festive denouncing bitemark-analysis.
The remaining papers were then subjected to a hand search for items
somehow slipping through the main search. Finally, I consulted the literature-
lists identified by the main organizations representing regional or interna-
tional forensic odontologists to check whether the main search was satisfac-
torily retrieving the items as intended.
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I hold that the final collection of papers and books can be considered to
be as complete as possible with respect to the question of this chapter.
The nearly 400 papers was classified according to its main purpose (de-
scriptive; analytic/empirical, with incomplete/open induction; analytic/
empirical, with complete/closed induction); degree of relevance to forensic
bitemark-analysis; and evidence-based/not evidence-based by Premise 1 of
this dissertation. The criteria used will be explained and justified in section
four of this chapter — as will be the distribution of the papers on these
classes. An annotated bibliography is added in Appendix 3. This Appendix
also contains a list of papers published prior to 1970 (not annotated).
8.2 The inference-procedure recommended
by the American Board of Forensic Odon-
tology
We take for granted that modern bitemark-experts know that when they are
requested by a court or a party to analyze a bitemark, then the purpose is
to minimally provide
a. the conditions of the suspected bitemark;
b. the class- and individual-level diagnoses of the causal source-object of the
suspected bitemark as well as the markers observed for these diagnoses;
c. the likelihoods of the diagnoses of b.;
d. the forensic items as well as the analytical and observational heuristics
used for the diagnoses of b.
Secondly, we also take for granted that (1) as forensic odontology-experts
they will concentrate on producing soundly justified diagnoses of physical
human biting-mechanisms, physical mechanisms of biting, and bitemarks on
human skin by the help of generally known and accepted procedures of in-
ference and observation — and avoid commenting on issues not within their
realm of expertise, such as the motive of biting; (2) as odontologist hav-
ing been trained within the scientific institution they are familiar with the
inference- norms as well as the ethical standards of that institution and the
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purpose and effect of such norms and standards; and that (3) the conse-
quences of wrong diagnoses are real and serious.
To maintain high quality diagnostic practice, forensic odontologists will
be supported by regional or international organizations. There are several
such organizations, but the single most relevant to the European community
of bitemark-experts — in terms of being appealed to in the published liter-
ature — is the American Board of Forensic Odontologists (ABFO).1 Other
European and international organizations exist, but these are not regularly
(if at all) cited — either because these have not specified or published any
guidelines or because these are simply not recognized as authorities. In the
following I will therefore concentrate on the guidelines produced by ABFO.
Which norms and procedure of inference are recommended by ABFO?
In ABFO’s Diplomates Reference Manual for forensic odontology from
2008 (ABFO-manual 2008) the section ”Bitemark Related Information; Sci-
entific Methodology Review” introduces one of ABFO’s objectives:
One of the [ABFO]’s objective is to improve the quality of its science.
To paraphrase A. R. Feinstein, ”To advance the art and science of forensic
odontology, the equipment an odontologist needs most to improve is him-
self/herself.” Since forensic scientists are presumed to be honest, we trust
other scientists to be unbiased, neutral, impartial objective and always cor-
rectly using the scientific method. Many scientific claims have been found
to be false or non-reproducible. The gambling phrase, ”trust the dealer, but
always cut the cards” should apply to every opinion promulgated by forensic
scientists. Another way of stating the problem is consistent with the opinion
of arms reduction: ”Trust, but verify.” When called upon to give an opinion,
each odontologist must face three basic challenges:
• To develop a scientifically valid opinion
• To develop an opinion that is accurate
• To develop an opinion that is based on the most current, proven tech-
niques and methodology.
Validity must be proven prior to promulgating any opinion, technique or
methodology. The system by which theory progresses to fact is based on the
Scientific Method. The scientific Method is a process by which a problem is
investigated using properly designed experiments or collecting information
from observations. (ABFO-manual 2008: 109)
What is ABFO’s notion of ”Scientific method”? It is worthwhile to quote
the full substantiation of it as it specified in ABFO (2008):
1http://www.abfo.org
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1. Requirements for problem solving using the scientific method
A. The problem to be solved must deal with he natural realm involving natural
conditions and events.
B. The problem must be clearly defined and sufficiently limited in scope so that a
hypothesis and a prediction can be developed.





E. Evaluate data in light of hypothesis and prediction
3. Important definitions
A. Hypothesis: A tentative explanation to account for an observed condition or
event.
• The hypothesis must be an explanation for the defined problem.
• The hypothesis must be testable: requires that evidence (data) can be collected
to support or refute the hypothesis.
B. Prediction: an outcome or consequence that will result if the hypothesis is
accurate. Probabilities can also be assigned based on the likelihood that the event
will occur. Depending on the data available, statistical analysis can be performed
to assign confidence intervals to the strength of the prediction.
C. Variable: generally described as anything that can potentially change (or ac-
tively be changed by the investigator) for experimental purposes. When all variables
have been identified, the investigator establishes the procedures for carrying out the
experiment. In biological systems, investigators must sometimes analyze data col-
lected from observing natural phenomenon when knowledge of multiple variables is
not always possible.
D. Bias: to prejudge or form opinion before all the facts are known. A definition
commonly found in the medical literature is ”a process at any stage of inference
tending to produce results that departs systematically from true values.” (Murphy,
The Logic of Medicine Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1976)
• Rarely an ”expert” might develop an opinion in spite of factual information. An example
would be ”expectational bias” or ”diagnostic suspicion bias” when an investigator expects
to find a certain outcome, then he/she intentionally or unintentionally finds the expected
outcome.
• Even with the best of intentions, the investigator can introduce factors that predetermine
the outcome of the investigation. For example, a consultant who consciously or uncon-
sciously has his/her opinion influenced because he/she believes that the referring agency is
”always right.”
• A worst case scenario is the consultant whose opinion is affected by remuneration. These
persons are frequently referred to as ”hired guns”. The consultant is anything but neutral,
impartial or objective.
• Another term frequently seen in the literature is ”previous diagnosis bias.” This type of
bias could be seen when a ”second opinion” consultant allows a previous diagnosis (opinion)
given by the first consultant to influence the second consultant’s opinion. This type of bias
could occur when you know and respect another consultant’s work and have that variable
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influence your opinion. It can also happen the other way — if you do not respect another
”expert” or have had disagreements in the past, those previous experiences could knowingly
or unknowingly influence your opinion.
• Whereas self-confidence is important, consultants can be ”biased” toward believing their
own opinion is the only acceptable opinion, refusing to acknowledge that an opinion differing
from theirs can have value. An over inflated ego can interferer with sound judgement.
Without proof to support the hypothesis, the philosophy of ”experience equal expertise”
has no scientific validity.
• Odontologists must scrupulously avoid all forms of bias.
E. Blinding: the process of assessment of raw data or information without prior
knowledge of potential outcomes.
F. Validity: the ability of the test (hypothesis) to determine or detect that which
you are testing. For example, flipping a coin may give you the right answers half
of the time if there are only two possible outcomes for what you are testing. For
instance, we could assign a decision on a bitemark by mandating : heads = yes,
the suspect’s teeth left that mark; tails = no, the suspect’s teeth did not leave that
mark. Even though he/she will be right half of the time, an odontologist using that
technique to form an opinion is incompetent and unethical.
G. Sensitivity: the ability of a test to detect the true positives.
H. Specificity: the ability of a test to detect the true negatives.
I. Utility: the relative risks and benefits of a test or procedure. A test that has a
high probability for a false result has low utility especially if the risks are high and
the benefits low. For instance, the utility of bitemark analysis is based on whether
the legal system is better off with or without it.
J. Reproducibility: if the study is reproducible, another investigator testing the
original hypothesis using the same parameters will arrive at the same (or very sim-
ilar) conclusions.
K. Reliability: the consistency between measurements in a series of tests. Re-
member that the instrument are only as accurate as the investigator using them.
L. Gold Standard: a test that is generally accepted as the most accurate of
available tests. (ABFO-manual 2008: 110-112)
The purpose of quoting the whole of ABFO-guidelines (2008)’s notion of
”Scientific Method” is to show that it is compatible to the this dissertation’s
reference-standard — Premise 1 presented in Chapter 1: If forensic bitemark-
experts approach a given diagnostic problem according to ABFO’s recom-
mendation, then the crime investigator has good reason to expect forensic
bitemark-diagnosis to be evidence-based according the standard of Premise
1. Particularly: The expert’s choice of reference-groups and -terms will be
induced, thus providing the means necessary for independent assessment of
the bitemark’s relevance and the diagnostic goal-achievement.
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8.2.1 Does bitemark-experts adhere to
ABFO-recommendations?
But can the crime investigator presume that the experts actually use ABFO’s
recommended inference-procedure? No study exists which is directly relevant
to this question. Four studies are however indirectly relevant:
Pretty (2003), as a part of a larger survey (n = 72, mostly Ameri-
can odontologists, volunteered after having visited the two websites host-
ing the survey), asked the respondents whether they adhered to the cur-
rent ABFO-guidelines with respect to (a) evidence-collection from suspected
biting-mechanisms and bitemark-sites: 70% always followed these, 11% fol-
lows some of them, and 17% was not aware of such ABFO-guidelines, (b)
Guidelines for analysis:73% state to follow the analysis-guidelines; 17% was
not aware it existed.
McNamee et al. (2003) asked whether ABFO-diplomates (bitemark-
experts certified by ABFO and obliged to follow their guidelines) and odon-
tolgists being members of the American Association of Forensic Scientists
(AAFS) adhered to the ABFO-guidelines concerning victim evidence collec-
tion (respondents being a group of bitemark-experts attending an annual
meeting of AAFS). McNamee et al. (2003) found that a majority of the re-
spondents adhered to most of these guidelines during actual casework, except
for the procedures of photography: Only 3 out of 8 ABFO-diplomats would
always themselves perform the photo-documentation, 4 would sometimes let
the police or the medical examiner perform it, and 1 would never perform
the procedure him/her self; among the non-diplomats (26) 13 would always
perform the procedure him/herself, 11 would sometimes do it, and 2 would
never do it. The film-type utilized was still an individual choice at the time
of the survey. This is worrisome, Mcnamee et al. (2003) hold, since the
photo-evidence is an instrumental part of the investigation and is also the
part being the most frequently challenged in bitemark-cases. Another aspect
of concern was the variation with respect to the techniques used for making
bite site impressions and excised tissue samples. These techniques were not
standardized by ABFO in 2003.
Pretty et al. (2001) asked the same questions as McNamee et al
2003 (of the group of bitemark-experts attending another annual meeting
of AAFS), but now concerning collecting evidence from suspected
biting-mechanisms. They too found general compliance, but voiced concern
about the number of experts not themselves performing the collection pro-
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cedures. Pretty et al. (2001) has the same general representational issues as
McNamee et al. (2003), and has also the same relevance-issues with respect
to the question of this chapter.
Kim and Sweet (1999) studied the adherence of ABFO-diplomats with
respect to wording of bitemark-conclusions. This study might have been more
relevant to the question of this chapter than the two studies above, but it
was not possible to get hold of this paper through my main procedures for
retrieving papers. In addition, like Pretty et al. (2001) and McNamee et al.
(2003), the study informed only about the adherence of a group of bitemark-
experts attending an annual meeting of AAFS. I could have contacted AAFS
for a copy of the proceedings of that years’ annual meeting, but given its
most likely low informational value I decided it not worthwhile.
I hesitate to generalize these finding to any larger communities of bitemark
experts. The respondents were only an unknown portion of those bitemark-
experts who attended a meeting or visited website: It is impossible to say how
well these respondents’ characteristics with respect to adherence to ABFO-
guidelines for bite site evidence collection represent those of the American
community of bitemark-experts in the year of the surveys, those of the Eu-
ropean community that year, and those of any community in any year later.
And the adherence to guideline-procedures for collecting bite-site evidence is
something else than inference-methodology. The results of the above surveys
are thus at best very indirectly and weakly relevant to the question of this
chapter.
I must find another way to assess whether bitemark-experts in practi-
cal bitemark-diagnosis adhere to the inference-procedure recommended by
ABFO-guidelines (2008). In the following section I will ask what is known
about the accuracy of bitemark-diagnostic instruments (experts themselves
and/or bitemark-markers).
8.3 Are bitemark-diagnoses generally
reliable and thus generally beneficial to
those using them?
Before assessing this question we may study how good bitemark-experts are
at differentiating between bitemarks with respect to causal biting-mechanisms.
An expert or a diagnostic test will be good at differentiating between
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groups or individuals if he/she/it has a high ability to detect who has or has
not a given characteristic or condition. The higher this ability is, the more
certain it is that the reported diagnosis is correct — and the more useful
this expert or test will be. In the ABFO-guidelines (2008), in its section on
scientific methodology, utility was defined as ”the relative risks and benefits
of a test or procedure. A test with a high probability for a false result has low
utility especially if the risks are high and the benefits low. For instance, the
utility of bitemark analysis is based on whether the legal system is better off
with or without it.” ABFO-guidelines (2008: 111). We must take for granted
that the bitemark-experts who are willing to testify in court believe that the
benefits of his/her bitemark-knowledge are greater than the cost.
Pretty (2003) asked bitemark-experts for their opinion about this ques-
tion of reliability. 72 odontologists (happening to visit one of the two websites
hosting the survey) with the experience of at least one bitemark-case were
included in the analysis: 33% were ABFO-diplomates; 3% AAFS (Ameri-
can Academy of Forensic Science) fellows; 33% AAFS-members; 24% ASFO
(American Society for Forensic Odontologists) members; 2% other (includ-
ing European experts). The following questions were asked and answered by
these respondents:
• How many number of bitemark-cases completed?
> 20 cases: 10% (of these 72% was ABFO-diplomates)
10-20 cases: 20%; 3-9 cases: 66%; ≤ 2 cases: 4%.
• Do you believe that the human dentition is unique to an individual?
Yes: 91%; Do not know: 8%; No: 1%.
• Do you believe that this uniqueness is replicated on human skin during biting
process?
Yes: 78%; Do not know: 11%; No: 11%.
(96% of ABFO-diplomates believe both that dentition is unique and that it is
replicated on skin during biting).
• Is a suitably trained individual able to positively identify individual from a bitemark
on human skin?
Yes: 70%; It is not scientifically sound 5%;
Only in certain circumstances: 25%.
• Can you apply the statistical ”product” rule to bitemark analysis?
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Yes, justified: 22%; No, not justified: 9%; Unsure: 9%;
Do not know what this rule is: 60%.
• Do you use transparent overlays as a technique for comparison?
Routinely: 63% (93% of these are ABFO-diplomates);
Occasionally: 20%; Never: 18%.
• There are at least eight techniques for producing overlays. Which one do you use?
Digital (Sweet): 32%; Digital (Naru): 8%;
Digital (other) 16%; Radiographic: 4%; Photocopying: 16%;
Hand drawn: 9%; Other method 5%; Do not use: 10%.
(18% would use more than one of these methods in any given case).
• Do you adhere to the ABFO-guidelines for evidence collection?
Entirely: 70%; Partially: 11%;
Are not aware of its existence: 17%.
• Do you adhere to the ABFO-guidelines for analysis?
Yes: 73%; Are not aware of existence: 20%.
• Do you think bitemarks should only be used to exclude a suspect?
Yes, agree: 22% (6% being ABFO-diplomates);
No, disagree: 69%; Unsure: 8%.
• Do you think a forensic odontologist with an appropriate level of training should
continue to analyse and render opinions in bitemark cases?
Yes: 86%; Unsure: 14%.
Pretty (2003) conducted this survey to examine the hypothesis of ”ivory
tower”-bias in bitemark-analysis: Critical voices have increasingly accused
bitemark-analysis to be inaccurate, analytically flawed, and lacking an ap-
propriate consensus concerning technical heuristics, but nobody had yet ex-
amined whether these accusations were justified. The results of the survey of
Pretty (2003) show that the main majority (91%) of the respondents believed
in the first central dogma of bitemark-analysis — that biting-mechanisms are
unique to individuals — and that a slightly smaller majority (79%) believed
in the second central dogma — that this uniqueness is replicated on the skin
during the process of biting. 96% of the ABFO-diplomates — those with
the highest level of training and experience — believed both that dentition
is unique and that it is replicated on skin during biting.
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Pretty (2003) is worried about the high proportion of general and ABFO-
diplomats who believe in the second dogma. Pretty and Sweet (2001)’s review
of the published literature showed that the few efforts at establishing parts of
that claim was scientifically flawed. This agrees with the review performed in
this dissertation, but I will be bolder: Both dogmas are rather empty claims
as anything may in principle be unique — and a unique cause will have
a unique effect. The problem is to develop markers which can be reliably
observed of actual human biting-mechanisms — markers which also have
a known effect which may be reliably observed of the bitemark on human
skin. This is a familiar problem in science and faces anyone needing accurate
classification, explanation, or prediction: Different knowledge-domains have
reached different levels of marker-development for different kinds of problem-
situations. In the forensic sciences forensic genetics may be said to be the
more advanced, with several sets of validated markers for different kinds of
problems. On the opposite end of the continuum you find bitemark-analysis:
Very few if any markers of biting-mechanisms have been validated as em-
pirically relevant by empirical studies and little consensus exist on how to
observe the few markers anticipated relevant. And worse, there is no consen-
sus about how to observe the effects of these markers, as they are expressed
on human skin after having been conditioned by mechanisms activated dur-
ing the biting-process.
Those experts willing to testify in court and those responding to the
questions of Pretty et al. (2003) thus seem to believe that bitemark-diagnosis
is more beneficial than harmful to the aims of the legal processing of the case.
What is the evidence of this?
8.3.1 Independent signs of experts’ ability to include
or exclude given biting-mechanisms as likely
cause of given bitemark on human skin
The point of buying and using, say, a pregnancy test is to determine whether
you are pregnant or not. Some women want a child now; other women do not
want a child now. Both need to be certain about the test-result and do not
have the time to understand how, by which substance, the test categorizes
urine-samples in ”pregnant” and ”not-pregnant”. Both groups need to be
certain, but need so in different ways: The woman wanting a child now wants
a positive result to be a true positive, but a woman not wanting a child now
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would want the negative result to be true negative. A given pregnancy test
with probability of a true positive of, say, 69% and a true negative of, say 81%
will not be bought by modern women: A risk of a false positive of 19% and
a false negative of 31% is simply not certain enough for the needs. This is of
course well known by the producers of the test: Reliability is simply a basic
marketing criterion (this is the extreme version of the economic/budgetary
reason for being evidence-based).
Pregnancy- and other diagnostic tests are just tangible instant expert-
knowledge: Experts and their knowledge by accumulated experience, obser-
vation, and inference-procedure — can be considered beneficial to the degree
it helps us solve or decide about certain other problems; Any body of infor-
mation, in the form of technical tests, expert knowledge, or lay knowledge,
is beneficial to the degree it is able to sort cases into the correct category.
The inclusion of true positive/negative-rates on the packaging of publicly
available medical diagnostic tests is just the medical or commercial way of
communicating the associated risks of contributing to Type I-error (rejecting
the null-hypothesis when it is true) and Type II-error (not rejecting the null-
hypothesis when it is false) in the scientific context. In the legal context one
would phrase these risks as the risk of convicting a true innocent and the risk
of acquitting a true guilty. The crime investigative expression would then be
the risk of contributing to these two risks.
A common way to assess the rates of true positives and true negatives,
jointly the accuracy of a body of knowledge, is by a technique called Receiver
Operating Characteristics-analysis, or ROC-analysis. A body of knowledge is
sensitive towards observable symptoms or traces signalling that a given case
has a condition in question, and it is specific towards observable symptoms
signalling that a given case does not have that condition. The sensitivity (the
ability to detect the true positives) and the specificity (the ability to detect
the true negatives) can be high or low: An expert, lay-person, or diagnostic
test may embody knowledge making us 99.999% sensitive — able to detect
close to all the positive cases in a group of both positives and negatives; or
the knowledge is only such that it makes him/her/it 50% sensitive — able
to detect only half of the positive cases. The same applies to knowledge for
detecting negative cases.
An expert/test/lay-witness with knowledge enabling only 50% detection
of positives and negatives is not very helpful. Then you may just as well flip
a coin. My pregnancy-test above had a sensitivity of 69% and a specificity of
81% which were considered too low for the needs of the two groups of women.
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In ROC-analysis one would always measure both sensitivity and specificity.
Both are necessary for a complete assessment of the abilities of a given body
of knowledge. But under certain conditions a joint measure such as AUC
(area under the curve) may be used to express the overall ability of the body
of knowledge to classify correctly.
ROC-analysis is particularly useful when a decision-maker suspects that
a body of knowledge is relevant for a given decision and its purpose, but
does not have the time or competence to assess that body of knowledge. It is
also useful when the expert or lay-witness is not able to communicate how,
by which characteristics, he/she sorts cases. Which level of accuracy should
be required? Neither 100% nor 50% accuracy can be useful standards in
practical diagnostic situations. Is 60% good enough? Above I claimed that a
modern pregnancy-test needs to be more than 80% accurate if women would
bother to buy/use it. Generally, the more serious the condition tested for, the
higher the accuracy needed — because of the consequences of being wrong.
But what if the underlying mechanism of a serious condition is inherently
complex and the existing accuracy is only 70%? This is better than 50%?
Again, whether this is sufficient will depend on the purpose of the decision.
Swets (1998), for instance, suggested that a diagnostic test with a ROC-AUC
of 0.9 should be classified as ”highly accurate”; one with ROC-AUC of 0.7-0.9
as ”useful for some purposes”; and one with ROC-AUC of 0.5-0.7 as ”poor”.
The bitemark-experts willing to testify in court believe that their knowl-
edge is accurate to a level being useful for the purpose of the legal processing:
They thus claim that their knowledge enables them to detect (a) more than
50% of the true causal biting-mechanisms of given bitemarks and (b) more
than 50% of the true non-causal biting-mechanisms of given bitemark —
they claim to be more than 50% accurate. That is an absolute minimum. In
light of the consequences of their decisions it would not be unreasonable to
require an accuracy of at least 0.7. What is the independent evidence that
bitemark-diagnoses are more than 50% accurate?
Whittaker et al. (1998) is the first and only study of the accuracy
(in terms of ROC-analysis) of bitemark-experts diagnosing real bitemarks.
The diagnosis concerned whether a bitemark was made by an adult (non-
accidental) or a child’s (accidental) biting-mechanism. 109 respondents from
England and Wales, with varying degrees of training and experience were
asked to classify 50 colour photographs of natural bitemarks (varying severity
and nature) according to each having been caused by an adult or child. The
”gold standard” was the verdict in the case. This standard was not informed
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Observer group Area beneath Standard
ROC curve error
Senior forensic expert 0.693 0.0248
Junior fornesic expert 0.680 0.0206
general dental practitioner 0.618 0.0262
Student dentist 0.690 0.0157
Police officer 0.618 0.0171
Social worker 0.634 0.0295
Table 8.1: Areas beneath the ROC curves of different groups of observers
classifying bitemark’s child/adult in origin
on before the classification, but previous information about all the cases could
not be ruled out completely. Anonymity was ensured to the respondents.
The respondents were asked to rate each of the photographed bitemarks (of
different severity and nature) according to the following scale:
1. I am certain that this bitemark was made by an adult.
2. I am fairly certain that this bitemark was made by an adult.
3. It is slightly more likely that this bitemark was made by an adult than by a child.
4. I am unsure whether this bitemark was made by an adult or by a child.
5. It is slightly more likely that this bitemark was made by a child than by an adult.
6. I am fairly certain that this bitemark was made by a child.
7. I am certain that this bitemark was made by a child.
No particular characteristics/criteria were required for the diagnosis de-
cisions. The results are presented in table 8.1
Whittaker et al. (1998) does not inform on the groups’ sensitivity or
specificity, but is otherwise reasonably unbiased: The senior and the junior
experts had been randomly chosen from the list published by the British
Association Of Forensic Odontologists (BAFO): All the senior experts had
experience from real case-work, but only some of the junior experts had such
experience. The general dental practitioners were randomly chosen (popula-
tion unspecified) and included a wide range of experience and undergraduate
training. The dental students were final year students, with one course in
forensic dentistry, from Cardiff Dental School. The police officers were cho-
sen from family support units in South Wales and were interested in or had
observed bitemarks on human skin. Finally, the social workers all had ex-
perience from non-accidental injuries to children, including bitemarks. A
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minor question mark may be attached to Whittaker’s justification for using
the court verdict as the gold standard: ”It was acknowledged that the court
verdict could always be questionable, although this is unlikely” Whittaker
(1998:13).
The results of this study suggest that formal training in forensic dentistry
is more important than experience from case-work (forensic or general dental
health context) for this diagnosis, and knowledge of teeth and their arrange-
ment per se is suggested to be less relevant than training for the particular
purpose of forensic dentistry. Both the expert-groups were above the mini-
mum of 0.5, but so were even the police-officers who had the poorest accuracy
of all, whose accuracy was at 0.618 (S.E.: 0.0295). The increase in accuracy
(to 0.693 (S.E.: 0.0248)) by having formal training in forensic odontology
is not reassuring, to me at least, and suggest that the characteristics used
by forensic experts are less discriminatory than the experts seem to believe
according to Pretty (2003).
Rawson et al. (1986) studied the reliability of 7 experts in diagnosing
the true biter of simulated bitemarks in the skin of a live dog (sedated) by
casts of biting-mechanisms (known on given characteristics). This reliability-
study was performed as a part of ABFO’s effort to standardise the observa-
tions and scorings in forensic bitemark-analyses (see below) and was therefore
not well described ”The average reliability or accuracy in correctly matching
[8] bite marks to the dentition was 66%” (Rawson et al. 1986).
Arheart and Pretty (1999) studied the accuracy (in terms of ROC-
analysis) of 32 American ABFO-experts with the experience of at least
one bitemark-case: Four sets of scaled and unscaled colour photographs of
bitemarks were to be diagnosed with respect to (a) whether the case was a
bitemark (seven possible certainty states); (b) whether the bitemark had any
evidential value (four possible value states); (c) whether the
bitemark was made or not by each of seven given models of teeth/biting-
mechanisms (seven possible certainty states).
Three of the bitemarks were natural bitemarks in human skin from real
cases; one was a simulated bitemark in a block of cheese from a known biting-
mechanism. Three of the suspected biting-mechanisms (models) were from
the person found guilty in the cases, one from the known biter, and three
biting-mechanisms (models) were selected from patients in a private dental
office.
Each expert was asked to perform a complete analysis of the bitemarks
and write a forensic report (required according to the current ABFO guide-
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Correct dentition Incorrect dentition Unweighted
Rating n Sensitivity n 1-Specificity Youden’s index
Reasonable medical
certainty 25 0.1953 1 0.0013 0.1940
Probable 43 0.5312 13 0.0182 0.5130
Possible 35 0.8046 73 0.1133 0.6913
Improbable 5 0.8437 126 0.2774 0.5663
Incompatible 15 0.9609 536 0.9753 0.0144
Inconclusive 4 0.9922 13 0.9922 0.0000
Non-diagnostic 1 1.0000 6 1.0000 0.0000
Total 128 768
Table 8.2: Sensitivity, specificity and Youden’s score for each level of conclu-
sion.
lines). The respondents were also provided the names of the submitters of
the four cases and the respondents were free to gather further information if
needed. The results are in table 8.2: 2
The ROC-area was calculated to be 0.86 (CI: 0.82-0.91), ”a fairly high
accuracy, indicating that the examiners are able to correctly identify the
dentition belonging to a particular bitemark.” (Arheart and Pretty 1999:108).
Both the other decisions — whether the case was a bitemark and whether
the bitemark had any evidential value — were significantly associated with
Youden-score: Partial correlation coefficient for (a) bitemark certainty and
score was 0.33 and (b) forensic value and score was -0.36. Years of experience
was not significantly related to score: 0.01 (p=0.958).
Aerhart and Pretty (1999) warn, however, about two aspects which condi-
tions the ability to generalize: (1) the few bitemarks and biting-mechanisms
could cause a ”learning-effect”; (2) the bitemarks were all rated as having
moderate to high evidential value — and does thus not say much about
situations in which evidential values are lower.
It will make only limited sense to compare the accuracy indicated in
Arheart and Pretty (1999) to that of Whittaker (1998) due to different kinds
of diagnoses, but the former yielded a better accuracy than the study in
Whittaker 1998, yet may be argued to be biased. Both studies indicated no
effect of the experience of the bitemark-experts.
Pretty and Sweet (2001) wanted ”to determine values of intra- and
inter-examiner reliability, sensitivity, and specificity on both a dichotomous
2Data from combined results of all examiners. Optimal cutoff point: ”possible”
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scale and the recommended [ABFO] conclusion scale. [. . . ] The impact of
the examiners training and experience was measured” (Pretty and Sweet
(2001:1385)).
The first part of the study concerned the intra-examiner reliability (three
months apart, same cases) of 10 ABFO-experts with a high degree of training
and experience. The second part of the study concerned the intra-examiner
reliability of 10 ABFO-experts (different from the first study), 10 ASFO-
experts all having forensic bitemark-training but only some having experience
from bitemark-cases, and 10 general dental practitioners with training in
forensic identification related to mass disasters.
10 simulated bitemarks in post-mortem pigskin were to be diagnosed
by each of the experts: The diagnosis was based on two photographs (one
colour and one black/white) of each of the bitemarks. To each bitemark was
attached two biting-mechanisms in two forms — cast/model and computer-
generated bitemark-overlay.3
The diagnosis concerned whether a given bite-mark was caused or not
caused by any of the two biting-mechanisms attached (five levels of certainty
possible). Inter-examiner reliability (70% response-rate) is shown in table
8.4:
The mean accuracy for the seven examiners’ first and second attempts
was 85. 7% and 83.5%, respectively, with no statistically significant differ-
ence. The mean values for sensitivity (73.2%) and specificity (89.3%) for
the first examination was not significantly different from those of the second
examination.
Inter-examiner reliability (100% response, but two respondents removed
to minimise indeterminacy):
There were no significant differences between the AUC-values of the three
groups studied: This may, again, suggest that experience does not matter.
The increase in the mean AUC-value from that of Whittaker (1998) may
be due to this survey including both models of the biting-mechanisms and
3An overlay is an image of the outlines of the perimeters of the anterior teeth of a given
biting-mechanism: A cast is produced of the biting-mechanism, photographed according
to some procedure (ABFO-specified or other), and certain characteristics — identified and
ascribed value either by decision-maker or by software-algorithm independent of case and
decision-maker — are the basis for the tracing of the outlines; the image is then, by hand
or software, superimposed on an image of the bitemark (also created according to some
procedure, ABFO-specified or other) and compared along a set of characteristics again
identified either by an expert or by software.
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Examiner Kappa S.E. Percent Agreement
1 0.30 0.222 65
2 0.38 0.219 70
3 1.00 0.224 100
4 1.00 0.224 100
5 0.52 0.224 80
6 0.88 0.222 95
7 1.00 0.224 100
Mean 0.72 87.2%
Table 8.3: Study I summary data illustrating percentage agreement between
examinations conducted three months apart.
Mean Values ABFO (%) ASFO (%) GDP (%)
Area under curve 80.5 +/– 11.8 81.0 +/– 8.8 80.8 +/– 8.0
Sensitivity
Reasonable
Medical Certainty 27.5 23.8 12.5
Probable 57.5 53.8 60.0
Possible 81.3 72.5 76.3
Exclusion 88.8 77.8 60.0
Inconclusive 100.0 100.0 100.0
Specificity
Reasonable
Medical Certainty 98.3 98.5 99.2
Probable 94.9 95.3 93.4
Possible 55.3 74.4 64.2
Exclusion 47.7 68.7 55.9
Inconclusive 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 8.4: Mean values from ROC analyses
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computer-generated overlays from these models: The latter will force the
expert’s attention to a limited set of characteristics. When also the method
of defining the possible states of these characteristics is fixed, as it was in
Pretty and Sweet (2001), the degree of subjectivity is further reduced. The
ABFO-guidelines (2010) leaves the use of overlays optional (Pretty (2003)
gave that 63% of its respondents used any kind of overlay, 93% of those be-
ing ABFO-diplomates), and if overlays are chosen, the expert may choose
any technique for production and observation (Pretty (2003) gave that there
are eight techniques in common use; that 40% prefer computer-based tech-
niques, alone or in combination with other techniques; 9% prefer hand-drawn
overlays only; and 18% never used such overlays).
MD/W (2000) (the experts in the Torgersen-case) claim there to be a di-
vide among European and American bitemark-experts concerning the role of
overlays in case-work: European experts prefer morphological characteristics
and complement with overlays while the American experts prefer overlays
over morphological characteristics.
I have not found any survey of European experts’ use of bitemark an-
alytical heuristics and no European organization is any authority in this
matter, so I am unable to verify MD/W’s claims. But it is difficult to assess
the implication of the results of Pretty and Sweet (2001) as the selection of
respondents was not specified.
Martin-de las Heras et al. (2007) studied the accuracy (in the terms
of ROC-analysis) of two decision-makers (one bitemark-expert and one den-
tist without forensic training or practice) deciding whether any one of 17
biting-mechanisms (with varying presence, status, and arrangement of upper
and lower anterior teeth) is ”nonbiter”, ”probable biter”, ”possible biter”, or
”biter” of any one of 32 bitemarks (made by casts of teeth/biting-mechanisms
being hinged and clamped onto non-curved, medium flexibility skin of re-
cently dead (3-10h) piglets for 15m).
The aim was to study whether a given new 3D digital technique for pro-
ducing overlays (DentalPrint software) was more accurate than an older 2D
digital technique (Adobe Photoshop software).
Martin-de las Heras et al. (2007) suspected that accuracy will be en-
hanced by the new technique which identified the scanned cast’s state on
specified characteristics automatically. This is contrary to the 2D-technique,
where the expert identifies these states. 4 A second aim was to study if
4Intra- and inter-observer reliability of new techniques identification of states on given
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Examiners AUC SE CI
Expert(3D∗) 0.764∗∗ 0.057 0.652 — 0.876
Nonexpert(3D∗) 0.642∗∗ 0.062 0.521 — 0.763
Expert(2D∓) 0.726∓∓ 0.059 0.610 — 0.841
Nonexpert(2D∓) 0.598∓∓ 0.062 0.477 — 0.720
Table 8.5: Results from ROC analyses for both types of examiners according
to the technique used to produce comparison overlays (Martin-de las Heras
2007:154 (Copyright holder John Wiley and Sons agreed use by licence nr.
3071261021)).
Cutoff Sensitivity CI Specificity CI
(%) (%) (%) (%)
0-1, 2, 3 56.3 38.5 – 72.2 95.8 90.2 – 98.6
0, 1- 2, 3 53.1 34.7 – 70.5 96.9 91.7 – 99.9
0, 1, 2- 3 43.8 27.8 – 61.5 97.9 93.2 – 99.6
Table 8.6: Sensitivity and specificity values for each specific cutoff points
obtained for the expert examiner using DentalPrint(c) software(Martin-de
las Heras 2007:154 (Copyright holder John Wiley and Sons agreed use by
licence nr. 3071261021)).
the experience of the decision-maker mattered. The results were as shown in
table 8.5:5
The expert’s sensitivity-values via 3D-technique were lower than the val-
ues for specificity as shown in table 8.6:6
The expert in this study were found to be significantly better than the
non-expert for each of the techniques, DentalPrint and Adobe Photoshop.
Again the results are, at best, covering only experts who actually use
bitemark-overlays and must be seen to be a preliminary version of a larger
study as there were only two decision-makers involved.
characteristics had been validated: ICC (3D): 0.9985 (CI: 0.9959-0.997 at 95%) and ICC
(2D): 0.9999 (CI: 0.9999-1.000 at 95%) (Martin-de las Heras et al. 2005)
5∗:Comparison overlays generated from DentalPrint
∗∗: Significant differences between expert and non-expert (χ2exp = 4.09; 1df, p ≤ 0.05)
∓: Comparison Overlays generated from Adobe Photoshop.
∓∓: Significant differences between expert and non-expert (χ2exp = 4.81; 1df, p ≤ 0.05.)
AUC, area under the curve; SE, standard error; CI, confidence intervals at 95%.
6In the table: 0=nonbiter; 1=probable biter; 2= possible biter; 3=biter; CI at 95%.
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8.3.2 Concluding on the reliability of the bitemark-
experts
The independent evidence is too incomplete to answer whether bitemark-
analysis is more beneficial than harmful to legal processing. The only reason-
ably sound evidence existing in 2008 of the accuracy of European bitemark-
experts is Whittaker (1998), which suggested an accuracy of 69.3% — when
purpose is diagnosing bitemarks according to adult’s or child’s biting mecha-
nism. This is better than a coin-flip, but should be compared to the poorest
accuracy of the non-expert groups — 61.8%. I find it difficult to say whether
the accuracy of this kind of diagnosis is suggestive of other kinds of diagnosis.
The other studies had either methodological issues or attended to accuracy
via specified markers which may but need not represent the markers actu-
ally used by bitemark-experts. Particularly, there are no studies about the
accuracy when diagnosing the stage of the repair-process of bitemarks.
As far as I know neither European nor American bitemark-experts are
subject to any accreditation schemes containing tests for accuracy. There is
thus no way of knowing the false positive/negative rates of a given expert. I
could find no sign in the literature that this kind of accreditation is needed,
not even in ABFO-guidelines (2010). But were such accuracy-tests to be
introduced they can only be one of the components when assessing the actual
size of risk to aims/values in given cases — because accuracy will have to be
tested under conditions only variable relevant to any actual case. The other
components needed are the reliability of the markers observed in given cases
and the prevalence of such markers in different populations. The knowledge
about these two issues are examined in the next section.
8.4 What is known about the phenomena and
mechanisms involved in bitemark produc-
tion?
In the Torgersen-case in the previous chapter the bitemark-experts observed
the following characteristics (condensed and in my ”translated” terms):
• tooth-wear and mark-”wear” of a kind and degree associated with teeth/biting-
mechanism’s state on occlusion;
• tooth-position (labiolingual) and mark-position (labiolingual);
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• tooth-position (mesiodistal) and mark-position (mesiodistal);
• tooth-width (mesiodistal) and mark-width (mesiodistal);
• tooth-shape and mark-shape;
• teeth arch shape and marks arch shape; and
• teeth arch width and marks arch width; teeth arch breadth and marks arch breadth.
The definitions of these characteristics and the observational procedures
by which the experts determined the items’ states on these characteristics
were not explicated in the expert-reports (except stating that they had used
overlays (of unspecified production-procedure)).
Upon request from the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine the court-
appointed experts furnished information about the prevalence of one of the
central characteristics observed, that of kind and degree of wear, by referring
to Smith and Robb (1996). Assuming the suspect’s biting-mechanism to
represent those of this study, his kind and degree of wear would have been
classified as uncommon — shared by 5.3% of this sample. (MD/W (2000:
15a)). The experts did not discuss the symptoms which enabled the experts
to infer that the causal biting-mechanism had a particular state on kind and
degree of wear or the diagnostic accuracy acquired via this characteristic.
And they could not have appealed to any study of the relationship between
the symptoms and the alleged cause as no study of it exists.
The experts did not justify the other characteristics and were not chal-
lenged to do so. Could they have done so? What is actually known about
the variables involved during bitemark-production?
8.4.1 The available studies and their degree of
evidence-basis
Trough the procedures described in section one above I retrieved 392 papers
and books on bitemarks and bitemark-analysis for forensic purposes. These
studies were classified according to the following terms:
Evidence-based: A study (1) of a specified delimited empirically testable hypothesis;
by (2) ordered observable information (not necessary numerical) on specified char-
acteristics; through (3a) an identified, specified, ethically justified/justifiable and
understandable7 technical procedure (enabling independent repetition of experi-
ment) (3b) an identified or identifiable inference methodology which enable(d) an
7Understandable to those having the same kind or level of training as the author of the
experiment — who might want to repeat the experiment.
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assessment of the likelihoods (not necessary numerical) of the hypothesis possibili-
ties; and (4) including an assessment of the bias, or its effects on representational
ability, involved by the specification of the hypothesis, the sampling procedure, or
the technical procedure of the experiment;
Descriptive/normative A study which either (a) aims to be creative, constructive,
informative, introductory or critical and have no intention to systematically justify
or test the truth/likelihood of a delimited hypothesis, or (b) aims or claims to have
tested a hypothesis but fails to satisfy the above definition of ”Evidence-based”;
Case-study: A study describing the characteristics and conditions of a particular
bitemark-case or a particular instrument/material/technique used in bitemark-
analysis;
Historical or Review: A study describing the development of a phenomenon over time;
and
Legal case: A description of a bitemark-case legally processed in some jurisdiction.
392 studies were retrieved through the initial searching procedure and



















Figure 8.1: The collection of published studies on bitemark-analysis according to aim
and norms of inference of the study.
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33 evidence-based studies of 392, or 7.6%, may seem like a poor pro-
portion, but this does not matter if the studies are directly relevant to the
questions critical to forensic bitemark-diagnosis. In the following I will assess
the relevance of the studies under each of the two main diagnostic criteria of
forensic bite-mark analysis: First those concerning diagnosis of a suspected
bitemark’s causal object or biting-mechanism, then the diagnosis of its time
of occurrence. I shall concentrate on studies directly relevant to the observa-
tion of forensic items — bitemarks and biting-mechanisms. 8 experimental
studies will then be omitted due to being only indirectly relevant to my
purpose: Four studies attend to techniques for correcting distortions caused
during the photographing procedure; and four studies attend to distortion of
bitemarks on skin excised and stored in given fixatives over given time.8.
8.4.2 Evidence-based knowledge of characteristics rel-
evant for bitemark- diagnosis.
Rawson et al (1984) is the first study of a commonly observed bitemark-
characteristic: Kind and degree of rotation of submarks of bitemarks and
of teeth in biting-mechanisms. Rawson et al. (1984) study rotation of 397
bitemarks in flat wax-plates, made through controlled biting with natural
biting-mechanisms known to represent the ”general population” (American)
on age, race, and sex. The purpose was to ”[. . . ] establish the scientific
base for the statistical analysis of the uniqueness of the human dentition”
(Rawson et al. 1984:246). Rotation was defined as a given anterior tooth’s
angle between its mesio-distal centre-line and the mesio-distal line between
the two central incisors relative to a coordinate system constructed by a line
from the midpoint between central incisors and normal on the line between
the cusps of the two arch-canines in the jaw. Rawson et al. (1984) specify the
number of rotation-values possible for each tooth of the twelve anterior teeth
(canine through canine in each jaw); demonstrate, via a binomial model, how
one may calculate the probability of different rotation-profiles, and argue
that this profile alone enables discrimination between biting-mechanisms to
8Studies of techniques for rectifying distortion caused by photo-procedure: Krauss
(1984); Lewin (1989); Bowers and Johansen (2001); and Awd (2006)
Studies of distortion of secondary bitemarks caused by surgical or preservation procedure:
Brzozowski et al. (1999); Brzozowski et al. (2000); Low et al. (2001); and (Rotwell et al.
(2001)
220
the individual level. This study also defines and measures arch-widths of
biting-mechanisms and their bitemarks.
Rawson et al. (1984) recognise that the study only demonstrate the dis-
criminatory power of rotation-profile with respect to bitemarks in flat
wax-wafers from known biting-mechanisms, not with respect to bitemarks in
human skin from unknown biting-mechanisms. The relevance of this study
to practical bitemark analysis thus remains weak until studies can account
for the way and strength in which rotation — as this concept is spec-
ified and observed in Rawson et al. (1984) — of bitemarks on flat wax
co-varies with the same rotation of bitemarks on objects with geometric
and visco-elastic properties similar to human skin. Rawson et al.’s specifica-
tion and observation of rotation is just one of several: No consensus exists
on how to specify and observe rotation — some include a tooth’s poste-
rior/anterior or labial-lingual relation to specified arch-curve, the reference
systems for value-ascriptions vary, and some prefer the name of ”position”
and implicitly or explicitly refers to either mesial-distal or labio-lingual or
both; and ABFO-guidelines (2008) does not recommend any particular spec-
ification/observation. A minor point may be added: Rawson et al. (1984)
assumed independence between the individual tooth-rotations, an assump-
tion which was not justified in the paper. This critique is, however, not very
constructive recognising that the study is the first evidence-based study on
the discriminatory power of this frequently used bitemark-characteristic.
We must wait until 2006 before someone picks up the theme from Rawson
et al. (1984): Bernitz et al. (2006) uses a similar concept of rotation as
Rawson et al. and attends to the prevalence of this marker in a South-African
population. The relevance of this study to practical bitemark-diagnosis is
similar to that of Rawson et al. (1984): Bernitz et. al did not go beyond
bitemarks in flat wax-plates either. By 2010 there was still no study of this
kind of rotation of bitemarks on objects with geometric and visco-elastic
properties similar to those of human skin, nor about the co-variance between
the rotation of such bitemarks and that of natural biting-mechanisms.
Rawson et al. (1986) tried to move forward: This is a much cited study
performing two experiments to study the reliability of experts using 13 char-
acteristics defined and specified by ABFO-guidelines (1984). The purpose
was to classify bitemarks on human skin made by natural biting-mechanisms
(known true biters) under controlled and natural conditions: In the first ex-
periment 21 experts classified 3 simulated bitemarks with different degree of
distortion; In the second experiment 41 (ca. 50% of initial sample) experts
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classified 4 natural bitemarks by known biters. The characteristics observed
were as follows:
1. All teeth in mark present in the suspect’s mouth (∗One point per arch if true)
2. Sizes of arches consistent (∗One point per arch if true)
3. Shape of arches consistent (∗One point per arch if true)
4. Teeth and mark in same labiolingual position (rotated or normal) (∗One point per
tooth)
5. Teeth and mark in same rotational position (rotated or normal) (∗One point per
tooth)
6. Vertical position of tooth re. occlusal plane matches depth of plane (One point per
matching tooth )
(use only in unusual cases)
7. Spacing between adjacent marking edges (∗One point per space)
8. Mesiodistal widths of tooth matches mark (∗One point per tooth)
use only if individual tooth is clearly marked)
9. Labiolingual width of tooth matches mark
OR attrition of edge matches mark (∗∗Three points per tooth)
10. Distinctive curvature of tooth incisal edge matches mark (Three points per tooth)
(use only in unusual cases)
11. Other distinctive features (fractured teeth, unusual anatomy) (Three points per
tooth)
12. Suspect has one edentulous arch and this is reflected in bitemark (Three points if
true)
∗ Three points if feature is significantly distinctive; ∗∗ Only in case permitting accurate
measurement
Rawson et al. (1986) claim to have demonstrated a high degree of reli-
ability among observers in scoring the bitemarks on all the variables except
variables 7, 6, and 10. But this is at best a highly contingent statement —
a contingency the reader must spend time to figure out for him/herself by
carefully scrutinizing the statistics and the text. Table 8.7 shows that high
reliability can at best be accredited to all the variables for bitemark-case I
(simulated on live sedated dog) by casts of teeth under conditions securing
minimal distortion of the characteristics to be scored. The other cases are
only conditionally reliable, with variable 1 as clear, 2 and 3, less so, and the
rest not reliably scored.
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Coherent Incoherent Difficult
scoring scoring to interpret
(”small variance”) (”larger variances”) (”many zero’s”)
Bitemark-case I Variables 1, 2, 3, Variable 7 Variable 6 and 10
(simulated, 4, 5, 8, and 9
not distorted)
Bitemark-case II Variable 1 Variables 2, 3, Variable 6
(simulated, 4, 5, 7,
medium distorted) 8 and 9
Bitemark-case III Variable 1 Variables 2, 3,
(simulated, 4, 5, 6, 7,
Very distorted) 8 and 9
Bitemark-case IV Variables 1, Variables 4, Variables 6, 7,
(natural, 2, and 3 5, and 8 9, and 10
distortion unknown) (”very fluctuant”)
Bitemark-case V Variables 1 Variables 2 and 3 Variables 6, 7,
(natural, (”some spread” ) 8, 9, and 10
distortion unknown) 4 and 5
(”big spreads”)
Bitemark-case VI Variables 1, Variables 4, Variables 6, 7,
(natural 2, and 3 and 5 8, 9, and 10
distortion unknown) (big ”variances”)
Bitemark-case VII Variables 1, Variables 4, Variables 6, 7,
(natural 2, and 3 and 5 8, 9, and 10
distortion unknown) (big ”variances”)
Table 8.7: The results from study by Rawson et al. (1986): Degree of relia-
bility in scoring ABFO-variables.
223
And further, what are these mean-scores and their standard deviations
actually telling us? A score is the sum of particular scores — some of these
in turn being the sum of as much as twelve such particular scores. There
are thus many combinations by which to arrive at the total score on a given
variable. This makes the measures for that variable not very informative.
Perhaps Rawson et al. (1986) accounted for this, but it is not reported
in the paper. In addition, the scoring sheet, if the respondents were given
instructions similar to that presented in the paper, leaves plenty of room
for confusion about appropriate procedure. The study fulfils my criteria for
being experimental, but the presentation of the results makes at least me
doubt (1) whether the study actually demonstrate high reliability among
decision-makers as claimed and (2) whether the reliability observed indicates
the decision-makers ability of having same total score only or their ability to
score same on partial scores as well. I hesitate therefore to make this study
signify anything about the reliability of experts in classifying bitemarks via
these characteristics.
Sweet, D., Bowers, C. M. (1998) Studied the reliability of experts
in determining area (cm2) and rotation of 8 individual anterior teeth of
30 biting-mechanisms (Caucasian population, not further described) via five
different overlays-procedures. Clear differences were demonstrated, with the
computer-based procedure as the best. But the discriminating powers of the
two characteristics via the computer-method were not reported and only the
authors themselves constituted the decision-makers: This study is thus only
evidence for the claim that these two authors are made more reliable by one
procedure than the four others when identifying area- and rotation-profiles
of biting-mechanisms.
McNamee et al. (2005) provides more information in their study
having the same purposes as Sweet and Bowers (1998): MacNamee et al.
compared the reliability of 30 experts, with different experience from prac-
tical bitemark-analysis, when identifying area-profiles and position-profiles
of biting-mechanisms through two different but commonly used computer-
based procedures. Their object and observation of position are quite similar
to those of rotation in Sweet and Bowers (1998) and Rawson et al. (1984),
i.e., mesio-distal angle to a specified base-line. The discriminating powers of
the two characteristics of area and position are provided: Both procedure A
and B’s definitions of area yielded poor inter-examiner and intra-examiner
reliability (reliability coefficients (given a ”a suitable” model and ANOVA):
Technique A (inter-examiner) 0.327 and (intra-examiner) 0.527; and tech-
224
nique B (inter-examiner) 0.437 and (intra-examiner) 0.550.
The coefficients for position were much better: A (inter-examiner) 0.946
and 0.997 and A (intra-examiner) 0.947 and 0.997; B (inter-examiner) 0.964
and 0.993 and B (intra-examiner 0.964 and 0.993).9 McNamee et al. (2003)
also found that the effects of experience on reliability — for both area- and
position-identification — were small and insignificant.
This study is evidence justifying the expectation that bitemark-experts
using either one of these computer-based procedures for identifying a biting-
mechanism’s profile on rotation will arrive at the same profile for that mech-
anism. Is the study also evidence justifying the expectation that experts will
be equally reliable when ascribing rotation-profile to a bitemark in human
skin? Yes — since the process simply provides relative distances between
points in a defined space. Can we then infer that only biting-mechanisms
found to have the same profile on rotation as a given bitemark can make up
the base-rate for the true cause of that bitemark? No — since other char-
acteristics will interfere during the biting-process and make the relationship
between the two rotation-profiles contingent: Both biting-mechanisms with
the same and those with different rotation-profile may produce bitemarks
with this rotation-profile.
Barsley and Lancaster (1987) studied the distribution of arch-width
in a sample (1198) of biting-mechanisms (casts) of dental school clinic pa-
tients (population not specified): Mean mandibular and maxillary widths
were found to be 2.81cm and 3.59cm, respectively, which is slightly more than
what Rawson et al. (1984) found — 2.50cm and 3.23cm respectively, but the
two studies’ samples had different proportions of female/male, black/white,
etc. Again the results of this study can be used to justify the classifica-
tion of known biting-mechanisms, but can only become relevant for practical
bitemark-analysis if studies are done on the nature and degree of the correla-
tion between the arch-widths of biting-mechanisms and that of bitemarks in
objects with geometric and viscoelastic properties similar to those of human
skin. The same applies to Kouble and Craig (2007) who studied the in-
cidence of missing anterior teeth among 1010 patients (16 years +) in South
Yorkshire, UK.
9Two coordinates observed for position. The similar values are not my typing errors:
They are the figures reported in the paper.
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1. The lack of consensus on specification and observation of char-
acteristics
One of the main challenges to current bitemark-analysis is the low degree
of consensus among bitemark-analysts concerning the identification, speci-
fication and observation of the basic characteristics believed to be relevant
to forensic bitemark-analysis: No organisation seems to have taken or been
given the responsibility of coordinating individual analysts in their efforts
to develop forensically relevant knowledge. ABFO is frequently appealed to
but has not managed to become the authority required for adequate develop-
ment. There seems to be an agreement that the characteristics identified in
ABFO’s scoring-scheme and studied by Rawson et al. (1986) is relevant, but
there is yet no agreement about the procedures by which these characteristics
should be observed.
Modern computers and software could have offered some standardizing
help, but the quickly arising number of software on offer, with different
degrees of person-independent ways by which characteristics are selected,
coupled with a lack of validation of any of these procedures for bitemark-
analytical purposes just add to the fragmentation. One might for instance
be excited by the prospect of 3D imaging-software considering the geometric
challenges to bitemark-analysis:
Blackwell et al. (2007), for instance, studied the accuracy of 1 decision-
maker identifying five morphometric characteristics using a procedure involv-
ing 3D imaging (3D Rugle3 Software-program) and an algorithm developed
for quantitative comparison of bitemarks in flat wax (acrylic) and human
teeth/biting-mechanisms: 42 dental students each made one bitemark into
flat wax-plates (acrylic) and provided casts of their maxillary and mandibu-
lar teeth. 16 teeth (first molars, canines, incisors) in each the maxilla and the
mandible were marked on 42 morphometric landmarks and transformed into
five variables. Logistic regression was used to obtain a model or algorithm
(cross validated) for a match, and ROC-analysis was performed to assess the
accuracy: The procedure gave a true positive rate of 78% and a false positive
rate of 15%.
Kieser et al. (2007) studied the reliability of 1 decision-maker iden-
tifying shape and size of 12 anterior (canines and incisors) teeth of 50
teeth/biting-mechanisms (postoperative unrestored orthodontic casts,
assumed low level of individuality) through geometric morphometric land-
mark procedure. The reliability of this decision-maker in identifying the
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characteristics through this process was high — the Intraclass Correlation
Coefficient being 0.95 at 0.01-level. The study also yielded a low and non-
significant covariation between shape and size for the sample: Upper jaw
measurements were correlated atr = 0.38 (p = 0.35); lower jaw measure-
ments at r = 0.52 (p = 0.08).
And, finally Martin-de las Heras et al (2005) studied the reliabil-
ity of 5 experts using DentalPrint software in identifying seven character-
istics of an unknown number of biting-mechanisms — demonstrating very
high reliability for all the decisions: Intraobserver reliability (one observer
only) was observed to have an Inter Class Correlation Coefficients (ICC) of
0.9985 (Confidence Interval, CI, at 95%: 0.9959-0.997); and interobserver
reliability was observed to have an ICC of 0.9999 (CI at 95%: 0.999-1.000).
Under the section on accuracy of bitemark-experts we saw that Martin-de
las Heras et al (2007) demonstrated that the accuracies of one expert and
one non-expert (PhD-student in forensic odontology) using DentalPrint for
diagnosing simulated bitemarks on post-mortem pigskin made by casts of 17
teeth/biting-mechanisms (controlled force and direction) were 76.4% (CI for
the area under the curve from the ROC-analysis: 0.625-0.876) and 64.2% (CI
for AUC (ROC): 0.521-0.763) for the expert and the non-expert respectively
(statistically significant difference) — which was slightly more (difference not
commented with respect to statistical significance) than the AUC’s observed
given a software program only allowing observation of two-dimensional ob-
jects (0.726 (IC at 95%: 0.610-0.841) vs. 0.598 (IC at 95%:0.477-0.720).
Martin-de las Heras et al. (2005, 2007) may be considered to be the
more relevant of these three studies of these computer-based procedures for
observing three-dimensional objects. But whether they also justify the use of
DentalPrint over the other procedure for observing two-dimensional objects is
impossible to say as the difference in accuracy was small and uncommented
with respect to statistical significance. Both Blackwell et al. (2007) and
Kieser et al. (2007) seem to indicate that the use of computer-based heuristics
for observing three-dimensional objects will enhance the objectivity of the
observations of objects.
One may not forget, however, that human conceptualization, decisions,
and actions intervene on several levels of this procedure as well and will make
any actual or case-based application less reliable than what is demonstrated
in the studies — even if the conditions of the actual case under examination
are as pure as those of the experiments in the studies.
The lack of consensus on characteristics and procedures for observing
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these is thus a serious challenge to bitemark-analysis: Cooperation in research
toward a common goal is needed, but is difficult to bring about if there is no
organisation having the coordinating responsibility.
Critical gaps in the knowledge about bitemark-production
This basic lack of consensus must be one of the reasons why four other chal-
lenges exist for bitemark-analysis as well: The need for more (a) knowledge
about the co-variation between characteristics observed of biting-mechanisms
and the corresponding characteristics observed of objects with geometric and
visco-elastic properties similar to human skin; (b) knowledge about the mech-
anisms operant during the process of biting and the interaction between
these mechanisms and the characteristics observed of resting forensic items;
(c) knowledge about the characteristics relevant for the second bitemark-
criterion, that of the time of occurrence of the bitemark; and (d) knowledge
about alternative diagnostic inference-procedures.
The studies reviewed above, although few, suggest that the more the
conditions of the experiments approach the conditions of naturally occurring
bitemarks, the lower the accuracy of the bitemark-experts becomes — both
the false-positive rates as well as the false negative rates increase. In other
words, the second dogma of bitemark-analysis — that the ”uniqueness” of a
biting-mechanism is replicated on human skin during biting process — seems
still to be more of an ideal than an empirically justified truth. The practical
implication is that biting-mechanisms with profiles different from that ab-
duced from a natural bitemark can not be excluded from the population of
possible causal biting-mechanisms.
Unfortunately, until 2008 no study being categorised as ”evidence-based”
had attended to this possibility: (1) No study exists which attends to the re-
lationship between A: characteristics observed of natural biting-mechanisms
and their bitemarks in flat objects without no or low viscoelastic variability
and B: characteristics observed of bitemarks in human skin or objects with
properties similar to those of human skin; (2) no experimental study exists
which attends to mechanisms suspected to condition the relationship between
A and B; and the discourse on epistemological norms, inference-procedures,
and standards are almost non-existent.
This state of knowledge at the end of 2008 is possible only if bitemark-
experts either are not aware of the possibility that bitemark-mechanisms
with given profiles can produce bitemarks with different profiles; do not take
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this possibility seriously; or do not believe this possibility to be practically
relevant. And this in turn is only possible if the epistemological norms among
bitemark-analysts are different from those recommended by ABFO or most
western academic institutions.
The studies being the sources of this chapter do not include papers pub-
lished after December 2008, but I have noticed two later studies which might
indicate a change of attitude and a will to remedy the current state of
bitemark-analysis: Radford et al. (2009) studied the difference in ob-
servation of given characteristics of bitemarks in flat objects — such as the
dental wax-plates used to record characteristics of biting-mechanisms — ver-
sus objects having a form (but not viscoelasticity) similar to the human arm.
Characteristics defined via landmark and semi-landmark analysis (3-D mor-
phometric) and observed on 20 bitemarks in dental wax on (a) flat object
and (b) rounded object yielded results with were consistent with the sus-
pected hypothesis of difference but not with its alternative: The authors
thus saw reason to question the use of traditional flat wax-plates to re-
construct bitemarks for forensic diagnostic purposes. Stols and Bernitz
(2010) demonstrate a technique by which to account for the differences be-
tween biting-mechanisms and bitemarks, differences due to variables operant
during the biting-process, due to change of positioning, or due to storage of
tissue-specimens. I am unable to say anything about the relevance of these
studies to practical bitemark-diagnosis as I have not assessed them properly.
But no matter how good their quality, these two studies can not alter
the general impression that the current state of knowledge about bitemark-
production in human skin is poor. Bitemark-production is certainly among
the more complex processes and this is a relevant reason for the state of
knowledge, but equally relevant is the lack of consensus among bitemark-
analysts about bitemark-markers and the ways in which to observe these
markers. Lack of consensus is in turn due to the failure to establish an
organisation which can coordinate the knowledge-production and enforce a
standard of inference agreed to be appropriate for this knowledge.
So far this review has only attended to the first criterion of forensic
bitemark-diagnosis — the diagnosing of the bitemark’s causal biting mecha-
nism. The review of the state of knowledge for the second criterion — the
diagnosis of the bitemark’s time of occurrence — is the subject of the next
section.
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8.4.3 Evidence-based knowledge for diagnosing a
bitemark’s time of occurrence
The second criterion of bitemark-diagnosis is a necessary criterion because of
the possibility of the bitemark being irrelevant to the legally relevant injury.
There is, at the end 2008, only one study which could have been directly
relevant to this bitemark-criterion — Avon et al. (2006) — but it is not rel-
evant as it does not qualify as ”evidence-based” as this was specified for my
classification of the existing literature (see section 3. above). Avon et al.
(2006)’ hypothesis is that, in bitemarks suspected relevant to lethal injury
but in site affected by livor mortis, specified histopathological/microscopic
characteristics (presence of unspecified erythrocytes in different layers and
zones around skinmark) are better than clinical/macroscopic characteristics
(morphology, colour) for diagnosing whether a bitemark was made ante-
mortem or post-mortem. Experimental bitemarks were created by letting 1
chrome-cobalt teeth/biting-mechanism make 6 bitemarks in thorax and ab-
domen skin of each of 3 live and later sacrificed female piglets 12 weeks old
(4 bitemarks ante-mortem, 2 post-mortem). The results were that unspeci-
fied erythrocytes were present in fat- and muscle-tissue of ante-mortem made
bitemarks, but not present in post-mortem made bitemarks; unspecified ery-
throcytes were present in blood-vessels in both ante- and post-mortem made
bitemarks; and unspecified erytrocytes were not present in connective tissue.
Unfortunately, Avon et al. (2006) do not inform about the reliability of the
technique used to determine presence/absence of erythrocytes. The study is
relevant to practical bitemark-analysis in the sense that it warns that clini-
cal characteristics of colour and morphology for diagnosing time of bitemark
could be more uncertain when the bitemark is affected by livor mortis, than
if it is not. Whether one then should better observe presence of erythrocytes
is a question not answered by the study.
Bitemark-experts have shown an even less interest in the characteristics
for diagnosing time of occurrence than in the dermatological conditions rel-
evant for the diagnosis about causal biting-mechanism.
Is this so due to bitemark-experts seeing this sub-diagnosis to require
knowledge outside odontology — that it is the responsibility of the medical
examiner? This is possible.
The question of timing of skin-injuries for forensic purpose is an old one
— as it is a standard diagnostic criterion for any skin-injury suspected rele-
vant to a legal injury. The medical examiner is thus well familiar with this
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diagnostic decision and the information required for it. The basic relevant
physical mechanism is that of wound-repair or tissue-restoration: From the
time of impact and to the time of forensic examination, the tissue in ques-
tion will pass through different stages of repair or restoration. Concentrating
on human skin, these stages may be determined by different characteristics
observed through different technical and conceptual heuristics. There are
clinical and macroscopic characteristics, such as presence of blood, colour
of bruising, the texture of the wound-edge and the surrounding tissue, etc.
via minimal use of technical heuristics; microscopic characteristics such as
leukocyte infiltration and erythrocyte-presence may be assessed through his-
tological techniques; and enzymatic characteristics (presence, amount) and
their triggers may be assessed via histochemical, biochemical, and immuno-
histochemical techniques.
As for the first diagnostic criterion of bitemark-diagnosis, the diagnosis of
a skin-mark’s time of occurrence must select the appropriate set of character-
istics on the basis of the prior classification on certain class-characteristics.
It is therefore impossible to say anything general about which is the most
relevant time-markers in a given case. Further, the choice of best markers
will also depend on the resources available to the medical examiner: Some
forensic examiners will have the best possible training, time, and equipment
possible — enabling the use of the most advanced and reliable techniques and
enabling observations of the most reliable markers; other examiners lacking
training, time, or equipment, must resort to the less reliable markers, such
those via clinical and macroscopical techniques. A third factor affecting the
choice of best markers in a given case is the anticipated evidentiary role of a
skinmark. And, finally, a fourth factor is the analytical norms and inference-
procedures adhered to or required of the medical examiners, the investigators,
and the legal agents.
The different techniques, markers, and the procedures for forensic deter-
mination of time or age of a skinmark are fairly well established, but the
accuracy of the techniques and the markers vary: Some are evidence-based
known to be generally more accurate than others, some are conditionally
more accurate.
I would have preferred to review the state of knowledge and the level of
agreement among forensic medical examiners in the same manner as above.
But the number of studies (experimental and others) published and the level
of technological and medical-specialist knowledge required for a thorough as-
sessment of their relevance for forensic diagnosis were decided outside the
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scope of this dissertation. The incomplete review I did perform suggests
a much higher proportion of studies qualifying as evidence-based according
to the definition in section three above — much higher than for the first
bitemark-criterion. But the same problem may exist for this second crite-
rion as well: The analytical norms adhered to when producing more general
knowledge for publication in a scientific journal may differ from those ad-
hered to when producing case-specific knowledge for presentation in a court
— even within the same person.
8.5 Conclusion
In light of the published studies I cannot but conclude that there is a poorly
developed state of knowledge about the characteristics relevant for diagnosing
(a.) skinmarks with respect to it being a human bitemark or not;
(b.) bitemarks with respect to it being caused by given causal teeth/biting-
mechanism; and
(c.) bitemarks with respect to it being caused simultaneously with control-
injury,
and that there are one main reason for this state of knowledge, namely the
low level of consensus among the bitemark-experts with respect to
the specification of anticipated relevant characteristics;
the observation of anticipated characteristics; and
the analytical norms and decision-criteria required for knowledge produc-
tion — be it for general knowledge purpose or for forensic diagnostic
purpose.
This low level of consensus is, in turn, due to bitemark-analysts not having
been able to establish any authoritative body which is given the responsi-
bility of identifying the most relevant research-areas, coordinate research,
enforce analytical norms and standards, and provide best practice guidelines
concerning choice and use of terms and technical procedures.
Mainly because of the lack of consensus there is in 2010 an almost com-
plete absence of
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• bitemark-expert initiated experimental studies on the conditions of hu-
man skin relevant to bitemark-analysis;
• an ability to exploit the existing accumulated dermatological knowl-
edge;
• experimental studies on the behaviour of regularly observed character-
istics on objects with geometric and viscoelastic properties similar to
human skin;
• experimental studies on how sets of such characteristics observed of
biting-mechanisms or their bitemarks on flat objects with low visco-
elasticity interact with corresponding characteristics observed on
bitemarks on objects with geometric and viscoelastic properties similar
to human skin;
• any kind of study relevant to the diagnostic criterion of simultaneity
between a bitemark and a control-injury known to be relevant to a legal
injury; and
• a theoretical or methodological discourse on appropriate inference strat-
egy for either the purpose of general knowledge or the purpose of foren-
sic diagnosis.
This state of knowledge and level of consensus, given all the years in
which forensic bitemark-analysis has been practiced, is only possible if the
bitemark-analysts either (a) can justify that they can and should adhere to
epistemological norms and inference-procedures different from those prac-
ticed in other expert-disciplines; (b) are simply unaware that there are alter-
native such norms and procedures; or (c) are aware, but do not understand
how alternative such norms and procedures affect their ability to achieve the
aims/values of the forensic diagnosis.
The answer to the questions in this chapter must be that very little of
the published knowledge on bitemark-production in human skin is relevant
to forensic bitemark-diagnosis of bitemarks in human skin — because most
of the existing knowledge are not evidence-based to the standard specified
in chapter 1 of this dissertation or specified by ABFO (2008). Most of the
published knowledge is produced according to a standard which I in the two
previous chapters called ”incomplete/open induction”. This standard implies
(1) that the reference-bases for the conclusions about the likelihood of the
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suspected hypothesis are left unspecified, which in turn leaves the likelihood
for the suspected hypothesis ambiguous; and, not the least, (2) that the crime
investigator will be prevented from using the so far only existing unambiguous
means for assessing the risk of wrong conclusions — which in turn prevents
the crime investigator from assessing the risk of having contributed to cause
consequences all agree should be avoided: That an innocent is convicted or
a guilty is acquitted.
A crime investigator should therefore not expect that a given bitemark-
expert’s diagnosis of a bitemark on human skin will be evidence-based, or in
other words, provide the information necessary for the investigator to assess
whether the risk of a wrong conclusion is sufficiently low for the purpose of
the investigation.
The main question of this second part of the dissertation has been whether
European crime-investigations of bitemark-means are evidence-based. I have
investigated this question via two sets of information: (1) The repeated inves-
tigations of the bitemark-means in the Torgersen-case as this was expressed in
mainly the court-appointed bitemark-experts and (2) the knowledge produc-
tion on bitemarks in human skin as this was expressed in published knowledge
produced by bitemark-experts. I suggest that one may with reasonable con-
fidence conclude that European bitemark-experts’ diagnoses of bitemarks in
human skin, more likely than not, will not be evidence-based to the stan-
dard of Premise 1 in this dissertation. Can we be equally confident that
the same conclusion applies to crime investigative decisions about bitemark-
means? It is difficult to imagine how an evidence-based crime investigator
could continue to request assistance from experts which did not provide the
information they needed. It is more likely that the two professions share the
same standard of inference. This would also be consistent with the inference-
standard required by jurists and judges during the trial-phase of a crime-case.
I thus also suggest that one may with reasonable confidence conclude
that European crime investigations of bitemark-means more likely than not
will not be evidence-based to the standard identified in this chapter. Again,
this does not mean that their conclusions about the relevance of bitemark-
means are always wrong. The conclusions may be correct or wrong — but by
not being evidence-based there will be no inter-subjective means by which
someone else than the crime investigator can assess that question. This
independent assessment may not have been frequently asked for in the past.
But it was asked for in the Torgersen-case, and it will be asked for in the
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future.
The final part of this dissertation will be more constructive: An evidence-
basing methodology is suggested which is compatible with the epistemological
conditions and aims of crime investigation; a model of the crime investiga-
tive bitemark-problem will be constructed and exemplified; and a practical




bitemark-means of evidence: A
Bayesian theoretical Approach
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The studies in the previous chapter suggest that we should not expect
that European crime investigative decisions about the evidential value of
bitemark-means are evidence-based — not to the standard of Premise 1 in
this dissertation nor to the standard recommended by academic institutions
and the main organization for forensic odontologists: The reason is that
forensic odontologists and, most likely, crime investigators prefer to adhere
to the inference-norm of ”incomplete and open induction” rather than to
”complete and closed induction” when they assess the significance of their
observations. The former norm conserves the attention on the suspected
hypothesis and leaves the attention to alternative possible hypotheses un-
structured — which in turn allows for passive/implicit, impulsive, and sub-
jective choice of reference-groups and -terms. The effects are that (a) the
public is prevented from assessing the reasonableness of the investigators
and experts decisions and (b) the public as well as the investigators/experts,
themselves are prevented from assessing whether the aims and values of the
criminal case process have been adequately protected and not undermined.
The strong want to avoid wrong decisions which may undermine important
aims and values is perhaps the single most important reason why academic
institutions insist that empirical investigations should be subject to the norm
of ”complete and closed induction”. This norm structures the investigators
reasoning — forces him/her to specify unambiguously the content of the
negation of the suspected hypotheses, assess the probability and significance
of the observations in the case the negation-hypothesis were to be true as
well as in the case the suspected hypothesis were to be true. This norm is
difficult to challenge: it has survived as the best means, so far, by which to
avoid wrongful decisions over time.
In this last part of the dissertation I will suggest a Bayesian theoretical
methodology as an alternative strategy when assessing and deciding about
the basic, causal-logical relevance or evidential value of case-specific legal
bitemark-means. The question in this part is
Question 3: A possible alternative procedure for bitemark-
means The Bayesian theoretical methodology is justifiably able to
protect the analytical and crime-investigative aims and values of the
bitemark-problem. But is it justifiably able to achieve and protect the
broader legal-institutional, criminal case processual, aims and values?
In Chapter 9 I present a subjectivist or personalistic Bayesian Network
approach (BNs) as a possible alternative. The epistemological concepts and
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technical heuristics of BNs is introduced, explained, and specified, and argued
to be adequately accounting for the epistemological conditions and aims of
the crime investigative decision.
In Chapter 10 I proceed to specify the kind of bitemark-problem to
be modelled in the terms of Bayesian Decision Theory. The first part spec-
ifies the context, the relevant events, the relevant consequences, and the
decision-options of the problem. This provides the basis for the expression
of the bitemark-problem as a utility-function. Secondly, the likelihood-ratio
is suggested used by the crime investigator as an indicator of the value of
the expert-information with respect to the diagnostic criteria involved in the
problem. Thirdly, a general likelihood-ratio for the bitemark-problem is sug-
gested and justified, and a general utility-function for the bitemark-problem
is specified.
In Chapter 11 I perform a BNs-analysis of a crime-investigative bitemark-
problem approximating that of the Torgersen-case. Borrowing the reality of
the case, it will be assumed (a) that four markers were used for the expert-
diagnosis of the most likely causal biting-mechanism of the bitemark and that
these have certain distributions; (b) that a joint set of both case-particular
and expert-knowledge markers was used for the diagnosis of simultaneity
between the legal injury and the bitemark and that this has a certain dis-
tribution; and (c) that the experts have a certain diagnostic accuracy when
using these markers for the two diagnostic purposes. The likelihood-ratio for
the problem is calculated and interpreted and I demonstrate how different
reference-classes affect the posterior probabilities.
In Chapter 12 I relate the suggested BNs-solution to the crime investiga-
tive bitemark-problem to the worries held by opponents to formal approaches
to evidence-assessment in the legal context. These worries are concluded to
be far less relevant when the BNs-approach is restricted to the decisions at
the investigative level. If Premise 2 and Premise 3 are reasonable then the
investigative decisions should not under-communicate uncertainty — quite
the contrary: Crime-investigative knowledge is then expert-knowledge just
like any other expert-knowledge and not only can but also should adopt a
methodology which routinely induces assessments of the risks of propagating
false beliefs.
The dissertation ends by suggesting a basic guideline to crime investi-
gators with a bitemark-problem similar to the one specified in Chapter 11.
This guideline specifies the minimum set of questions the crime investiga-
tor needs to assess and answer for such problems in order for the decision
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about basic relevance or evidential value to be evidence-based. The guide-
line includes the questions needed answered by the bitemark-experts and the
medical examiners as well.
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Chapter 9
Bayesian Networks with a
Subjectivist notion of
Probability, BNs
In this chapter I present the norms central to Bayesian theories of justification
and to Bayesian methodologies; and I present the notation and definitions
required for the modeling of the crime-investigative bitemark-problem. I will
do so in the terms of Bernardo and Smith’s Bayesian Theory (2000). The
epistemological norms are the topic of the first section. The second sec-
tion presents the axiomatic basis for the methodologies of Bayesian decision-
analysis and Bayesian Networks. I will in the following denote these two
methodologies by BNs, the subscript referring to the subjectivist notion of
probability assumed when I apply the methodology of Bayesian Networks.
In the third section I introduce and define two sets of concepts crucial to
BNs: Belief, uncertainty, and probability; and preference, consequence, and
utility. In the last section I will explicate the graph-theoretical component
of BNs and discuss briefly the epistemic and pedagogic contribution of this
heuristic.
9.1 Introduction
All inferences — whether from the particular to the general or from the gen-
eral to the particular, and independent of the number of individuals — need
to use four kinds of logical connectives: Conjunction, disjunction, implica-
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tion, and negation. As explicated in chapter 2, the criterion of validity for
deductive arguments by these connectives are clear: If the premises are true
then the implication is true as well. But the criterion of soundness for induc-
tive arguments via these connectives is less clear: It was possible to identify
reliability, relevance, and coherence as necessary components of soundness,
but conflict remains about the exact meaning of these sub-criteria. Several
suggestions exist, even for those situations where one needs to move between
the particular and the general for only a limited number of units. I referred
to one of these suggestions, that of Savage (1954/1972).
BNs agrees epistemologically with Savage (1954/1972) and shares the
same problem: What are the criteria for sound discrimination between alter-
native decision-possibilities in a given problem? The main important differ-
ence between BNs and the proposal of Savage (1954/1972) is that he former
exploits a heuristic from graph-theory when assessing and justifying a sug-
gested causal relationship among the variables identified as relevant for a
given decision-problem. The general Bayesian Networks-approach — a BN-
approach without a subscript — does not presume a subjectivist notion of
probability nor a Bayesian epistemology, but does not preclude so either.
The ”Bayesian” in Bayesian networks refers to a heuristic exploited by Sav-
age (1954/1972) as well — namely Thomas Bayes’s (1702-1761) solution for
assessing inverse probability: Bayes Rule or Theorem(Bayes 1763, in Pearson
and Kendall (eds.) 1970:131-153). Bayes’ Rule is useful in situations where
the investigative question is about the probability of an abduced hypothesis
conditional on a particular set of observations (as opposed situations in which
the question is about the probability of a set of observations conditional on
an assumed probability or density function for the suggested relationship).
The idea that probability can/should be interpreted as personal or subjective
degree of belief as well as or rather than objective or relative frequency is
a much later idea. The reason, then, for using Bayesian Networks instead
of Savage’s proposal is that the former exploits graph theory in addition to
probability theory when justifying a particular model of a problem. The lat-
ter is useful when an inference problem becomes complex and/or if there is
a particular need to standardize decision-performance when a given kind of
inference problem tend to recur.
Both complexity and recurrence are basic characteristics of the decision-
problem of this dissertation — of assessing and deciding about the evidential
value of a bitemark-means. A third characteristic of the bitemark-problem
is that it concerns propositions about highly conditioned events — events
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being a singular outcome of a causal process with unknown properties. This
”forces” the investigator to ask the kind of question typically addressed by
Bayesian Networks: ”What are the likelihoods of the alternative hypotheses
given this set of information?”. A fourth characteristic of the problem is that
the decision-maker almost completely lacks expert-knowledge in the form of
results from larger scale studies using standard statistical techniques. The
third and the fourth characteristic exclude the kind of question typically
addressed by regular scientists: ”What is the probability of having these
observations conditional on this hypothesis and these randomly selected in-
dividuals?”. The investigator with a bitemark-problem has, typically, only
access to experts’ personal experience about the phenomenon in question.
This more or less inter-subjective experience, just like the data of a large
scale study, must of course also be accredited — it must be assessed for
its degree of soundness: Is the experience sufficiently reliable, relevant, and
coherent for its intended purpose?
So, if it is agreed that the crime-investigative bitemark-problem involves
inference and decision under uncertainty and if it is agreed that such infer-
ences need to be sufficiently sound because of the serious consequences, BNs
is a possible methodology by which to ensure such soundness strategically,
across decision-makers and particular cases.
9.2 The Bayesian epistemological basis of
BNs
For the presentation of the Bayesian-epistemological fundament of BNs I
have chosen to stay rather close to the account provided by Bernardo and
Smith in their Bayesian Theory (2000).
This means that I will interpret the investigator’s problem of deciding
the evidential value of a bitemark on human skin as a practical decision-
problem within a given context. The latter consists of previous knowledge
of the investigator — in terms of (a) his or her experiences with similar cases
and situations and (b) his or her obligations to adhere to the institutional
and organizational values, norms, procedures, and instructions governing the
processing of crime-cases in the investigative phase. This context is seen as
the investigator’s initial state of mind or reference-structure: It will condition
the way and content by which he/she organizes, assesses, and decides about
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the new case. This contextual background knowledge will be denoted by K0.
A decision-problem will be defined as follows:
Definition 9.1. (Decision problem).
A decision-problem will be defined by the elements (E , C, A, ≤), where
(i) E is an algebra of relevant events, Ej ;
(ii) C is a set of possible consequences, cj ;
(iii) A is a set of options, or potential acts, consisting of functions which map finite
partitions of Ω, the certain event in E , to compatibly-dimensioned ordered sets
of elements of C;
(iv) ≤ is a preference order, taking the form of a binary relation between some of
the elements of A. Bernardo and Smith (2000:18-19)
9.2.1 The events relevant to a decision-problem
The basic framework for the interpretation of the content of propositions
or claims involved in the investigator’s inference or decision-problem will be
that of Boolean algebra: The content of single propositions will be seen as
events, denoted by capital letters E, F , . . . — each having a finite number
of mutually exclusive states, denoted by lower case letters, e, f , . . . — which
belong to the finite universe of events, E . The certain event will be denoted
by Ω and the impossible or empty event by ∅, both belonging to E .
States and events relate to each other by the following notation:
• e  E — e is an element or state of the event E.
• E ⊂ F (or F ⊃ E) — every element in E is contained in F
• E = F — E and F have exactly the same kind and number of elements.
Events can be constructed or deconstructed according to the following set
of basic rules (a selection):
• ¬E — the complement of E with respect to E
• ∪iei — the union of the elements of E
• E ∪ F — the union of the elements in E and the elements in F (either E or F )
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• E ∩ F — the intersection of elements which occurs in both E and F
• E ∩E = E, E ∪E = E
• ∅ ∩ E = 0, ∅ ∪ E = E
• E ∩ E = E = E ∪ E, E ∩ (¬E) = 0(∅), E ∪ (¬E) = 1(E)
• E ∪ F = F ∪ E and E ∩ F = F ∩ E — commutativity
• E ∪ (F ∪G) = (E ∪ F ) ∪G and E ∩ (F ∩G) = (E ∩ F ) ∩G — associativity
• E ∪ (E ∩G) = E and E ∩ (E ∪ F ) = E — absorption
• E ∪ (F ∩G) = (E ∪ F ) ∩ (E ∪G), and
• E ∩ (F ∪G) = (E ∩ F ) ∪ (E ∩G) — distributivity
As said, the context K0 of the investigator is seen to condition both the
way and content by which he or she assesses and decides about a new case
— K0 thus determines which events which are relevant to the decision-
problem. This is then why E in (i) is said to contain relevant events Ei. The
property of relevance needs much more precision and substance than this,
but I want to define it in terms of the consequences and the relation ≤ of
the decision-problem and will wait until these elements have been treated (a
fuller concept of relevance will be offered in connection with the treatment
of the graph-theoretical component of the Bayesian Network-approach).
9.2.2 The consequences of a decision
C is the set of possible consequences the investigator needs to take into consid-
eration during the assessment of the bitemark-problem. A decision to choose
this or that particular evidential value for a bitemark may either be correct
— which realizes the intended aims, or it may be wrong — which does not
realize the intended aims, but something else. I have several times described
the content of the most important consequences of crime-investigative deci-
sions. The consequences of the bitemark-problem will be further specified
below and in the next chapter. The basic preference-structure among conse-
quences of decisions in general as well as their relation to the events specified
for a decision-problem will be returned to below.
9.2.3 The options available to the crime-investigator
A is the set of actions or decision-options available to the decision-maker. In
the bitemark-problem the investigator is to decide about the evidential value
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of a bitemark-means: In principle a bitemark-means may have any evidential
value relative to a given indictment. In practice it is finite and possible simply
dichotomous, deciding either that the bitemark-means is positively relevant
or not positively relevant. Any possible decision is in principle available to
the investigator in any bitemark-problem and are the problem-particular set
of decision-options generally denoted by A. The particular content of the
options in the bitemark-problem will be specified later.
A human decision to do something will be seen as an act which intervenes
in the world and causes it to change. A human act will be seen as an option,
denoted by a, being a function which links events to consequences — a linking
of a partition of Ω, {Ej, j ∈ J}, to a corresponding set of consequences {cj,
j ∈ J}. An event Ej which leads to consequence cj will be denoted by
{cj | Ej}; and a problem with k possible options linking Ej and cj will be
denoted by ak = {cj | Ej}.
9.2.4 A qualitative ranking of Options and events
The fourth basic element of the decision-problem is the relation ≤ between
pairs of options in A. ≤ is to be interpreted as an ordering with certain
properties. (a1, a2) ∈ A:
Definition 9.2 (Binary relations)
If a1 is not preferred to a2 this will be expressed as a1 ≤ a2
(i) a1 ∼ a2 ⇐⇒ a1 ≤ a2 and a2 ≤ a1
(ii) a1 < a2 ⇐⇒ a1 ≤ a2 and it is not true that a2 ≤ a1
(iii) a1 ≥ a2 ⇐⇒ a2 ≤ a1
(iv) a1 > a2 ⇐⇒ a2 < a1 (Bernardo and Smith (2000:20))
An individual consequence of an option can be identified as a special case
of options: c = {c | Ω}, for any c ∈ C. c will denote either an element
of C or the element {c | Ω} of A (Bernardo and Smith 2000:20) To save on
notation≤ will also be used to indicate the binary relation between individual
consequences of options: If, and only if, {c1 | Ω} ≤ {c2 | Ω} this will be
written c1 ≤ c2 and say that consequence c1 is not preferred to consequence
c2.
≤ will further (again to economize) be used to define a binary relation on
E × E , the collection of all pairs of relevant events, to capture the notion of
one event being more likely than another .
245
Definition 9.3 (Uncertainty relation)
E ≤ F ⇐⇒ for all c1 < c2, {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E} ≤ {c2 | F, c1 | ¬F};
we then say that E is not more likely than F .(Bernardo and Smith (2000:21))
The implications from Definition 9.2 will be seen to describe uncertainty
relations between events as well.
It is important to stress again that preferences between options (as well as
preferences between consequences and between events) are always considered
conditional on the investigator’s initial state of knowledge and organizational
and institutional values, norms, procedures, and instructions — denoted by
K0. When the investigator opens a new investigation he or she will have
to account for the new information. If G is a new event assumed to have
occurred, preferences between options must be described by a new binary
relation, ≤G, which includes bothK0 and the additional information provided
by G. The relation between ≤ and ≤G is given by the following:
Definition 9.4. (Conditional preference).
For any G > ∅,
(i) a1 ≤G a2 ⇐⇒ for all a {a1 | G, a | ¬G} ≤ {a2 | G, a | ¬G};
(ii) E ≤G F ⇐⇒ for all c1 ≤G c2 {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E} ≤G {c2 | F, c1 | ¬F};
If a1 is not preferred to a2 if G has occurred, then preference carries over
to any pair of options leading, respectively, to a1 or a2 if G occurs and defined
identically if ¬G occurs.
9.3 The decision-theoretical framework —
the axiomatic basis of BNs
To have precise assumptions about the elements of the above qualitative basis
Bernardo and Smith (2000) offer five axioms which will be stated here. They
are to be seen as prescriptive — as what a decision-maker should (and can)
do if it is considered important to achieve certain aims/values. They are thus
not aspiring to describe the ways human beings reason generally.
The first axiom states that the consequences involved in a given decision-
problem should be comparable:
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Axiom 1. (Comparability of consequences and dichotomized
options)
(i) There exist consequences c1, c2 such that c1 < c2.
(ii) For all consequences c1, c2, and events E, F ,
either {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E} ≤ {c2 | F, c1 | ¬F}
or {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E} ≥ {c2 | F, c1 | ¬F}
(Bernardo and Smith (2000;23)).
This axiom states that the decision-maker having to choose among alter-
native options should be willing to express preference between consequences:
A crime-investigator having to decide whether a bitemark-means is positively
relevant or not to a given indictment must thus be willing to express pref-
erences among the following possible consequences: Having contributed to
(a) convict a guilty person, (b) convict an innocent person, (c) acquit an
innocent person, or (d) acquit a guilty person.
The second axiom states that the preferences among options should be
transitive:
Axiom 2. (Transitivity of preferences)
(i) a ≤ a
(ii) If a1 ≤ a2 and a2 ≤ a3, then a1 ≤ a3
(Bernardo and Smith (2000;24)).
A useful consequence of the above:
Proposition 9.1. (Transitivity of uncertainties)
(i) E ∼ E
(ii) If E1 ≤ E2 and E2 ≤ E3, then E1 ≤ E3
(Bernardo and Smith (2000;25)).
Axiom 2 and Proposition 9.1 state that a decision-maker following it
would ensure coherency concerning his/her preferences among options and
events. The message of Axiom 2 seems obvious, but staying true to it during
practical case-work is not easy. The events as well as concerns are numer-
ous and complexly inter-acting, and new more or less relevant events and
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concerns will interfere: Confusion and temptation are constant challenges
to any individual’s ability to stay transitive. Anyone having tried to lose
weight or quit smoking (or write a Ph.D.) knows clearly what it takes, yet
knows too how difficult it is in practice. Embodying this axiom or rather
this epistemological norm in the methodology may thus assist the individual
decision-maker trying to achieve certain aims/values.
A third axiom concerns the consistency among the preferences:
Axiom 3. (consistency of preferences)
(i) If c1 ≤ c2 then, for all G > ∅, c1 ≤G c2.
(ii) If , for some c1 < c2, (c2 | E, c1 | ¬E) ≤ (c2 | F, c1 | ¬F ), then E ≤ F .
(iii) If, for some c and G > ∅, (a1 | G, c | ¬G) ≤ (a2 | G, c | ¬G), then a1 ≤G a2
(Bernardo and smith (2000:27))
This axiom states that preferences between pure consequences should
only be dependent on the ”relative likelihood” of E and F and not on the
particular consequences used to construct the options. One important im-
plication of Axiom 3 is that preferences between consequences are invariant
under changes of the origin of information on the events of the problem:
Proposition 9.2. (Invariance of preferences between
consequences)
c1 ≤ c2 if and only if there exist G > ∅ such that c1 ≤G c2
(Bernardo and Smith (2000:27)).
A second implication of Axiom 3 is that the uncertainty ordering of events
respect logical implications:
Proposition 9.3. (Monotonicity)
If E ⊆ F then E ≤ F
(Bernardo and Smith (2000:27))
That we are able to say that if E logically implies F , then F cannot
be considered less likely than E, will be a key property in the next chap-
ter’s effort to solve the crime-investigator’s problem of deciding about the
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evidential value of a bitemark. This logical relationship is, for some of the
connections in the decision-problem modelled, the only means by which to
elicit independence structures.
We may also already now exploit this relationship between logic and
uncertainty-orderings to define what it will mean to have pairwise indepen-
dence of events:
Definition 9.5 (Pairwise independence of events).
E and F are (pairwise) independent, denoted E ⊥ F , if, and only if, for all c, c1, c2
(i) c • {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E} ⇒ c •F {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E},
(ii) c • {c2 | F, c1 | ¬F} ⇒ c •E {c2 | F, c1 | ¬F},
where • is any one of the relations <, ∼ or >
(Bernardo and Smith 2000:28).
The suggestion that the investigator should ensure that the preference
and uncertainty relations between consequences and events adhere to the
above axioms are a suggestion to adhere to a set of epistemological norms: If
the investigator adhere to these norms he/she will be coherent or consistent
given the context K0 and the particular decision-problem during the assess-
ment and the decision to choose this or that option as the solution to the
decision-problem. The normative aspect of these properties needs perhaps
some stressing. They are not descriptions of actual human reasoning. They
might have been descriptive because humans certainly can reason according
to these rules and will also do so if problems are sufficiently transparent.
But we may not expect humans to reason according to the axioms when
the problems become more complex. To ensure predictable achievement of
aims/values across individual decision-makers and cases one may embed these
norms in the inference-procedures of problem solving.
Under the methodology of BNs, all the order-relations between the con-
sequences and events of a decision-problem will be seen to be personal: This
will mean that the decision-maker is free to express his/her own preference
and uncertainty structure given the conditions imposed by the context K0.
This subjectivity is less radical than it seems: It will be presumed that
(a) an investigator is normally equipped with logical, emotional, and social
intelligence; (b) he/she actually do oblige by the organizational and institu-
tional norms and instructions of the context in which these assignments are
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performed and which are specified in K0; (c) the content of the propositions
involved should be interpreted as elements of a finite space of possibilities; (d)
the all the relevant events and consequences given K0 and the new particular
problem is identified and specified and that only these will be considered
during the analysis; and (e) that the investigator’s orderings should have
the coherency-properties of the axioms above. These presumptions ensure
inter-subjectivity and are simply not compatible with the kind and degree
of disintegration sometimes claimed to be the result of allowing personal
judgements of probability.
It is not difficult to see how frequency- or model-based uncertainty-
assignments have something extra which makes at least me have more confi-
dence in them — namely the actual ability to repeatedly test, and indepen-
dently so, any claim of association under known conditions. The number of
times you experience two characteristics occurring together will increase your
degree of confidence that there is some kind of association between these two
characteristics. This will never be denied by Bayesians. But there are situ-
ations in which repeated trials are not possible — like for the claims about
associations made by a crime-investigator or a medical diagnostician. The
question is how confidence can be established for claims in these situations
as well. The traditional solution is personal authority: A claim is trustable
if is made by a person appropriately trained and/or experienced. This so-
lution is still practiced for more or less good reasons, but I have already
argued why other solutions should be sought for public decisions. To sug-
gest the methodology of BNs to the decision-maker of public decisions is to
suggest that certain necessary confidence-installing aspects of the traditional
scientific methodologies can and should be required: The crime-investigator
cannot repeat trials to test his/her hypotheses, but he/she can still aspire the
epistemological norms presumed for such repeated trials and implement these
by adhering to known rules of logic — by adhering to the axioms identified
above.
The above norms are then the basic necessary elements of this disserta-
tion’s concept of evidence-basis, and are the norms I suggest can and should
be respected during crime-investigative assessments about the value of means
of evidence. In the next section I introduce certain heuristics which may be
exploited if one accepts and respects the above axioms and their epistemo-
logical purpose.
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9.4 Managing uncertainty and value of con-
sequences within BNs: Probability and
Utility
Bernardo and Smith (2000:29) argue that there is an analogy between ≤
and a number of qualitative relations used in everyday language — such as
hotter than, heavier than, not hotter than, and not heavier than, more prob-
able than, not more probable than, etc. These relations exist in any social
language and can well be communicated without numbers attached. Yet, we
will usually have no problems attaching standard numeric scales to express
more precisely how much more (or less) hot, heavy, or probable something
is compared to another something. Any such quantification presumes the
existence of a coherent qualitative ordering relation as specified in the above
subsection.
Bernardo and Smith (2000) argue further that it is possible to have a
standard option having close links to more familiar numerical scales such as
kilogram and metre and which may play an analogous role to these. The first
step is to assume the following about the algebra E :
Axiom 4. (Existence of standard events).
There exists a subalgebra S of E and a function µ : S → [0, 1] such that:
(i) S1 ≤ S2 if, and only if, µ(S1) ≤ µ(S2);
(ii) S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ implies that µ(S1 ∪ S2) = µ(S1) + µ(S2);
(iii) for any number α in [0, 1], and events E, F , there is a standard event S such
that µ(S) = α, E ⊥ S and F ⊥ S;
(iv) S1 ⊥ S2 implies that µ(S1 ∩ S2) = µ(S1)µ(S2).
(v) if E ⊥ S, F ⊥ S and E ⊥ F , then E ∼ S ⇒ E ∼F S (Bernardo and Smith
(2000:29)).
Collections of disjoint standard events are then proposed to be as follows:
Proposition 9.4. (Collections of disjoint standard events). For any
finite collection {α1, . . . , αn} of real numbers such that αi > 0 and α1+ . . .+αn ≤ 1
there exists a corresponding collection {S1, . . . , Sn} of disjoint standard events such
that µ(Si) = αi, i = 1, . . . , n (Bernardo and Smith (2000:31)).
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And the last axiom required concerns the precise measurements of pref-
erences and uncertainties:
Axiom 5. (Precise measurement of preferences and uncertain-
ties).
(i) If c1 ≤ c ≤ c2, there exists a standard event S such that c ∼ {c2 | S, c1 | ¬S}.
(ii) For each event E, there exists a standard event S such that E ∼ S (Bernardo
and Smith (2000:31)). .
1. Formal definitions of degrees of belief and degrees of want
A crime-investigator’s choice among the options of the decision-problem in
this dissertation — deciding whether or not a bitemark-means is positively
relevant to a given indictment — should be determined by both (a) the un-
certainties attached to the events relevant to the bitemark-problem and (b)
the possible consequences of deciding correctly or incorrectly with respect to
the aims/values intended by the decision. In this subsection I will first pro-
vide a formal definition of degrees of beliefs, providing a numerical measure
of the uncertainty associated with the occurrence of events. Secondly, I will
provide a formal definition of degrees of want, providing a numerical measure
of the value associated with the possible consequences. By these heuristics
the crime-investigator may assess the relative probability of all the possible
consequences in a given decision-problem: The probability of correctly decid-
ing the bitemark-means to be positively relevant or not and the probability
or risk of incorrectly deciding so.
a.) belief and probability
Bernardo and Smith (2000) establish some basic results concerning the uncer-
tainty relation between events. As a consequence of Axiom 5 the uncertainty
relation between events is complete;
Proposition 9.5. (Complete comparability of events).
Either E1 > E2, or E1 ∼ E2, or E2 > E1 (Bernardo and Smith 2000:33); and
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Proposition 9.6. (Additivity of uncertainty relations).
If A ≤ B, C ≤ D, and A∩C = B ∩D = ∅, then A∪C ≤ B ∪D. Moreover, if A < B or
C < D, then A ∪ C < B ∪D (Bernardo and Smith 2000:34).
Then Bernardo and Smith (2000) offer a definition of a quantitative mea-
sure of degree of belief:
Definition 9.6. (Measure of degree of belief ).
Given an uncertainty relation ≤, the probability P (E) of an event E is the real number
µ(S) associated with any standard event S such that E ∼ S (Bernardo and Smith
2000:33).
These probabilities are, as said, interpreted as personal degrees of be-
lief, numerical representations of the decision-maker’s personal uncertainty
relation ≤ between events given K0.
Proposition 9.7. (Existence of uniqueness).
Given an uncertainty relation ≤ there exists a unique probability P (E) associated with
each event E.
Proposition 9.8. (Compatibility).
A function f : E → < is said to be compatible with an order relation ≤ on E × E if, for
all events,
E ≤ F ⇐⇒ f(E) ≤ f(F )
Proposition 9.9. (Compatibility of probability and degrees of
belief ).
The probability function P (.) is compatible with the uncertainty relation ≤
The following proposition is argued by Bernardo and Smith (2000:35) to
be of fundamental importance as it states that coherent, quantitative degrees
of belief have the structure of a finite additive probability measure over E :
253
Proposition 9.10. (Probability structure of degrees of belief ).
P (∅) = 0 and P (Ω) = 1.
If E ∩ F = ∅, then P (E ∪ F ) = P (E) + P (F ).
E is significant if and only if 0 < P (E) < 1.1
Corollary. (Finitely additive structure of degrees of belief ).








(ii) For any event E, P (¬E) = 1− P (E).
Bernardo and Smith (2000) suggest the above to be the justification why
formally coherent, quantitative measures of uncertainty must take the form
of probabilities. Throughout the rest of this dissertation I will assume this
justification to hold: Whenever I use the term of probability I include coher-
ent degrees of belief.
Bernardo and Smith (2000) offer the further definitions and propositions
of general probability calculus relevant for the kind of inferences which will
be needed later in this dissertation:
Definition 9.7. (Probability distribution).
If {Ej , j ∈ J} form a finite partition of Ω, with P (Ej) = pj , j ∈ J , then {pj , j ∈ J} is said
to be a probability distribution over the partition (Bernardo and Smith (2000:36)).
This means that the total belief (Ω being 1) is distributed among the
events of the partition, {Ej, j ∈ J}, according to the relative degrees of
belief {pj, j ∈ J }, with ∑j P (Ej) = 1 (Bernardo and Smith (2000:37)).
Pairwise independence of events was above defined (Definition 9.6.) in
terms of ≤ and denoted by ⊥. This is argued to be compatible with the
standard calculus definition:
1Significant events are events which are practically possible but not certain: An event is
significant given G > ∅ if c1 <G c2 implies that c :1<G {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E} <G c2. If G = Ω,
E will be said to be is significant; Proposition: An event E is significant given G > ∅,
if and only if ∅ < E ∩ G < G. In particular, E is significant if and only if ∅ < E < Ω.
(Bernardo and Smith 2000: 27)
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Proposition 9.11. (Characterization of independence).
E⊥F ⇐⇒ P (E ∩ F ) = P (E)P (F )
(Bernardo and Smith (2000:37)).
To assess the relevance of multitude of simpler events relevant to the
complex event expressed by a bitemark-means the investigator may exploit
the rule of conditional probability as defined in standard probability calculus:
If the conditional beliefs are such that E ≤G F ⇐⇒ E ∩G ≤ F ∩G and
if there exist c1 < c2 such that {c2 | E, c1 | ¬E} ≤G {c2 | F, c1 | ¬F} and
if P (E | G) provides a quantitative measure of the uncertainty attached to
E given the assumed occurrence of G (and K0), then a question about the
relevance between E and G can be assessed in the terms of the following rule:
Proposition 9.12. (Conditional probability).
For any G > ∅
P (E | G) = P (E ∩G)
P (G)
,
(Bernardo and Smith (2000:39))
where it is claimed that E ≤G F ⇐⇒ P (E | G) ≤ P (F | G).
Then Proposition 9.11 can then be extended to degrees of belief condi-
tional on the assumed occurrence of significant events:
Proposition 9.13. (Probability structure of conditional degrees
of belief ).
For any event G > ∅
(i) P (∅ | G) = 0 ≤ P (E | G) ≤ P (Ω | G) = 1;
(ii) if E ∩ F ∩G = ∅, then P (E ∪ F | G) = P (E | G) + P (F | G);
(iii) E is significant given G ⇐⇒ 0 < P (E | G) < 1 (Bernardo and Smith
(2000:40)).
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Corollary. (Finitely additive structure of conditional degrees of
beliefs).
For all G > ∅,




Ej | G) =
∑
j∈J
P (Ej | G);
(ii) for any event E, P (¬E | G) = 1− P (E | G) (Bernardo and Smith (2000:40)).
The graph-theoretical component of BNs, which will be explicated in the
next section, will particularly make use of a special case of Proposition 9.12.
First:
Proposition 9.14.
For all F > ∅, E⊥F ⇐⇒ P (E | F ) = P (E).
In the case of three events, E, F , and G, we would regard the degree of
belief about E as being independent of knowledge of F and G if and only if
P (E | H) = P (E), for any of the four possibilities for H:
{F ∩G,F ∩ ¬G,¬F ∩G,¬F ∩ ¬G}
Bernardo and Smith (2000:46) suggest the following definition for mutual
independence to capture the above perception:
Definition 9.8. (Mutual independence)








And they suggest the following definition for conditional independence
(Bernardo and Smith 2000:47)
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Definition 9.9. (Conditional independence)
The events {Ej , j ∈ J} are said to be conditionally independent given G > ∅ if, for any




Ei | G) =
∏
i∈I
P (Ei | G).
For any subalgebra F of E , the events {Ej , j ∈ J} are said to be conditionally independent
given F if and only if they are conditionally independent given any G > ∅ in F .
If coherent degrees of belief combine according to the rules of finitely addi-
tive mathematical probability, then the definition above can greatly simplify
the specification of subgroups of events within a complex decision-problem.
Such simplification will be of great help for the particular decision-problem
studied in this dissertation and will constitute a central element of the justifi-
cation why BNs can function to evidence-base crime-investigative decisions.
I find it important to stress that the numerical results may only be used
to indicate a relationship between two events — that these are considered
relevant to each other — and to indicate the strength of that relationship.
So far the definitions have not said anything about the order of the relevant
events. In practical inference problems, we usually think in terms of ordered
relationships: Either causal relationships (where one event is perceived as
the cause of the other event, the effect) or class-relationships (where one
class of things is seen to belong to another more general class of things).
This perceived order will indeed be expressed simply by the way we con-
strue the rule, when we ask for P (E | G) rather than P (G | E), but this
alone provides no justification for a specific causal or logical order. Neverthe-
less, the rule and the suggestion of a certain order may be used heuristically
to discriminate between hypotheses as possible causes or host-classes of ob-
served effects or subclasses: Either when asking about the probability of
observing a certain set of effects/sub-classes conditional on an assumed and
specified probability/density function (believed to account for a suggested re-
lationship causal/class-membership) or when asking about the probabilities
of alternative causes/classes conditional on a certain specified set of observed
effects/sub-classes. For the latter analytical purpose it is common to use a
rule derived from the above rule of conditional probability, namely Bayes’
rule:
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Proposition 9.15. (Bayes’ theorem).
For any finite partition {Ej , j ∈ J} of Ω and G > ∅
P (Ei | G) = P (G | Ei)P (Ei)∑
j∈J P (G | Ej)P (Ej)
.
In crime-investigation, where the typical question is about the probability
of a particular cause of a particular observed event, the rule of conditional
probability may be used to calculate the effect of having observed a set of
particular simpler events believed or assumed to be relevant. Denoting the
event of the causal proposition by Hj {j = 1, 2} (for hypothesis event having
occurred (value 1) or not (value 2)) and the set of observed simpler events
as El {l = 1, . . . n} (for n separate sets of information or evidence), the rule
of conditional probability could be specified as follows:
P (H1 | El, K0) = P (El | H1, K0)P (H1 | K0){P (El | H1, K0)P (H1 | K0)}+ {P (El | H2, K0)P (H2 | K0)} .
Definition 9.10. (Prior, posterior and predictive probabilities)
If {Hi, i ∈ I} are mutually exclusive and exhaustive events (hypotheses), then for any
event (information), E,
(i) P (Hi), i ∈ I (conditioned by K0), are called the prior probabilities of the
Hi, i ∈ I;
(ii) P (E | Hi), i ∈ I are called the likelihoods of the Hi, i ∈ I, given D;
(iii) P (Hi | E), i ∈ I are called the posterior probabilities of the Hi, i ∈ I;
(iv) P (E) are called the predictive probability of E implied by the likelihoods
and the prior probabilities.
b.) Consequences and utilities
As said, a crime-investigator’s choice among the options of the decision-
problem in this dissertation — deciding whether or not a bitemark-means is
positively relevant to a given indictment — should be determined by both
(a) the uncertainties attached to the events relevant to the bitemark-problem
and (b) the possible consequences of deciding correctly or incorrectly with
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respect to the aims/values intended by the decision. Above I have provided
the formal definition of degrees of beliefs and a numerical measure of the
uncertainty associated with the occurrence of events. Now I will provide a
formal definition of degrees of want, providing a numerical measure of the
value associated with the possible consequences.
Via the measurement framework defined by Bernardo and Smith (2000)’s
Axiom 5(i) above, it is also possible to have a direct way of introducing a
numerical measure of the value of consequences, so that the consequences
can be accounted for in a coherent manner. Bernardo and Smith (2000:49)
first characterizes extreme consequences by the following definition:
Definition 9.11. (Extreme consequences).
The pair of consequences c∗ and c∗ are called, respectively, the
worst and the best consequences in a decision-problem if, for any other
consequence c ∈ C, c∗ ≤ c ≤ c∗(Bernardo and Smith (2000: 49).
The consequences in the crime-investigative context and, by extension,
the legal context are in the form of persons’ legal rights, resources available
to other cases, and general legal and a-legal values and principles. Is it
possible to say that extreme consequences exist here? Can one in a given
case say that c∗ is the worst possible loss of rights, values, and resources,
which according to Definition 9.11 would imply that c∗ plus some additional
loss is not possible? This value would be difficult to specify in given cases, but
in practice and across similar cases one does operate with extreme values. In
this dissertation I will thus, heuristically, assume that extreme consequences
exist and that the decision-problem of this dissertation — of deciding about
the relevance of a bitemark-means — can be seen as a bounded one according
to Bernardo and Smith (2000: 50), for which a canonical utility function for
consequences can be defined:
Definition 9.12. (Canonical utility function for consequences).
Given a preference relation ≤ , the utility u(c) = u(c | c∗, c∗) of a
consequence c, relative to the extreme consequences c∗ < c∗, is the real
number µ(S) associated with any standard event S such that c ∼ {c∗ |
S, c∗ | ¬S}. The mapping of u : C → < is called the utility function
(Bernardo and Smith 2000:50).
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A proposition that the utility of a consequence is uniquely defined and
remains unchanged by the arrival of new information is justified, Bernardo
and Smith (2000) holds, by definition of utility involving comparison among
consequences and options constructed with standard events:
Proposition 9.16. (Existence and uniqueness of bounded utility).
For any bounded decision-problem(E , C, A, ≤) with extreme conse-
quences c∗ < c∗,
(i) for all c, u(c | c∗, c∗) exists and is unique;
(ii) the value of u(c | c∗, c∗) is unaffected by the assumed occurrence
of an event G > ∅;
(iii) 0 = u(c∗ | c∗, c∗) ≤ u(c | c∗, c∗) ≤ u(c∗ | c∗, c∗) = 1 (Bernardo and
Smith 2000:50).
Bernardo and Smith (2000) note that u(c | c∗, c∗) can be given an oper-
ational definition in terms of degrees of belief: If there is a choice between
the fixed consequence c and the option {c∗ | E, c∗ | ¬E}, for some event E,
then the utility of c can be thought of as defining a threshold value for the
degree of belief in E, in the sense that values greater than u would lead the
individual to prefer the uncertain option, whereas values less than u would
lead an individual to prefer c for certain. The value of u itself corresponds
to the indifference between the two options and is the degree of belief in
the occurrence of the best rather than the worst consequence (Bernardo and
Smith 2000: 51).
This ends the explication of how the values attached to the consequences
involved in a decision-problem can have a numerical measure, a utility.
But, as said at the start of this section, a crime-investigator’s preferences
among options of the decision-problem in this dissertation should be deter-
mined by both the uncertainties attached to the events decided relevant for
the problem and the consequences to the relevant individual legal rights,
collective institutional values, and resources. How can one attach an overall
numerical measure of value to an option? This question remains to be an-
swered before I can end this section on the quantitative aspects of the BNs.
Bernardo and Smith (2000) suggest the following definition:
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Definition 9.13. (Conditional expected utility).
For any c∗ < c∗, G > ∅, and a ≡ {cj | Ej , j ∈ J},
u(a | c∗, c∗, G) =
∑
j∈J
u(a | c∗, c∗)P (Ej | G)
is the expected utility of the option a given G , with respect to the
extreme consequences c∗, c∗. IfG = Ω, we shall simply write u(a | c∗, c∗)
in place of u(a | c∗, c∗,Ω) (Bernardo and Smith 2000: 51).
A decision-criterion for bounded decision-problems follows from the as-
sumptions, definitions, and propositions given in the above two sections:
Proposition 9.17. (Decision criterion for a bounded problem).
For any bounded decision with extreme consequences c∗ < c∗ and
G > ∅,
a1 ≤G a2 ↔ u(a1 | c∗, c∗, G) ≤ u(a2 | c∗, c∗, G)
(Bernardo and Smith 2000: 51).
Bernardo and Smith (2000:52) stresses that Proposition 9.17 only estab-
lishes a complete ordering of the options considered and will not guarantee
the existence of an optimal option for which the expected utility is a maxi-
mum. However, they say, in most practical decision-problems the set of op-
tions considered will be finite and so a best option (not necessarily unique)
will exist. This is also believed to be the case for the crime-investigative
decision-problem of this dissertation.
This ends the formal explication of the Bayesian epistemological norms for
coherent quantitative comparisons of alternative (bounded) decisions. This
framework is one of the two components involved in the analytical strategy of
the BNswhich I recommend to the crime-investigator who needs to assess and
decide about the relevance of a bitemark-means. I will hold that it is alone
constitutes a sufficient justification for the claim that BNs has evidence-
basing power. The second component involved in BNs, the graph theoretical
component, will be introduced in the next section. This component is, I hold,
not strictly necessary but explicates and thus corroborates the justification
of the analyst’s structuring of the decision-problem according to logical and
causal relationships.
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9.5 The graph-theoretical component of BNs
Graph-theory is a branch of combinatoric with applications in a host of
disciplines such as anthropology, computer science, chemistry, psychology,
telecommunication, and traffic-management, etc. Its basic language is the
same as that of the decision-theoretical framework above: The content of
ordinary language propositions about the world is interpreted to be events
being elements of algebras in which the elements are related but not necessar-
ily according to a specific order. Thus any kind of relationship between any
kind of object is possible: People or animals contacting through verbal/non-
verbal communication or physical and mental entities, events, or mechanisms
contacting through causality, regular conjunction, or logic.
Following Buckley and Lewinter (2003: 47-48), a graph G is a formal
representation of a given relationship-problem and consists of two sets: A
nonempty finite set V of vertices or nodes represents the objects and a
finite set E of edges constitutes unordered pairs of distinct nodes from V ,
signifying dependency relationships. If V = v1, v2, . . . , vn is a set of n nodes,
the edge set E = e1, e2, . . . , em consists of m two-element subsets of V —
each edge being on the form vi, vj, but written vi, vj to denote the edge.
In this dissertation the problem of the decision-maker — the crime-
investigator — is to assess the effect of a given set of reported observations
on the certainty of given hypotheses about uncertain events, for the purpose
of optimizing the outcome with respect to given statements about conse-
quences. In terms of graph theory, the objects and relationship of interest in
this decision-problem are propositions, or the events claimed by these, and
their logical and causal relationships.
The logical and causal nature of this problem restricts the kind of graphs
relevant to so-called Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), where the edges are
added arrowheads to signify the direction of the believed logical implication
or causal influence. A DAG is thus a formal representation of the logical
or causal connections between propositions identifying certain entities with
specified characteristics. The only constraint of DAGs is that you may not
directly represent recursive relationships — any specified sequence of con-
nected nodes must be acyclic. A DAG may thus be used to model a given
inference problem when the need is to estimate the certainty of hypotheses in
light of evidence but where there is a risk of bias due to complex conditioning
and/or — in the case of a recurring problem — changing decision-makers.
A DAG D consist of set of a finite nonempty set of nodes V (D) together
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with a set of ordered pairs of distinct nodes called arcs. When talking about
the relationships in DAGs it is customary to use family relations: If there is
a directed edge from A to B, A will be called a parent of B and B a child of
A. Any node may thus have ascendants and descendants. A node without
ascendants will be called a root node and a node without descendants will
be called an end node. An arc AB goes from A to B and A is said to be
adjacent to B while B is said to be adjacent from A — to signify one-
way traffic only (Buckley and Lewinter 2003: 261-265). A DAG will have
certain connectivity-properties providing three basic reasoning rules which
may be exploited when accounting for uncertainty in given complex inference
problems:
An inference problem may contain events connected serially, where, say,
A is known to affect or imply B, which in turn is known to affect or imply
C.
A B C 
Figure 9.1: A serial connection.
If we receive evidence that A is in one of its possible states, this will
change the certainty of B — which in turn will change the certainty of C.
Similarly, were we to receive evidence that C is in one of its states, then this
will change the certainty of B which in turn will change the certainty of A.
But if we receive evidence that B is in one of its states, being instantiated,
then any knowledge of A would not matter for the certainty of C — the
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channel becomes blocked. Knowledge about B thus makes A independent of
C, or, in graph-theoretical terms, A and C are d-separated given B.
Proposition 9.18. (Justification by serial connection).
Justification may be transmitted through a serial connection unless
the state of the event in the connection is known.2
2Jensen 2001:6, slightly reformulated.
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A second kind of connection between events is the diverging kind, where
A alone influences or implies two or more other events B, C, . . .E:
A B 
C 
Figure 9.2: A diverging connection.
If we do not know the state of A, then influence may pass between A’s
children; if A is known, then the channel between the children is blocked. In
graph-theoretical terms: Evidence may be transmitted through a diverging
connection unless the parent is instantiated — then the children become
d-separated.
Proposition 9.19. (Justification by diverging connection).
Justification may be transmitted through a diverging connection
unless the state of the parent-node in the connection is known or evi-
denced.3
The third kind of connection between variables is the converging kind,
where one child has several parents:
If nothing is known about the child, except what is known about its
parents, then the parents are d-separated. In this case, receiving knowledge




Figure 9.3: A converging connection.
about one parent does not tell you anything about the state of any of the
other parents. But if you receive evidence on the state of the child from other
sources than the parents, then the parents become d-connected: Information
on the child opens up the channel between the parents; information on the
child affecting the certainty of a parent also tells about the certainty about
the other parents.
Proposition 9.20. (Justification by converging connection).
Justification may only be transmitted through a converging con-
nection if either the child-node or one of its descendants has received
evidence.4
The three rules above cover all the ways in which justification, effect, or
evidence may be transmitted in a causal network. If adhering to these, the
analyst is enabled to decide for any pair of nodes whether they are dependent
or not given information on any of them. The following definition of d-
separation will apply:
4Jensen 2001:8, slightly reformulated.
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Definition 9.14. (d-separation).
Two variables [events] A and B in a causal [or logical] network are
d-separated if for all paths between A and B there is an intermediate
variable [event] V such that either
— the connection is serial or diverging and the state of V is known or
— the connection is converging and neither V nor any of its descen-
dants have received evidence.
If A and B are not d-separated we call them d-connected. Jensen
2001: 10).
A DAG may thus model the causal impact between the events of these
propositions — in a given inference problem. The statement in the model
will be:
The event A causes with certainty x the event B.
Our reasoning is:
If we know that A occurred, then B occurred with certainty
x
This coincides with the reasoning of a crime-investigator in the later
stages of an investigation of a particular case: He/she knows that the prosecu-
tor will only bring an indictment to court if all the necessary legal conditions
are provable beyond a specified probability by the evidence. The investiga-
tor must deduce the implications down to the observations of lay or expert
witnesses:
If the [indictment] is true then this implies that the [means of evidence]
must be true, which in turn implies that [event1] must be true, which in turn
implies that . . . [eventi+1] must be true.
This deduction of implications was informally done with respect to the
bitemark-theme of the Torgersen-case in the chapters 4, and 5. A DAG over
this inference problem would look much like the figures at in those chapters.
But this deductive explication of logical implication is of course not sufficient
as it only tells the investigator that the certainty of an assumed implication-
proposition depends on the certainty of its premise-proposition in a specific
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way. What is needed is a way to assess how the certainty of an implication
can inform about the certainty of a suggested premise given the suggested
specification of a logical relationship — because the assumed implications
of a main premise (which has already happened) are the only components
the investigator can more directly assess the certainty of. In a DAG the
inversion of the relationship between premise-node and its implication-node is
done by using Bayes’ Rule on the probabilistic relationship between variables
representing the events hosted by the nodes. Bayes Rule was specified above
as was the other consequences of probability calculus which is exploited in a
DAG-representation of a decision-problem.
Using the formulation chosen by Jensen (2001) a definition of Bayesian
Networks can be given:
Definition 9.15. (Bayesian Network).
A Bayesian Network consists of the following:
— A set of variables and a set of directed edges between variables.
— Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states.
— The variables together with the directed edges form a directed
acyclic graph (DAG). (A directed graph is acyclic if there is no
directed path A1 → · · · → Ans.t.A1 = An.)
— To each variable A with parents B1, . . . , Bn, there is attached the
potential table P (A | B1 . . . Bn). (Jensen 2001:19-20)
As said in the section on inference-problems as decision-problems, the for-
mer may be said to contain a universe of events, U = E1 . . . En. The degrees
of belief we have in the occurrence of these events may be represented by prob-
ability. If we have access to the joint probability table P (U) = P (E1, . . . , En),
we may calculate both P (Ei) as well as P (Ei | G), where G is relevant
events or observations. But as the table for P (U) grows exponentially with
the number of events it will not take many before calculation becomes un-
manageable. This is where the connectivity-properties of a DAG, expressed
above in terms of the three reasoning rules, come in to assist the analyst:
By exploiting the conditional independences believed/suggested to exist be-
tween the events of an inference problem, a Bayesian Network is said to offer
a compact representation of P (U), where P (U) may be calculated from the
different probability-tables specified in the network:
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Definition 9.16. (The chain rule for Bayesian Networks)
Let BN be a Bayesian network over U = A1, . . . , An. Then, the





P (Ai | pa(Ai)),
where pa(Ai) is the parent set of Ai. (Jensen 2001:21)
As we see, the chain rule of Bayesian Networks expresses the same as that
of the definition 9.9 above, of conditional independence. The above prop-
erty, called the chain rule, constitutes a fundamental property of Bayesian
Networks and is in the literature referred to as the Markov property of an
inference problem:
Definition 9.17. (The Markov property)
A DAG with a joint probability distribution P(.) over its variables
is a Bayesian Network if and only if
• for every variable A in the DAG, and every set B of variables such
that it does not include the set of descendants of A, A is said to be
conditionally independent from B given the set of parent variables
of A:
P (A | B, pa(A)) = P (A | pa(A))
(Taroni et al. (2006:51)).
This ends the presentation of the graph-theoretical component of the
methodology of BNs. This component is a corroborating heuristic, not epis-
temologically necessary for simpler problems like the one of this dissertation,
but invaluable when the number of events becomes larger and/or when the
there is a particular need to justify the model chosen for a given problem.
Together with the Bayesian Theoretical norms of coherency and the heuris-
tics enabling quantification of degrees of beliefs and wants it makes the BNs
a possible methodology or inference-procedure by which crime-investigative
decisions about means of evidence can become evidence-based.
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9.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented the epistemological norms and terms of the
methodology of BNs. The norms, expressed by the three axioms in section 2,
are anchored in specified rules of logic — rules well agreed to serve a decision-
maker needing to achieve certain consequences while avoiding certain others.
Adherence to these norms and their underlying logical rules is the basic
necessary requirement for the formulation of precise/unambiguous reference-
groups and -terms and is therefore a fundamental normative element of the
standard of evidence-basis specified in Premise 1 in the first chapter of this
dissertation. The quantification of degrees of beliefs and preferences, and the
provision of the numerical measures for expressing these, are heuristics —
analytically useful instruments compatible with these norms.
In the next chapters I will use BNs to model the crime-investigative
problem of deciding about the relevance of a bitemark-means with respect





in the terms of Bayesian
Theory
In this and the next two chapters I will use BNs to construct an evidence-
basing decision-procedure to the crime investigator with a particular kind of
bitemark-problem. In this chapter I will, first, specify a particular kind of
bitemark-problem in the terms of BNs; then derive the general likelihood-
ratio of such bitemark problems; and thirdly, suggest this ratio as the in-
strument by which the investigator may assess the basic evidential value of
bitemark-means when having a bitemark-situation similar to the one mod-
elled.
10.1 The bitemark-problem
Recall that I in this dissertation only attend to the problems directly rele-
vant to the crime investigator in the investigative phase of the criminal case
process — when he/she analyses and decides on the positive claims involved
in case-specific means of evidence, aiming truth and certainty for these de-
cisions, in terms of highest possible accuracy, unambiguity, objectivity, and
impartiality. This positive analysis will be conditioned by the general ethical
norms and legal codes specified for crime investigation and means of evidence,
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but it will not be conditioned by what is case-specifically good and right —
the crime investigator does not have to aspire that the analyses should be
consensus-creating or conflict-reducing.
The decisions-maker of the bitemark-problem is thus the crime investiga-
tor. He or she is in the latter stages of the crime-investigative phase of a given
crime-case: A victim, the legal injuries, and a suspect have been identified;
most of the information has been detected and collected; and one or more
legal indictments — claims about individuals, objects, actions, and relation-
ships formulated in legal terms — have been identified. The typical problem
of the investigator in this phase is to assess the various means of evidence —
claims implied if the legal indictment is true — and determine whether these
means are positively relevant to the indictment(s) to the degree required by
law. I will attend to a particular subgroup of such decision-problems:
• The decision whether or not a suspected bitemark observed on the skin
of the victim was caused by an identified suspect simultaneously with
the legally relevant injuries in the case.
In the following I will specify this bitemark-problem in the formal terms
of BNs.
10.1.1 The context
The crime-investigator is thus only to attend to the positive aspects — the
physical as well as the motivational possibilities — of the occurrence of the
suspected bitemark: ”If it is a human bitemark, how, why, and when
did it occur here?” The assessment of the motivational possibilities requires
information about the reasoning of the biter and presumes that the physical
possibilities have already been assessed and decided on. In this dissertation
I constrain to the physical — spatial and temporal — positive possibilities
of the bitemark-means.
Bitemarks in crime cases do not occur as often as fingerprints, biological
material, or other traces, but often enough to exhibit considerable variability.
They may be more or less easy to classify on the standard set of markers
used for the different diagnostic purposes: Both weak and severe bitemarks
— made by more or less force or by severe stretching of the skin, made
by mobile teeth or a damaged biting-mechanism — will make it difficult
for the bitemark-experts to agree on the mark-contour of a given bitemark.
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Agreeing on the basic contour is necessary for the expert-decision about
the kind and number of markers necessary for the differentiation between
possible biting-mechanisms. In order not to involve too many uncertainties,
the decision-problem will be constrained to include only a specified subgroup
of bitemarks. Other initial conditions will be fixed as well when searching for
an evidence-based solution to the investigator’s bitemark-means problem.
The investigator’s accumulated knowledge and experience of similar and
different problems and his/her general or case-specific formal or informal
obligations; the assumptions specified in the first chapter of this dissertation;
and the following set of initial conditions will constitute the context of the
decision-maker and his/her problem:
• There is a crime investigator in charge of the investigation of a crime case and
who is at the moment investigating the probable truth of the following indictment-
proposition:
”The identified suspect S = s is the causal agent of the crime act
CA = ca which caused the legally relevant injuries LI = li to the victim
V = v and which occurred at time T = t0 and place PL = pl0.”
This indictment-proposition is less complex than the proposition which will be
referred to as the legal indictment: The former is a causally/logically necessary
consequence of the latter and is simpler in that it does not include the legal terms
necessary for the ultimate decision at the end of the trial phase — the former
only includes the a-legal terms necessary for the crime investigative decision at the
end of the investigative phase about the causal mechanism behind the event under
investigation.
• The investigator is fully informed about the basic non-negotiable aims associated
with crime investigative decisions: He/she must (a) contribute to convict the guilty
or acquit the innocent and must not contribute to convict the innocent or acquit
the guilty; and (b) contribute to secure the resources available to other cases and
not contribute to undermine such resources;
• The crime investigator is formally required to provide evidence-based decisions
about any suspected means of evidence: He/she must explicitly, in a written format,
justify, in terms of the reference-groups and -terms, how and why (a) the means is
positively or not positively relevant and (b) the risk of being wrong about (a) is
sufficiently small. The crime investigator knows that this report is itself a means of
evidence with respect to the claim that the investigation did not undermine any of
the aims and values involved in the criminal case process.
• In addition to the legally relevant injuries (li) identified in the proposition above,
there is a given set of observations of other possible effects of the causal mechanism
behind the event which occurred in the specified T = t0 and PL = pl0. Among
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these observations are two sets of skinmarks on the person legally injured: (1)
There is a skinmark known to be a direct effect of the crime act — from now on li
denotes only this skinmark; and (2) there is a skinmark suspected to be an effect
of acts related to the crime act —- this skinmark will be denoted by CM = cm
(Crime Mark of unknown cause). Both these skinmarks will be assumed to be truly
externally caused skin-injuries;
• The crime mark, cm, belongs to the following subgroup of skinmarks:
1. on the skin of a living or a deceased human being;
2. is classified as 3 or 4 (high forensic significance) on Pretty’s Bitemark Severity
and Significance Scale (Pretty 2007);
3. has no transferred components (no unknown cell-material, fibre, etc.);
• The crime investigator has already decided (evidence-based) that there were only
two human causal agents present at t0 and pl0. In the following I will assume that
this decision is without uncertainty of any kind: The problem is thus assumed to
be a true one-offender problem.
• The crime investigator is at the moment investigating the relevance of the following
proposition with respect to the indictment-proposition above:
”The suspect S = s is the causal agent of cm which is a bitemark
CBM = cbm which occurred at time T = t0 and place PL = pl0.”
This bitemark-proposition is less complex than the proposition of the bitemark-
means: The former is a causally/logically necessary consequence of the latter and
is simpler in that it does not include the legal terms necessary for the ultimate
decision at the end of the trial phase.
• The crime-investigator needs to assess two questions in order to decide about the
relevance between the bitemark-proposition and the indictment-proposition
1. Is s the cause of cm?
2. Was cm made simultaneously with li?
• The crime investigator needs to request diagnostic assistance from a trained and
experienced forensic bitemark-expert with respect to the following questions:
1. ”Is cm a human bitemark (CBM = cbm)?”
2. ”If cm is a human bitemark, is it caused by s’ biting-mechanism SBM =
sbm?”
3. ”If cm is a human bitemark, was cbm caused simultaneously with li?”
• the crime-investigator is responsible that any diagnostic decisions made by any ex-
pert is evidence-based: He/she must ensure that the experts explicitly, in a written
format, justify, in terms of the reference-groups and -terms, why and how each of
these diagnostic decisions is positively relevant or not positively relevant (to the
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investigator’s bitemark-proposition) and why and how the risk of being wrong is
sufficiently small. The crime investigator is responsible that the expert knows that
the expert-report is itself a means of evidence with respect to the claim that the
expert-analyses did not undermine any of the aims and values involved in the crim-
inal case process.
• The objects observed by any expert or investigator exist and are authentic (the
chain of custody will be assume to be perfectly intact, without uncertainty);
• The crime investigation of the bitemark-proposition, including the expert-analyses,
has been performed according to the ethical norms and legal codes/rules/instructions
generally conditioning crime investigation and forensic analyses.
• The experts and the investigators are normally truthful and have normally working
senses and reasoning-faculties (logical, cognitive, and emotional).
This particularly conditioned situation, or context, will be denoted by
K0. Any conclusions arrived at in the remaining sections and chapters of
this dissertation are relevant only for situations representative of the above
situation.
10.1.2 The relevant decision-options of the problem
In general, the outcomes of a bitemark-problem are as follows: Either the
bitemark-proposition is strictly positively relevant; it is strictly negatively
relevant; or it is not relevant to the indictment-proposition. ”Strictly posi-
tively relevant” can be concluded when the expert-information is sufficiently
discriminatory and sufficiently more probable under the bitemark-proposition
than under its negation; ”strictly negatively relevant” can be concluded when
the expert-information is sufficiently discriminatory and sufficiently more
probable under the negation of the bitemark-proposition than under the
bitemark-proposition; and ”not relevant” can be concluded when the expert-
information is not sufficiently discriminatory or not more probable under
the bitemark-proposition than under its negation. Under the K0 specified
above the possible outcomes will be set to be ”strictly positively relevant”
and ”not strictly positively relevant”. There are several ways in which a
bitemark-proposition may be ”not strictly positively relevant”, with sepa-
rate effects on the evidential role of the bitemark in the investigation. I will
return to this later. Now I will just identify the two possible options of the
crime-investigator of my decision-problem:
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ai , i = {1, 0};
a1 denotes the option of deciding that the bitemark-proposition is
strictly positively relevant to the indictment-proposition, and
a0 denotes the option of deciding that the bitemark-proposition is not
strictly positively relevant to the indictment-proposition.
10.1.3 The relevant events of the problem
I have already specified the events of bitemark-proposition and the indictment-
proposition in the list containing the initial conditions of the analysis. There
I also hinted at three logically and immediately necessary consequences of
the bitemark-proposition in the form of questions. In the historical case
discussed in chapter six I elicited the further consequences of these proposi-
tions/questions. In the following I will keep the denotations for these, but
collapse some and abstract the particular identities of that case. The basic
relevant propositions and their events is listed below:1
PC: ”The identified suspect, s, is the causal agent of the crime act which
caused the legally relevant injuries to the victim and which occurred at
time T = t0 and place PL = pl0.”;
BM : ”s, via his/her biting-mechanism SBM = sbm, is the causal agent of
this bitemark (Crime Bite Mark, CBM = cbm) which occurred at time
T = t0 and place PL = pl0.”
BM1: ”sbm is the causal object of cbm”;
BM1.1: ”sbm is observed to have the profile bmi1sbm with respect to BMI1
(the bitemark-index relevant for biting-mechanisms when the bitemark
belongs to the subgroup specified).”;
BM1.2: ”cbm is observed to have profile bmi2cbm with respect to BMI2
(the bitemark-index relevant for suspected bitemarks on human skin
and belonging to the subgroup specified).”;
BM2: ”cbm was caused simultaneously with li”;
1Appendix 4 contains a detachable list to ease the reading.
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BM2.1: ”li is observed to have the profile tili with respect to TI (the time-
index used for determining the stage of the repair process of skin-
injuries.”;
BM2.2: ”cbm is observed to have the profile ticbm with respect to TI) (the
time-index used for determining the stage of the repair process of skin-
injuries).”.
I have presented these propositions as claims, which may be true or false.
It would perhaps have been more appropriate to let the propositions be
questions — to stress the epistemological principle that the events in question
are not directly accessible to us. On the other hand it would perhaps be more
appropriate to address the events of the propositions directly and not mix in
the associations connected to propositions expressed in a natural language —
to stress the methodological principle of precision and simplicity. Whether
the ”objects” of the decision-problem are propositions, questions, or events
does not matter much methodologically (I hold) and I shall sometimes speak
of propositions (questions), sometimes of the events they are about.
10.1.4 The relevant consequences of the problem
So far I have identified the possible options and the relevant events of the
bitemark-problem. Under the specification of K0 I also identified the aims of
the decision: (a) to contribute to convict the guilty person or to acquit the
innocent person and to not contribute to convict the innocent person or to
acquit the guilty person and (b) to contribute to protect resources intended
for other case and not contribute to lessen such resources. As we do not know
whether the events really occurred or not, the crime-investigator and/or the
expert’s choice of decision-option may be either correct or wrong: In the
case the decision are correct, then the aims will be achieved as intended;
In the case the decision is wrong, then the aims will not be achieved. The
possible consequences when the investigator wants to choose/decide a1 (”The
bitemark-proposition is strictly positively relevant”) are: (1) The decision is
correct and the investigator contributes to convict the true guilty; and (2) the
decision is wrong and the investigator contributes to convict a true innocent.
The possible consequences when the investigator wants to decide a0 (”the
bitemark-proposition is not strictly positively relevant”) are: (1) The decision
is correct and the investigator contributes acquit a true innocent; and (2) the
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decision is wrong and the investigator contributes to acquit a true guilty. I
will suggest the following order for these specified possible consequences:
c1: Decide ”strictly positively relevant” correctly and contribute to convict
a true guilty;
c2: Decide ”not strictly positively relevant” correctly and contribute to ac-
quit a true innocent;
c3: Decide ”not strictly positively relevant” wrongly and contribute to acquit
a true guilty;
c4: Decide ”strictly positively relevant” wrongly and contribute to convict a
true innocent;
I believe it to be justified to accredit the first consequence as an absolute
best and the last as an absolute worst: This and the suggested ordering are
compatible with practical outcomes and compatible with the general value
structure expressed by the legal principles of ”innocent until proven guilty”
and ”it is better to acquit ten guilty than to convict one innocent”.
A decision of positive or not positive relevance may also have consequences
on the resources — in terms of money, time, and expertise (crime investiga-
tive as well as forensic/scientific) — allocated to crime investigations of cases
similar to the one in question. To use more than the allocated share of re-
sources in one case means less resources to the next case — which may possi-
bly contribute to increase the risk of incorrect decisions in that case. Indeed,
a substantial part of the justification for requiring evidence-based public de-
cisions is via the limited resources of the modern welfare state. The question
whether resource-costs are justifiable will depend on both legal-general and
case-particular conditions: The legal kind of crime act under adjudication;
the case-specific circumstances of that act; the expected symbolic value of
the legal decision in the particular case; the accuracy expected of particular
means of evidence in question; and the relative evidential burden hosted by
given means of evidence.
In cases like the Torgersen-case from Part II a host of circumstances
would generally justify resource-costs. In that case the resources invested in
the bitemark-means were considerable and there is no question that the re-
sources available to other cases thus were reduced. But in light of the current
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generally weak discriminatory power of bitemark-diagnosis, compared to say
fingerprint- or genetic profiling means, I suggest that a bitemark-means can
only justify costs if the bitemark is of the subgroup specified above and if
the bitemark-means are corroborated by other means of evidence — i.e. if
it is not strictly necessary for or against the indictment but assists means
of evidence more accurately able to increase or decrease the certainty of the
indictment
Due to this I will have to specify one further initial condition for the crime
investigator’s decision-situation:
• The bitemark-means of evidence suspected relevant to the indictment
assessed is not a necessary means of evidence, only a corroborating
means of evidence — only applicable for increasing or decreasing an
already sufficient degree of certainty of the truth or the falsity of the
indictment.
To simplify the consequence-possibilities while awaiting more accurate
bitemark-analysis I will simply assume that the above four possible legal-
specific consequences are the relevant consequences.
10.1.5 Representing by probability and utility
So far I have specified the basic components of the investigator’s bitemark-
problem. But to proceed with the problem within the BNs I must first assume
that the class of events claimed by the propositions above has the structure
of an algebra. Holding the axioms, propositions, and the definitions from the
previous chapter we may first express the uncertainty about the occurrence of
the events of the propositions in the standard of probability, as probability-
functions. Letting ∼ denote ”represented by”,
PC ∼ PCj , j = {p, d}; Degree of belief in PCj ∼ P (PCj),
P (PCj) = (pPCp , pPCd); pPCj > 0; (pPCp + pPCd) = 1.
PCp denoting that the event occurred and PCd denoting that the event did not occur, to be
claimed by the prosecution and the defence counsel respectively.
BM ∼ BMj , j = {1, 0}; Degree of belief in BMj ∼ P (BMj),
P (BMj) = (pBM1 , pBM0); pBMj > 0; (pBM1 + pBM0) = 1.
BM1 denoting that the event occurred and BM0 denoting that the event did not occur, to be
claimed by the prosecution and the defence counsel respectively.
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BM1 ∼ BM1j , j = {1, 0}; Degree of belief in BM1j ∼ P (BM1j),
P (BM1j) = (pBM11 , pBM10); pBM1j > 0; (pBM11 + pBM10) = 1.
BM11 denoting that the event occurred and BM10 denoting that the event did not occur, to be
claimed by the prosecution and the defence counsel respectively.
BM1.1 ∼ bmi1sbm, {bmi1sbm,¬bmi1sbm}; Degree of belief in bmi1sbm ∼ P (bmi1sbm),
P (bmi1sbm) = (pbmi1sbm , p¬bmi1sbm); pbmi1sbm > 0; (pbmi1sbm + p¬bmi1sbm) = 1.
bmi1sbm denoting the event that the suspects’s biting-mechanism has profile bmi1 and ¬bmi1sbm
denoting the event that the suspects’s biting-mechanism has a different profile than bmi1 — on
the BMI1-index relevant for biting-mechanisms in the specified bitemark-situation
BM1.2 ∼ bmi2cbm, {bmi2cbm,¬bmi2cbm}; Degree of belief in bmi2cbm ∼ P (bmi2cbm),
P (bmi2cbm) = (pbmi2cbm , p¬bmi2cbm); pbmi2cbm > 0; (pbmi2cbm + p¬bmi2cbm) = 1.
bmi2cbm denoting the event that the bitemark has profile bmi2 and ¬bmi2cbm denoting the event
that the bitemark has a different profile than bmi2 — on the BMI2-index relevant for bitemarks
of the specified bitemark-situation
BM2.1 ∼ ticbm, {ticbm,¬ticbm}; Degree of belief in ticbm ∼ P (ticbm),
P (ticbm) = (pticbm , p¬ticbm); pticbm > 0; (pticbm + p¬ticbm) = 1.
ticbm denoting the event that the bitemark has profile ti and ¬ticbm denoting the event that
the bitemark has different profile than ti — on the TI-index relevant for estimating the age of
skinmarks in the specified bitemark-situation
BM2.2 ∼ tili, {tili,¬tili}; Degree of belief in tili ∼ P (tili),
P (tili) = (ptili , p¬tili); ptili > 0; (ptili + p¬tili) = 1.
tili denoting the event that the control-injury known to be an effect of the legal injury has profile ti
and ¬tili denoting the event that the control injury has different profile than ti — on the TI-index
relevant for estimating the age of skinmarks in the specified bitemark-situation
and then, secondly we may express the preference among the
consequence-propositions in the standard of utility, as a utility-function:
(c1 through c4) ∼ ck, k = {1, 2, 3, 4}; Value associated with ck ∼ U(ck),
U(ck) = (uc1 , uc2 , uc3 , uc4).
c1 denoting the extreme consequence of having contributed to convict
the true guilty, the absolutely best;
c2 denoting the consequence of having contributed to acquit the true
innocent, the next most valued;
c3 denoting the consequence of having contributed to acquit the true
guilty, the next least valued; and
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c4 denoting an extreme consequence, of having contributed to convict
the true innocent, the absolute worst.
Having thus a bounded decision-problem for the crime-investigator’s
bitemark-problem in the form of probability functions for the relevant events
and a utility function for the relevant consequences, it remains to specify the
general measure of the value attached to the possible actions or decisions,
ai, that the investigator can make. As said, the investigator will be seen to
have two possible decisions: Either decide that the BMj is strictly positively
relevant or decide that it is not strictly positively relevant:
ai, i = {1, 0};
a1 denoting the option of deciding that BMj is strictly positively relevant to PCj ,
and a0 denoting the option of deciding that BMj is not strictly positively relevant
to PCj .
The form of this value depends on both the events specified to consti-
tute the certain event Ω and on the particular consequences to which these
events lead. The conditional expected utility of the crime investigator’s de-
cision about the relevance of the bitemark-proposition with respect to the
indictment-proposition will be expressed by
u(ai | ck, BMj) =
∑
u(ai(ck))P (BMj)
A decision-criterion for the crime investigator in this situation follows
from the assumptions, definitions, and propositions given in the previous
chapter:
For this bounded decision with extreme consequences c4 <
c3 < c2 < c1 and BMj > ∅,
a1 ≤BMj a0 ↔ u(a1 | ck, BMj) ≤ u(a0 | ck, BMj).
A best decision will exist as the set of options considered in this practical
decision problem is finite. This criterion recommends that the crime inves-
tigator should decide that BMj is not strictly positively relevant to CPj if
it is found that the expected utility of deciding that it is strictly positively
relevant is equal or less than the expected utility of deciding that it is not
so.
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The above specified, ordered, and finite collection of the relevant events,
relevant consequences, relevant decision-options, their respective measure-
heuristics, and the decision-criterion or norm are then the basic components
of the crime investigator’s decision-problem in the above specified situation
K0.
The specification of the embedded expert-problem
The decision about the relevance of the bitemark-proposition is made by
the crime-investigator, but he/she cannot decide about this before the ex-
perts have analyzed and concluded about the two bitemark-criteria — BM1j,
whether the suspect’s biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark, and
BM2j, whether the bitemark occurred simultaneously with the control-injury.
As I have specified the situation, the expert-conclusions must be evidence-
based as well, i.e. provide information about the risk of wrong decisions. It
is the crime investigator who needs to ensure that he/she gets that kind of
information from the experts.
The components of these embedded decision-problems of the experts are
not different in kind from the crime investigator’s problem. The events
claimed by BM1 and BM2 have already been specified and represented
as events being uncertain according to the general structure of probability
— as have the events presumed by them (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, and tili).
It would have been desirable to specify further the subcomponents of these
two diagnostic problems. The bitemark was above assumed to be forensically
significant in the sense of being classified as 3 or 4 (high forensic significance)
on Pretty’s Bitemark Severity and Significance Scale (Pretty 2007). This cri-
terion was set to ensure a minimum level of expert consensus about the basic
diagnosis about the causal object of the skinmark, but also about the orienta-
tion of the upper vs. the lower jaw’s marks as well as the specification of the
kind of teeth involved, whether marks are from molar, canine, or incisor kinds
of teeth. The further differential diagnoses require observations of BMI1,
BMI2 and TI — the profiling-instruments relevant in given situations.
In the Torgersen-case from Part II of this dissertation we saw that the
experts for example chose to observe kind and degree of wear and degree
of regularity among the individual marks and teeth relative to the arch-line.
Other characteristics were observed as well, some not explicitly specified. But
any given bitemark will require and be subject to different and subjectively
composed and thus particular profiling instruments. This is different from
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forensic genetics where the expert has access to a delimited set of charac-
teristics or markers, which are agreed on, well specified, and well studied in
different populations. In bitemark-analysis, even though the experts seem (in
the literature) to agree that, say, rotation and position of teeth and marks are
relevant characteristics, they have not agreed on one standard definition and
method of observation: each expert has his/her own preferred definitions —
some preferring precise definitions, others prefer more inclusive terms — and
each has his/her own techniques for observation — some preferring to ob-
serve unaided, some prefer microscopes, some prefer stereoscopes, and some
prefer computer-software (which they do not agree on either). A few studies
exist concerning the distribution of given characteristics, but these concerns
biting-mechanisms only or bitemarks in flat dental wax without mentionable
visco-elasticity. But when the definition and observation used in that study
cannot be expected used by the next expert, the study becomes rather worth-
less. There is unfortunately very little which may be safely assumed concern-
ing the relationship between a characteristic observed of biting-mechanisms
and the corresponding characteristic observed of the bitemarks from those
mechanisms or the relationship between different characteristics observed of
biting-mechanisms or bitemarks.
In the next chapter I venture certain distributions and relationships, but
that will only be for illustrating the methodology and the model suggested in
this chapter. Awaiting better knowledge about the constituent characteristics
and relationships I will abstain from differentiating the profiling instruments
BMI2, BMI1, and TI any further.
However crude the specification of the profiling-instruments, it is still
possible to specify the consequences of the expert-decisions. These are in
principle similar to those commonly used in the scientific context — to avoid
error of type I (of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) and II (of
not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false), but the practical aims
are similar to those of the crime investigator and can be expressed in the
terms of Bayesian Theory: To reduce as much as possible the risk of deciding
wrongly about a given question by choosing the decision which maximizes
the expected utility.
This ends the specification of the components involved in the delimited
crime-investigative bitemark-problem.
We may now proceed to simplify or standardise the solution of the decision-
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problem: We may exploit (a) the logical rules made possible by above speci-
fication of the relevant events and (b) the heuristic of graph-theory in order
to establish an agreement about the best logical and causal relationships
existing among the events involved.
10.2 Using the likelihood ratio to express the
value of the expert-information
The basic problem of the crime investigator is thus to determine whether the
expert-observations are more probable if the bitemark-proposition were to be
true than if its negation were to be true. One standard way in methodology to
assess the effect of a given set of information on a suspected hypothesis is to
relate its likelihood to that of the alternative hypothesis via the likelihood-
ratio. This will be suggested to the crime investigator with a bitemark-
problem as well.
In this and the next section I will presume the scenario in which the
investigator has received expert-reports on the BMI1-, BMI2-, and TI-
profiles of the forensic items. It will be assumed that these reports are true
positives:
1. It is reported that the suspect’s biting-mechanism has profile bmi1sbm
on the BMI1-index; the bitemark has profile bmi2cbm on the BMI2-
index; and that the two profiles are compatible in the sense that the
biting-mechanism is a possible cause of the bitemark.
2. It is reported that the bitemark has profile ticbm on the TI-index; the
control-injury has profile tili on the TI-index; and that the two profiles
are compatible in the sense that the bitemark-injury could have possibly
occurred simultaneously with the control-injury.
In terms of Bayesian Theory the problem about the effect of the expert-
information on the bitemark-proposition can be solved via Bayes Rule:
P (BM1 | bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili,K0) =
P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM1,K0)× P (BM1 | K0)
P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM1,K0)× P (BM1 | K0) (10.1)
+P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM0,K0)× P (BM0 | K0)
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To de-clutter the expressions I will suspend K0 (PCj is subsumed into
K0) from the expressions:
P (BM1 | bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili) =
P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM1)× P (BM1)
P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM1)× P (BM1) (10.2)
+P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM0)× P (BM0)
The term on the left side of the equation is the posterior probability
of the hypothesis conditional of the expert-observations; the first term in
the numerator on the right side is the likelihood of the hypothesis given the
expert-observations; the second term in the numerator is the prior probability
of the hypothesis; and the denominator is the predictive probability of the
evidence.
In their Bayesian networks and Probabilistic Inference in Forensic Science
(2006: 70-72) Taroni et al. suggest using the likelihood-ratio resulting from
the odds form of Bayes’ Theorem as an indication of the value of the forensic
evidence. Using the basic rules of logic and probability the investigator’s




P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM1)




It is the first term on the right side of the equation which is the likelihood-
ratio, sometimes called Bayes’ factor, which can be interpreted as the effect of
the observations on the hypotheses — or the ability of the evidence to change
the certainty of the hypotheses (the term on the left side is the posterior odds
on the hypothesis conditional on the evidence and the second term on the
right side is the prior odds on the hypothesis).
Two probabilities are thus to be assessed by the investigator: First the
probability of the profiles if the suspected hypothesis were to be true and
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then probability of the observed profiles if the negation of this hypothesis
were to be true. These two probabilities may be equal — providing a ratio of
1 — or not — providing a ratio larger than 1 or smaller than 1. If the ratio
is 1 it means that the observations are not able to discriminate between the
two alternative hypotheses; if the ratio is larger than 1 this indicates that the
observations favour the suspected hypothesis; and if the ratio is less than 1,
then this indicates that the observations favour the negation of the suspected
hypothesis.
In the Torgersen-case from Part II, the Board of Forensic Medicine asked
the experts about the content and their assessment of their reference-group —
their BM0 and (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM0). The experts argued that
bitemark-analysis did not and could not have this reference-basis because
precise numerical observations could not be had and thus no pool of data ex-
isted for statistical techniques. This is an unhappy confusion of methodology
with techniques and a failure to grasp the purpose of the former.
Indeed, statistical techniques use data in numerical form. But however
mathematically sophisticated, such techniques rest on the epistemological
norm, by nature qualitative, that a judgement that a phenomenon has a
characteristic to a large, medium, or small degree cannot be meaningful un-
less compared/related to something — a standard or a reference-basis. In
Premise 2 and Premise 3 of this dissertation (Chapter 1) I argue that this
reference-basis is cognitively necessary as nothing can be large or larger on
its own, but refers to something else being larger or smaller. If the judge-
ment does not matter much to us we may omit this reference. Or if it for
some reason is important that the judgment is not questioned too hard, we
may suppress or under-communicate it. The latter may be necessary during
the trial-phase’s negations towards a resolution of conflicting interests. But
it works only if the judgement has been related, and intentionally so, to a
specific reference.
None of the bitemark-experts in the Torgersen-case had any qualms con-
cluding it to be very likely (or unlikely) that the suspect’s biting-mechanism
was the cause of the bitemark. Judging so, they appealed implicitly to some
reference-group being a relatively less (more) likely cause. But this group
they had qualms talking about. The results of the study in chapter seven
suggest, unfortunately, that bitemark-analysts are somehow incapacitated
from making use of the ordinarily available methodological trust-generating
instruments used by other scientists. This failure to adapt methodologi-
cally is, I hold, the reason why the traditional forensic sciences are under
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siege (Pyrek (2007), Saks and Koehler (2005)) and is why the Norwegian
Torgersen-case will not resolve peacefully.
When I as well as others suggest using the likelihood-ratio to express
the evidential value of observations (expressed in numbers or words), then
we merely suggest a traditional technique which is founded in traditional
methodology which, in turn, is intentionally constructed to ensure adherence
to basic epistemological norms — norms developed from the basic need to
avoid undermining our own intentions, aims and values.
I thus suggest that the crime investigator in the situation I have speci-
fied should use the likelihood ratio as an expression of the evidential value,
denoted by V , of the bitemark with respect to the indictment:
V =
P (bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, tili | BM1)
P (bmi1sbm, bmicbm, ticbm, tili | BM0) (10.4)
Now I will turn the attention to the internal relationships between the
variables involved in this likelihood-ratio. The crime investigator’s bitemark-
problem as it is specified is not among the most complex in terms of the
number of variables involved, but I will nevertheless exploit the instrument
of graph-theory to explicate the reasoning behind the suggested simplified
likelihood-ratio which will be suggested at the end of this chapter. The
purpose is again to explicate my justification for this simplified ratio in terms
of my beliefs about the logical and causal relationships between the events
claimed by the propositions identified as relevant — because this may be
the reference basis from which to reconstruct the model in the case I am
wrong and because it may be used as the reference-basis for any individual
case-decision in the case I am correct.
10.3 A Directed Acyclic Graph over the crime
investigator’s bitemark-problem
As said in the previous chapter, a BNs over a decision-problem consists
of a set of nodes hosting variables representing the relevant events of the
decision-problem and a set of directed edges representing the probabilistic
dependency-relationships between these variables; each variable may have a
finite set of mutually exclusive states; the nodes and the directed edges forms
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a directed acyclic graph — a DAG; and to each variable A with parents B1,
. . . , BNn, there is attached the probability table P (A | B1, . . . , Bn).
The DAG-instrument serves two purposes: One is to model the logical
and the causal relationships believed to exist among a given set of events; the
other is, on the basis of the model, to simplify the calculations involved in the
problem. For our bitemark-problem we may exploit categorical or logical and
causal semantics and the reasoning rules of DAGs to model the problem and
then use this model to elicit the subgroups of variables being conditionally
independent — thus simplifying the calculation involved in specifying the
decision-function for the crime investigator’s problem.
The basic problem of the crime investigator is to decide the probability-
distribution for BMj conditional on the probability distributions of BM1j
and BM2j — as these in turn are conditional on the experts’ observations
about the profiles of the bitemark, the suspect’s biting-mechanism, and the
control skin-injury.
It should be easy to agree that BMj should be the hosted by the root-
node of the bitemark-DAG and that bmi1sbm, bmi2cbm, ticbm, and tili should
be hosted by end-nodes of the bitemark-DAG. The remaining nodes will host
the remaining variables BM1j and BM2j.
In our scenario the crime investigator has received expert-reports that (1)
the two profiles of bmi1sbm and bmi2cbm are compatible and (2) so are ticbm
and tili. These profiles are observable and I have assumed the reports to be
true positives.
Under the current methodological regime of bitemark-analysts it is likely
that a bitemark-expert having observed such compatible profiles would then
recommend to the investigator that the hypotheses of BM1 and BM2 were
likely to be true. Under the BNs-approach we would not be allowed to say
anything about these hypotheses until we knew more about the probability of
observing compatible profiles if the suspect’s biting-mechanism were not the
cause of the bitemark and if the bitemark were made at time different from
that of the control-injury: In principle and in practice the bitemark may have
been made by another person’s biting-mechanisms and/or the bitemark may
have been caused at an occasion irrelevant to the legally relevant injuries.
In the scenario suspected, the identified suspect is truly the biter and
the bitemark was made at the time specified: Then the suspect’s biting-
mechanism is the true causal object of the bitemark and the bitemark did
occur simultaneously with the control-injury. This scenario may be modelled








Figure 10.1: An initial bitemark-DAG: If the suspected scenario is true — that the
suspect is the biter and the bitemark was made simultaneously with the control-injury
— then the bitemark connects the suspect to the place and time of the legally relevant
injuries; the bitemark-proposition is evidence favouring the indictment-proposition.
The question is whether some of the arrows included in figure 10.1 can
be justifiably removed via rules of logic and the principles of d-separation
— the aim being to arrive at subgroups of variables with more manageable
contingency tables.
In the following I will rely on Cook et al. (1998)’s conceptualization
of the investigative processing of forensic information: I will start at the
source-level — on which the physical items are observed and categorized by
the bitemark-experts; then I include the activity-level — on which the pro-
files observed are compared and assessed, by the bitemark-expert and the
investigator in tandem, in relation to carefully chosen reference-populations;
and finally I include the crime-level — on which the value of the aggre-
gated information is assessed by the crime-investigator for the final deci-
sions whether the bitemark-proposition is strictly positively relevant to the
indictment-proposition.
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10.3.1 The source-level of the problem: Classifying the
bitemark, the suspect’s biting-mechanism, and
the control-injury
At the source-level the expert is to diagnose the suspected bitemark with
respect to (1) whether it is a human adult bitemark; (2) whether the suspect’s
biting-mechanism is a possible cause; and (3) whether the bitemark occurred
within the time-interval specified.
The first diagnosis is a sequential diagnosis: I have already assumed that
the skinmark has an external and abrupt cause; a next diagnosis is whether
it is a bitemark by human/animal teeth or by object with teeth-like forms;
then follows the diagnosis whether it is human or animal biting-mechanism,
etc. Several decisions must thus be made before considering whether some
particular human biting-mechanism may be the cause. From now on I will
assume the diagnosis of the bitemark as a human adult biting-mechanism as
a true positive.
Diagnosing the bitemark’s most likely causal biting-mechanism
The bitemark was caused by a human biting-mechanism and the suspect’s
biting-mechanism has a profile compatible with that of the bitemark. Then
we have two possibilities: Either the bitemark was made by the suspect’s
biting-mechanism or it was made by someone else’s biting-mechanism. These
two possibilities were above denoted by BM11 and BM10 respectively:
BM11: ”s’s biting-mechanism is the causal object of the bitemark”;
BM10: ”Someone else’s biting-mechanism is the causal object of the
bitemark”.
Recall the likelihood-ratio, but consider first the relationship between the
profiles and BM1j:
V =
P (bmi2cbm, bmi1sbm | BM11)
P (bmi2cbm, bmi1sbm | BM10) .
By the third law of probability this may be expressed as
V =
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10)
P (bmi1sbm | BM11)
P (bmi1sbm | BM10) .
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What is the nature of the relationship expressed in the second term on
the right side of the equation — P (bmi1sbm | BM11)/P (bmi1sbm | BM10)?
Whether the suspect is the biter or not cannot change the profile of the
suspect’s biting-mechanism: P (bmi1sbm | BM11) = P (bmi1sbm | BM10);
V =
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10) .
The numerator of the remaining term on the right side states that the
probability of observing the profile of the bitemark is conditional on the
suspect’s biting-profile when he/she is also the biter. It is possible to agree
that this event cannot be further simplified.
The denominator of the remaining term on the rights side states that
the probability of observing the profile of the bitemark is conditional on the
suspect’s profile when he/she is also not the biter. But if the suspect is not
the biter, he/she and his/her profile should then not be counted in: Someone
did make the bitemark, but if the suspect is not the biter then he/she should
be abstracted from the suspect-population.
V =
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)
P (bmi2cbm | BM10) .
The probability of the bitemark-profile conditional on the suspect not be-
ing the biter can be estimated by the proportion of the general relevant pop-
ulation of biting-mechanisms (with any profile) which could possibly make
bitemarks with profiles similar to that of the bitemark in question. This
proportion is sometimes called ”the random match-probability”.
This relationship between BN1j, bmi1sbm, and bmi2cbm may be called
a converging relationship in which, according to the corresponding rule of
d-separation, effect cannot not be transmitted between BMj and bmi1sbm if
nothing is reported on the state of bmi2cbm (or one of its descendants). When
information about the profile of the bitemark is included the channel between
BN1j and bmi1sbm opens and effect may be transmitted. This conditional
dependence-relationship may be graphically displayed as in figure 10.2 — in
which the conditional dependence is expressed by having removed the arrow




Figure 10.2: A partial bitemark-DAG limited to the diagnosis of the bitemark with
respect to the suspect’s versus others’ biting-mechanism.
Diagnosing the bitemark’s most likely time of occurrence
The second source-level question is whether the bitemark was made simul-
taneously with the control-injury (an injury known to be a direct effect of
the legal injury): Either the bitemark was made at the same time as the
control-injury or not. Above these two possibilities were denoted by BM21
and BM20 respectively:
BM21: ”The bitemark was caused simultaneously with control-injury;
BM20: ”The bitemark was not caused simultaneously with the control-injury.
The bitemark and the control-injury are assessed and observed via differ-
ent technical heuristics and categorized on TI to have profiles ticbm and tili,
respectively. The likelihood-ratio is then
V =
P (ticbm, tili | BM21)
P (ticbm, tili | BM20) .
By the third law of probability this may be expressed as
V =
P (ticbm | tili, BM21)
P (ticbm | tili, BM20)
P (tili | BM21)
P (tili | BM20) .
292
What is the nature of the relationship expressed in the second term on the
right hand side of this equation — P (tili | BM21)/P (tili | BM20)? Whether
the bitemark was made at the same time-interval or not as the control-injury
cannot change the time-profile of the control-injury. The profile is what it
is independent of whether the bitemark was made simultaneously with it or
not; P (tili | BM21) = P (tili | BM20);
V =
P (ticbm | tili, BM21)
P (ticbm | tili, BM20) .
The numerator of the remaining term on the right side states that the
probability of the time-profile of the bitemark is conditional on the time-
profile of the control-injury when these also did occur simultaneously. It is
possible to agree that this event cannot be further simplified.
The denominator of the remaining term on the right side states that the
probability of the profile of the bitemark is conditional on the time-profile of
the control-injury when these also did not occur simultaneously. There is no
causal influence in this scenario, but a logical one: The time of the control-
injury cannot cause the time of occurrence of the bitemark, but conditions
by disallowing a state similar to the control-injury. The denominator stays
unchanged:
V =
P (ticbm | tili, BM21)
P (ticbm | tili, BM20) .
The relationship between BM2j, tili, and ticbm is also a converging rela-
tionship. BM2j and tili are d-separated if nothing is reported on the state
of ticbm (or one of its descendants); but if information about the time-profile
of the bitemark is included then effect can be transmitted between BM2j
and tili. This conditional dependence-relationship may be graphically dis-
played as in figure 10.3 — in which the conditional dependence is expressed
by having removed the arrow between BM2j and tili:
10.3.2 The activity- and the crime-levels of the prob-
lem
The last relationship to be considered is that between BMj, BM1j, and
BM2j: Either the bitemark was made by the suspected individual simulta-





Figure 10.3: A partial bitemark-DAG limited to the diagnosis of the bitemark with
respect to having occurred simultaneously or not with control-injury.
were denoted by BM1 and BM0 respectively (the latter being a composite
event):
BM1: ”The suspect made the bitemark simultaneously with the legally rel-
evant injuries”,
BM0: ”The suspect did not make the bitemark or the bitemark was made
by the suspect or another person at an occasion irrelevant to the legally
relevant injuries.”
At the source-level, for both profiling-purposes, it was rather easy to
decide that it was the probability of profile of bitemark which was the primary
question. At the activity- and the crime-level it is less easy to determine the
primary question — neither causality nor logic may help us. An ad hoc
principle which does not affect the results will be resorted to: Because the
question of simultaneity is a recurrent question in any forensic means of
evidence problem but the question of the suspect being the biter or not is
particular to bitemark-means of evidence, the latter will be chosen as the
probability of primary concern. The relationship of interest then is:
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P (BM1j | BM2j, BM1)
P (BM1j | BM2j, BM0)
P (BM2j | BM1)
P (BM2j | BM0)
What is the nature of the relationship expressed in the second term of
the above expression — P (BM2j | BM1)/P (BM2j | BM0)? Is the state of
BM2j dependent on the state of BMj? If the latter is in the state BM1,
then the probabilities of having BM21 and BM20 is 1 and 0 respectively:
If the suspect is the agent then the bitemark must have been simultaneous
and then its complement is impossible. What if BMj is in its state BM0?
If BMj is in the state BM0 and BM2j is in state BM20 this means that
either the suspect or someone else made the bitemark at a time irrelevant
to the crime event. If BM2j is in state BM21 it means that the bitemark
was made by the offender simultaneously with the crime event, but not by
the identified suspect. It is tempting to set P (BM21 | BM0) = P (bmi2cbm |
(bmi1¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi¬sbm, BM10). But then P (BM20 | BM0) must be 1 −
P (bmi2cbm | (bmi1¬sbm∪¬bmi¬sbm, BM10) which excludes the possibility that
the identified suspect could have made the bitemark. Another interpretation
is to see P (BM21 | BM0) = P (BM20 | BM0): That when the suspect is
not the agent the question of the identity of the offender becomes irrelevant
to the question about the simultaneity of the two skinmarks. I will proceed
with the latter solution, but I am not sure if I understand this properly — I
am not able to justify it very well.
The relationship P (BM2j | BM1)/P (BM2j | BM0) is one of conditional
dependence and cannot be further simplified.
What about the first term P (BM1j | BM2j, BM1)/
P (BM1j | BM2j, BM0)?
• If the suspect is the offender and the bitemark was made simultaneously
with the crime act, then the suspect’s biting-mechanism must be the
cause of the bitemark: P (BM11 | BM21, BM1) = 1.
Then P (BM10 | BM21, BM1) = 0; and
• if the suspect is the offender but the bitemark was made at another
event irrelevant to the crime event, then the probability that the sus-
pect’s biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark can be estimated
by the time-independent probability of it being the cause. I will denote
this probability by β: P (BM11 | BM20, BM1) = β.
Then P (BM10 | BM20, BM1) = 1− β; and
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• If the suspect is not the offender and the bitemark was made simulta-
neously with the crime act, then the suspect’s biting-mechanism can
not be the cause of the bitemark: P (BM11 | BM21, BM0) = 0.
Then P (BM10 | BM21, BM0) = 1; and
• if the suspect is not the offender and the bitemark was made at another
event irrelevant to the crime event, then the probability that the sus-
pect’s biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark can be estimated
by the time-independent probability of it being the cause. This proba-
bility was above denoted by β. Then P (BM10 | BM20, BM1) = 1−β.
The relationship between BMj, BM2j, and BM1j, is thus also a converg-
ing relationship. BMj and BM2j is d-separated if nothing is known about
the state of BM1j or its descendant bmi2cbm. Receiving information about
the BMI-profile of the bitemark will then open for effect to travel between







Figure 10.4: The final bitemark-DAG for the bitemark problem.
These assessments and the final result are analogue to those made by
Taroni et al. when they considered the relationships between the events rele-
vant in a one-offender shoe-imprint scenario (Taroni et al. 2006: 101-103). A
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shoe-imprint is similar to a bitemark in human skin by the indirect relation-
ship between the forensic markers of the shoe and those of the imprint. But
it is different in one respect: The suspected shoe only indirectly can be used
to connect the suspected person to the place of the crime as the shoe is not a
part of the body of the person in the way a biting-mechanism is (in the case
of natural teeth). A bitemark-problem is thus simpler than a shoe-imprint
problem in that you avoid having to account for the events made possible
due to the shoe not being integral to the body of a person.2.
In addition I have altered both the name and the formulation of the event
which Taroni et al. (2006: 103) label the ”relevance”-term: They prefer to
formulate it as ”The offender left the imprint” while I prefer ”The imprint
was made simultaneously with the legally relevant injury”. Their aim, I
anticipate, given their labelling of this diagnosis-event or criterion as the rel-
evance-event, is to stress the event’s role as a constantly recurring kind of
event in any forensic problem at the action-level. I have no methodological
issue with this and also agree that it might be a better pedagogical solution
than mine is. My aim is to bring out the point that this event is the test
whether the imprint and a known observable effect of the legal act is con-
nected in time — while the other diagnostic event or criterion, whether the
suspect, via the forensic item observed, is the causal agent of the imprint, is
the test whether the imprint and the suspect connects in space. Both tests
are logically or causally necessary, and equally so, in any forensic problem.
But my specification is less transparent than Taroni et al.’s — I run into
certain logical complications which makes it not the wisest way in which to
communicate the roles of the diagnostic criteria to new students of forensic
science. The main point is, however, that my choice of relationships for the
events of the bitemark-problem has support in the fact that Taroni et al.
(2006) arrived at the same solution for the shoe-imprint problem.
In the next section we will see how my choice of relationships affects the
derivation of the general likelihood-ratio for the kind of bitemark-problems
studied in this dissertation.
2Taroni et al (2006) also assumed that the imprint could not have been made by the
suspect’s shoe by the suspect at another time. I relaxed this assumption and suggested
it estimated by the time-independent probability that the suspect’s biting-mechanism is
the causal object of the bitemark (complemented by the probability of another person’s
bitemark being the causal object)
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10.4 Deriving the likelihood-ratio for
the bitemark-problem
The likelihood-ratio has two functions: When substantiated by case infor-
mation and calculated, it may be interpreted as a practical indication of
the evidential value of the bitemark; but its real function is methodological
— to evidence-base the crime investigator’s decision about case-conditioned
relevance to the standard specified in the first chapter of this dissertation.
The crime investigator’s primary concern or question can be represented
by the following initial likelihood-ratio:
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM1)
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM0) (10.5)
I will start with the numerator first.
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM1) =
P (bmi2sbm | bmi1sbm, BM11, BM1)P (BM11 | bmi1sbm, BM1) (10.6)
+P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10, BM1)P (BM10 | bmi1sbm, BM1).
First, according to assumptions in the previous section:
• BM1 screens off bmi2cbm from BMj (and BM2j):
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11, BM1) = P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbmBM11);
and
• having no knowledge of the profile of the bitemark, bmi2cbm, makes the
uncertainty about BM1 unaffected by knowledge about the suspect’s
biting-mechanism’s profile, bmi1sbm.
Then
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM1) =
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)P (BM11 | BM1) (10.7)
+P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10)P (BM10 | BM1).
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Accounting for BM2:
P (BM11 | BM1) =
P (BM11 | BM21, BM1)P (BM21 | BM1) + (10.8)
P (BM11 | BM20, BM1)P (BM20 | BM1)
and
P (BM10 | BM1) =
P (BM10 | BM21, BM1)P (BM21 | BM1) + (10.9)
P (BM10 | BM20, BM1)P (BM20 | BM1) :
• If the suspect is the offender and the bitemark was made simultaneously
with the crime act, then the suspect’s biting-mechanism must be the
cause of the bitemark: P (BM11 | BM21, BM1) = 1.
Then P (BM10 | BM21, BM1) = 0; and
• if the suspect is the offender but the bitemark was made at another
event irrelevant to the crime event, then the probability that the sus-
pect’s biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark can be estimated
by the time-independent probability of it being the cause. Denote this
probability by β: P (BM11 | BM20, BM1) = β.
Then P (BM10 | BM20, H1) = 1− β; and
• BM2 and BM are probabilistically independent,
so
P (BM11 | BM1) = P (BM21) + βP (BM20) (10.10)
and
P (BM10 | BM1) = (1− β)P (BM20). (10.11)
The numerator is now:
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P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)[P (BM21) + βP (BM20)]
+P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10)[(1− β)P (BM20)] (10.12)
Then the denominator:
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM0) =
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11, BM0)P (BM11 | bmi1sbm, BM0) (10.13)
+P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10, BM0)P (BM10 | bmi1sbm, BM0).
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM0) =
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11, BM0)P (BM11 | BM0)
+P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10, BM0)P (BM10 | BM0).
Accounting for BM2:
P (BM11 | BM0) = P (BM11 | BM21, BM0)P (BM21 | BM0) +
P (BM11 | BM20, BM0)P (BM20 | BM0) (10.14)
and
P (BM10 | BM0) = P (BM10 | BM21, BM0)P (BM21 | BM0) +
P (BM10 | BM20, BM0)P (BM20 | BM0) (10.15)
• If the suspect is not the offender and the bitemark was made simulta-
neously with the crime act, then the suspect’s biting-mechanism can
not be the cause of the bitemark: P (BM11 | BM21, BM0) = 0.
Then P (BM10 | BM21, BM0) = 1; and
• if the suspect is not the offender and the bitemark was made at another
event irrelevant to the crime event, then the probability that the sus-
pect’s biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark can be estimated
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by the time-independent probability of it being the cause. This prob-
ability was above denoted by β: P (BM11 | BM20, BM1) = β.
Then P (BM10 | BM20, BM1) = 1− β; and
• BM2j and BMj are probabilistically independent,
so
P (BM11 | BM0) = βP (BM20) (10.16)
and
P (BM10 | BM0) = P (BM21) + (1− β)P (BM20). (10.17)
The denominator is now:
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)[βP (BM20)]
+P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10)[P (BM21) + ((1− β)P (BM20))]. (10.18)
• P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM10) = P (bmi2cbm | BM10)
The overall LR:
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)[P (BM21) + βP (BM20)]
LR =
+P (bmi2cbm|BM10)[(1−β)P (BM20)]
P (bmi2cbm|bmi1sbm,BM11)[βP (BM20)] (19a)
+P (bmi2cbm | BM10)[P (BM21) + ((1− β)P (BM20))]
Some simplifications may be made:
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• P (bmi2cbm | BM10) is the ”random match” probability — the proba-
bility of observing the bitemark of this profile if someone else’s biting-
mechanism is the causal object of the bitemark: This may be denoted
by γ;
• P (BM21) is the probability that the bitemark was made simultane-
ously with the legally relevant injury: This may be denoted by sim.
The complement P (BM20) is then equal to 1− sim).
LR =
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)[sim+ β(1− sim)] + γ[(1− β)(1− sim)]
P (bmi2cbm | bmi1sbm, BM11)[β(1− sim))] + γ[sim+ ((1− β)(1− sim))](10.19)
10.5 Conclusion
Renaming LR as VBM , to signify ”value of bitemark-means”, the crime inves-
tigator’s bitemark-problem in the specified situation may thus be formally
represented as the following:
If the options of the crime investigator is to decide either ” strictly posi-
tively relevant”, denoted by a1, or ”not strictly positively relevant”, denoted
by a0, if there for each of ai exist BMj of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events, and if there exist consequences ck associated with ai, then the crime
investigator can decide a1, positive relevance, if and only if
u(a1 | P (BMj | VBM , K0)) > u(a0 | P (BMj | VBM , K0)),
The claim in this dissertation is that this representation of the bitemark-
problem will ensure evidence-based decisions about the relevance of bitemark-
means — conditional on the problem being representative of the context
being of the kind specified and denoted by K0.
In the next chapter I will study how this interpretation of the bitemark-
problem may be exploited in a practical bitemark-problem.
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Chapter 11
A practical example: A
bitemark-problem similar to
that of the Torgersen-case
In this chapter I will perform a BNs-analysis of a crime investigative bitemark-
problem approximating that of the Torgersen-case. I borrow some of the re-
ality of that case, but will assume (a) that only four characteristics were used
for diagnosing the most likely causal biting-mechanism of the bitemark; (b)
that a unspecified set of markers was used for diagnosing the simultaneity
between the bitemark and the control-injury; and (c) that certain specifica-
tions and distributions hold for the characteristics and for the accuracy of
the experts diagnosing via these.
The purpose is to demonstrate how the methodology and the model
suggested in the previous chapter work in an approximately real bitemark-
situation — to demonstrate how a crime-investigator in practice may secure
an evidence-based decision about a bitemark-means’ relevance to a legal in-
dictment.
It is important to stress that the results of this analysis will not be valid
for the Torgersen-case: (1) in that case the experts did observe the four
characteristics I include, but they also observed others as well (some explicit
in the written reports, but ill-defined, and, most likely, some implicit); (2)
the specifications and distributions I suggest for the four characteristics and
for the expert-accuracies are not expert-based, but based on my judgment
that the characteristics are reasonably similar to characteristics which have
been studied, with respect to expected expert-consensus about specification
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and distribution; (3) the decision in the Torgersen-case concerned the rel-
evance of the bitemark-means while my decision concerns the relevance of
the bitemark-proposition — about the physical but not the motivational as-
pects of the causal mechanism behind the biting. I should therefore add the
following ”will”:
I will not allow the results of this analysis in this chapter to be
used for any legal or legal-political strategic or tactical purposes
related to neither the Torgersen-case nor other similar cases. I
will, however, allow the results of the other chapters to be used
for any purpose.
11.1 Assumptions about the relevant events,
consequences, and options
In this chapter I will illustrate the reasoning of a crime-investigator having
a real bitemark-problem and who has chosen to use the BNs-approach and
my model of the problem. I will borrow the reality of the bitemark-problem
in the Torgersen-case from part II of this dissertation, using the informa-
tion provided in Eskeland (2000 and 2005) and Review Commission (2006),
complement with information provided in the published literature, and the
following assumptions about the investigator’s situation:
Assumption 1. The context:
I will assume that the context of the case is representative of that specified
in the first section of the previous chapter and denoted by K0. K0 differs
from the Torgersen-case in that it only allows bitemark-means to be a cor-
roborating means of evidence while it in the Torgersen-case was a necessary
means of evidence.
Assumption 2. The decision-problem:
The decision-problem of the case will be assumed to be representative of
that specified in the previous chapter: Having the same relevant proposi-
tions/events, consequences, and decision-options. The denotations for these
elements will be kept, but particularized to indicate the individuals (persons,
forensic items, etc.) of the case;
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Assumption 3. The expert-recommendations with respect to BM1:
It will be assumed that the bitemark-experts have reported that the suspect’s
biting-mechanism has a BMI1-profile compatible with the BMI2-profile of
the bitemark and that they have recommended that the suspect’s biting
mechanism is ”very likely” the cause of the bitemark. BM1j is thus recom-
mended to be in state BM11. This corresponds with the Torgersen-case.
Assumption 4. The expert-recommendations with respect to BM2:
It will be assumed that the bitemark-experts and the forensic medical ex-
aminer agree that the bitemark has a TI-profile compatible with the TI-
profile of the control-injury and that BM2j is in state BM21. This does
not correspond to the Torgersen-case. In that case the diagnostic criterion
of simultaneity was not explicitly questioned or assessed.
Assumption 5. The profiling for diagnosing causal object of bitemark
The characteristics included in the BMI1- and BMI2-instruments used by
the Torgersen-experts were difficult to elicit due to incompleteness and impre-
cision of the written reports. It was particularly difficult to identify the com-
ponents of BMI2 (the set of characteristics used for profiling the bitemark).
It is however certain that the Torgersen-experts observed the following char-
acteristics when diagnosing the causal biting-mechanism of the bitemark:
• Kind and degree of wear (hereafter: wear);
• Kind and degree of rotation/position (hereafter: rotation/position);
• Existence of object in position 4a for the bitemark and 42 for the sus-
pect’s biting-mechanism (hereafter: existence 4a(42));
• kind of labio-lingual relationship between the objects in positions 5
and 6 for the bitemark and positions 41 and 31 for the suspect’s biting-
mechanism) (hereafter: labio-lingual 5,6(41,31)):
With respect to wear and rotation/position the experts most likely ob-
served these of both individual and sub-groups of skinmarks and teeth, but,
again due to the incomplete and imprecise reports, I will have to let the pro-
files on wear and rotation/position refer to the macro-units — the bitemark
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and the biting-mechanism. The profiles on existence 4a(42) and labio-lingual
5,6(1,41) refer to subunits — to one or two individual marks and teeth.
These four characteristics will constitute the BMI1- and
BMI2-instruments used by the expert in my illustrative case. The discrimi-
natory power via these instruments will thus be different from those used in
the Torgersen-case. The results from the analyses of this chapter can there-
fore not be reason or evidence for or against any claim that the Torgersen-
experts’ conclusions were wrong: My purpose is solely to exemplify a different
analytical procedure.
Further assumptions must be made about (a) how the experts observed
the four characteristics of the bitemark and the biting-mechanism; (b) the
characteristics’ distribution in the relevant population; and the expert’s di-
agnostic accuracy when using these characteristics.
Assumption 5a. BMI1m and BMI2m: Observing and classify-
ing the bitemark and the suspect’s biting-mechanism with respect
to rotation/position The Torgersen-experts referred both to positioning
and rotation of some of the individual teeth and skinmarks relative to archs
formed by groups of such. It is not clear from the expert-reports whether
mesio-distal rotation was separated from labio-lingual position. My rota-
tion/position does not differentiate either. Neither is it clear how the experts
classified each tooth and mark with respect to these characteristics, but both
the bitemark and the suspect’s biting-mechanism were found to be regular.
The Torgersen-experts did not opine about the proportion of any relevant
population having biting-mechanisms being regular on rotation/position.
Nor did they opine on the kind and degree of distortion or deviance between
the rotation/position-profile observed of biting-mechanisms at rest and that
of bitemarks on human skin at rest — after having been affected by pro-
cesses (such as teeth-mobility, jaw-mobility, force and direction of biting,
and skin’s visco-elasticity) activated during the biting-process. And, finally,
the experts did not provide any estimate for the possibility that they could
be wrong. They did express that they could never be absolutely certain, but
did not address (a) the probability that any of the profiles ascribed to the
samples were wrong; (b) the probability that the compatibility-conclusion
was a false positive, or (c) the probability that another biting-mechanism
from any reference-population, with the same or different rotation/position-
profile as the suspect, could have made the profile of the bitemark. And,
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finally, the Torgersen-experts did not inform whether they were subject to
any accreditation schemes beyond the most general. I have found no sign
in the literature that European or other forensic bitemark-experts are regu-
larly accredited with respect to diagnostic accuracy with or without specific
forensic markers. The experts did not appeal to any such to support their
claim of accuracy in the Torgersen-case.
To pursue the illustration of the methodology and the model from the
previous chapters I will have to make some assumptions. I will assume that
5a1. the experts used the instruments of BMI1m and BMI2m when classi-
fying the rotation/position-configuration of the biting-mechanism and
the bitemark respectively;
5a2. they reported the suspect’s biting-mechanism to have profile
BMI1m = bmi1msbm and the bitemark to have profile
BMI2m = bmi2mcbm;
5a3. these two profiles are the objects’ true profiles (no false
positives/negatives for these decisions). This assumption is done for
simplifying purposes;
5a4. the proportion of biting-mechanisms in the relevant population sharing
the same bmi1m-profile as the suspect is 40% and the proportion with
a different profile, ¬bmi1m, is 60%. This distribution is justified by
(a) my belief that a rotation/position of regular is not an uncommon
condition in the relevant population (biting-mechanisms in Oslo 1958),
and (b) my belief that others would agree to this belief and to the
suggested distribution;
5a5. of all the biting-mechanisms which will cause bmi2m-bitemarks, 80%
will have the same profile as the suspect, bmi1m, and 20% will have
a different profile, ¬bmi1m. The justification for this distribution is
(a) my belief that the profile observed of the bitemark is the effect
of not only the profile of the causal biting-mechanism but also of the
mechanisms activated during the biting-process, (b) my belief that if
a bitemark is classified to have medium forensic significance on the
Pretty-scale (see specification of K0 in chapter 9, section 2), then the
difference due to distortion should be moderate;
307
5a6. the experts, their perceptions and observations of rotation/position,
and the diagnostic situation are representative of those in the accuracy-
studies existing for diagnosis via rotation/position (see chapter 7):
• via rotation/position alone, the experts are able to identify the
true causal biting-mechanism 80% of the times and are able to
identify the true negative causal biting-mechanism 80% of the
times.
• the experts thus have a false positive rate of 20% and a false
negative rate of 20%.
This distribution is justified by (a) my belief that the Torgersen-experts’
diagnostic situation was similar to that of the accuracy-studies using a
similar notion of rotation/position and (b) my belief that if a bitemark
is classified to have medium forensic significance on the Pretty-scale
(see specification of K0 in chapter 9, section 2), then the risk of misdi-
agnosis should be moderate.
Assumption 5b. BMI1a and BMI2a: Observing and classifying the
bitemark and the suspect’s biting-mechanism with respect to wear
The Torgersen-experts reported that at least five of the individual marks
in the bitemark had symptoms indicating that the causal biting-mechanism
must have been worn in a specific way and degree — a condition caused
by the biting-mechanism having a particular occlusion-condition (”edge-to-
edge”). The symptoms were only described in terms of the causal teeth-
characteristics such as furrowing and splintering. It is not clear if or how
they differentiated these symptoms from those expected when the causal
biting-mechanism has another kind (by another cause, such as food-habits,
medication/drug-abuse, or disease) or degree of wear. The experts classified
the suspect’s biting-mechanism as very worn of a kind caused by occlusion
being edge to edge with respect to wear. Only after repeated questioning did
the experts opine that if the suspect could be assumed to be a member of the
sample studied by Smith and Robb (1996) (a prevalence-study of a related
characteristic) then the suspect’s degree of wear would have been classified
as very uncommon — a degree of wear shared by 5.3% of that sample.
As for rotation/position the experts did not address the issue of the rela-
tionship between wear of the biting-mechanism at rest and symptoms of such
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of the bitemark at rest, after having been exposed to further mechanisms dur-
ing the biting. And, finally, the experts did not provide any estimates of the
possibilities that (1) they were wrong about (a) the wear-classification of the
suspect’s biting-mechanism or the bitemark or (b) the decision that the sus-
pect’s wear and the bitemark’s symptoms of such were compatible and that
(2) that another biting-mechanism with same or different wear-profile as the
suspect’s could have made the profile of the bitemark. Again, to pursue the
illustration of the methodology and the model from the previous chapters, I
will have to make assumptions: I will assume that
5b1. the expert in my case used the instruments of BMI1a and BMI2a
when classifying the kind and degree of wear-configuration of the biting-
mechanism and the bitemark respectively;
5b2. they reported the suspect’s biting-mechanism to have profile
BMI1a = bmi1asbm and the bitemark to have profile
BMI2a = bmi2acbm;
5b3. these two profiles are the objects’ true profiles (no false
positives/negatives for these decisions). This assumption is done for
simplifying purposes.
5b4. the proportion of biting-mechanism in the relevant population for the
case sharing the same bmi1m-profile as the suspect will be 5% and
the proportion with a different profile, ¬bmi1m, will be 95%. This
distribution is justified by (a) the assumption that the population of
the suspect’s biting-mechanism is sufficiently similar to that of Smith
and Robb (1996)’s sample. I am not able to judge whether this is
a reasonable assumption or not: The court-appointed experts on the
Torgersen-case claimed that the suspect’s kind and degree of wear was
rare, but the defence-experts claimed it to be rather common in the
population relevant for the Torgersen-case. My choice that my suspect’s
wear-profile is shared by 5% of the relevant population is motivated
solely by the purpose of illustrating the methodology and the model
and does not aspire to be any best estimate;
5b5. of all the biting-mechanisms which will cause bmi2a-profiled bitemarks,
80% will have profile bmi1a (similar to suspect) and 20% will have a
different profile, ¬bmi1a. The justification for this distribution is (a)
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my belief that the profile observed of the bitemark is the effect of not
only the biting-mechanism but also of the mechanisms activated during
the biting-process and (b) my belief that if a bitemark is classified to
have medium forensic significance on the Pretty-scale (see chapter 7,
section 2) then the difference due to distortion should be moderate;
5b6. the expert’s diagnostic situation are representative of those of the ac-
curacy studies (see chapter seven) involving a characteristic assumed
to be both conceptually and observationally sufficiently similar to that
of the experts on the Torgersen-case:
• via the kind and degree of wear-instrument alone, the experts are
able to identify the true biting-mechanism 60% of the times and
the true negative biting-mechanism 60% of the times.
• the experts thus have a false positive rate of 40% and a false
negative rate of 40%.
This distribution is justified by (a) the belief that the Torgersen-experts’
diagnostic situation was similar to those of the accuracy-studies involv-
ing similarly ill defined characteristics, particularly the characteristic
of area (Martin-de las Heras et al. (2007)) and (b) the belief that
even if a bitemark is classified to have medium forensic significance on
the Pretty-scale (see specification of K0 in chapter nine) the risk of
misdiagnosis should be larger than that of rotation/position.
Available studies indicate that rotation/position is a simpler
phenomenon, easier to agree on, than that of area. Firstly, Martin-
de las Heras et al. (2007) is direct evidence of this as is the similar
specification of rotation/position in Martin-de las Heras et al. (2007),
Rawson et al. (1984), and Bernitz et al. (2005). A specification found
useful by three studies might not seem much, but in bitemark-analysis
it is. Secondly, area was not uniformly perceived despite perception-
guidelines (Martin-de las Heras et al. (2007)). And thirdly kind and
degree of wear is suspected to be even more prone to varying percep-
tions than area, particularly as no observation guideline or standard
exists: No study of any kind even mentions wear as a possibly relevant
characteristic in bitemark-analysis, while both rotation/position and
area are among the most frequently mentioned and studied (together
with inter-canine-distance and missing teeth).
310
The justifications for my choices about diagnostic accuracy via wear
are thus not solid and should not be used for practical purposes. They
may, however, be used for the purpose of this chapter, to illustrate
alternative methodology.
Assumption 5c. BMI142 and BMI24a: Observing and classify-
ing the bitemark and the suspect’s biting-mechanism with respect
to existence of object in position 4a and 42 respectively. In the
Torgersen-case the question about the existence of a sub-mark between the
sub-marks nr. 4 and 5 was a central issue. All the experts involved across
time and parties agreed that there was a space between the sub-marks nr.
4 and 5: all the court-appointed experts agreed that the submarks nr. 4,
5, and 6 had been caused by teeth 43, 41, and 31, respectively. Only after
repeated questioning by the defense did the modern court-appointed experts
state that a suspect having tooth 42 present is compatible with having a
bitemark without a clear impression from that tooth: Particularly if tooth
42 was smaller than the adjacent teeth 41 and 43 would this be possible.
Torgersen’s biting-mechanism had a 42 slightly smaller than both 41 and 43.
The expert-witnesses assisting the defense disagreed: They claimed there to
be no mark in position 4a and that this is only possible if the causal biting-
mechanism either did not have a tooth 42 or that this tooth was severely
damaged. Senn (1999) argued that his experiment with a model claimed
to be from the suspect’s teeth consistently made a mark when pressed into
dental wax. But the authenticity of that model became questioned and none
of the experts opined on the mobility of teeth in general or the mobility of
Torgersen’s 42 in particular. And they clearly disagreed about the skin’s
ability to register impact from teeth 42 of a kind similar to that of Torg-
ersen. None of the experts opined on the prevalence of absent, damaged, or
small tooth 42 in any relevant population. And, by December 2008, no stud-
ies of the effect of mechanisms activated during the biting-process existed.
Finally, the experts did not provide any estimates for the possibilities that
their classifications or diagnoses were wrong. To pursue the illustration of
the methodology and the model from the previous chapters will assume that
5c1. the experts used the instruments of BMI142 and BMI24a when classi-
fying existence42 of the biting-mechanism and existence4a the bitemark
respectively;
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5c2. they reported the suspect’s biting-mechanism to have profile
BMI142 = bmi142sbm and the bitemark to have profile
BMI24a = bmi24acbm;
5c3. these two profiles are the objects’ true profiles (no false
positives/negatives for these decisions). This assumption is done for
simplifying purposes.
5c4. the proportion of biting-mechanisms in the relevant population sharing
the same bmi142-profile as the suspect is 50% and the proportion with
a different profile, ¬bmi142, is 50%. This distribution is justified by the
lack of information about this characteristic in the relevant population
(biting-mechanisms in Oslo 1958).
5c5. of all the biting-mechanisms which will cause bmi24a-profiled bitemarks,
50% will have the same profile as the suspect, bmi142, and 50% will
have a different profile, ¬bmi142. The justification for this distribu-
tion is (a) the inability to discriminate between the available expert-
information about this relationship.
5c6. the experts, their perceptions and observations of existence 4a and
existence 42 under in conditions similar to those of the Torgersen-case,
have a very poor accuracy:
• via existence4a and existence42 alone, the experts are able to
identify the true biting-mechanism 50% of the times and the true
negative biting-mechanism 50% of the times.
• the experts thus have a false positive rate of 50% and a false
negative rate of 50%.
This distribution is justified by the lack of agreement/knowledge among
experts and studies about the effects of mechanisms activated during
the biting-process — the expert-knowledge provides no more informa-
tion than the tossing of a coin.
Assumption 5d. BMI131, 41 and BMI25, 6: Observing and classify-
ing the bitemark and the suspect’s biting-mechanism with respect
to labio-lingual relationship between sub-marks 5 and 6 and be-
tween teeth 41 and 31: In the Torgersen-case the question about the
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labio-lingual relationships between the sub-marks nr. 5 and 6, and that
of the suspect’s teeth 41 and 31 became an issue. All the experts involved
across time and parties agreed that the marks were labio-lingually related op-
positely that of the suspect’s teeth. Again, only after repeated questioning
by the defence did the modern court-appointed experts state that a suspect
having teeth 41 and 31 labio-lingually related as the suspect is compatible
with having a bitemark with corresponding marks oppositely related: This
was explained by the properties of the skin. The expert-witnesses assisting
the defense disagreed — claiming it to exclude Torgersen as the biter. The
court-experts appealed to the effect of skin-properties when explaining the
possibility of the opposite relationship, but did not appeal to the other mech-
anisms activated during the biting. The expert-witnesses for the defense did
not comment at all about the effects of these mechanisms. Nor could they
appeal to any published knowledge about such relationships as no studies
existed by 2001. No studies had been performed by December 2008 either.
To pursue the illustration of the methodology and the model from the
previous chapters I will assume that
5d1. the expert used the instruments of BMI141, 31 and BMI25, 6 when
classifying labio-lingual5,6 of the bitemark and labio-lingual41,31of the
biting-mechanism respectively;
5d2. they reported the suspect’s biting-mechanism to have profile
BMI141, 31 = bmi141, 31sbm and the bitemark to have profile
BMI25, 6 = bmi25, 6cbm;
5d3. the two profiles are the objects’ true profiles (no false
positives/negatives for these decisions). This assumption is done for
simplifying purposes.
5d4. the proportion of biting-mechanisms in the relevant population sharing
the same profile as the suspect is 50% and the proportion with a dif-
ferent profile, ¬bmi141, 31, is 50%. This distribution is justified by the
lack of information about this characteristic in the relevant population
(biting-mechanisms in Oslo 1958).
5d5. of all the biting-mechanisms which will cause bmi25, 6-profiled bitemarks
50% have profile bmi141, 31 and 50% have a different profile, ¬bmi141, 31.
The justification for this distribution is the inability to discriminate be-
tween the available expert-information about this relationship.
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5d6. the expert’s perceptions and observations of labio-lingual 5,6 and labio-
lingual 41,31 under conditions similar to the Torgersen-case yields very
poor diagnostic accuracy:
• via labio-lingual5,6 and labio-lingual41,31 alone, experts are able
to identify the true biting-mechanism 50% of the times and true
negative biting-mechanism 50% of the times.
• the expert thus has a false positive rate of 50% and a false negative
rate of 50%.
This distribution is justified by the judgment that the current state
of expert agreement and experience/knowledge about the relationship
between labio-lingual5,6 and labio-lingual41,31 is poor — providing a
discriminating power similar to that of tossing a coin.
Assumption 5e. The relationship among the characteristics ob-
served of the biting-mechanisms and among those observed of the
bitemark I will, finally, assume independence between BMI1m, BMI1a,
BMI142, and BMI141, 31 and independence between BMI2m, BMI2a,
BMI24a, and BMI25, 6. The experts on the Torgersen-case did not com-
ment on the issue of dependence/independence between the characteris-
tic observed. And the literature on bitemark-analysis contains no pub-
lished studies of the relationship between teeth-wear and kinds of teeth-
rotation/positioning or any similar relationships relevant for forensic
bitemark-analysis. I know of general odontological studies of such relation-
ships concerning teeth, but chose not to review these as I would not be able to
assess their relevance to bitemark-analysis. The bitemark-literature did not
contain studies referring to these studies either. The question of dependency
between characteristics seems not to be found relevant to bitemark-analysts
— most likely because their current methodology does not induce this ques-
tion. The profiling-instruments specified above may just as well be dependent
— due to a common cause such as kind of occlusion, jaw-size, etc. and/or
due to the mechanisms activated during the biting-process. It is impossible
for me to opine on the nature of such dependencies as I am no odontologist.
The only criterion for choosing independence is thus that it makes the anal-
ysis simpler. The consequence if I am wrong, which is a real possibility, is
that the discriminating power is wrong. This, again, is not serious as long
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the single aim is to illustrate the methodology and the model of the previous
chapters.
Assumption 6. The profiling for diagnosing simultaneity
In the Torgersen-case, according to the written reports, no expert or in-
vestigator profiled any items for determining the simultaneity between the
bitemark and the crime act. The diagnosis about simultaneity is a necessary
criterion for deciding about the relevance of the bitemark to the crime act.
The investigators thus repeatedly decided, consciously or not, that the pro-
files, their relevance, and their similarity were sufficiently justified by expert-
information. In order to proceed with the illustration of the methodology
and the model I will have to assume that the expert used a given profil-
ing instrument, TI, containing the characteristics relevant for determining
simultaneity.
The kind of characteristics included in a TI will depend on how close in
time he investigator needs ”simultaneity” to mean. In one-offender bitemark-
cases it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which a bitemark is made
by one person minutes before yet unrelated to the crime act that in turn is
caused by another person. If we stretch the simultaneity to mean one hour,
this possibility becomes more than just speculation. The latter would be a
relevant possibility in the Torgersen-case.
In the forensic literature on the question of the age or timing of skin-
injuries, immunohistochemical markers have been identified which enable
discrimination down to minutes. These markers are however not been vali-
dated for practical forensic case-work and there are yet no accuracy studies of
diagnosis via these markers. Cruder histological markers, enabling discrim-
ination between hours and days are better studied. So, if the investigator
needs simultaneity to mean within an hour, the investigator must use case-
specific non-medical kinds of information.
In the Torgersen-case four of the individual marks of the bitemark were
agreed to have disrupted the epidermis and the dermis, which means that a
certain force must be assumed to have been used. If the bitemark was made
during an event unrelated to the crime event, this in turn means that the
victim must have been involved in two violent interactions on the same day,
the bitemark having been made consensually or not. This is possible — the
victim may have been abnormally prone to abuse. The information available
suggests that the victim in the Torgersen-case was not particularly prone to
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abuse.
On the other hand it is of course possible that the bitemark occurred
simultaneously with the crime event. The nature of the crime scene, with
the clothes having been torn off the way it had, strongly suggesting a sex-
ual attach, is information relevant to this possibility. Due to (a) the lack of
both case-based and general information about the medical forensic markers
for diagnosing simultaneity and (b) the lack of information about the vic-
tim’s propensity for being abused I will assume the following scenario to be
representative:
6a. The investigator and the bitemark-expert or the forensic examiner used
the instrument of TI — which involves both histological markers and
non-expert circumstantial information — when classifying the bitemark
and the control-injury;
6b. They agreed to report the bitemark to have profile TI = ticbm and the
control-injury to have profile TI = tili;
6c. I will assume for simplicity that these two profiles are the objects’ true
profiles (no false positives/negatives for these classification-decisions);
6d. I will suggest that the probability that the victim had been exposed
to two independent violent interactions on the same evening (that the
bitemark and the control-injury are effects of different processes) is set
at 0.05. The probability that they are the effect of the same mechanism
is then 0.95. Again, my choice is motivated solely by the purpose of
illustrating the methodology and the model and does not aspire to be
a best estimate.
6e. According to the epistemological norms I should further assume that
the experts and the TI-instruments are not perfectly able to discrimi-
nate between the two possibilities. Having no other justification than
the need to illustrate the methodology and the model of the previous
chapters I will suggest that the decision-makers are able to detect 80%
of the true simultaneous cases and 80% of the true not simultaneous
cases. The risk that this estimate is wrong is real, but the consequences
of being wrong are considered to be less serious given this purpose than
if the purpose was to arrive at a best estimate. For the latter purpose I
would have had to be much more careful and included far more relevant
information.
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Assumption 7. The value of the possible consequences in the case.
In any bitemark-case the possible consequences are of a kind and order similar
to those specified in the previous chapter. The investigator can either decide
a1, that the bitemark-proposition is positively relevant to the indictment-
proposition conditional on the profiles observed, and be either correct, con-
tributing to convict a true offender, or wrong, contributing to convict a true
innocent; or decide a0, that the bitemark-proposition is negatively relevant
to the indictment-proposition conditional on the profiles observed, and be
either correct, contributing to acquit a true innocent, or wrong, contributing
to acquit a true offender. In the previous chapter I suggested that the val-
ues associated with the possible consequences of the possible decisions in the
crime investigator’s bitemark-problem could be represented via utility and
denoted as follows:
(c1 through c4) ∼ ck, k = {1, 2, 3, 4}; Value associated with ck ∼ U(ck),
U(ck) = (uc1 , uc2 , uc3 , uc4); c1 denoting an extreme consequence, the abso-
lutely best; c2 denoting the consequence next most valued; c3 denoting the conse-
quence next least valued; and c4 denoting an extreme consequence, the absolute
worst.
The magnitude of the values, however, may depend on the legal injury
under investigation: An injury involving the death of a physically weaker
or dependent person in addition to sexual assault is more serious than that
involving equally strong individuals and not resulting in death. In a case
similar to the Torgersen-case, involving the death of a 16 years old girl and
possibly sexual assault is undeniably serious. Should the distances between
the possible losses be equal? Would the loss in value when moving from the
consequence c1 (”contributing to convict a true guilty”) to c2 (”contributing
to acquit a true innocent”) be felt equally serious to the losses of moving from
c2 to c3 (contributing to acquit a true guilty”) and from c3 to c4 (”contributing
to convict true innocent”)? I believe it would not: The loss involved moving
from c1 to c2 would be small compared to that when moving from c2 to c3
and to that when moving from c3 to c4, but the loss when moving from c2
to c3 should be larger than the loss involved when moving from c3 to c4. I
suggest and assume that the following distribution is a better model of the
possible losses than that of equal losses:
uc1 = 10; uc2 = 8; uc3 = 4; uc4 = 1.
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Assumption 8. The Bayesian Network given the above assumptions
The Bayesian network for the scenario conditional on the assumptions of 1














Figure 11.1: A Bayesian network for assessing the bitemark-proposition in the case ap-
proximating that of the Torgersen-case (the nodes hosts variables representing the same
events as above, only that the suspect, bitemark, teeth/biting-mechanism etc. are partic-
ularized to a case representing K0, the context-condition specified in the first section).
Denoting the pairs of characteristics by i,(i = m, a, (4a(42)), (5, 6(41.31)))
The corresponding likelihood-ratio to this network is as follows:
LR =
{∏
P (bmi2icbm | bmi1isbm, BM11)
}











[sim+ ((1− β)(1− sim))]
(11.1)
The parameters which need to be assessed are then the following:
• BM1 and BM0: Whether the suspect or someone else made the bitemark simulta-
neously with the control-injury;
• BM11 and BM10: Whether the suspect or someone else’ teeth/biting-mechanism
is the causal object of the bitemark;
• BM21 and BM20: Whether the bitemark was made simultaneously or not with
the control-injury.
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The numerical specification of these parameters requires an assessment
of the conditional and the unconditional probabilities. This is the topic of
the next section.
11.2 The numerical specification of the con-
ditional and the unconditional probabil-
ities
11.2.1 The node hosting BMj: The prior probabilities
that the suspect versus another person made
the bitemark simultaneously with the legally
relevant injury
What is the prior probability that the suspect made the bitemark simulta-
neously with the legally relevant injury? This uncertainty and its comple-
ment — the uncertainty about the possibility that another person made the
bitemark simultaneously or not with the legally relevant injuries — must
be assessed and suggested before the other conditional uncertainties can be
assessed. This assessment is just a methodological answer to a basic epis-
temic need recognized by most epistemological theories: To assess the uncer-
tainty of a particular event we need to identify the most appropriate or best
reference-class, reference-basis, reference-population, or collection of initially
similar situations/individuals by which to compare and assess whether the
effect or value of the expert-information is large, small, or indifferent.
Just like the patients of a primary physician are unique individuals, so are
the cases of the crime-investigator: An individual patient’s symptoms or an
individual case’s traces may resemble those of other patients/cases, but the
background-conditions will be different; two patients may complain about
chest-pain, heart-problem may be abduced as a possible cause for both, but
heart-problem will be much less likely for the physically active teenager than
for the inactive but busy corporate manager — because heart-problems are
much more frequent among inactive busy corporate managers than among
physically active teenagers. The physician knows about these different base-
or population-rates by his/her training, personal and others experience of
patients, and scientific studies — so he/she will set the prior probabilities of
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heart-problem differently for the two groups. This will be analogue to the
situation of the crime-investigator: Two cases, both presenting a murdered
and raped young female victim and an arrested individual male, will both
have that the arrested male is abduced as a possible cause, but the prior
probability that he is the cause will be different in the two cases due to
case-particularities.
The finding of the most appropriate reference-basis is familiar to crime
investigation and legal assessment of the relevance of evidence: The Interna-
tional Journal of Evidence and Proof, 2007;11:243-317 for example, contains
a series of papers on the problem of reference-class in legal assessments of
evidence. Some of the papers here even use the legal need to identify the
best comparison-basis as an argument against formal approaches in the legal
context — because formal approaches, it is claimed, will be biased towards
classes for which knowledge already exists and preferably then in numerical
form (Roberts 2007)! This must be a misunderstanding. The reference-class
problem is central to any person needing to assess the value of something
in a conditioned situation — and the more important it is to get that value
right, the more important it is to get the reference-class right. The risk of
choosing wrong/inappropriate reference-populations via formal methodolo-
gies is no greater or less than via informal methodologies as both is used for
the purpose of relevant assessments.
In the Torgersen-case Torgersen was abduced as a possible cause due to
initial information about the time and place of his arrest (and possibly his
previous police-records). These characteristics made it physically possible
that he could be the offender. But the written sources do not give any
clues to how the investigator reasoned about the reference-class or base-
rate for the initial probability that Torgersen was the cause of the injuries:
If only presence in time and place were the initial characteristics then the
number of other possible offenders would have been quite large considering
the crime scene being in urban semi-residential area and it being a Friday
night; but if one includes a police record containing a previous conviction of
rape, the suspect-population becomes rather small. I am not certain whether
the Norwegian legal system allows previous convictions to be relevant or not.
In the following I will omit this characteristic, but I will in the next section
illustrate how the value of the bitemark-evidence change when the reference-
class change, when we include more relevant information, possibly in the
form of previous convictions. The investigator of course reflected about other
possible suspects as well as the base-rate, but neither the first nor the modern
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investigators seems to think of the reference-populations as a methodological
instrument by which to assess, express, and justify their conclusion about
the strength of probability that Torgersen was the offender. Neither did
the bitemark-experts on the Torgersen-case with respect to their diagnoses
— and neither would any bitemark-expert according to the review of the
analytical norms among bitemark-analysts in chapter 7. As said above, most
epistemological theories and certainly Bayesian Theory recognize the need
for reference-classes, and the BNs-methodology of this dissertation requires
the analyst to formulate and justify it explicitly.
To proceed I will therefore suggest a reference-population in terms of
a prior probability of BM1 — i.e., the probability that the suspect is the
one who bit simultaneously with the control-injury after the investigator has
seen the crime scene and the victim and decided a possible time for the
crime act (T = t0), but before the investigator has received any other infor-
mation from experts or witnesses. According to the principle of innocence,
the person arrested and suspected should, before any information is system-
atically assessed for relevance, be perceived to be neither more nor less a
likely offender than any other person which could possibly have committed
this crime. In our case and in the Torgeresen-case, the suspect was arrested
approximately at 00.58 am, 500m from the crime scene 30 minutes prior to
the alarm went at the fire-department (received call 1.27am). The last cer-
tain observation of the victim was by a neighbor at the address of the crime
scene at 11.00pm. The sources has no information on how the first investiga-
tor reasoned about the suspect-population, but say that it is not completely
wrong to say that any person within 1 km of the crime scene in the time
interval between 11.00 pm and 1.30am is a possible suspect. How many per-
sons would this be? 2000? 20? Let us say that a reasonable estimate is
350 persons — assuming the offender to have been an adult but not older
than 80 years. This figure must of course be justified in practice. Can the
crime investigator limit more? The kind of circumstances and injuries of the
crime scene may be reason for anticipating that the offender was an adult
male (to be justified again). Say for my limited purpose of illustration that
this leaves a suspect population of 100. In the last section I will study how
a larger or smaller population affects the results. The point now is just to
establish a base-population to which we may related the expert-information
on the bitemark. A suspect-population of 100 persons gives that the prior
probability of the possibility that an identified suspected person is the cause,
P (BM1), is 0.01 — since the suspect is one of these 100 persons. As there
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are 99 other possible unidentified suspects, the probability that any of these
is the cause, P (BM0), is 0.99.
11.2.2 The node hosting BM2j: The prior probabilities
that the bitemark was made simultaneously or
not with the control-injury
Above, degree of certainty about the event of BM2, P (BM21), was denoted
by sim. Before any case-specific information is related systematically to the
alternative possibilities the crime-investigator may suspect that the bitemark
was made simultaneously with the lethal injuries — due to the site of the
bitemark and the other characteristics suggesting a sexualized crime. A
conservative estimate of the prior uncertainty about simultaneity is therefore
to let it be just as probable as its opposite possibility: P (BM21) = sim = 0.5
and (P (BM20) = 1− sim = 0.5.
How is this prior probability changed by the information on the histo-
logical markers and the case-specific non-medical information — when the
bitemark and the control-injury has been profiled by the TI-instrument? I
assumed in the previous section that the items’ profiles were informed to
be ticbm and tili (and without error). It was further assumed that similar
TI-profiles may be observed even if the bitemark was caused during an event
unrelated to the crime event: The probability of observing similar profiles
when the bitemark was made some hours earlier during an irrelevant event
was suggested to be 0.05; and the probability of observing similar profiles
were the bitemark made during the crime event were suggested to be 0.95. It
was further assumed that the investigator and the expert are able to detect
80% of the true simultaneous cases and 80% of the true non-simultaneous
cases.
What would then be the posterior probability of sim, conditional on
this expert-information? This question is suggested formally expressed and
answered as follows:
P (BM21 | ticbm, tili) = P (ticbm|tili,BM21)·P (BM21)P (ticbm|tili,BM21)·P (BM21)+P (ticbm|tili,BM20)·P (BM20) .




There are basically two possibilities to assess: The experts have reported to
have observed the two profiles, but what is the probability of this observation
conditional on each of the two possible states of BM2j —
P (ticbm | tili, BM21) and P (ticbm | tili, BM20)?
P (ticbm | tili, BM21): In the case the bitemark and the control-injury are
simultaneous, then the probability of observing similar profiles is 0.95.
P (ticbm | tili, BM20): In this scenario the bitemark and the control-injury
are not simultaneous — the probability of observing similar profiles is then
0.05.
The local value of expert-information on the TI-marker for the two sam-
ples is VBM2j = 0.95/0.05 — or, in odds, the value is 19:1 in favor of the
suspected hypothesis.
Given the conditional independence between the BMj and the BM2j we
may proceed to update the uncertainty of the latter now: How much has this
information changed the prior probability of the suspected hypothesis? If
my suggested prior probability of 0.5 is reasonable, the posterior probability
of BM21 may be calculated as follows:
P (BM21 | ticbm, tili) = P (ticbm|tili,BM21)P (BM21)P (ticbm|tili,BM21)P (BM21)+P (ticbm|tili,BM20)P (BM20)
= 0.95·0.5(0.95·0.5)+(0.05·0.5) = 0.95.
The posterior probability of the alternative hypothesis, P (BM20) is then
1− 0.95 = 0.05..
The experts agreed that the bite-mark and the control-injury in this case
are simultaneous and this must be accounted for: What is the probability
that the experts are correct when they report that the two injuries occurred
simultaneously? Denoting the expert-report by Wsim and recalling assuming
them to be accredited at 80% accuracy,
P (BM21 | Wsim) = 0.95 · 0.8
(0.95 · 0.8) + (0.05 · 0.2) = 0.987.
We may let these posterior probabilities represent sim and 1 − sim re-
spectively: sim = 0.987 and 1− sim = 0.013.
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Before we can insert these results into the likelihood-ratio suggested for
the investigator’s bitemark-problem we must attend to the other nodes in
the network.
11.2.3 The node hosting BM1j
The probability of the possible events of BM1 is, according to my suggested
model, conditional on BMj and BM2j. In the previous chapter I explained
that the probabilities of BM11 and BM0 conditional on BM21 and BM1
before any information is received about the relevant profiles of the bitemark
and the suspect’s biting-mechanism will logically be 1 and 0 respectively.
The probabilities of the other possibilities are derived the same way and are
tabulated in table 1:
BM1 BM0
BM21 BM20 BM21 BM20
BM11 BM10 BM11 BM10 BM11 BM10 BM11 BM10
1 0 1 0 0 1 β 1− β
Table 11.1: The probabilities of BM1j conditional on BM2j and BMj.
11.2.4 The node hosting bmi2mcbm:
This is the event that the bitemark is reported by the bitemark-experts to
have the profile bmi2mcbm on the rotation/position-index, BMI2m. This
report was assumed for simplifying reasons to be a true positive. The experts
were further assumed to have recommended (a) that the suspect’s biting-
mechanism had the profile of bmi1msbm (also assumed to be a true positive)
and (b) that the two profiles were compatible with each other. This is part of
the bitemark-experts’ justification why they recommend the suspect’s biting-
mechanism to be the most likely causal teeth/biting-mechanism.
In section one of this chapter I assumed the possibility that
biting-mechanisms could be classified via the BMI1m-index to be either a
bmi1m or a ¬bmi1m, and that bmi1m was shared by 40% of the relevant
population and ¬bmi1m by 60%. Both these kinds of biting-mechanisms
can produce bitemarks (of the subgroup specified in the previous chapter) on
human skin which either may be classified as bmi2m or ¬bmi2m via a cor-
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responding BMI2m-index. The following general possible joint distribution
of biting-mechanisms and bitemarks was suggested and assumed:
bmi1m ¬bmi1m
bmi2m 0.8 · 0.4 = 0.32 0.2 · 0.6 = 0.12 0.44
¬bmi2m 0.2 · 0.4 = 0.08 0.8 · 0.6 = 0.48 0.56
0.4 0.6 1.00
Table 11.2: Suggested distribution of biting-mechanisms and bitemarks on
human skin with respect to possible states on rotation/position-indexes,
BMI1m and BMI2m.
There are basically two possibilities to assess: The expert reported that
the two observed profiles were compatible, but what is the probability of
this observation conditional on each of the two possible states of BM11 —
P (bmi2mcbm | cbm1msbm, BM11) and P (bmi2mcbm | cbm1msbm, BM10)?
P (bmi2mcbm | bmi1msbm, BM11)
In this scenario the suspect is the only individual involved and his biting-
mechanism is the true causal object of the bitemark. When the expert is
perfect in the profiling of each of the two forensic objects and it is certain that
the suspect is the only individual involved, the likelihood that the suspect’s
biting-mechanism, having profile bmi1m, made this bitemark with its bmi2m-
profile is:
P (bmi2mcbm | bmi1msbm) =
P (bmi1msbm|bmi2mcbm)P (bmi2mcbm)
P (bmi1msbm|bmi2mcbm)P (bmi2mcbm)+P (bmi1msbm|¬bmi2mcbm)P (¬bmi2mcbm) =
0.8·0.4
0.8·0.4+0.2·0.4 = 0.8
This may then be used as the value of the first term in the nominator of
the overall likelihood ratio VBM .
P (bmi2mcbm | (bmi1m¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1m¬sbm), BM10)
In this scenario someone else’s biting-mechanism — with profile bmi1m¬sbm
or profile ¬bmi1m¬sbm — is the relevant reference-basis:
P (bmi2mcbm | bmi1m¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1m¬sbm) =
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P (bmi1m¬sbm∪¬bmi1m¬sbm)|bmi2mcbm)P (bmi2mcbm)
P (bmi1m¬sbm∪¬bmi1m¬sbm)|bmi2mcbm)P (bmi2mcbm) =
+P (bmi1m¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1m¬sbm) | ¬bmi2mcbm)P (¬bmi2mcbm)
0.44
1 = 0.44
This is also what is sometimes called the ”random match”-probability —
the probability of randomly finding a biting-mechanism which could make a
bmi2m-profiled bitemark under circumstances similar to our case. Its size is
very large compared to that in DNA-cases. This is because almost half of
the relevant population of biting-mechanisms could have made a bitemark
with the observed profile: The profile is simply not very rare and therefor
has not much discriminatory power. This ”random match” probability was
in the previous chapter denoted by γ. The probability of observing the rota-
tion/position-profile of the bitemark when someone else’s biting-mechanism
is the cause of the bitemark will be denoted by γm: γm = 0.44.
I also justified and suggested that the expert’s ability to diagnose correctly
when using the rotation/position-characteristic alone could be estimated to
be 80% true positives and 20% false positives. In a practical case, however,
I find it difficult to justify that the expert would first diagnose according
to rotation/position and then move on to diagnose according to another
characteristic independently of the previous conclusion. In practical cases
there is, in other words, a distinct possibility that the diagnoses via the
chosen characteristics are dependent on each other. As I find this possibility
more likely than that of independence I will postpone the assessment of the
joint expert-accuracy until the end of this section.
11.2.5 Node bmi2acbm
This is the event that the bitemark is reported by the bitemark-experts to
have the profile bmi2acbm on the kind and degree of wear-index, BMI2a.
This report was assumed for simplifying reasons to be a true positive. The
experts was further assumed to have recommended (a) that the suspect’s
biting-mechanism had the profile of bmi1asbm (also assumed to be a true
positive) and (b) that the two profiles are compatible with each other and
is part of the bitemark-experts’ justification why they recommend the sus-
pect’s biting-mechanism to be the most likely causal biting-mechanism —
that BM11 is more likely than BM10.
In section one of this chapter I assumed the possibility that biting- mech-
326
anisms could be classified via the BMI1a-index to be either a bmi1a or
a ¬bmi1a, and that bmi1a was shared by 5% of the relevant population
and ¬bmi1a by 95%. Both these kinds of biting-mechanisms can produce
bitemarks (of the subgroup specified in the previous chapter) on human
skin which either may be classified as bmi2a or ¬bmi2a via a correspond-
ing BMI2a-index. The following general possible distribution of biting-
mechanisms and bitemarks was suggested and assumed:
bmi1a ¬bmi1a
bmi2a 0.8 · 0.05 = 0.04 0.2 · 0.95 = 0.19 0.23
¬bmi2a 0.2 · 0.05 = 0.01 0.8 · 0.95 = 0.76 0.77
0.05 0.95 1.00
Table 11.3: Suggested distribution of teeth/biting-mechanisms and
bitemarks on human skin with respect to possible states on wear-indexes,
BMI1a and BMI2a.
Again there are basically two possibilities to assess: The experts have
reported to have observed the two profiles, but what is the probability of
this observation conditional on each of the two possible states of BM1j —
P (bmi2acbm | bmi1asbm, BM11) and P (bmi2acbm | (bmi1a¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1a¬sbm), BM10)?
P (bmi2acbm | bmi1asbm, BM11)
The reasoning will be analogue to that of the previous characteristic:
P (bmi2acbm | bmi1asbm) =P (bmi1asbm|bmi2acbm)P (bmi2acbm)P (bmi1asbm) =
0.8·0.0.5
0.8·0.05+0.2·0.05 = 0.8
This may then be used as the value of the second term in the nominator
of the overall likelihood ratio VBM .
P (bmi2acbm | (bmi1a¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1a¬sbm), BM10)
In this scenario someone else’s biting-mechanism — with profile bmi1a¬sbm
or profile ¬bmi1a¬sbm — is the reference-group:
P (bmi2a¬cbm | (bmi1a¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1a¬sbm), BM10) = 0.23
This is then the random ”match”-probability via wear alone.
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The size of this probability is still quite large compared to that in DNA-
cases, but it is smaller than via rotation/position. The suggested low pro-
portion of people with biting-mechanism having a kind and degree of wear
similar to the suspect’s mechanism enables a better discriminatory power via
wear than via rotation/position — if, that is, the expert is good at not only
detecting the symptoms, but also at differentiating among such symptoms
— recognizing this particular wear from other kinds and degrees of wear
(above I justified there to be reason not to expect high accuracy via this
characteristic).
The probability of observing the wear-profile of the bitemark when some-
one else’s teeth/biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark will be denoted
by γa: γa = 0.23
11.2.6 The node hosting bmi24acbm
This is the event that the bitemark is reported by the bitemark-experts to
have the state bmi24acbm on the existence4a-characteristic, BMI24a (the
scale for determining the existence of a sub-mark in the position between
sub-marks nr. 4 and 5). This report was assumed for simplifying reasons to
be a true positive. The expert was further assumed to have recommended
(a) that the suspect’s biting-mechanism was a bmi142sbm (tooth 42 exists
and its height is lower than adjacent teeth) (also assumed to be a true pos-
itive) and (b) that the two states were compatible with each other. This is
the third piece of information used by the bitemark-experts to justify why
they recommend the suspect’s biting-mechanism to be the most likely causal
biting-mechanism.
Above I assumed BMI42 = bmi142 was shared by 50% of the relevant
population and ¬bmi142 by 50%. Both these kinds of biting-mechanisms can
produce bitemarks being classified as bmi24a or ¬bmi2m (”No existence of a
sub-mark in the position between sub-marks 4 and 5”). The following general
possible distribution of biting-mechanisms and bitemarks was suggested and
assumed:
Again two possibilities must be assessed: The expert reported that the
two observed characteristics were compatible, but what is the probability of
this observation conditional on each of the two possible states of BM11 —
P (bmi24acbm | cbm142sbm, BM11) and P (bmi24acbm | cbm142sbm, BM10)?
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bmi142 ¬bmi142
bmi24a 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50
¬bmi24a 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50
0.50 0.50 1.00
Table 11.4: Suggested distribution of biting-mechanisms and bitemarks on
human skin with respect to possible states on 4a(42)-characteristics, BMI142
and BMI24a.
P (bmi24acbm | bmi142sbm, BM11)
Again, In this scenario the suspect is the only individual involved and his
biting-mechanism is the true causal object of the bitemark:
P (bmi24acbm | bmi142sbm, BM11) = 0.5.
This value may then be used for the third term in the nominator of the
overall likelihood ratio VBM .
P (bmi24acbm | (bmi142¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi142¬sbm), BM10)
Again, in this scenario someone else’s biting-mechanism —
with state bmi142¬sbm or ¬bmi142¬sbm — is the reference group:
P (bmi24a¬cbm | (bmi142¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi142¬sbm), BM10) = 0.50
This is then the ”random match”-probability via this characteristic. Its
size is large due to half of the relevant population of biting-mechanisms being
able to make a bitemark with the observed profile. The discriminatory power
achieved via this characteristic was in the previous section justified to be
limited — the court-experts in the Torgersen-case claimed a relatively small
tooth 42 could make a bitemark without a detectable imprint from this tooth
and the defense-experts claimed it would and that a space in the bitemark
implies the absence of tooth 42. And no study exists on the effects of the
visco-elasticity of the skin and or the mobility of teeth. This is the reason
why I suggested that the discriminatory power of this characteristic should
be considered small.
The probability of observing a bitemark with a potential mark 4a when
someone else’s biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark will be denoted
by γ4a: γ4a = 0.50.
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11.2.7 The node hosting bmi25, 6cbm
This is the event that the bitemark is reported by the bitemark-expert to
have the state bmi25, 6cbm on the 5,6(41,31)-characteristic, BMI25, 6 (a scale
for determining the relative labio-lingual positioning between the submarks
5 and 6) ( report assumed to be true positive). The experts were further
assumed to have recommended (a) that the suspect’s biting-mechanism was
a bmi141, 31sbm (the relative labio-lingual positioning between the teeth 41
and 31) (also assumed to be true positive) and (b) that the two states were
compatible with each other. This is part of the bitemark-expert’s justification
why they recommend the suspect’s biting-mechanism to be the most likely
causal biting-mechanism — that BM11 is more likely than BM10.
Above I assumed BMI141, 31 = bmi141, 31 was shared by 50% of the
relevant population and ¬bmi141, 31 by 50%. Both these kinds of biting-
mechanisms can produce bitemarks being classified as either bmi25, 6 or
¬bmi25, 6. The following general possible distribution of biting-mechanisms
and bitemarks was suggested and assumed:
bmi141, 31 ¬bmi141, 31
bmi25, 6 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50
¬bmi25, 6 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50 · 0.50 = 0.25 0.50
0.50 0.50 1.00
Table 11.5: Suggested distribution of biting-mechanisms and bitemarks on
human skin with respect to possible states on 5,6(41,31)-characteristics,
BMI141, 31 and BMI25, 6.
The expert reported that the two observed characteristics were compati-
ble, but what is the probability of this observation conditional on each of the
two possible states of BM11 — P (bmi25, 6cbm | cbm141, 31sbm, BM11) and
P (bmi25, 6cbm | cbm141, 31sbm, BM10)?
P (bmi25, 6cbm | bmi141, 31sbm, BM11)
The suspect is the only individual involved and his biting-mechanism is the
true causal object of the bitemark:
P (bmi25, 6cbm | bmi141, 31sbm, BM11) = 0.50
This value may then be used for the fourth term in the nominator of the
overall likelihood ratio VBM .
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P (bmi25, 6cbm | (bmi141, 31¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi141, 31¬sbm), BM10)
Here someone else’s biting-mechanism — with state bmi141, 31¬sbm or profile
¬bmi141, 31¬sbm — is the reference-basis:
P (bmi25, 6¬cbm | (bmi141, 31¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi141, 31¬sbm), BM10) = 0.50
This is then the ”random match”-probability via this characteristic. The
reason for its size is as for the previous characteristic. And the discriminatory
power achieved via this characteristic must be expected to be small for the
same reasons as for the previous characteristic.
The probability of observing a bitemark with a potential mark 4a when
someone else’s biting-mechanism is the cause of the bitemark will be denoted
by γ5,6(41,31): γ5,6(41,31) = 0.50.
11.2.8 Accounting for variance introduced by the ex-
pert.
In practical case-work one should account for the error and variation in-
troduced by having a particular expert or experts performing the classifi-
cations/profiling of the forensic objects and the diagnoses. This expert(s)
is also the one providing opinion about the appropriate base-rates for the
diagnoses — which thus also may be more or less accurate. In forensic
genetics the experts have access to both evidence-based knowledge as well
as solid expert-consensus concerning the uncertainties involved for the three
decision-tasks above — the particular geneticist involved on a given case may
be expected to adhere to existing guidelines for the different scenarios that
arise in particular cases. This cannot be expected in bitemark-cases given the
current state of knowledge about bitemarks and expert-consensus on relevant
concepts and markers. One may not even expect that the individual expert
follows the guideline offered by the American Board of Forensic Odontology,
the one organization otherwise recognized as an authority in the community
of bitemark-experts.
How should one then account for the variation introduced by individual
experts? Starting with the diagnostic decisions, I noted above the question
about the diagnostic accuracy of a bitemark-expert using the four diagnostic
instruments above. Given the existing level of development with respect to
the diagnostic instruments of bitemark-analyses I found it difficult to justify
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independence between the expert’s conclusions on each: The reasoning and
concluding on each is, I suggested, more likely dependent on each other. The
particular accuracies were suggested to be as follows:
Via rotation/position : P (WBM11 | BM11) = 0.80
Via wear : P (WBM11 | BM11) = 0.60
Via existence4a(42) : P (WBM11 | BM11) = 0.50
Via labio-lingual5,6(41,31) : P (WBM11 | BM11) = 0.50
Via expert-markers and case-markers : P (WBM21 | BM21) = 0.80
But how would the relationship be if contingent on each other? I find
it difficult to justify one particular relationship. For illustrative purposes
I will therefore simply assume that when all and only the four profiling-
instruments are used for diagnosing BM1 in our particular case, the expert
is able to detect 70% of the true causal/non-causal biting-mechanisms:
P (WBM11 | BM11) = 0.70.
and
P (WBM11 | BM10) = 0.30.
The only justification I have is that this is the accuracy achieved in the
one existing most relevant study on accuracy —Whittaker et al. (1998):
In this study, real cases were diagnosed and no specified set of characteristic
were required. The diagnosis concerned, however, only whether the bitemark
was from an adult or child’s biting-mechanism. In the less relevant studies
(due to poor methodology or highly stylized biting-situations) the accuracies
were slightly higher. An accuracy of 0.7 may thus be too high or too low.
But it will have to do until further studies about the accuracy of bitemark-
experts have been performed — and it will do for the purpose of this chapter
and dissertation.
The next possible source of variation stems from the profiling-operations:
just as the decision about the most likely causal biting-mechanism may be
wrong, so may the profile ascribed to the forensic object. Above I assumed
that the states ascribed to both the bitemark and the biting-mechanisms on
their respective four diagnostic instruments were true positives. This may
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not be expected in actual decisions. It is however difficult to justify any given
value for a given expert — but I do suspect that the risks of false positives
for the states of the bitemark should be expected to be larger than those
of the biting-mechanism. Again, the lack of information due to the state
of consensus about concepts and characteristics and the state of knowledge
about bitemark-production makes the choice of distribution difficult. For the
purpose of this chapter and dissertation, while awaiting further information
I will continue with the assumption that the profiling of the forensic objects
is perfectly reliable.
The last source of variation is then the case-expert’s recommended
reference-groups for the diagnoses. In the previous section I justified the
distributions of the characteristics via my own opinion about what could be
agreed to be the proportion of the population having rotation/position being
regular and kind and degree of wear being rare. I suggested 40% and 5%
respectively. But particularly the former could also be as large as 70% —
that would no raise any eyebrow if the population concerned was a modern
European population with its current state of dental health-care — almost
all may have regular teeth today. In Oslo in 1958 — the population relevant
for our bitemark-case — would be different with a smaller proportion having
regular teeth. The point is that as long as few studies exist to support the
expert-opinion concerning the distribution of the characteristics chosen to
be observed the size of the likelihood ratio will dependent on the expert’s
accuracy in a more substantive way than is the case in forensic genetics.
How should this accuracy be estimated? What makes a bitemark-expert
good or poor with respect to assessing proportions of a population having
this or that characteristic? I suggest using solid training in odontology and
forensic odontology, continual practical experience with biting-mechanism
for health-purposes, and a serious interest in biting-mechanisms, bitemarks,
and bitemark-production as relevant markers (bitemark-diagnostic experi-
ence was not relevant in three of the five accuracy studies which exist). If
the expert is one with these qualities I suggest it to be reasonable to expect
a sensitivity of above 60% but less than 90%. I will simply use 90% for both
sensitivity and specificity, assuming the expert in our case to be among the
more reliable: P (W∏ γi | ∏ γi) = 0.90. and P (W∏ γi | ¬(∏ γi)) = 0.10.
Table three lists the unconditional and the conditional probabilities as-
signed to the nodes.
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Prior probability of BM1 0.01
Prior probability of BM0 0.99
Posterior probability of BM21 P (BM21 | ticbm, tili) = sim 0.99
Posterior probability of BM20 P (BM20 | ticbm, tili) = 1− sim 0.01
Conditional probability of BM11 P (BM11 | BM21, BM1) 1.00
Conditional probability of BM10 P (BM10 | BM21, BM1) 0.00
Likelihood of BM11 P (bmi2mcbm | bmi1msbm, BM11) 0.80
(given rotation/position)
Likelihood of BM11 P (bmi2acbm | bmi1asbm, BM11) 0.80
(given kind and degree
of wear)
Likelihood of BM11 P (bmi24acbm | bmi142sbm, BM11) 0.50
(exsistence4a(42))
Likelihood of BM11 P (bmi25, 6cbm | bmi141, 31sbm, BM11) 0.50
(labio-lingual5,6(41,31)
”Random match” probability P (bmi2mcbm | 0.44
(rotation/position) (bmi1m¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1m¬sbm), BM10) = γm
”Random match” probability P (bmi2acbm | 0.23
(wear) (bmi1a¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi1a¬sbm), BM10) = γa
”Random match” probability P (bmi24acbm | 0.50
(existence 4a(42)) (bmi142¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi142¬sbm), BM10) = γ4a(42)
”Random match” probability P (bmi25, 6cbm | 0.50
(labio-lingual5,6(41,31)) (bmi141, 31¬sbm ∪ ¬bmi141, 31¬sbm), BM10) = γ5,6(41,31)
Diagnostic accuracy P (BM11 | WBM11 ) 0.70





Table 11.6: Unconditional and conditional probabilities assigned to the nodes
of the bitemark-network.
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11.3 The likelihood-ratio and the posterior
odds on BMj
The likelihood-ratio of BMj, VBMj , which was derived in the previous chapter
and further specified to contain four independent expert-markers in the first
section of this chapter, may now be used when the crime investigator in
a bitemark-case approximately similar to the Torgersen-case is to assess the
value of the expert-information with respect to the two diagnosis-conclusions
recommended to the investigator.
Recall that the likelihood ratio for our problem was as follows (the pairs
of characteristics being denoted by i, (i = m, a, (4a(42)), (5, 6(41.31)))):
LR =
{∏
P (bmi2icbm | bmi1isbm, BM11)
}











[sim+ ((1− β)(1− sim))]
(11.2)
I need to include the accuracies of the expert with respect to the diagnosis
concerning the causal biting-mechanism and the population distribution of
the characteristics, but I will make a simplifying assumption first: I will let β
be 0; β represents the probability that the suspect made the bitemark during
an event irrelevant to the legal injuries when he/she is also not the offender
of these. Its complement represents the probability that someone else made
the bitemark during an irrelevant event — these either being or not being
the cause of the legally relevant injuries. Assuming a β of 0 or very small is
to say that the population of biters (irrespective of the crime-case) is large.















{∏P (bmi2icbm | bmi1isbm, BM11)} sim
{∏ γi} + (1− sim). (11.4)
Now I may include the expert-accuracies:
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LR =
{∏P (bmi2icbm | bmi1isbm, BM11)}P (WBM11 | BM11)sim
{∏ γi}P (W∏ γi |∏ γi) + (1− sim). (11.5)
= 0.80·0.80·0.50·0.50·0.70·0.9870.44·0.23·0.50·0.50·0.90 +(0.013) =
0.111
0.0228= 4.87
According to this ratio (and the assumptions about independent char-
acteristics) it is 4.87 times more probable to observe this profiled bitemark
under BM1 — i.e., if it were true that the suspect’s bmi1-profiled biting-
mechanism made the bitemark at the specified time-interval — than under
BM0 — i.e., if it were true that someone else made the bitemark. This sig-
nifies that the expert-information on the forensic items makes a small, but
positive difference — favoring BM1 over BM0. I will return to discuss the
crime investigative significance of this ratio in the next section. I must first
consider the posterior posterior odds on BM1 conditional on this information.
The posterior odds on BM1 need to exceed 1 for the bitemark-position to
be positively relevant to the indictment-proposition. I suggested above that
the prior odds on BM1 to be 0.01 (to simplify expressions I will substitute
LR by VBMj to signify that the LR may be interpreted as the value of the
expert information):
P (BM1 | VBMj)













The posterior odds under the suggested prior odds are not greater than
1. As some may find it easier to relate to probabilities rather than odds:
P (BM1 | VBMj) =
P (VBMj | BM1)P (BM1)






The posterior probability that the identified suspect made the bitemark
simultaneously with the legally relevant injury conditional on the expert-
information is 0.0469 — and the probability that someone else made the
bitemark is the complement:
P (BM0) = 1− 0.042 = 0.9531.
Under the assumptions I made about the distributions of the characteris-
tics I chose to include, the forensic evidence can thus be said to be positively
relevant to the bitemark-proposition: It reduces the uncertainty from 0.01
to 0.0469 — when no other information relevant to the case is accounted
for. A likelihood ratio of 4.87 is greater than one — which means that
the expert-information is positively relevant, it does make a difference. In
principle, at least, it is possible to say that this is evidence favoring the
bitemark-proposition. But should the investigator recommend the bitemark-
proposition to the prosecutor? Recalling the Norwegian Board of Forensic
Medicine’s statement about the practice in Scandinavian forensic genetics, in
paternity cases, one is only allowed to speak with weight (”it is very likely”)
that a given man is the father of a child if the likelihood ratio exceeds 19 (or
95%) (The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine 2001:2). A ratio of 4.87,
according to this standard, could thus not be recommended to be very likely,
but something less.
Instead of comparing to the DNA-situation the investigator could ask
about the risk posed to the aims and the values of the decision. The expert-
information is positively relevant to the bitemark-proposition, but the inves-
tigator could either (1) recommend the information as positively relevant and
be correct — thereby convicting the true offender (the best) — or be wrong
— thereby convicting an innocent (the worst); or (2) recommend the infor-
mation as negatively relevant and be correct — thereby acquitting the true
innocent (the next best) — or be wrong — thereby acquitting the true guilty
(the next worst). To assess the risk to aims and values and to evidence-base
the decision the investigator could perform a utility-assessment:
Recall from the previous chapter that the crime investigator can decide
a1, positive relevance, if and only if
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u(a1 | BM1) > u(a0 | BMj),
where
u(ai | BMj) =
∑
u(ck)P (BMj | ai, VBMj , K0)
u(ck) being the value attached to the consequence foreseen if deciding ”posi-
tive relevance” when BMj occurs and P (BMj | ai, VBMj , K0) is the degree of
belief in the occurrence of BMj conditional on the event of deciding ”positive
relevance” while having the profiles observed of the forensic items.
u(a1 | BMj) = uc1P (BM1) + uc4P (BM0) = (10 · 0.042) + (1 · 0.958) = 1.558
u(a0 | BMj) = uc3P (BM1) + uc2P (BM0) = (4 · 0.06) + (8 · 0.94) = 7.832
According to the principle of maximizing expected utility the crime inves-
tigator should choose to decide ”negative relevance”. This means that the
investigator should recommend the prosecutor to not construct and argue
any separate bitemark-means of evidence —because the risk of being wrong,
i.e. the risk of thereby contributing to convict a true innocent, is too high.
11.4 The effect of different reference-classes
In the above case I suggested prior odds on BM11 to be 0.01/0.99 — as I
suggested there to have been 100 persons with the same initial characteristics
(being within 1km radius of the crime scene between 11.00pm and 1.30am)
as the suspect. This number of possible suspects may have been too low or
too high — i.e., this reference-class may be inappropriate.
If we increase the size of the suspect population, then the utility of the
option of recommending positive relevance will only decrease. But what if
the population is smaller than 100 possible suspects — perhaps 50 or less,
say 10? This will happen when other relevant information is accounted for.
The likelihood-ratio will not change with the changing prior odds and neither
will the risks of false positives. But the utility of the option of recommending
”positive relevance” will with fewer suspects sooner or later become larger
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Prior Posterior Posterior Posterior




P (BM0|VBMj ,K0) P (BM1 | VBMj , K0) P (BM0 | VBMj , K0)
0.01/0.99 0.0011/0.0226 0.0469 0.9531 1.422 7.812
0.02/0.98 0.0022/0.0223 0.0905 0.9095 1.814 7.638
0.025/0.975 0.0028/0.0222 0.1119 0.8881 2.007 7.552
0.03/0.97 0.0033/0.0221 0.1299 0.8701 2.169 7.480
0.05/0.95 0.0056/0.0217 0.2051 0.7949 2.846 7.180
0.10/0.90 0.0111/0.0205 0.3512 0.6488 4.161 6.595
0.20/0.80 0.0222/0.0182 0.5495 0.4505 5.946 5.802
Table 11.7: Changing the prior odds on BM1
than the alternative option. Table 11.3 shows how the posterior odds and
the utilities of the decision-options change when the prior odds change:
The option of ”positive relevance” becomes available when the when the
prior odds on BM1 get larger than 0.20.
However, this cannot change the likelihood-ratio. The information pro-
vided by the expert-knowledge concerning the bitemark’s most likely causal
biting-mechanism and most likely time of occurrence stays unaffected by
the other evidence. The time of occurrence of the bitemark, on its own,
yielded a likelihood-rate of 19:1 in favor of BM21: The crime investigator
will be evidence-based when recommending it to be ”very likely” that the
bitemark was made simultaneously with the crime act. But the question
whether it was the suspect’s biting-mechanism or someone else’s which made
the bitemark is far more uncertain. If the investigator assumes that the
bitemark was made at the same time as the legally relevant injury, then the
likelihood that the bitemark was made by the suspect’s biting-mechanism is
4.9:1. This rate assumes that bitemark-experts would agree to the assump-
tions made for this analysis. Unfortunately it is impossible to know this.
The bitemark-experts on the Torgersen-case hesitated to speak about their
reference-classes, reflecting a general hesitance among bitemark-experts to do
so — something which may partly be explained by the current methodologi-
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cal norms adhered to by the experts. This may also explain why the current
state of consensus among bitemark-experts about concepts and characteris-
tics is fragile and the current state of knowledge about the causal mechanisms
involved in bitemark-production in human skin is weak.
11.5 Conclusion.
In this chapter I have demonstrated how a particular subgroup of bitemark-
problems could be solved under certain assumptions about the distribution
of the characteristics involved and about the accuracies of the particular
expert(s) requested to assist on the case. These assumptions were partly
justified by the choices made by the experts in the Torgersen-case, partly
by information in the published literature on bitemark-analysis, and partly
by my own beliefs about natural language adjectives signifying proportions.
The aim has been to demonstrate that evidence-basis may be achieved for
bitemark-problems despite the lack of information of a kind usually associ-
ated with ”evidence-based” knowledge. The criterion of evidence-basis is a
logical and not a statistical one, requiring the decision-maker to close the
space of possibilities — i.e. actually and explicitly specifying the alternative
possibility or possibilities to the one suspected — in order to get a grip on
the risk of incorrect decisions and use this to justify the decision about the
consequences concerning aims and values specified for the decision. The aim
has not been to say anything about the expert-conclusion in the Torgersen-
case: Their conclusion may have correct or wrong, but as long as they did
not want to speak about their reference-bases we may not assess that ques-
tion. This also makes it impossible to assess whether the crime investigative
decisions about the bitemark-means in the Torgersen-case actually achieved
or undermined the aims and values of that decision.
In the last chapter I will relate the methodology and the suggested model
to the worries voiced by Tribe (1971). I will also suggest a bitemark-procedure





The basic question in this dissertation has been what it can and should mean
to have an evidence-based crime investigation. This question has been asked
for ethical, societal/political, and economic reasons. The ethical reasons are
the same as those underlying the legal presumption of innocence and the prin-
ciple that it is better to let ten guilty go free than to convict one innocent:
An individual is as innocent and free as any other individual until evidence
to the contrary is presented by the accuser, in a court of law. The detecting
and assessment whether or not signs of guilt are true signs of guilt, whether
evidence is evidence at all, is a matter of truth alone and is made during the
crime investigative phase, and the suspect remains innocent until true signs
exist. This belief that guilt can only be ascribed given true signs of guilt and
not merely signs of guilt is thus an ethical issue and is reflected in practice
in the separation between the investigative and the prosecutorial office. The
question of what separates good evidence from less good evidence is thus
also an ethical issue as it affects who is ascribed guilt and who is presumed
innocent. The societal/political reasons concerns institutional legitimacy in
modern, or rather, post-modern society: The citizen of modern European ju-
risdictions have become highly educated and is drilled in democratic ideals of
equality and individual rights — they expect public decisions to be backed in
principled reasoning and will protest decisions that only appeals to tradition
or authority. This dissertation has been an effort to suggest principles for
reasoning tailored to the crime investigative problem-situation, principles be-
lieved to answer this more demanding public. The economic reasons are the
decreasing public budget at the same time as technologies rapidly changes
and becomes more advanced, the amount of information only grows, and the
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kinds of crime change. Choices will have to be made and the prioritizing
must also be principled.
In the public health sector the principle of ”evidence-based medicine” is
seen as a sound principle for balancing the ethical, societal/political, and
economic concerns. It is increasingly being enforced for not only decisions
about treatment but also diagnostic decisions. In this dissertation I have
argued that there are no epistemological differences between the inference-
situation of the clinical diagnostician and that of the crime investigator: In
both situations, the decision-maker has to make a choice and decide which
of a set of alternative causal mechanisms is the most likely for a particu-
lar, uniquely conditioned, case, and the consequences of wrong decisions are
equally grave. I thus suggest that the same basic principle as that underlying
evidence-based medicine can be an equally sound principle for balancing the
ethical, societal/political, and economic concerns relevant to crime investiga-
tive decisions.
When formulated in the terms relevant for the crime investigative context,
the basic principle is identified to be the following:
Premise 1.
A crime investigative decision that a means of evidence is posi-
tively relevant with respect to a suspected hypothesis formulated
in the terms of the anticipated indictment is evidence-based if
and only if (1) the expected utility of a given set of observations
(made by any kind of witness — lay, expert, or crime-investigator)
is greater under the suspected hypothesis than under the negation
of that hypothesis and (2) the expected utility of the given set
of observations under the negation of the suspected hypothesis
is justified (explicitly) to be sufficiently small for the anticipated
role of the means of evidence.
In this dissertation I have analyzed the current crime investigative prin-
ciples of reasoning, or norms of inference, for a delimited subgroup of crime
investigative decision-problems — namely decisions about bitemark-means,
in which forensic bitemark-experts are needed to assist on the analyses of
the conditions involved. For this purpose I studied (1) the expert-reasoning
behind a series of crime investigative decisions made about a bitemark-means
in a historical case and (2) the reasoning of bitemark-experts as this is ex-
pressed in studies of the mechanisms involved in bitemark-production. In
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the historical case, the experts did not provide the kind of information re-
quired for the crime investigative decision to be evidence-based according to
the standard specified above, and only a minor proportion of the published
studies did so for their decision to be evidence-based.
I had to conclude that the principle of inference identified for the bitemark-
experts’s reasoning — which I labelled ”abduction with incomplete or open
induction” — more likely than not is descriptive of the crime investigative
reasoning as well. This does not mean that crime investigative decisions
about bitemark-means are always wrong. But it does mean that there are
then no inter-subjective means available to assess whether they are more
often correct than wrong. In practice, it means that we have no precise in-
strument by which to assess whether the aims and values intended by these
decision are more often achieved than not — or, in yet other words: we have
no instrument by which to assess whether these decisions more often than
not contribute to convict the true guilty and acquit the true innocent and
thus protects the values expressed by the presumption of innocence and the
principle of letting ten guilty free before convicting one innocent.
And neither does it mean that ”abduction with incomplete or open in-
duction” is generally wrong: It is probably the inference strategy most nat-
ural to most people and is the one most efficient when time is limited, the
consequences are not too serious, or when there are good reasons to under-
communicate uncertainty. The latter is the case at the end of the trial-phase:
The need to reach a legal decision to which both parties can agree and the
public can and will abide by, is a good reason to under-communicate uncer-
tainty — if, that is, the court can take for granted that the crime investigation
has assessed this uncertainty and found it sufficiently small for the legal pur-
pose. But ”abduction with incomplete or open induction” is just not suited
for decision-problems where the main aim is justified, accurate, and impar-
tial knowledge and where the consequences of being wrong are serious. To
under-communicate uncertainty in this situation would be to undermine ones
own aim.
Why is it then that crime investigators, if I am correct in suggesting
them similar to the bitemark-experts, choose the above inference strategy?
A possible reason can be that this is the strategy surviving when under
constant influence from jurists, prosecutors, and solicitors (whose attention
is fixed on the trial-phase’s need for consensus and balance) and when not
having the training, time, or resources to tailor their own methodologies.
In this dissertation I thus see neither epistemological nor institutional
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reasons why crime investigative decisions about the relevance of means of
evidence should not be evidence-based according to the standard identified
above. This is also why I in the last part of this dissertation suggest Bayesian
theory and a Bayesian Networks-methodology as a strategy to evidence-base
such decisions. I try to be constructive by suggesting a solution, in the terms
of this methodology, to the bitemark-problem, and by demonstrating how
the reasoning via this methodology and my suggested model would work if
having a bitemark-problem under conditions constructed to be as close as
possible to those of the Torgersen-case.
The Bayesian Networks-methodology is a formal approach, based on basic
rules of logic and probability-calculus, and does thereby insist on a certain
level of precision with respect to the objects it includes or excludes from
its concepts and terms. Indeed, this will involve degrees of reduction and
bias, as Tribe (1971:1361-1366) claims in the argument I denoted by (1e.)
in section 4.3 (Chapter 4) of this dissertation. But this reduction is not
necessarily only to objects measurable via known standards and is not even
exclusive to formal approaches — for is not reduction involved whenever one
tries to capture something via any kind of language? Is an ambiguous term
always more inclusive? Of course not, it may just as well be exclusive —
the ambiguity being just a social, rhetorical, or political means, to either
avoid offending someone or committing to something. Precision is also a
means for something and is, just like ambiguity, neither god nor bad in
itself. It is its use in specific situations which may be good or bad. And
indeed there are of course sworn formalists who will approach reality as
if it was one big Sudoku. But for the majority of the users of a formal
approach, it is just an instrument in the effort to standardise inference and
decision-making in situations where the consequences of wrong decisions to
specified ethical and societal/political values as well as monetary or other
more material values are serious. This is certainly my aim when I suggest
using the Bayesian Inference-methodology to solve the bitemark-problem.
For this kind of problem situation, the ambiguity about the reference-classes
used when assessing the likelihood of a suspected hypothesis can be argued
to be self-destructive: over time causing the public to loose confidence in the
legal system because one prefers not to specify the reference-class already
used when having passed judgement on the probability of a hypothesis.
The two worries about (1) inappropriate reduction and bias by preferring
easily quantifiable aspects and (2) inappropriate choice of reference-classes
are the only two worries expressed by Tribe (1971) which is relevant when
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considering using formal approaches during the investigative phase and for
the subgroups of decisions studied in this dissertation. The other worries are
more relevant for evidence-assessment by a lay-jury during the trial-phase.
And these worries are not difficult, for me at least, to agree on.
Now there is one question left: Say now that a crime investigator sees
some sense in my arguments concerning the need to evidence-base decisions
about the relevance of means of evidence, has a bitemark-problem with con-
ditions approximating those I specified I chapter 10 of this dissertation, but
has no time to review the bitemark-literature and not being familiar with
formal methodologies. What can he/she do? We can of course not just e-
mail him/her the likelihood-ratio or the utility-function. We can do as has
been done in the medical context for years: Suggest a decision-guideline or
a ”best-practice”-procedure in which the conditions involved in a bitemark-
means are specified, and also specify the questions under each condition
which must be informed on by what kind of information from which kind
of sources. The following is a possible sketch of what could be the content
of such a best-practice-guideline for bitemark-problems (this is a sketch and
not an actual guideline).
Core conditions for positively relevant bitemark-means
(one-offender cases)
1. The suspected bitemark must be in category 2, 3 or 4 on Pretty (2006)’s
Bitemark Severity and Significance Index (see Figure 12.1 below);
• The classification can be performed by investigator (Non-experts
(police-officers) participating in the validation-study of the index showed high
inter-examiner reliability.)
2. The suspected bitemark must be diagnosed to most likely have occurred
within the same interval of time as that identified for a control-injury
known to be related to the legally relevant injuries:
• the expert must provide
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(a) the probability of observing two similar profiles if the sus-
pected hypothesis were true ”the suspected bitemark and the control-
injury was made during the same specified time interval);
(b) the probability of observing two similar profiles if the negation
of the suspected hypothesis were to be true (”the suspected
bitemark and the control-injury was not made during the same specified
time interval — i.e. but during an event irrelevant to the crime event);
(c) the medical markers used for the profiling of the two skin-
injuries must be specified in medical terms or terms agreed
on among the forensic examiners;
(d) the joint discriminatory potential of the markers must be in-
formed on: Result from relevant population study is best but
subjective/intersubjective estimate is good enough;
(e) the control-injury must be explicitly justified to have the same
initial conditions as the suspected bitemark;
• The probability under (a) must be greater than the probability
under (b);
• justification for the reference-basis used for expert item (b) (co-
operation necessary due to case-contingent size for time-interval);
• the person with the suspected bitemark must not have been ab-
normally prone to abuse.
3. The suspected bitemark must most likely be a human bitemark:
• the expert must provide
(a) the probability of observing the characteristics used for this
diagnosis if the suspected hypothesis were true (”The suspected
bitemark is a human bitemark”);
(b) the probability of observing the characteristics used for this
diagnosis if the negation of the suspected hypotheses were
true (”The suspected bitemark is not a bitemark but something else —
an animal bitemark, an object with teethlike forms, an internally caused
irregularity”);
(c) the characteristics used for this diagnosis must be specified
in dermatological terms or terms agreed on among forensic
examiners and bitemark-experts;
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(d) the joint discriminatory potential of the characteristics must
be informed on: Result from relevant population study is best
but subjective/intersubjective estimate is good enough;
(e) justification for the reference-basis used for item (b);
• The probability under (a) must be greater than the probability
under (b);
• the person with the suspected bitemark must not have been ab-
normally prone to abuse.
4. The identified suspect’s biting-mechanism must be the most likely cause
of the bitemark:
• the expert must provide
(a) the probability of observing similar profiles if the suspected
hypothesis were true (”The suspect’s biting-mechanism is the cause
of the bitemark”);
(b) the probability of observing similar profiles if the negation
of the suspected hypotheses were true (”The suspect’s biting-
mechanism is not the cause of the bitemark — i.e., someone else’s biting-
mechanism is the cause of the bitemark”);
(c) specification of each of the characteristics constituting both
the two profiles used for this diagnosis: The bitemark’s pro-
file must be specified in dermatological terms; the biting-
mechanism’s profile must be specified in odontological terms
— or terms agreed on among forensic examiners and bitemark-
experts;
(d) estimates of the degree of covariation within and between each
pair of corresponding bitemark- and biting-mechanism char-
acteristics: Results from relevant larger scale studies are best
but subjective/intersubjective estimates are good enough;
(e) estimates of the discriminatory potential of each of the pairs
of characteristics: Result from relevant population study is
best, but subjective/intersubjective estimate is good enough;
(f) justification for the group of individuals selected for items (b)
and (e);
• The probability under (a) must be greater than the probability
under (b).
347
Any one of the numbered conditions failing is reason to decide ”not pos-
itive relevance”.
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1) Very mild bruising, no individual tooth marks present, diffuse 
arches visible, may be caused by something other than teeth – low 
forensic significance 
2) Obvious bruising with individual, discrete areas associated with 
teeth, skin remains intact, moderate forensic significance 
3) Very obvious bruising with small lacerations associated with 
teeth on the most severe aspects of the injury, likely to be assessed 
as definite bitemark, high significance 
4) Numerous areas of laceration, with some bruising, some areas of 
the wound may be incised.  Unlikely to be confused with any other 
injury mechanism and a high forensic significance.  
5) Partial avulsion of tissue, some lacerations present indicating 
teeth as the probable cause of the injury.  Moderate forensic 
significance.   
6) Complete avulsion of tissue, possibly some scalloping of the 
injury margins suggested that teeth may have been responsible for 












Figure 12.1: Bitemark Severity and Significance Index (Pretty 2006).
This guideline is of course just a sketch to indicate the outline of a possi-
ble future bitemark-guideline and is not intended for practical use. A useful
guideline will have to be formulated and authorized in cooperation with crime
investigators, bitemark-experts, and the legal agents being served the infor-
mation thus gathered — to ensure a beneficial contribution of the guideline.
Having suggested this preliminary bitemark-guideline to a crime investigator
with a bitemark-problem I am at the end of this dissertation. I hope to have
contributed in a constructive way, as was the intention, to the discourse on
methodology, inference and inquiry in general and to these concepts as they
are relevant to crime investigation within the legal institution.
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Appendix 1
A brief introduction to the Norwegian legal system
The Norwegian legal system (attention to criminal law and procedure
only) belongs to the civil law-systems, with its attention to codified laws
and theoretical texts more than case-based precedence; with an inquisitorial
trial process rather than an adversarial; with a rather active (professional)
judge with independent adjudicative powers, usually accompanied with non-
expert or expert lay judges (randomly selected), and sometimes with a jury;
and with its preference for the principle of free admittance of evidence with
few codified norms governing the kind of evidence admitted in a criminal
case. The courts are independent of the other branches of the Norwegian
government and are administrated by The National Courts Administration,
the members of which are appointed by the national Assembly and the King-
in-Council. (Wacks 2008, Hov 1999)1
The ordinary courts consist of three instances: The District Court(66)
decides criminal cases by guilty plea or by a mixed panel of professional
and lay judges. Judgements here may be appealed to the next instance, the
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal (6 circuits) hears appeals against
decisions by the District Court, and in case of appeal against the issue of
guilt a jury or a bench of three professional and four lay judges will review
the case (the reasons of the decisions are not given). In cases of sentencing
more than 16 years a jury (10 lay members) hears the case. In 1995 Norway
introduced a two-instance system in which all cases can be tried in both
first and second instance. Before 1995 serious criminal cases were brought
directly before the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court has 19 judges.
Its Appeal Committee assesses a cases eligibility for the Supreme Court. In
criminal cases the Supreme Court hears only appeals against sentencing and
procedure (not guilt). Its decision and reasoning are written and public. 2
Norway is signatory to various international conventions, including the
European Convention of Human Rights and is subject to the European Court
of Human Rights. 3
1http://www.domstol.no/default2916.aspx?epslanguage=EN accessible by June 2010.
2http://www.domstol.no/default2916.aspx?epslanguage=EN accessible by June 2010.
3http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/jd.html?id=463 accessible by June 2010.
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The Norwegian Prosecuting Authority is organised on three levels — The
Director of Public Prosecutions; The Public Prosecutors; and The Prose-
cuting Authority in the Police — and is responsible for the investigation
of criminal cases and for the prosecution of a criminal case if it is decided
—normally by the Prosecuting Authority attached to the police, in more se-
rious case by Public Prosecution in the area of the case or by the Director
of Public Prosecution — that the case should be brought to the court for
trial. The public prosecutor in a given region is responsible for its police
districts (A separate national prosecuting authority exists for the instruction
and supervision of investigation of organised crime and serious crime. The
investigation of such crime is performed by specialised investigative organi-
sations)4
A crime investigation is initiated and led by the polices law-enforcement
personnel who may, but need not have prosecutorial authority. An investi-
gation will be in continual contact with the prosecutorial and general court-
authorities as these have to authorise, and sometimes initiate, a variety of
investigative steps. Any investigation is subject to laws, regulations, and di-
rectives. For example, with respect to investigative strategy The Norwegian
Criminal Procedure Act (1981/2006), Section 226, states that
The purpose of an investigation is to obtain the necessary information
a) for deciding whether an indictment should be preferred
b) to serve as preparation for the courts trial of the issue of guilt and any
issue concerning the determination of a sanction, and
c) to prevent or stop criminal acts
d) in order to execute sentences and other sanctions, and
e) to serve as a preparation for the child welfare service to deal with the issue
of whether measures shall be instituted pursuant to Act 17. July 1992 No.
100 relating to child welfare services.
The provisions of chapter 13 apply to social inquiry and mental observa-
tion
If a specific person is under suspicion, the investigation shall seek to
clarify both the evidence against him and the evidence in his favour.
The investigation shall be carried out as quickly as possible and in such
a way that no one is unnecessarily exposed to suspicion or inconvenience.
Forensic scientific resources: The investigator in charge of a criminal
investigation has access to permanent forensic technicians, who are police-
college educated and specialised on fingerprints, crime scene photography,
4http://www.riksadvokaten.no/ra/ra.php?infoid=12
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etc. or university or college educated chemists, engineers, etc., and forensic
medicine personnel, who are university educated geneticists, pathologists, bi-
ologists, etc. According to need the investigator may request external expert-
assistance — such as forensic dentists. The case-specific appointment, use,
and performance of external scientific expertise are regulated by law (The
Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act 1981/2006: Chapters 10 and 11).
The legal status of scientific experts may vary: A court-appointed expert
is expected to work impartially, to assist the court and must produce a writ-
ten report which by law needs to be accredited by The Board of Forensic
Medicine (se below). An expert is obliged to assist if appointed by the court,
is obliged to testify in court; must attest to being conscious of his or her re-
sponsibility, and has expenses covered by the court. Usually only one expert
is appointed on given issues and both parties must agree to the choice. An
expert witness is appointed and paid by one of the parties to serve his/her
needs and need not produce written statements accredited by the Board of
Forensic Medicine. This experts legal status is similar to that of an ordinary
witness.
Internal and external quality control of forensic technical and
scientific resources in Norway: By 2001 only the Division of Forensic Tox-
icology and Drug Abuse at Institute of Public Health Norwegian had been
accredited to ISO-standard (see internet site below). The other institutes,
laboratories, or individual expert disciplines employed for forensic investi-
gation had no such accreditation/certification by any external body. No
external formal criteria existed for their services and the institutes, labora-
tories, or subject disciplines had not formalised internal criteria. Yet there
existed an assessment mechanism by the existence of The Norwegian Board
of Forensic Medicine. This Board accredited the work of court appointed ex-
perts (medical or other) in given cases, was regularly consulted in particular
issues or cases by the court, and stayed in close contact with and arranged
courses and seminars for experts, investigators, lawyers and judges. This
Board thus had a certain normative power balancing the lack of regular and
standardised accreditation, an authority which was secured in section 146 in
The Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act (1981/2006). The Board is national




The Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission was estab-
lished as an independent legal body in 2004. The Review Commission is not
an ordinary legal body — it may not itself produce legally enforceable deci-
sions in given cases, but, if reopening is decided, the commission will refer
the case back for retrial at the same court-level it was last decided. Only if
new circumstances, new evidence, or other conditions (as defined in Sections
390-393 of the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act) have come into existence
since the last court decision can the Commission decide to reopen the case
by sending it back to court for retrial. (The Norwegian Criminal Procedure
Act 1981/2006, http://www.gjenopptakelse.no/index.php?id=30, accessible
by June 2010))
The Review Commission assessed Torgersen and his counsellors motion
for review with respect to the following two sections of the Norwegian Crim-
inal Procedure Act:
Section 391
In favour [note 1: See Section 390, first part, relate to section 393.] of
the person charged reopening of a case may be required:
1) when [note 2: See Section 393 first part, nr.1.] a judge, member of
the jury, keeper of the records, police officer, or official in the prosecut-
ing authority, prosecutor, defence counsel, expert or court interpreter
has been guilty of a criminal offence in relation to the case, or a wit-
ness has given false evidence in the case, or a document that has been
used in the case is false or forged, and it cannot be excluded that this
affected the judgement to the detriment of the person charged,[note
3: Compare to Dispute Act Section 407 nr.1 to nr.3.]
2) when an international court or UN human rights committee has in
a case against Norway found that[note 4: Compare to Dispute Act
Section 407 nr.7.]
a) the decision conflicts with a rule of international law that is binding
on Norway, and it must be assumed that a new hearing should lead
to a different decision, or
b) the procedure on which the decision is based conflicts with a rule
of international law that is binding on Norway if there is reason to
assume that the procedural error may have influence the substance of
the decision, and that a reopening of the case is necessary in order to
remedy the harm that the error has caused,
3) when a new circumstance is revealed or new evidence is produced
which seems likely to lead to an acquittal or summary dismissal of
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the case or to the application of a more lenient penal provision or a
substantially more lenient sanction. In a case in which a custodial
sentence, committal to compulsory mental health care pursuant to
section 39 of the Penal Code, compulsory care pursuant to section 39
a of the Penal Code or loss of civil rights[note 5: Relate to Penal Code
Section 29. ] is not imposed, new information or evidence that the
person concerned should have presented at an earlier stage may not
be produced. [note 5: Relate to Sections 390 and 392. ]
Section 392.
Even though the conditions prescribed in 390 or 391 are not fulfilled,
the court may order the case to be reopened in favour of the person
charged when the Supreme Court has departed from a legal interpre-
tation that it has obviously adopted and on which the judgement is
based.
The same applies when special circumstances make it doubtful
whether the judgement is correct, and weighty considerations indicate
that the question of guilt of the person charged should be tried anew.
(The Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act 1981/2006)
The following links may provide more information:
The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police: www.regjeringen.no;
Lovdata: www.lovdata.no; an institution initiated by the Norwegian Min-
istry of Justice and the Law Faculty at University of Oslo for the pur-
pose of establishing and managing systems of legal information. Its
internet site contains the primary legal sources regulating the Norwe-
gian citizens’ rights and obligations. The information is free of charge
and contains statutes, central and local administrative regulations, and
the more recent decision by the Supreme Court and the Court of Ap-
peal;
The National Courts Administration: www.domstol.no
The Norwegian Higher Prosecuting Authority: www.riksadvokaten.no;
The Norwegian Police: www.politi.no
Norwegian Criminal Case Review Commission: www.gjenopptakelse.no
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The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine: www.justissekretariatene.no
The Institute of Forensic Medicine: www.med.uio.no/rmi/; this insti-
tute is a unit of the medical faculty of University of Oslo. In addition
to regular university functions the institute serves the police and the
Courts, mainly on forensic genetics and forensic pathology.
The Norwegian Institute of Public Health: www.fhi.no; the Insitute’s
Division of Forensic Toxicology and Drug Abuse is the main unit
assisting the police and the courts concerning the analysis and interpre-
tation of biological samples’ with respect to alcohol, drugs (medicinal
and illegal) and toxic agents in legal cases.
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Appendix 2
Forensic odontologist F. Stroems written report on
the bitemark in the Torgersen-case
(The report is translated by the author of this dissertation)
Dentist Ferdinand Strm
Regular Forensic Dentist
Teacher in forensic dentistry,
School of Odontology, Oslo
28.April 1958
To Oslo Court of Preliminary Hearings
Report
Bitemark examination of the murdered Rigmor Johnsen [date of birth].6.
At 09.00am, 7-12.1957, I was called on the phone by Professor G
Waler [the forensic medical examiner on duty] who informed that a 16
years old girl was found killed and that the body had been transported
to the Institute of Forensic Medicine (IFM). A bitemark appeared
visible on one of the victims breasts, and he asked for my assistant
examination of the body. I arrived at IMF 09.30am. The medical
examination had not yet been initiated, and the body was in the
position shown on figure 1. [Figure 1. missing from Excerpts].
I could immediately conclude the explicit presence of marks from
biting in the left breast, 3 of the marks were from the upper jaw and
3 to 4 from the lower jaw. It must be assumed that it was the front
and right side teeth that had been operant in the biting.
[. . . ]
The breast was photographed in natural scale. Figure 2 [figure 2.
is missing from excerpts]. The bitemarks were numbered 1 to 7, as
I started from the upper left and went right and round. See Figure
6The photographic documentation cited in Stroem 1958, is, as it is represented in the
Excepts, either missing or is of such poor quality that it is omitted. Only the photograph
of the anomaly on RJs left breast taken by either Stroem or the medical examiner at the
time of examination and Ts set of teeth at the time of examination is included
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3. [Figure 3. is present in Excerpts, but poorly represented a hand
drawing]
The picture in Figure 4. is by an enlarged scale [Figure 4 is miss-
ing from Exerpts].
Bitemark nr.1 Biting through the skin, upper jaw
Bitemark nr.2 Biting through the skin, upper jaw
Bitemark nr.3 Biting through the skin, upper jaw
Bitemark nr.4 Biting through the skin, lower jaw
Bitemark nr.5 Biting through the skin lower jaw
Bitemark nr.6 Impression, no blood assembled under the mark, lower
jaw
Bitemark nr.7 Possible impression, no blood assembled under the
mark, lower
Bleeding from the bite-wounds could not be seen, not blood-assembling
under the marks either.
A plaster-imprint was taken of the breast. Figures 5 and 6 show
photographs of this imprint, of bitemarks from the upper jaw and the
lower jaw respectively. Figure 7 shows a picture of the two pictures
mounted so as to represent the position of the bitemarks as they ap-
pear on the plaster impression. The three pictures are enlarged 2,5
times.
During my analysis the 7-12-57 I expressed to Police Constable
Haukenaes that the one who performed this biting must have severely
worn teeth in the lower jaw. After having made the plaster impression,
the breast was cut off from the body and put in preserving liquid.
The same day, 7-12-57, at 14.30pm, I went with PC Haukenaes
to [the police station where F.F. Torgersen [FT] was kept] in order to
take an impression of the teeth of [FT]. I talked to the suspect and
noticed that his right front tooth had had a corner broken off. I asked
when this had happened. He answered that it happened several years
ago. The suspect did not want to provide an imprint without a lawyer
present.
I tried again Wednesday 12-12-1957, but he still would not provide
an imprint.
Being requested by the Oslo Court of Preliminary Hearing and by
the Oslo Police, I went to Bodsfengslet [prison in Oslo] to examine Jon
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Roger Langbraatens [L] teeth. He bit into plastelin and an imprint
of his teeth was made. Report was sent to Oslo Police 26. March
1958. Figure 8 and 9 [both present in Excerpts, but omitted] shows
models of his teeth made, respectively, from the plastelin-imprint and
the imprint made of his full set of teeth. Figure 10 [both present in
Excerpts, but omitted] shows a photography of the plastelin-imprint
My conclusion from this examination is:
After a very thorough analysis of this material compared to with
the material of the bitemarks in the murdered RJs left breast, I find
the deviations to be so extensive that I with certainty can exclude [L]
as the one who performed this bite.
12-4-58 I was requested by Judge Koren to, together with him and
[FT]s lawyer, to meet with the accused. The accused was now willing
to provide an imprint on the condition that if I was not able to exclude
him a second dental expert should be appointed. This was agreed. 14-
4-58 I made an imprint of his teeth and let him bite into plastelin. He
was helpful, and I got the best imprints. Models were made from both
the imprint of the whole set of teeth, figure 11, and from the imprints
in plastelin, fig 12 [present in Excerpts, but omitted]. Fig.13 and 14
[both present in Excerpts, but omitted] shows a photo of the imprint
in plastelin, from the upper jaw and the lower jaw respectively.
From the models Fig.11 [present in Excerpts, but omitted] it is
visible that the suspect has a so-called edge to edge bite, i.e. that
the front teeth, when occluded, meet at the cutting edges. This is a
deviation from the ordinary norm of upper jaw front teeth more or
less covering the lower jaw front teeth.
Due to this peculiar positioning of the teeth the, cutting edges of
the teeth have characteristic furrows, both in the upper jaws middle
front teeth and in the lower jaws middle front teeth, especially explicit
in the front middle teeth. The corner of upper jaws right mid front
tooth - the corner closest to the side front tooth is broken off, and
the corners of the lower jaws middle front teeth is, due to wear and
splintering, less characteristic.
The suspect has good regularly positioned teeth, but due to the
peculiar positioning of the set of teeth, the edge to edge bite, he has,
as mentioned, acquired characteristic furrows in the front teeth, in
addition to the upper jaws middle front tooth having a defect corner
that is visible from the outside. The same is the case for the lower jaws
middle front tooth where the corner nearest to the midline is defect,
also visible from the outside, and a space in the midline in the cutting
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edge is thus occurring. A set of teeth such as that of the suspect with
an assembly of characteristics should thus be particularly suitable for
identification.
On the murdered we found, as mentioned, several marks, we see
thus explicit marks from two upper jaw middle front teeth and im-
pressions of two lower jaw front teeth. The bite performed is not done
in order to bite off a piece, but is a so called pleasure bite, combined
with sucking on the nipple of the breast. Due to the ball-shaped form
and the plasticity of the skin of the breast a bitemark here will appear
differently than that made into an apple. We do not know the posi-
tion of the part of the breast that was bitten relative to the teeth-rows
during the biting.
Another thing is that it does not make much sense to measure
the lengths of the bite marks in human skin, as the elastic fibres of
the skin will contract the marks when biting stops and as the vaulted
form of the breast makes it difficult to produce a measurement that
is comparable to the suspects teeth.
In these bites it will therefore be studied whether the characteris-
tics found in the teeth of the suspect can be found in the bitemarks
of the breast.
Suspect [FT]s teeth has, as mentioned, a series of characteristics
in the cutting edges of both the upper and lower jaws middle front
teeth. These characteristics are to be found also in the bitemarks.
Bitemark nr.1 represents the furrow in the cutting edge of upper
jaws left middle front tooth.
Bitemark nr.2 represents 2/3rd of the cutting edge of upper jaws
right middle front tooth (the part towards the midline), and
shows clearly the jagged front cutting edge. The part away from
the midline is not bitten into the skin because it is broken off.
Bitemark nr.3 must be from the right side front tooth, but has, as
the tooth itself, no characteristics and is only partly recognised.
Bitemark nr.4 must be from the lower jaws right canine tooth but
is without characteristics, as is the tooth itself.
Bitemark nr.5 is from right middle front tooth and is re-presented
with all characteristics. Especially explicit is the cob [/flask/spadix]
shaped extension in the furrow.
Bitemark nr.6 is from the left middle front tooth and re-presents
all the tooths characteristics, especially prominent is the straight
furrow.
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The space between the two middle front teeths cutting edges in the
lower jaw of [FT] (earlier mentioned), is clearly present in the
bitemark.
Stereoscopic images for comparing the bitemarks and the cutting
edges of [FT]s teeths are made, Fig.15,16,17, and 18 [all present in
Excerpts, but omitted].
Conclusion. An odontological examination of a bitemark-trace
compared with the suspects teeth will, if there do not exist accordance
[/agreement/similarity], imply absolute acquittal for the suspect. Dif-
ferently if existence of accordance [/agreement/similarity]. In this case
there will always be judgements and there should be exhibited care, if
there are no details that are judged to be particularly characteristic.
The teeth of suspect [FT] have a series of particular characteristics
that without exception is to be found re-presented in the bite-traces
of the murdered. From a scientific point of view it is my opinion that
it is predominantly probable that the bitemark in RJs breast is from
the suspect [FT].
Based on my personal experience, well informed about my respon-
sibility, I assess the bitemark in the breast of the murdered to be
identical [Stroms underlining] to the teeth of the suspect [FT].
[Stroms signature] Ferdinand Strom
P.S. I have also taken imprint in plastelin of Svein Erik Johansen




Published literature on bitemark analysis
1976-2008.
This appendix contains the collection of papers and books on forensic
bitemark analysis published through international scientific journals. The
main and basic procedure for retrieving the items was by using Metalib of the
Library Services of the University College of London (UCL): All the possible
spelling combinations of bitemark and teethmark, including singular/plural
(bite(s), bitemark(s), bite mark(s), bite-mark(s), etc.). was used. The only
condition specified was that of year of publication (from 1970 through 2008).
The search was not conditioned by discipline as bitemark-analysis by nature
extends into several disciplines. The resulting collection was then subjected
to a hand search for items somehow slipping trough the main search. A
third procedure consisted in consulting the literature identified by the main
organisations representing regional or international forensic odontologists.
The final collection of items was made by removing any item not belonging to
the following class of objects: Forensic analysis and diagnosis of bitemarks by
human teeth on human skin. Membership was of course not always clear cut:
Some items mention bitemarks only as relevant for a non-bitemark question;
some were felt should have been considered too a-analytical for publication in
a scientific journal — by being descriptive in a more or less ad-hoc fashion or
by being singularly praising or denouncing bitemark-analysis or some aspect
of it.
This final class of papers or books is considered to be an as complete as
possible class with respect to being relevant for the questions asked in this
dissertation.
The concepts used for classification of the papers:
Evidence-based: A study (1) of a specified delimited empirically testable hypothesis;
by (2) ordered observable information (not necessary numerical) on specified char-
acteristics; through (3a) an identified, specified, ethically justified/justifiable and
understandable7 technical procedure (enabling independent repetition of experi-
ment) (3b) an identified or identifiable inference methodology which enable(d) an
7Understandable to those having the same kind or level of training as the author of the
experiment — who might want to repeat the experiment.
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assessment of the likelihoods (not necessary numerical) of the hypothesis possibili-
ties; and (4) including an assessment of the bias, or its effects on representational
ability, involved by the specification of the hypothesis, the sampling procedure, or
the technical procedure of the experiment;
Descriptive/normative A study which either (a) aims to be creative, constructive,
informative, introductory or critical and have no intention to systematically justify
or test the truth/likelihood of a delimited hypothesis, or (b) aims or claims to have
tested hypothesis but fails satisfying the above definition of ”experiment”;
Case-study: A study describing the characteristics and conditions of a particular
bitemark-case or a particular instrument/material/technique used in bitemark-
analysis;
Historical or Review: A study describing the development of a phenomenon over time;
and
Legal case: A description of a bitemark-case legally processed in some jurisdiction.
392 studies were retrieved through the searching procedure.
1976
MacDonald, D.G., Laird, W.R., (1976) Bitemarks in Murder case Int J Forensic Dent:
3(10) 26-30
(Case-study; population-comments)
Vale G. L. Sognnaes R. F., Felando G. N., Noguchi T, (1976) Unusual three dimensional
bite mark evidence in a homicide case. J. Forensic Sci. Vol. 21:642-652
(Case-study)
Sognnaes, R. F. (1976) Dental science as evidence in court Int J Forensic Dent1976;
3(9):14-6
(Case-study, court-presentation)
Anderson W. R., Hudson R. P., (1976) Self inflicted bite marks in battered child syndrome
Forensic Sci. 1976; Vol. 7: 71 - 74
(Case-study; victim’s biting-mechanism into biter population)
Bang G., (1976) Analysis of tooth marks in a homicide case. Observations by means
of description, stereophotography, SEM and stereometric graphic plotting Acta
Odontol. Scand. 1976; 34: 1-11
(Case-study, instrument (Scanning electron microscopy))
Rawson, (1976) Solarisation as an aid to bite-mark analysis. Int. J. Forensic Dent. Vol.
3. Page 31
(Descriptive, Instrument (Solarisation), BMA-general)
Goodbody, R.A. (1976) Turner, C.H., Turner, J.L. The Differentiation of Toothed Marks:
Report of a Case of Special Interest Med Sci Law 1976; 16(1): 44-8
(Case-study, Initial differential diagnosis)
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Farr, ? (1976) Bite Mark Crucial in Murder Verdict L.A. Times, 1976, Nov. 4, pt. 2, at
3, col. 1.
(Newspaper, comment on case, People v. Slone trial in California)
People v. Milone 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976)
(Legal case)
1977
Luntz, L. (1977) History of Forensic Dentistry Dental Clinics of North America 1977;
21:7-17
(History of BMA)
Christensen, M.S., Hargen, C.W., Nact, S., Gans, E.H. (1977) Viscoelastic Properties of
Intact Human Skin: Instrumentation, Hydration Effects, and the Contribution of
the Stratum Corneum J. Invest Dermatol 1977; 69: 282-286
(Descriptive, skin-properties general, not bma-related)
Sognnaes, R.F. (1977) The case for better bite and bitemark preservations Int J Forensic
Dent 1977 4(13):17-20
(Descriptive/normative, on preservation/representation of )
Sognnaes RF., (1977) Battered child death involving enigmatic bitemark evidence. J Cal
Dent Assoc 4:22-8
(Case-study)
Sognnaes RF., (1977) Forensic stomatology. Three part series. New Eng J Med 296(4):79-
85
(Descriptive, general forensic odontology)
Standish, S.M., Stimson, P.G. (eds) (1977) Proceedings The dental Clinics of North
America - Symposium on Forensic Dentistry: Legal Obligations and Methods of
Identification for the Practitioner. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1977
(Descriptive, general forensic odontology)
Levine, L.J. (1977) Bite Mark Evidence In Standish, S.M., Stimson, P.G. (eds) (1977)
Proceedings The dental Clinics of North America - Symposium on Forensic Den-
tistry Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company
(Descriptive, general forensic bitemark-analysis)
Keiser-Nielsen, S., (1977) Dental Identification: Certainty v. probability. Forensic Sci.
1977; Vol. 9: 87 - 97
(descriptive/normative, forensic inference methodology (discriminatory power of
markers and sufficient markers for exclusion/inclusion))
Woolridge, E.D. Legal Aspects of Forensic Medicine and Dentistry Dent Clin North Am
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(Descriptive, characteristic (bacteria-presence) of skin, diagnosing human or ani-
mal)
Rawson, (1978) Transillumination and image intensification in bite mark investigations.
Paper for the Acad of Forensic Science, St. Louis. 1978
(Descriptive, instrument (transilumination) for bitemarks on skin)
Sognnaes RF., (1978) Forensic oral measurements Dental Survey1978:54(12): 12-24
(Descriptive, characteristics of biting-mechanism, general (not related to
bma))
Moenssens, A., Inbau, F., Starrs, J. Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases Mineola, NT
Foundation Press 1978:746-57
(Descriptive, reliability of BMA, legal needs USA)
DeVore, V. (1978) How to Use Forensic Dentistry Maryland Law Forum 1978: 128, 166-
169
(Descriptive/normative, AAFS,ABFO criteria for training, experience, remains-
identification and biter-identification)
People v. Sloan 76 Cal. App. 3d 611 at 625, 143 Cal Rptr. 61 (1978)
(Legal case)
State v. Garrison 120 Arz. 255, 585 P.2d 563, 1978
(Legal case)
1979
Sognnaes, R.F. (1979) Forensic Oral Measurements Dental Survey 1979; 54(12); 12-24
(Unknown, characteristics of teeth, general (not bma-related))
Sognnaes, R.F. (1979) Forensic Bite Mark Measurements Dental Survey 1979;55(April):
34-47
(Unknown, characteristics of teeth, general (not bma-related))
MacDonald, D.G. (1979) Bite Marks, Recognition and Interpretation J. Forensic Science
1979; 14: 229
(Descriptive, general bma)
Daly, C.H., Odland, G.F. (1979) Age Related Changes in the Mechanical Properties of
Human Skin J. Invest. Dermatology 1979; 73: 84-7
(Descriptive, characteristics of skin, general (not bma-related))
Dixon, P.H. (1979) Recent Developments. Evidence - Admissibility of Evidence - Frye
Standard of ”general acceptance” for admissibility of scientific evidence rejected in
favour of balancing test. Cornell Law Review, 1978-1979;64:875-885
(Descriptive, Case-study (United states v. Williams, 1978/1979), legal needs, reli-
ability BMA (FRYE-standard))
374
Marr, J.S., Beck, A.M., Lugo, J.A. (1979) An Epidemiologic Study of the Human Bite
Public Health Reports 1979;94(6,November):514-521
(Epidemiologic (occurrence of bitemarks New York Health Districts))
Rawson, (1979) Computerized study of bite mark characteristics in the general popula-
tion. ADA News 1979:10: 3
(Descriptive, instrument (computer-software) characteristics of
bitemarks on skin)
Rawson, R. D., Bell, A., Kinard, B.S., Kinard, J. G., (1979) Radiographic interpretation
of contrast media-enhanced bite marks. J. Forensic Sci. 1979:24: 898 - 901
(Descriptive, instrument (radiography/contrast-media), characteristics of bitemarks
on human skin)
Morrison HL., (1979) Psychiatric observations and interpretations of bite mark evidence
in multiple murders J Forens Sci 1979; 24(2):492-502
(Descriptive, motive for biting behaviour)
Beckstead, J. W., Rawson, R. D., Giles, W., (1979) Review of bite mark evidence Journal
of American Dental Association 1979;99(1):69-74
(Descriptive, review of published BMA-knowledge)
People v. Beil 76 Ill. App. 3d 924, 395 N.E. 2d 400 (1979)
(Legal case)
South Carolina v. Jones 259 S.E. 2nd 123, 1979
(Legal case)
United states v. Martin 9 M.J. 731 (NCMR 1979)
(Legal case)
1980
Glass R.T., Andrews E. E., Jones K. D., (1980) Bite mark evidence - a case report using
accepted and new techniques J. Forensic Sci. 1980: 25: 638 - 645
(Case-study, instruments/materials, characteristics of skinmark and
biting-mechanism)
Woolridge, E. D. (1980) Forensic Dentistry NCJ 068927 (in Eckert, W.G. (1980) Intro-
duction to Forensic Science 1980:114-154, NCJ-71044
(Descriptive, forensic odontology general (inc. BMA))
Siegel,R., Sperber, N. (1980) Forensic Odontology Workbook
(Descriptive, BMA-introduction/manual)
Dawson, J.B., Barker, D.J., Ellis, D.J., et al (1980) A Theoretical and Experimental
Study of Light Absorption and Scattering by in Vivo Skin Phys Med Biol 1980; 25:
695-709
(Experiment, instrument (light), for detecting characteristics of skinmarks (not
bma-related)
375
Dorion R. B. J., Siegel R., Sperber N., (ed)., (1980) Impressions of Bite Site - Bite Mark
Impressions on Human Tissues. Forensic odontology work book Am. Soc. Forensic
Odon. 1980
(Descriptive, instruments/material for preserving/representing
skinmarks)
Holt JK., (1980) Identification from bitemarks J Forensic Sci Soc 1980:20(4): 243-6
(Descriptive, instrument/material, inference method bma-related)
Luntz, L.L., Luntz, P. (1980) Landmark Decision Involving a Bite Mark The New Dentist
1980;11(3, Nov.):31-34
(Case-study, reliability of BMA)
Raekallio, J. (1980) Estimation of Time in Forensic Biology and Pathology Am. J.
Forensic Med. Pathol. 1980; 1: 213-218
(Experiment, characteristics (biochemical) of skinmarks, age-estimation of skin-
injuries + review of older markers)
Raekallio, J. (1980) Histological Estimation of Age of Injuries. In Perper, J.A., Wecht,
C.H. (eds) Microscopic Diagnosis in Forensic Pathology Springfield, Illinois: Charles
C. Thomas, 1980: 3-16
(Review of age-estimation of skinmark)
Souviron, R.R. (1980) The Growing Importance of Bite Marks in Forensic Odontology
The New Dentist, 1980; 11(3, Nov.): 18-19
(Descriptive, BMA general)
State of Nevada v Jaime Aguilar 7th Judicial District, No 553-B-1980
(Legal case)
1981
Furness J., (1981) A general review of bitemark evidence Am J Forensic Med Pathol
1981: 2(1):49-52
(Review of bitemark-analysis)
Sperber ND, Lubin H., (1981) Bite mark evidence in crimes against persons J Am Col
Health Association 1981: 29(4):165-7
(Descriptive, BMA-general)
Jakobsen J. R., Keiser-Nielsen S., (1981) Bite mark lesions in the human skin For. Sci.
Int. 1981;18:41-45
(Case, conceptualisation in bitemark-analysis, causal mechanism, differential diag-
nosis)
Dorion, R.B.J. (1981) Preliminary Research on the Preservation of Traumatic Injury
Patterns Can Soc Forens Sci., Hamilton ON, 1981:?
(Descriptive, preserving/representing skinmarks)
376
Rawson, R.D., Kinard,G., Omen, R.K., Johnson, J. (1981) Computerised bite mark anal-
ysis American Academy of Forensic Sciences Annual Meeting, Odontology Section,
Los Angeles California, 1981
(Descriptive, instrument (computer-sofware), (bma-related))
Duguid, R., McKay, G.S. (1981) Bite Length Measurements and Tooth-to-Arch Relation-
ships Obtained from Dental Casts using an X, Y-Digitiser and Computer Journal
of the Forensic Science Society 1981;21(3, July): 211-223
(Experiment, instrument (computer-software) for observing characteristics
(bitemark-length) of bitemarks on unknown material made by biting-mechanism
(casts) with known characteristics (tooth to arch relationships))
Herschaft, E. et al (1981) Techniques of Bite Mark Evidence-gathering
(Descriptive, introduction/manual, bma-related)
Sperber, N. D. (1981) Forensic Odontology (NCJ 088842) P 721-754, 1981, In Edward J
Imwinkelried, ed. (1981) Scientific and Expert Evidence (721-754), Second edition
NCJ-88831
(Descriptive, introduction/manual, general forensic odontology)
Ciesco, J.N., Malone, W. F. P., Sandrik, J.L. Mazur, B (1981) Comparison of Elasto-
metric Impression materials Used in Fixed Prosthodontics Journal of Prosthetic
Dentistry 1981;45:89-94
(Descriptive, material for preserving/representing teeth/biting- mechanism, odon-
tology general, (not bma-related))
Lacy, A.M., Bellmann, T., Fukul, H., Jendersen, M.D. (1981) Time Dependent Accuracy
of Elastomer Impression materials, Part I:Condensation Silicones Journal of Pros-
thetic Dentistry 1981;45:209-215
(Experiment, reliability of material for preserving/representing
biting-mechanism, odontology general, (not bma-related))
Dorion, R.B.J. (1982) Preliminary Research on the Preservation of Traumatic Injury
Patterns AAFS, Orlando FL, Feb. 1982
(Descriptive, preserving/representing skinmarks)
Sobel, M.N. (1981) Forensic Odontology (NCJ 091472) In Cyril H Wecht, ed. Forensic
Sciences Chapter 28, 1981, - See NCJ-91467)
(Descriptive, introduction/manual on remains-id and bma)
Hempling, S.M. (1981) The Application of Ultraviolet Photography in Clinical Forensic
Medicine Medicine, Science, and Law 1981; 21(3): 215-322
(Descriptive, instrument (UV-photography) general forensic (not bma-related))
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(connective tissue)
379
J M Adcock, J.M. (1983) Use of Bite Mark Evidence NCJ 089510 Detective 1983:10(1):6-
13
(Descriptive, introduction/manual bma)
Irons. F. Steuterman, M.C., Brinkhous, W. (1983) Two Bitemarks on assailant. Primary
link to homicide conviction Am J Forensic Med Pathol 1983;4(2, June):177-80
(Case-study, conceptualisation (distortion), characteristics of bitemarks
biting-mechanism, biter-population, )
Levine, L. J. (1983) Forensic Odontology NCJ 095059, in Lipskin, B.A., Field, K.R.
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ity
Bernstein, M. L. (1986) Testing the bite mark J Am Dent Assoc, 1986:112(6): 806.
(Descriptive, reliability of bma)
Vale, G.L. (1986) Bite mark evidence in the investigation of crime CDA J (California
Dental Association Journal) 1986:14(3):36-42
(Descriptive, general bma)
Wagner, G.N. (1986) Bitemark identification in child abuse cases Pediatr Dent 1986: 8
(May, 1 Special): 96-100
(Descriptive, introduction/manual for bma)
383
Wade v. State 490 N.E. 2d 1097 Ind. (1986)
(Legal case)
State v. Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d 224 at 228, n.2, 397 N.W. 2d 136 (1986)
(Legal case)
People v. Marsh, 409 Mich. 110 at 111; 293 N.W. 2d 588 (year unknown)
(Legal case)
1987
Warnick AJ, Biedrzycki L, Russanow G., (1987) Not all bite marks are associated with
abuse, sexual activities, or homicides: a case study of a self-inflicted bitemark J
Forensic Sci 1987;32(3):788-92
(Case-study, victim into the biter-population)
Dorion, R.B.J. (1987) Transillumination in bite mark evidence J Forens sci 1987;32(3):690-
7
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Dailey, J. C. (1991) A Practical Technique for the Fabrication of Transparent Bite Mark
Overlays J For Sci , 1991; 36:565-570
389
(Description, instrument (standard photocopying machine) for proding instrument
(transparent overlay) for observing characteristics (profile or contour-markers) of
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Barry, L. A. (1994) Bite mark evidence collection in the United States Bull Hist Dent
1994: 42(1):21-7
(Descriptive, partial review)
Nuckles, D. B., Herschaft, E. E., Whatmough, L. N. (1994) Forensic odontology in solving
crimes: dental techniques and bite-mark evidence General Dentistry 1994:42(3):210-
4
(Descriptive, review, introductory/manual, BMA-general)
Rothwell, B. R. (1994) Bite marks in forensic odontology: Fact or Fiction, in Worthing-
ton, P., Evans, J.R. (ed) (1994): Controversies in Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery,
Philadelphia: WB Saunders, 588-600
(Descriptive, review, introductory/manual, BMA-general)
French, G. M., Johnson, C. F. (1994) Bites in the night: Determining the etiology of bite
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(Case-study)
David, T. J. (1994) Recapturing a Five-Month-Old Bite Mark by Means of Reflective
Ultraviolet Photography Journal of Forensic Sciences 1994; 39(6) November: 1560-
1567
(Case-study, instrument (RUV-photo) for observing characteristic (unspecified) of
skinmark for diagnosing presence of skinmark after five months)
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Appendix 4 Denotation
Denotation of propositions relevant to the Torgersen-case:
PC: The suspect Torgersen is the causal agent of the victim’s lethal/rape
injuries which occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata 6b,
Oslo?
BM : Torgersen is the causal agent of the bitemark observed on the left breast
of the victim which occurred between 11.00 and 11.30 in Skippergata
6b, Oslo?
BM1: Torgersen’s teeth/biting-mechanism is the causal object of the
bitemark?
BM1.1: Torgersen’s teeth/biting mechanism’s state on bitemark-index1 is to
a sufficient degree compatible with the bitemark’s state on bitemark-
index2?
BM1.11: T’s teeth’s state on bitemark-index1 is bmi1?
BM1.12: The bitemark’s state on bitemark-index2 is bmi2?
BM2: The bitemark occurred simultaneously with the lethal and the rape
injuries?
BM2.1: The bitemark’s state on the time-index is equal to the lethal/rape
injuries’ state on the time-index?
BM2.11: The lethal/rape injuries’ state on the time index is t1?
BM2.12: The bitemark’s state on the time-index is t1?
Denotation of propositions generally relevant to bitemark-means:
PC: The suspect (S = s) is the causal agent of the victim (V = v)’s legal
injuries (LI = li) which occurred at time (T = t) at place (PL = pl);
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BM : s is the causal agent of the bitemark (crimemark (CM = cm)) which
occurred at time (t) at place (pl);
BM1: s’ teeth/biting-mechanism (suspected mechanism (SM = sm)) is the
causal object of the cm?
BM1.1: sm’s state on bitemark-index1 (BMI1 = bmi1sm) is to a suffi-
cient degree compatible with the CM = cm’s state on bitemark-index2
(BMI2 = bmi2)?
BM1.11: BMI1 = bmi1sm?
BM1.12: BMI2 = bmi2cm?
BM2: The CM = cm occurred simultaneously with the lethal and the rape
injuries (LI = li)?
BM2.1: CM = cm’s state on the time-index (TI = tcm) is equal to LI = li
state on the time-index (TI = tli)?
BM2.11: TI = tli?
BM2.12: TI = tcm?
Denotation of persons, injuries, and other objects generally rele-
vant to bitemark-means:
S = s: A particular individual suspected of being the causal agent of a par-
ticular legal injury.
V = v: A particular individual being the victim of the particular legal injury.
LI = li: A particular legally relevant injury.
T = t: A particular time interval determined for the legally relevant injury.
PL = pl: A particular place determined for the legally relevant injury.
CM = cm: A particular observable item (in our case, a bitemark) suspected
of being an effect of the global causal mechanism which produced the
particular legal injury.
433
SM = sm: A particular observable item (in our case, a teeth/biting-
mechanism) suspected of being the object which directly caused the
bitemark (cm).
BMI1: The index of characteristics used to classify teeth/biting-mechanisms
(sms) in given bitemark-situations.
BMI1 = bmi1sm: The particular BMI1-configuration or -profile observed
of a particular teeth/biting-mechanism (sm).
BMI2: The index of characteristics used to classify bitemarks (cms) in given
bitemark situations.
BMI2 = bmi2sm: The particular BMI2-configuration or -profile observed
of a particular bitemark on human skin (cm).
TI: The index of characteristics used to determine the time of occurrence of
skin injuries.
TI = tili: The particular TI-configuration or -profile observed of a particular
legally relevant injury (li).
TI = ticm: The particular TI-configuration or -profile observed of a partic-
ular bitemark (cm).
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